v2.2.1

Security

• Credentials in the scanned URL are no longer published. An
  auth-gated preview URL passed through a secret (https://user:pass@…,
  or a ?x-vercel-protection-bypass=… token) was echoed verbatim into
  the PR comment, the job summary, SARIF, annotations and the results
  file, none of which the runner's log masking covers. On the scanned
  host, a URL's userinfo, query and fragment now read ***
  (https://***@staging.example.com/app?***); the path is kept so the
  page is still recognisable. A URL carrying credentials, and its
  password, are also masked in the run log. Rule help links on other
  hosts are unchanged, and the backend still receives the real URL.
• The sticky comment is only ever this action's own. The comment
  marker is public, so anyone able to comment on a pull request could
  plant it first; the action then wrote its verdict into their comment
  on every run, and they could edit it between pushes. A marker comment
  is now reused only when its author is the token's own identity
  (github-actions[bot] for the workflow token, or the user behind a
  personal access token). With a GitHub App installation token the
  action cannot tell which comments are its own, so it posts a new
  comment on each run instead of updating one.