

Scope without Syntax

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- Scope is highly sensitive to linear order. Minimalist syntacticians either have to deny this or model it as a crazy coincidence (Antisymmetry, or see works like Collins (2017)).
- Scope is *highly* dependent on context (Chomsky's Aphasia).

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- **YET**, there’s a tendency for some linguists to talk about the notation of formal logic as if it’s somehow psychologically real.
 - We physically move quantifiers in our derivations to get the right “logical form”.
 - Linguistics Wars: does formal logic create language or *vice versa*?

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 - We can handle the linear order effects and the context dependence of scope.

Typical Scope Data (English)

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- NB: There are some differences between scopes of universals and existentials. This won't be a part of my analysis, but I'll talk about it later.

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- But, given context, the cost of communication and other pragmatic effects, we narrow down on the plausible interpretations.
- Unambiguous sentences are those with one sensible interpretation left, while ambiguous ones have several.
- Interesting empirical correlates, but we'll get into that later.

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 - Each player has three different strategies: paper, scissors or rock.
 - The winner gets a “payoff” to symbolize victory.

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 - The Speaker, knowing what Nature has decided, decides whether to word a sentence as an *Active* one or a *Passive* one.
 - Lastly, the Hearer, ignorant of Nature's choice, but knowing what the Speaker said, chooses whether to interpret the sentence with a *Surface* scope reading or an *Inverse* scope reading.

Payoffs and Costs

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- Both the Speaker and Hearer get a payoff of c (for **c**ommunication) if the Hearer ends up figuring out the right reading from the Speaker's sentence. This is the MacGuffin.


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- Certain constructions, like passives are marked. The Speaker's payoff is deduced by $-p$ when he employs a passive.
- Inverse scope is also non-preferred. When the Hearer reconstructs a sentence with inverse scope, both players lose $-i$.

The Entire Game



Meta-game Thinking

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- Result: there's only one plausible choice if the Speaker uses a Passive, but there are two possibilities if he uses an Active (ambiguity).

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Passive	$-p$	$c - p - i$	$c - p$	$-p - i$
Scramble	0	$c - i$	c	$-i$


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- *Scramble* **dominates** *Passive* as a strategy when it is available.

Scrambling Game



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 - Hearer: Always choose *Surface*
 - Speaker: Always choose what strategy will yield c, c when the Hearer chooses *Surface*.
- No ambiguity ever—every sentence is unambiguous and surface scope.

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- This is not just a “parameter”, but a principle of order independent of formal syntactic properties of languages.
- The Game Theoretics should be constant across *not just* rigid/flexible languages, but across rigid/flexible constructions.

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- Combine my account here with the other two pieces and you would have a phenomenologically complete theory of quantification.

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