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Counterparty restrictions: local enforcement and transaction-bound screening evidence
#926
When a transaction is subject to counterparty restrictions, is UCP's intended pattern entirely business/provider-local enforcement using existing Signals and Actions, or is there an existing contract for sharing transaction-bound screening evidence across participants?
I reviewed the public contracts and found substantial existing enforcement machinery. I have not established a protocol defect or that a new extension is necessary. I would appreciate clarification of the intended integration pattern.
Concrete scenario
Consider a hypothetical B2B purchase:
A buyer's platform obtains screening evidence concerning buyer A, seller B and delivery destination D.
The merchant receives that evidence during checkout.
Before completion, the delivery destination changes to D2, or a different party funds the purchase through the selected payment instrument.
The merchant or payment provider must determine whether the earlier evidence still applies or another check is required.
This is an illustrative integration scenario, not an observed bypass. The relevant parties may include the ordering buyer, seller, payer, payment recipient and goods recipient; their roles should not automatically be treated as interchangeable.
The question is how cooperating participants establish the scope and continued applicability of evidence. A successful payment or buyer authorization alone would not establish permission to supply the goods or services.
Existing mechanisms I found
Signals can carry independently verifiable third-party attestations. Businesses can request required signals through errors that block status progression.
Actions allow negotiated extensions to gate defined effects. Their concrete trust, processing and fallback rules belong to the declaring extension.
Checkout provides lifecycle and error mechanisms, while UCP states that eligibility and policy enforcement must occur at checkout using binding transaction data.
The AP2 Mandates Extension signs the complete checkout payload, excluding ap2, and binds buyer authorization to checkout terms. This can protect extension data included in the signed payload, but does not itself define screening-decision semantics.
These mechanisms may already be sufficient for an implementation that performs and enforces all relevant checks locally. I am not assuming that every participant needs to exchange a portable clearance decision.
Guidance requested
Responsibility: Is counterparty screening intentionally left to each business, platform and payment provider, with no shared decision contract expected?
Composition: Where external screening evidence is used, is the intended pattern a namespaced Signal, an extension-defined Action, handler-specific configuration, or some combination?
Scope and validity: Is there existing guidance for identifying which parties and transaction facts the evidence covers, its issuer and policy scope, expiry, and the changes that require re-evaluation?
Failure handling: If required screening cannot be completed or its evidence is no longer applicable, how should the integration keep the relevant operation blocked—including when the platform cannot process the required verification flow?
Contribution scope: Would a reference scenario or integration note showing this composition be useful before considering any shared schemas?
I am asking about interoperability between cooperating implementations. I am not proposing that UCP operate a screening service, select applicable legal rules, issue universal legal-clearance certificates, or compel deliberately noncompliant participants to obey restrictions.
If existing mechanisms fully cover this scenario, pointers to the intended pattern would be helpful. Otherwise, I can contribute a scoped reference example and documentation.
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Question
When a transaction is subject to counterparty restrictions, is UCP's intended pattern entirely business/provider-local enforcement using existing Signals and Actions, or is there an existing contract for sharing transaction-bound screening evidence across participants?
I reviewed the public contracts and found substantial existing enforcement machinery. I have not established a protocol defect or that a new extension is necessary. I would appreciate clarification of the intended integration pattern.
Concrete scenario
Consider a hypothetical B2B purchase:
This is an illustrative integration scenario, not an observed bypass. The relevant parties may include the ordering buyer, seller, payer, payment recipient and goods recipient; their roles should not automatically be treated as interchangeable.
The question is how cooperating participants establish the scope and continued applicability of evidence. A successful payment or buyer authorization alone would not establish permission to supply the goods or services.
Existing mechanisms I found
ap2, and binds buyer authorization to checkout terms. This can protect extension data included in the signed payload, but does not itself define screening-decision semantics.These mechanisms may already be sufficient for an implementation that performs and enforces all relevant checks locally. I am not assuming that every participant needs to exchange a portable clearance decision.
Guidance requested
Related work and boundaries
I am asking about interoperability between cooperating implementations. I am not proposing that UCP operate a screening service, select applicable legal rules, issue universal legal-clearance certificates, or compel deliberately noncompliant participants to obey restrictions.
If existing mechanisms fully cover this scenario, pointers to the intended pattern would be helpful. Otherwise, I can contribute a scoped reference example and documentation.
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