v0.2.0

Binaries

No Rust toolchain needed. Download the asset for your platform,
check it against sha256sums.txt, and run it. Linux builds are
static (musl); Windows ships verify.exe inside a .zip.

Platform	Asset
Linux x86_64	verify-v0.2.0-x86_64-unknown-linux-musl.tar.gz
Linux aarch64	verify-v0.2.0-aarch64-unknown-linux-musl.tar.gz
macOS Apple silicon	verify-v0.2.0-aarch64-apple-darwin.tar.gz
macOS Intel	verify-v0.2.0-x86_64-apple-darwin.tar.gz
Windows x86_64	verify-v0.2.0-x86_64-pc-windows-msvc.zip

$ sha256sum -c sha256sums.txt
$ tar -xzf verify-v0.2.0-x86_64-unknown-linux-musl.tar.gz
$ ./verify-v0.2.0-x86_64-unknown-linux-musl/verify ./CASE-2026-1842

Added

• Notary proof verification: verify now re-checks the signed record slice
  instead of only requiring it to be present. notary/pubkey.json must
  parse to a 32-byte Ed25519 key whose derived key id matches; every record
  must carry v: 1, that key id, and a valid Ed25519 signature over the
  canonical record with sig removed; seq must be continuous per camera
  and each prev_record_hash must link to its predecessor. A slice may
  begin mid-chain: the first record's earlier link is not claimed.
• Coverage: every retrieved[].source_sha256 must be present and covered by
  a signed segment record; provenance.detail counts, seq bounds, key id
  and camera must agree with the slice when present.
• BundleReport.notary_records (CLI --json: notary_records) reports how
  many signed records were verified.
• Negative vectors tampered-notary-signature and tampered-notary-chain,
  re-sealed so the failure lands inside the proof, plus a mid-chain unit
  test signed with the published test-vector seed.

Changed

• verify names the signed-record count for notary provenance.
• Dependencies: base64 and ed25519-dalek (verification only; no network
  capability, guarded by the existing Cargo.lock test).

Spec

• docs/SPEC.md §5.5 step 8 now specifies the signature, key-id, chain and
  coverage checks; §5.6 states what a bundled key does and does not prove;
  §7 allows verifier strictness to increase in a MINOR release for bundles
  that never conformed.