Kraj/socfpga 4.1 ltsi #3

kraj · 2016-05-17T01:00:56Z

No description provided.

[ Upstream commit cb984d1 ] As gcc major version numbers are going to advance rather rapidly in the future, there's no real value in separate files for each compiler version. Deduplicate some of the macros #defined in each file too. Neaten comments using normal kernel commenting style. Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz> Cc: Segher Boessenkool <segher@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Sasha Levin <levinsasha928@gmail.com> Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org> Cc: Alan Modra <amodra@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>

[ Upstream commit 95272c2 ] -ftracer can duplicate asm blocks causing compilation to fail in noclone functions. For example, KVM declares a global variable in an asm like asm("2: ... \n .pushsection data \n .global vmx_return \n vmx_return: .long 2b"); and -ftracer causes a double declaration. Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Linda Walsh <lkml@tlinx.org> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>

The omap_hwmod _enable() function can return success without setting the hwmod state to _HWMOD_STATE_ENABLED for IPs with reset lines when all of the reset lines are asserted. The omap_hwmod _idle() function also performs a similar check, but after checking for the hwmod state first. This triggers the WARN when pm_runtime_get and pm_runtime_put are invoked on IPs with all reset lines asserted. Reverse the checks for hwmod state and reset lines status to fix this. Issue found during a unbind operation on a device with reset lines still asserted, example backtrace below ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 879 at arch/arm/mach-omap2/omap_hwmod.c:2207 _idle+0x1e4/0x240() omap_hwmod: mmu_dsp: idle state can only be entered from enabled state Modules linked in: CPU: 1 PID: 879 Comm: sh Not tainted 4.4.0-00008-ga989d951331a #3 Hardware name: Generic OMAP5 (Flattened Device Tree) [<c0018e60>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c0014dc4>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14) [<c0014dc4>] (show_stack) from [<c037ac28>] (dump_stack+0x90/0xc0) [<c037ac28>] (dump_stack) from [<c003f420>] (warn_slowpath_common+0x78/0xb4) [<c003f420>] (warn_slowpath_common) from [<c003f48c>] (warn_slowpath_fmt+0x30/0x40) [<c003f48c>] (warn_slowpath_fmt) from [<c0028c20>] (_idle+0x1e4/0x240) [<c0028c20>] (_idle) from [<c0029080>] (omap_hwmod_idle+0x28/0x48) [<c0029080>] (omap_hwmod_idle) from [<c002a5a4>] (omap_device_idle+0x3c/0x90) [<c002a5a4>] (omap_device_idle) from [<c0427a90>] (__rpm_callback+0x2c/0x60) [<c0427a90>] (__rpm_callback) from [<c0427ae4>] (rpm_callback+0x20/0x80) [<c0427ae4>] (rpm_callback) from [<c0427f84>] (rpm_suspend+0x138/0x74c) [<c0427f84>] (rpm_suspend) from [<c0428b78>] (__pm_runtime_idle+0x78/0xa8) [<c0428b78>] (__pm_runtime_idle) from [<c041f514>] (__device_release_driver+0x64/0x100) [<c041f514>] (__device_release_driver) from [<c041f5d0>] (device_release_driver+0x20/0x2c) [<c041f5d0>] (device_release_driver) from [<c041d85c>] (unbind_store+0x78/0xf8) [<c041d85c>] (unbind_store) from [<c0206df8>] (kernfs_fop_write+0xc0/0x1c4) [<c0206df8>] (kernfs_fop_write) from [<c018a120>] (__vfs_write+0x20/0xdc) [<c018a120>] (__vfs_write) from [<c018a9cc>] (vfs_write+0x90/0x164) [<c018a9cc>] (vfs_write) from [<c018b1f0>] (SyS_write+0x44/0x9c) [<c018b1f0>] (SyS_write) from [<c0010420>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x1c) ---[ end trace a4182013c75a9f50 ]--- While at this, fix the sequence in _shutdown() as well, though there is no easy reproducible scenario. Fixes: 747834a ("ARM: OMAP2+: hwmod: revise hardreset behavior") Signed-off-by: Suman Anna <s-anna@ti.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Walmsley <paul@pwsan.com>

Right now, the lock schema for media_device struct is messy, since sometimes, it is protected via a spin lock, while, for media graph traversal, it is protected by a mutex. Solve this conflict by always using a mutex. As a side effect, this prevents a bug when the media notifiers is called at atomic context, while running the notifier callback: BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at mm/slub.c:1289 in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 3479, name: modprobe 4 locks held by modprobe/3479: #0: (&dev->mutex){......}, at: [<ffffffff81ce8933>] __driver_attach+0xa3/0x160 #1: (&dev->mutex){......}, at: [<ffffffff81ce8941>] __driver_attach+0xb1/0x160 #2: (register_mutex#5){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffffa10596c7>] usb_audio_probe+0x257/0x1c90 [snd_usb_audio] #3: (&(&mdev->lock)->rlock){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffffa0e6051b>] media_device_register_entity+0x1cb/0x700 [media] CPU: 2 PID: 3479 Comm: modprobe Not tainted 4.5.0-rc3+ #49 Hardware name: /NUC5i7RYB, BIOS RYBDWi35.86A.0350.2015.0812.1722 08/12/2015 0000000000000000 ffff8803b3f6f288 ffffffff81933901 ffff8803c4bae000 ffff8803c4bae5c8 ffff8803b3f6f2b0 ffffffff811c6af5 ffff8803c4bae000 ffffffff8285d7f6 0000000000000509 ffff8803b3f6f2f0 ffffffff811c6ce5 Call Trace: [<ffffffff81933901>] dump_stack+0x85/0xc4 [<ffffffff811c6af5>] ___might_sleep+0x245/0x3a0 [<ffffffff811c6ce5>] __might_sleep+0x95/0x1a0 [<ffffffff8155aade>] kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x20e/0x300 [<ffffffffa0e66e3d>] ? media_add_link+0x4d/0x140 [media] [<ffffffffa0e66e3d>] media_add_link+0x4d/0x140 [media] [<ffffffffa0e69931>] media_create_pad_link+0xa1/0x600 [media] [<ffffffffa0fe11b3>] au0828_media_graph_notify+0x173/0x360 [au0828] [<ffffffffa0e68a6a>] ? media_gobj_create+0x1ba/0x480 [media] [<ffffffffa0e606fb>] media_device_register_entity+0x3ab/0x700 [media] Reviewed-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javier@osg.samsung.com> Acked-by: Sakari Ailus <sakari.ailus@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Hans Verkuil <hans.verkuil@cisco.com> Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@osg.samsung.com>

We shouldn't be calling clk_prepare_enable()/clk_prepare_disable() in an atomic context. Fixes the following issue: [ 5.830970] ehci-omap: OMAP-EHCI Host Controller driver [ 5.830974] driver_register 'ehci-omap' [ 5.895849] driver_register 'wl1271_sdio' [ 5.896870] BUG: scheduling while atomic: udevd/994/0x00000002 [ 5.896876] 4 locks held by udevd/994: [ 5.896904] #0: (&dev->mutex){......}, at: [<c049597c>] __driver_attach+0x60/0xac [ 5.896923] #1: (&dev->mutex){......}, at: [<c049598c>] __driver_attach+0x70/0xac [ 5.896946] #2: (tll_lock){+.+...}, at: [<c04c2630>] omap_tll_enable+0x2c/0xd0 [ 5.896966] #3: (prepare_lock){+.+...}, at: [<c05ce9c8>] clk_prepare_lock+0x48/0xe0 [ 5.897042] Modules linked in: wlcore_sdio(+) ehci_omap(+) dwc3_omap snd_soc_ts3a225e leds_is31fl319x bq27xxx_battery_i2c tsc2007 bq27xxx_battery bq2429x_charger ina2xx tca8418_keypad as5013 leds_tca6507 twl6040_vibra gpio_twl6040 bmp085_i2c(+) palmas_gpadc usb3503 palmas_pwrbutton bmg160_i2c(+) bmp085 bma150(+) bmg160_core bmp280 input_polldev snd_soc_omap_mcbsp snd_soc_omap_mcpdm snd_soc_omap snd_pcm_dmaengine [ 5.897048] Preemption disabled at:[< (null)>] (null) [ 5.897051] [ 5.897059] CPU: 0 PID: 994 Comm: udevd Not tainted 4.6.0-rc5-letux+ #233 [ 5.897062] Hardware name: Generic OMAP5 (Flattened Device Tree) [ 5.897076] [<c010e714>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c010af34>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14) [ 5.897087] [<c010af34>] (show_stack) from [<c040aa7c>] (dump_stack+0x88/0xc0) [ 5.897099] [<c040aa7c>] (dump_stack) from [<c020c558>] (__schedule_bug+0xac/0xd0) [ 5.897111] [<c020c558>] (__schedule_bug) from [<c06f3d44>] (__schedule+0x88/0x7e4) [ 5.897120] [<c06f3d44>] (__schedule) from [<c06f46d8>] (schedule+0x9c/0xc0) [ 5.897129] [<c06f46d8>] (schedule) from [<c06f4904>] (schedule_preempt_disabled+0x14/0x20) [ 5.897140] [<c06f4904>] (schedule_preempt_disabled) from [<c06f64e4>] (mutex_lock_nested+0x258/0x43c) [ 5.897150] [<c06f64e4>] (mutex_lock_nested) from [<c05ce9c8>] (clk_prepare_lock+0x48/0xe0) [ 5.897160] [<c05ce9c8>] (clk_prepare_lock) from [<c05d0e7c>] (clk_prepare+0x10/0x28) [ 5.897169] [<c05d0e7c>] (clk_prepare) from [<c04c2668>] (omap_tll_enable+0x64/0xd0) [ 5.897180] [<c04c2668>] (omap_tll_enable) from [<c04c1728>] (usbhs_runtime_resume+0x18/0x17c) [ 5.897192] [<c04c1728>] (usbhs_runtime_resume) from [<c049d404>] (pm_generic_runtime_resume+0x2c/0x40) [ 5.897202] [<c049d404>] (pm_generic_runtime_resume) from [<c049f180>] (__rpm_callback+0x38/0x68) [ 5.897210] [<c049f180>] (__rpm_callback) from [<c049f220>] (rpm_callback+0x70/0x88) [ 5.897218] [<c049f220>] (rpm_callback) from [<c04a0a00>] (rpm_resume+0x4ec/0x7ec) [ 5.897227] [<c04a0a00>] (rpm_resume) from [<c04a0f48>] (__pm_runtime_resume+0x4c/0x64) [ 5.897236] [<c04a0f48>] (__pm_runtime_resume) from [<c04958dc>] (driver_probe_device+0x30/0x70) [ 5.897246] [<c04958dc>] (driver_probe_device) from [<c04959a4>] (__driver_attach+0x88/0xac) [ 5.897256] [<c04959a4>] (__driver_attach) from [<c04940f8>] (bus_for_each_dev+0x50/0x84) [ 5.897267] [<c04940f8>] (bus_for_each_dev) from [<c0494e40>] (bus_add_driver+0xcc/0x1e4) [ 5.897276] [<c0494e40>] (bus_add_driver) from [<c0496914>] (driver_register+0xac/0xf4) [ 5.897286] [<c0496914>] (driver_register) from [<c01018e0>] (do_one_initcall+0x100/0x1b8) [ 5.897296] [<c01018e0>] (do_one_initcall) from [<c01c7a54>] (do_init_module+0x58/0x1c0) [ 5.897304] [<c01c7a54>] (do_init_module) from [<c01c8a3c>] (SyS_finit_module+0x88/0x90) [ 5.897313] [<c01c8a3c>] (SyS_finit_module) from [<c0107120>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x1c) [ 5.912697] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 5.912711] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 994 at kernel/sched/core.c:2996 _raw_spin_unlock+0x28/0x58 [ 5.912717] DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(val > preempt_count()) Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Reported-by: H. Nikolaus Schaller <hns@goldelico.com> Tested-by: H. Nikolaus Schaller <hns@goldelico.com> Signed-off-by: Roger Quadros <rogerq@ti.com> Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <lee.jones@linaro.org>

A fault in a user provided buffer may lead anywhere, and lockdep warns that we have a potential deadlock between the mm->mmap_sem and the kernfs file mutex: [ 82.811702] ====================================================== [ 82.811705] [ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ] [ 82.811709] 4.5.0-rc4-gfxbench+ #1 Not tainted [ 82.811711] ------------------------------------------------------- [ 82.811714] kms_setmode/5859 is trying to acquire lock: [ 82.811717] (&dev->struct_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff8150d9c1>] drm_gem_mmap+0x1a1/0x270 [ 82.811731] but task is already holding lock: [ 82.811734] (&mm->mmap_sem){++++++}, at: [<ffffffff8117b364>] vm_mmap_pgoff+0x44/0xa0 [ 82.811745] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 82.811749] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 82.811752] -> #3 (&mm->mmap_sem){++++++}: [ 82.811761] [<ffffffff810cc883>] lock_acquire+0xc3/0x1d0 [ 82.811766] [<ffffffff8118bc65>] __might_fault+0x75/0xa0 [ 82.811771] [<ffffffff8124da4a>] kernfs_fop_write+0x8a/0x180 [ 82.811787] [<ffffffff811d1023>] __vfs_write+0x23/0xe0 [ 82.811792] [<ffffffff811d1d74>] vfs_write+0xa4/0x190 [ 82.811797] [<ffffffff811d2c14>] SyS_write+0x44/0xb0 [ 82.811801] [<ffffffff817bb81b>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x73 [ 82.811807] -> #2 (s_active#6){++++.+}: [ 82.811814] [<ffffffff810cc883>] lock_acquire+0xc3/0x1d0 [ 82.811819] [<ffffffff8124c070>] __kernfs_remove+0x210/0x2f0 [ 82.811823] [<ffffffff8124d040>] kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0x40/0xa0 [ 82.811828] [<ffffffff8124e9e0>] sysfs_remove_file_ns+0x10/0x20 [ 82.811832] [<ffffffff815318d4>] device_del+0x124/0x250 [ 82.811837] [<ffffffff81531a19>] device_unregister+0x19/0x60 [ 82.811841] [<ffffffff8153c051>] cpu_cache_sysfs_exit+0x51/0xb0 [ 82.811846] [<ffffffff8153c628>] cacheinfo_cpu_callback+0x38/0x70 [ 82.811851] [<ffffffff8109ae89>] notifier_call_chain+0x39/0xa0 [ 82.811856] [<ffffffff8109aef9>] __raw_notifier_call_chain+0x9/0x10 [ 82.811860] [<ffffffff810786de>] cpu_notify+0x1e/0x40 [ 82.811865] [<ffffffff81078779>] cpu_notify_nofail+0x9/0x20 [ 82.811869] [<ffffffff81078ac3>] _cpu_down+0x233/0x340 [ 82.811874] [<ffffffff81079019>] disable_nonboot_cpus+0xc9/0x350 [ 82.811878] [<ffffffff810d2e11>] suspend_devices_and_enter+0x5a1/0xb50 [ 82.811883] [<ffffffff810d3903>] pm_suspend+0x543/0x8d0 [ 82.811888] [<ffffffff810d1b77>] state_store+0x77/0xe0 [ 82.811892] [<ffffffff813fa68f>] kobj_attr_store+0xf/0x20 [ 82.811897] [<ffffffff8124e740>] sysfs_kf_write+0x40/0x50 [ 82.811902] [<ffffffff8124dafc>] kernfs_fop_write+0x13c/0x180 [ 82.811906] [<ffffffff811d1023>] __vfs_write+0x23/0xe0 [ 82.811910] [<ffffffff811d1d74>] vfs_write+0xa4/0x190 [ 82.811914] [<ffffffff811d2c14>] SyS_write+0x44/0xb0 [ 82.811918] [<ffffffff817bb81b>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x73 [ 82.811923] -> #1 (cpu_hotplug.lock){+.+.+.}: [ 82.811929] [<ffffffff810cc883>] lock_acquire+0xc3/0x1d0 [ 82.811933] [<ffffffff817b6f72>] mutex_lock_nested+0x62/0x3b0 [ 82.811940] [<ffffffff810784c1>] get_online_cpus+0x61/0x80 [ 82.811944] [<ffffffff811170eb>] stop_machine+0x1b/0xe0 [ 82.811949] [<ffffffffa0178edd>] gen8_ggtt_insert_entries__BKL+0x2d/0x30 [i915] [ 82.812009] [<ffffffffa017d3a6>] ggtt_bind_vma+0x46/0x70 [i915] [ 82.812045] [<ffffffffa017eb70>] i915_vma_bind+0x140/0x290 [i915] [ 82.812081] [<ffffffffa01862b9>] i915_gem_object_do_pin+0x899/0xb00 [i915] [ 82.812117] [<ffffffffa0186555>] i915_gem_object_pin+0x35/0x40 [i915] [ 82.812154] [<ffffffffa019a23e>] intel_init_pipe_control+0xbe/0x210 [i915] [ 82.812192] [<ffffffffa0197312>] intel_logical_rings_init+0xe2/0xde0 [i915] [ 82.812232] [<ffffffffa0186fe3>] i915_gem_init+0xf3/0x130 [i915] [ 82.812278] [<ffffffffa02097ed>] i915_driver_load+0xf2d/0x1770 [i915] [ 82.812318] [<ffffffff81512474>] drm_dev_register+0xa4/0xb0 [ 82.812323] [<ffffffff8151467e>] drm_get_pci_dev+0xce/0x1e0 [ 82.812328] [<ffffffffa01472cf>] i915_pci_probe+0x2f/0x50 [i915] [ 82.812360] [<ffffffff8143f907>] pci_device_probe+0x87/0xf0 [ 82.812366] [<ffffffff81535f89>] driver_probe_device+0x229/0x450 [ 82.812371] [<ffffffff81536233>] __driver_attach+0x83/0x90 [ 82.812375] [<ffffffff81533c61>] bus_for_each_dev+0x61/0xa0 [ 82.812380] [<ffffffff81535879>] driver_attach+0x19/0x20 [ 82.812384] [<ffffffff8153535f>] bus_add_driver+0x1ef/0x290 [ 82.812388] [<ffffffff81536e9b>] driver_register+0x5b/0xe0 [ 82.812393] [<ffffffff8143e83b>] __pci_register_driver+0x5b/0x60 [ 82.812398] [<ffffffff81514866>] drm_pci_init+0xd6/0x100 [ 82.812402] [<ffffffffa027c094>] 0xffffffffa027c094 [ 82.812406] [<ffffffff810003de>] do_one_initcall+0xae/0x1d0 [ 82.812412] [<ffffffff811595a0>] do_init_module+0x5b/0x1cb [ 82.812417] [<ffffffff81106160>] load_module+0x1c20/0x2480 [ 82.812422] [<ffffffff81106bae>] SyS_finit_module+0x7e/0xa0 [ 82.812428] [<ffffffff817bb81b>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x73 [ 82.812433] -> #0 (&dev->struct_mutex){+.+.+.}: [ 82.812439] [<ffffffff810cbe59>] __lock_acquire+0x1fc9/0x20f0 [ 82.812443] [<ffffffff810cc883>] lock_acquire+0xc3/0x1d0 [ 82.812456] [<ffffffff8150d9e7>] drm_gem_mmap+0x1c7/0x270 [ 82.812460] [<ffffffff81196a14>] mmap_region+0x334/0x580 [ 82.812466] [<ffffffff81196fc4>] do_mmap+0x364/0x410 [ 82.812470] [<ffffffff8117b38d>] vm_mmap_pgoff+0x6d/0xa0 [ 82.812474] [<ffffffff811950f4>] SyS_mmap_pgoff+0x184/0x220 [ 82.812479] [<ffffffff8100a0fd>] SyS_mmap+0x1d/0x20 [ 82.812484] [<ffffffff817bb81b>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x73 [ 82.812489] other info that might help us debug this: [ 82.812493] Chain exists of: &dev->struct_mutex --> s_active#6 --> &mm->mmap_sem [ 82.812502] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 82.812506] CPU0 CPU1 [ 82.812508] ---- ---- [ 82.812510] lock(&mm->mmap_sem); [ 82.812514] lock(s_active#6); [ 82.812519] lock(&mm->mmap_sem); [ 82.812522] lock(&dev->struct_mutex); [ 82.812526] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 82.812531] 1 lock held by kms_setmode/5859: [ 82.812533] #0: (&mm->mmap_sem){++++++}, at: [<ffffffff8117b364>] vm_mmap_pgoff+0x44/0xa0 [ 82.812541] stack backtrace: [ 82.812547] CPU: 0 PID: 5859 Comm: kms_setmode Not tainted 4.5.0-rc4-gfxbench+ #1 [ 82.812550] Hardware name: /NUC5CPYB, BIOS PYBSWCEL.86A.0040.2015.0814.1353 08/14/2015 [ 82.812553] 0000000000000000 ffff880079407bf0 ffffffff813f8505 ffffffff825fb270 [ 82.812560] ffffffff825c4190 ffff880079407c30 ffffffff810c84ac ffff880079407c90 [ 82.812566] ffff8800797ed328 ffff8800797ecb00 0000000000000001 ffff8800797ed350 [ 82.812573] Call Trace: [ 82.812578] [<ffffffff813f8505>] dump_stack+0x67/0x92 [ 82.812582] [<ffffffff810c84ac>] print_circular_bug+0x1fc/0x310 [ 82.812586] [<ffffffff810cbe59>] __lock_acquire+0x1fc9/0x20f0 [ 82.812590] [<ffffffff810cc883>] lock_acquire+0xc3/0x1d0 [ 82.812594] [<ffffffff8150d9c1>] ? drm_gem_mmap+0x1a1/0x270 [ 82.812599] [<ffffffff8150d9e7>] drm_gem_mmap+0x1c7/0x270 [ 82.812603] [<ffffffff8150d9c1>] ? drm_gem_mmap+0x1a1/0x270 [ 82.812608] [<ffffffff81196a14>] mmap_region+0x334/0x580 [ 82.812612] [<ffffffff81196fc4>] do_mmap+0x364/0x410 [ 82.812616] [<ffffffff8117b38d>] vm_mmap_pgoff+0x6d/0xa0 [ 82.812629] [<ffffffff811950f4>] SyS_mmap_pgoff+0x184/0x220 [ 82.812633] [<ffffffff8100a0fd>] SyS_mmap+0x1d/0x20 [ 82.812637] [<ffffffff817bb81b>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x73 Highly unlikely though this scenario is, we can avoid the issue entirely by moving the copy operation from out under the kernfs_get_active() tracking by assigning the preallocated buffer its own mutex. The temporary buffer allocation doesn't require mutex locking as it is entirely local. The locked section was extended by the addition of the preallocated buf to speed up md user operations in commit 2b75869 Author: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de> Date: Mon Oct 13 16:41:28 2014 +1100 sysfs/kernfs: allow attributes to request write buffer be pre-allocated. Reported-by: Ville Syrjälä <ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com> Bugzilla: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=94350 Signed-off-by: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk> Reviewed-by: Joonas Lahtinen <joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Ville Syrjälä <ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com> Cc: Joonas Lahtinen <joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com> Cc: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de> Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

The mcb_bus structure previously was released in mcb_release_bus. This lead to the following warning on module unload: ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 2032 at drivers/base/core.c:251 device_release+0x73/0x90 Device 'mcb:0' does not have a release() function, it is broken and must be fixed. Modules linked in: men_z135_uart mcb_pci(-) mcb CPU: 1 PID: 2032 Comm: rmmod Not tainted 4.6.0-rc4+ #3 Hardware name: N/A N/A/COMe-mBTi10, BIOS MVV1R921 X64 10/14/2015 00000286 00000286 c0117de4 c12d6f16 c0117e2c c18be0d3 c0117dfc c104f6e1 000000fb f5ccbe08 f5ccbe00 f5c64600 c0117e18 c104f728 00000009 00000000 c0117e10 c18db674 c0117e2c c0117e3c c13ce5c3 c18be0d3 000000fb c18db674 Call Trace: [<c12d6f16>] dump_stack+0x47/0x61 [<c104f6e1>] __warn+0xc1/0xe0 [<c104f728>] warn_slowpath_fmt+0x28/0x30 [<c13ce5c3>] device_release+0x73/0x90 [<c12d92e4>] kobject_release+0x34/0x80 [<c12d929d>] ? kobject_del+0x2d/0x40 [<c12d9205>] kobject_put+0x25/0x50 [<c13ce77f>] put_device+0xf/0x20 [<c13d114b>] klist_devices_put+0xb/0x10 [<c1752673>] klist_next+0x73/0xf0 [<c13d1140>] ? unbind_store+0x100/0x100 [<f8a23370>] ? mcb_bus_add_devices+0x30/0x30 [mcb] [<c13d0a81>] bus_for_each_dev+0x51/0x80 [<f8a23319>] mcb_release_bus+0x19/0x40 [mcb] [<f8a23370>] ? mcb_bus_add_devices+0x30/0x30 [mcb] [<f8a2b033>] mcb_pci_remove+0x13/0x20 [mcb_pci] [<c130d358>] pci_device_remove+0x28/0xb0 [<c13d201b>] __device_release_driver+0x7b/0x110 [<c13d2847>] driver_detach+0x87/0x90 [<c13d1b9b>] bus_remove_driver+0x3b/0x80 [<c13d2ed0>] driver_unregister+0x20/0x50 [<c130be53>] pci_unregister_driver+0x13/0x60 [<f8a2b1f4>] mcb_pci_driver_exit+0xd/0xf [mcb_pci] [<c10be588>] SyS_delete_module+0x138/0x200 [<c1159208>] ? ____fput+0x8/0x10 [<c1068054>] ? task_work_run+0x74/0x90 [<c1001879>] do_fast_syscall_32+0x69/0x120 [<c1757597>] sysenter_past_esp+0x40/0x6a ---[ end trace 1ed34c2aa3019875 ]--- Release a mcb_bus' memory on the device's release callback, to avoid above warning. Signed-off-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de> Reported-by: Andreas Werner <andreas.werner@men.de> Tested-by: Andreas Werner <andreas.werner@men.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

…x and uuid_mutex When the replace target fails, the target device will be taken out of fs device list, scratch + update_dev_time and freed. However we could do the scratch + update_dev_time and free part after the device has been taken out of device list, so that we don't have to hold the device_list_mutex and uuid_mutex locks. Reported issue: [ 5375.718845] ====================================================== [ 5375.718846] [ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ] [ 5375.718849] 4.4.5-scst31x-debug-11+ #40 Not tainted [ 5375.718849] ------------------------------------------------------- [ 5375.718851] btrfs-health/4662 is trying to acquire lock: [ 5375.718861] (sb_writers){.+.+.+}, at: [<ffffffff812214f7>] __sb_start_write+0xb7/0xf0 [ 5375.718862] [ 5375.718862] but task is already holding lock: [ 5375.718907] (&fs_devs->device_list_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffffa028263c>] btrfs_destroy_dev_replace_tgtdev+0x3c/0x150 [btrfs] [ 5375.718907] [ 5375.718907] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 5375.718907] [ 5375.718908] [ 5375.718908] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 5375.718911] [ 5375.718911] -> #3 (&fs_devs->device_list_mutex){+.+.+.}: [ 5375.718917] [<ffffffff810da4be>] lock_acquire+0xce/0x1e0 [ 5375.718921] [<ffffffff81633949>] mutex_lock_nested+0x69/0x3c0 [ 5375.718940] [<ffffffffa0219bf6>] btrfs_show_devname+0x36/0x210 [btrfs] [ 5375.718945] [<ffffffff81267079>] show_vfsmnt+0x49/0x150 [ 5375.718948] [<ffffffff81240b07>] m_show+0x17/0x20 [ 5375.718951] [<ffffffff81246868>] seq_read+0x2d8/0x3b0 [ 5375.718955] [<ffffffff8121df28>] __vfs_read+0x28/0xd0 [ 5375.718959] [<ffffffff8121e806>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130 [ 5375.718962] [<ffffffff8121f4c9>] SyS_read+0x49/0xa0 [ 5375.718966] [<ffffffff81637976>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x7a [ 5375.718968] [ 5375.718968] -> #2 (namespace_sem){+++++.}: [ 5375.718971] [<ffffffff810da4be>] lock_acquire+0xce/0x1e0 [ 5375.718974] [<ffffffff81635199>] down_write+0x49/0x80 [ 5375.718977] [<ffffffff81243593>] lock_mount+0x43/0x1c0 [ 5375.718979] [<ffffffff81243c13>] do_add_mount+0x23/0xd0 [ 5375.718982] [<ffffffff81244afb>] do_mount+0x27b/0xe30 [ 5375.718985] [<ffffffff812459dc>] SyS_mount+0x8c/0xd0 [ 5375.718988] [<ffffffff81637976>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x7a [ 5375.718991] [ 5375.718991] -> #1 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#5){+.+.+.}: [ 5375.718994] [<ffffffff810da4be>] lock_acquire+0xce/0x1e0 [ 5375.718996] [<ffffffff81633949>] mutex_lock_nested+0x69/0x3c0 [ 5375.719001] [<ffffffff8122d608>] path_openat+0x468/0x1360 [ 5375.719004] [<ffffffff8122f86e>] do_filp_open+0x7e/0xe0 [ 5375.719007] [<ffffffff8121da7b>] do_sys_open+0x12b/0x210 [ 5375.719010] [<ffffffff8121db7e>] SyS_open+0x1e/0x20 [ 5375.719013] [<ffffffff81637976>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x7a [ 5375.719015] [ 5375.719015] -> #0 (sb_writers){.+.+.+}: [ 5375.719018] [<ffffffff810d97ca>] __lock_acquire+0x17ba/0x1ae0 [ 5375.719021] [<ffffffff810da4be>] lock_acquire+0xce/0x1e0 [ 5375.719026] [<ffffffff810d3bef>] percpu_down_read+0x4f/0xa0 [ 5375.719028] [<ffffffff812214f7>] __sb_start_write+0xb7/0xf0 [ 5375.719031] [<ffffffff81242eb4>] mnt_want_write+0x24/0x50 [ 5375.719035] [<ffffffff8122ded2>] path_openat+0xd32/0x1360 [ 5375.719037] [<ffffffff8122f86e>] do_filp_open+0x7e/0xe0 [ 5375.719040] [<ffffffff8121d8a4>] file_open_name+0xe4/0x130 [ 5375.719043] [<ffffffff8121d923>] filp_open+0x33/0x60 [ 5375.719073] [<ffffffffa02776a6>] update_dev_time+0x16/0x40 [btrfs] [ 5375.719099] [<ffffffffa02825be>] btrfs_scratch_superblocks+0x4e/0x90 [btrfs] [ 5375.719123] [<ffffffffa0282665>] btrfs_destroy_dev_replace_tgtdev+0x65/0x150 [btrfs] [ 5375.719150] [<ffffffffa02c6c80>] btrfs_dev_replace_finishing+0x6b0/0x990 [btrfs] [ 5375.719175] [<ffffffffa02c729e>] btrfs_dev_replace_start+0x33e/0x540 [btrfs] [ 5375.719199] [<ffffffffa02c7f58>] btrfs_auto_replace_start+0xf8/0x140 [btrfs] [ 5375.719222] [<ffffffffa02464e6>] health_kthread+0x246/0x490 [btrfs] [ 5375.719225] [<ffffffff810a70df>] kthread+0xef/0x110 [ 5375.719229] [<ffffffff81637d2f>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70 [ 5375.719230] [ 5375.719230] other info that might help us debug this: [ 5375.719230] [ 5375.719233] Chain exists of: [ 5375.719233] sb_writers --> namespace_sem --> &fs_devs->device_list_mutex [ 5375.719233] [ 5375.719234] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 5375.719234] [ 5375.719234] CPU0 CPU1 [ 5375.719235] ---- ---- [ 5375.719236] lock(&fs_devs->device_list_mutex); [ 5375.719238] lock(namespace_sem); [ 5375.719239] lock(&fs_devs->device_list_mutex); [ 5375.719241] lock(sb_writers); [ 5375.719241] [ 5375.719241] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 5375.719241] [ 5375.719243] 4 locks held by btrfs-health/4662: [ 5375.719266] #0: (&fs_info->health_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffffa0246303>] health_kthread+0x63/0x490 [btrfs] [ 5375.719293] #1: (&fs_info->dev_replace.lock_finishing_cancel_unmount){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffffa02c6611>] btrfs_dev_replace_finishing+0x41/0x990 [btrfs] [ 5375.719319] #2: (uuid_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffffa0282620>] btrfs_destroy_dev_replace_tgtdev+0x20/0x150 [btrfs] [ 5375.719343] #3: (&fs_devs->device_list_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffffa028263c>] btrfs_destroy_dev_replace_tgtdev+0x3c/0x150 [btrfs] [ 5375.719343] [ 5375.719343] stack backtrace: [ 5375.719347] CPU: 2 PID: 4662 Comm: btrfs-health Not tainted 4.4.5-scst31x-debug-11+ #40 [ 5375.719348] Hardware name: Supermicro SYS-6018R-WTRT/X10DRW-iT, BIOS 1.0c 01/07/2015 [ 5375.719352] 0000000000000000 ffff880856f73880 ffffffff813529e3 ffffffff826182a0 [ 5375.719354] ffffffff8260c090 ffff880856f738c0 ffffffff810d667c ffff880856f73930 [ 5375.719357] ffff880861f32b40 ffff880861f32b68 0000000000000003 0000000000000004 [ 5375.719357] Call Trace: [ 5375.719363] [<ffffffff813529e3>] dump_stack+0x85/0xc2 [ 5375.719366] [<ffffffff810d667c>] print_circular_bug+0x1ec/0x260 [ 5375.719369] [<ffffffff810d97ca>] __lock_acquire+0x17ba/0x1ae0 [ 5375.719373] [<ffffffff810f606d>] ? debug_lockdep_rcu_enabled+0x1d/0x20 [ 5375.719376] [<ffffffff810da4be>] lock_acquire+0xce/0x1e0 [ 5375.719378] [<ffffffff812214f7>] ? __sb_start_write+0xb7/0xf0 [ 5375.719383] [<ffffffff810d3bef>] percpu_down_read+0x4f/0xa0 [ 5375.719385] [<ffffffff812214f7>] ? __sb_start_write+0xb7/0xf0 [ 5375.719387] [<ffffffff812214f7>] __sb_start_write+0xb7/0xf0 [ 5375.719389] [<ffffffff81242eb4>] mnt_want_write+0x24/0x50 [ 5375.719393] [<ffffffff8122ded2>] path_openat+0xd32/0x1360 [ 5375.719415] [<ffffffffa02462a0>] ? btrfs_congested_fn+0x180/0x180 [btrfs] [ 5375.719418] [<ffffffff810f606d>] ? debug_lockdep_rcu_enabled+0x1d/0x20 [ 5375.719420] [<ffffffff8122f86e>] do_filp_open+0x7e/0xe0 [ 5375.719423] [<ffffffff810f615d>] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x6d/0x80 [ 5375.719426] [<ffffffff81201a9b>] ? kmem_cache_alloc+0x26b/0x5d0 [ 5375.719430] [<ffffffff8122e7d4>] ? getname_kernel+0x34/0x120 [ 5375.719433] [<ffffffff8121d8a4>] file_open_name+0xe4/0x130 [ 5375.719436] [<ffffffff8121d923>] filp_open+0x33/0x60 [ 5375.719462] [<ffffffffa02776a6>] update_dev_time+0x16/0x40 [btrfs] [ 5375.719485] [<ffffffffa02825be>] btrfs_scratch_superblocks+0x4e/0x90 [btrfs] [ 5375.719506] [<ffffffffa0282665>] btrfs_destroy_dev_replace_tgtdev+0x65/0x150 [btrfs] [ 5375.719530] [<ffffffffa02c6c80>] btrfs_dev_replace_finishing+0x6b0/0x990 [btrfs] [ 5375.719554] [<ffffffffa02c6b23>] ? btrfs_dev_replace_finishing+0x553/0x990 [btrfs] [ 5375.719576] [<ffffffffa02c729e>] btrfs_dev_replace_start+0x33e/0x540 [btrfs] [ 5375.719598] [<ffffffffa02c7f58>] btrfs_auto_replace_start+0xf8/0x140 [btrfs] [ 5375.719621] [<ffffffffa02464e6>] health_kthread+0x246/0x490 [btrfs] [ 5375.719641] [<ffffffffa02463d8>] ? health_kthread+0x138/0x490 [btrfs] [ 5375.719661] [<ffffffffa02462a0>] ? btrfs_congested_fn+0x180/0x180 [btrfs] [ 5375.719663] [<ffffffff810a70df>] kthread+0xef/0x110 [ 5375.719666] [<ffffffff810a6ff0>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x200/0x200 [ 5375.719669] [<ffffffff81637d2f>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70 [ 5375.719672] [<ffffffff810a6ff0>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x200/0x200 [ 5375.719697] ------------[ cut here ]------------ Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com> Reported-by: Yauhen Kharuzhy <yauhen.kharuzhy@zavadatar.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>

commit e2c8b87 moved modeset locking inside resume/suspend functions, but missed a code path only executed on lid close/open on older hardware. The result was a deadlock when closing and opening the lid without suspending on such hardware: ============================================= [ INFO: possible recursive locking detected ] 4.6.0-rc1 #385 Not tainted --------------------------------------------- kworker/0:3/88 is trying to acquire lock: (&dev->mode_config.mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffffa063e6a4>] intel_display_resume+0x4a/0x12f [i915] but task is already holding lock: (&dev->mode_config.mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffffa02d0d4f>] drm_modeset_lock_all+0x3e/0xa6 [drm] other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(&dev->mode_config.mutex); lock(&dev->mode_config.mutex); *** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation 7 locks held by kworker/0:3/88: #0: ("kacpi_notify"){++++.+}, at: [<ffffffff81068dfc>] process_one_work+0x14a/0x50b #1: ((&dpc->work)#2){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff81068dfc>] process_one_work+0x14a/0x50b #2: ((acpi_lid_notifier).rwsem){++++.+}, at: [<ffffffff8106f874>] __blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x34/0x65 #3: (&dev_priv->modeset_restore_lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffffa0664cf6>] intel_lid_notify+0x3c/0xd9 [i915] #4: (&dev->mode_config.mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffffa02d0d4f>] drm_modeset_lock_all+0x3e/0xa6 [drm] #5: (crtc_ww_class_acquire){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffffa02d0d59>] drm_modeset_lock_all+0x48/0xa6 [drm] #6: (crtc_ww_class_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffffa02d0b2a>] modeset_lock+0x13c/0x1cd [drm] stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 88 Comm: kworker/0:3 Not tainted 4.6.0-rc1 #385 Hardware name: LENOVO 2776LEG/2776LEG, BIOS 6EET55WW (3.15 ) 12/19/2011 Workqueue: kacpi_notify acpi_os_execute_deferred 0000000000000000 ffff88022fd5f990 ffffffff8124af06 ffffffff825b39c0 ffffffff825b39c0 ffff88022fd5fa60 ffffffff8108f547 ffff88022fd5fa70 000000008108e817 ffff880230236cc0 0000000000000000 ffffffff825b39c0 Call Trace: [<ffffffff8124af06>] dump_stack+0x67/0x90 [<ffffffff8108f547>] __lock_acquire+0xdb5/0xf71 [<ffffffff8108bd2c>] ? look_up_lock_class+0xbe/0x10a [<ffffffff8108fae2>] lock_acquire+0x137/0x1cb [<ffffffff8108fae2>] ? lock_acquire+0x137/0x1cb [<ffffffffa063e6a4>] ? intel_display_resume+0x4a/0x12f [i915] [<ffffffff8148202f>] mutex_lock_nested+0x7e/0x3a4 [<ffffffffa063e6a4>] ? intel_display_resume+0x4a/0x12f [i915] [<ffffffffa063e6a4>] ? intel_display_resume+0x4a/0x12f [i915] [<ffffffffa02d0b2a>] ? modeset_lock+0x13c/0x1cd [drm] [<ffffffffa063e6a4>] intel_display_resume+0x4a/0x12f [i915] [<ffffffffa063e6a4>] ? intel_display_resume+0x4a/0x12f [i915] [<ffffffffa02d0b2a>] ? modeset_lock+0x13c/0x1cd [drm] [<ffffffffa02d0b2a>] ? modeset_lock+0x13c/0x1cd [drm] [<ffffffffa02d0bf7>] ? drm_modeset_lock+0x17/0x24 [drm] [<ffffffffa02d0c8b>] ? drm_modeset_lock_all_ctx+0x87/0xa1 [drm] [<ffffffffa0664d6a>] intel_lid_notify+0xb0/0xd9 [i915] [<ffffffff8106f4c6>] notifier_call_chain+0x4a/0x6c [<ffffffff8106f88d>] __blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x4d/0x65 [<ffffffff8106f8b9>] blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x14/0x16 [<ffffffffa0011215>] acpi_lid_send_state+0x83/0xad [button] [<ffffffffa00112a6>] acpi_button_notify+0x41/0x132 [button] [<ffffffff812b07df>] acpi_device_notify+0x19/0x1b [<ffffffff812c8570>] acpi_ev_notify_dispatch+0x49/0x64 [<ffffffff812ab9fb>] acpi_os_execute_deferred+0x14/0x20 [<ffffffff81068f17>] process_one_work+0x265/0x50b [<ffffffff810696f5>] worker_thread+0x1fc/0x2dd [<ffffffff810694f9>] ? rescuer_thread+0x309/0x309 [<ffffffff810694f9>] ? rescuer_thread+0x309/0x309 [<ffffffff8106e2d6>] kthread+0xe0/0xe8 [<ffffffff8107bc47>] ? local_clock+0x19/0x22 [<ffffffff81484f42>] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x40 [<ffffffff8106e1f6>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x1b5/0x1b5 Fixes: e2c8b87 ("drm/i915: Use atomic helpers for suspend, v2.") Cc: Maarten Lankhorst <maarten.lankhorst@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Bjørn Mork <bjorn@mork.no> Signed-off-by: Maarten Lankhorst <maarten.lankhorst@linux.intel.com> Link: http://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/1459328913-13719-1-git-send-email-bjorn@mork.no

When I was writing an atomic wrapper for rmfb, I ran into the following backtrace from lockdep: ============================================= [ INFO: possible recursive locking detected ] 4.5.0-patser+ #4696 Tainted: G U --------------------------------------------- kworker/2:2/2608 is trying to acquire lock: (crtc_ww_class_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffffc00c9ddc>] drm_modeset_lock+0x7c/0x120 [drm] but task is already holding lock: (crtc_ww_class_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffffc00c98cd>] modeset_backoff+0x8d/0x220 [drm] other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(crtc_ww_class_mutex); lock(crtc_ww_class_mutex); *** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation 4 locks held by kworker/2:2/2608: #0: ("events"){.+.+.+}, at: [<ffffffff810a5eea>] process_one_work+0x15a/0x6c0 #1: ((&arg.work)){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff810a5eea>] process_one_work+0x15a/0x6c0 #2: (crtc_ww_class_acquire){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffffc004532a>] drm_atomic_helper_remove_fb+0x4a/0x1d0 [drm_kms_helper] #3: (crtc_ww_class_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffffc00c98cd>] modeset_backoff+0x8d/0x220 [drm] While lockdep probably catches this bug when it happens, it's better to explicitly warn when state->acquire_ctx is not set. Signed-off-by: Maarten Lankhorst <maarten.lankhorst@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch> Link: http://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/1462266751-29123-1-git-send-email-maarten.lankhorst@linux.intel.com

This lock is already taken in ata_scsi_queuecmd() a few levels up the call stack so attempting to take it here is an error. Moreover, it is pointless in the first place since it only protects a single, atomic assignment. Enabling lock debugging gives the following output: ============================================= [ INFO: possible recursive locking detected ] 4.4.0-rc5+ #189 Not tainted --------------------------------------------- kworker/u2:3/37 is trying to acquire lock: (&(&host->lock)->rlock){-.-...}, at: [<90283294>] sata_dwc_exec_command_by_tag.constprop.14+0x44/0x8c but task is already holding lock: (&(&host->lock)->rlock){-.-...}, at: [<902761ac>] ata_scsi_queuecmd+0x2c/0x330 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(&(&host->lock)->rlock); lock(&(&host->lock)->rlock); *** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation 4 locks held by kworker/u2:3/37: #0: ("events_unbound"){.+.+.+}, at: [<9003a0a4>] process_one_work+0x12c/0x430 #1: ((&entry->work)){+.+.+.}, at: [<9003a0a4>] process_one_work+0x12c/0x430 #2: (&bdev->bd_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<9011fd54>] __blkdev_get+0x50/0x380 #3: (&(&host->lock)->rlock){-.-...}, at: [<902761ac>] ata_scsi_queuecmd+0x2c/0x330 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 37 Comm: kworker/u2:3 Not tainted 4.4.0-rc5+ #189 Workqueue: events_unbound async_run_entry_fn Stack : 90b38e30 00000021 00000003 9b2a6040 00000000 9005f3f0 904fc8dc 00000025 906b96e4 00000000 90528648 9b3336c4 904fc8dc 9009bf18 00000002 00000004 00000000 00000000 9b3336c4 9b3336e4 904fc8dc 9003d074 00000000 90500000 9005e738 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 6e657665 755f7374 756f626e 0000646e 00000000 00000000 9b00ca00 9b025000 ... Call Trace: [<90009d6c>] show_stack+0x88/0xa4 [<90057744>] __lock_acquire+0x1ce8/0x2154 [<900583e4>] lock_acquire+0x64/0x8c [<9045ff10>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x54/0x78 [<90283294>] sata_dwc_exec_command_by_tag.constprop.14+0x44/0x8c [<90283484>] sata_dwc_qc_issue+0x1a8/0x24c [<9026b39c>] ata_qc_issue+0x1f0/0x410 [<90273c6c>] ata_scsi_translate+0xb4/0x200 [<90276234>] ata_scsi_queuecmd+0xb4/0x330 [<9025800c>] scsi_dispatch_cmd+0xd0/0x128 [<90259934>] scsi_request_fn+0x58c/0x638 [<901a3e50>] __blk_run_queue+0x40/0x5c [<901a83d4>] blk_queue_bio+0x27c/0x28c [<901a5914>] generic_make_request+0xf0/0x188 [<901a5a54>] submit_bio+0xa8/0x194 [<9011adcc>] submit_bh_wbc.isra.23+0x15c/0x17c [<9011c908>] block_read_full_page+0x3e4/0x428 [<9009e2e0>] do_read_cache_page+0xac/0x210 [<9009fd90>] read_cache_page+0x18/0x24 [<901bbd18>] read_dev_sector+0x38/0xb0 [<901bd174>] msdos_partition+0xb4/0x5c0 [<901bcb8c>] check_partition+0x140/0x274 [<901bba60>] rescan_partitions+0xa0/0x2b0 [<9011ff68>] __blkdev_get+0x264/0x380 [<901201ac>] blkdev_get+0x128/0x36c [<901b9378>] add_disk+0x3c0/0x4bc [<90268268>] sd_probe_async+0x100/0x224 [<90043a44>] async_run_entry_fn+0x50/0x124 [<9003a11c>] process_one_work+0x1a4/0x430 [<9003a4f4>] worker_thread+0x14c/0x4fc [<900408f4>] kthread+0xd0/0xe8 [<90004338>] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x14/0x1c Fixes: 6293600 ("[libata] Add 460EX on-chip SATA driver, sata_dwc_460ex") Tested-by: Christian Lamparter <chunkeey@googlemail.com> Signed-off-by: Mans Rullgard <mans@mansr.com> Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>

…offline_kmem() memcg_offline_kmem() may be called from memcg_free_kmem() after a css init failure. memcg_free_kmem() is a ->css_free callback which is called without cgroup_mutex and memcg_offline_kmem() ends up using css_for_each_descendant_pre() without any locking. Fix it by adding rcu read locking around it. mkdir: cannot create directory `65530': No space left on device =============================== [ INFO: suspicious RCU usage. ] 4.6.0-work+ #321 Not tainted ------------------------------- kernel/cgroup.c:4008 cgroup_mutex or RCU read lock required! [ 527.243970] other info that might help us debug this: [ 527.244715] rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 0 2 locks held by kworker/0:5/1664: #0: ("cgroup_destroy"){.+.+..}, at: [<ffffffff81060ab5>] process_one_work+0x165/0x4a0 #1: ((&css->destroy_work)#3){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffff81060ab5>] process_one_work+0x165/0x4a0 [ 527.248098] stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 1664 Comm: kworker/0:5 Not tainted 4.6.0-work+ #321 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.9.1-1.fc24 04/01/2014 Workqueue: cgroup_destroy css_free_work_fn Call Trace: dump_stack+0x68/0xa1 lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0xd7/0x110 css_next_descendant_pre+0x7d/0xb0 memcg_offline_kmem.part.44+0x4a/0xc0 mem_cgroup_css_free+0x1ec/0x200 css_free_work_fn+0x49/0x5e0 process_one_work+0x1c5/0x4a0 worker_thread+0x49/0x490 kthread+0xea/0x100 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x40 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160526203018.GG23194@mtj.duckdns.org Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Acked-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@virtuozzo.com> Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [4.5+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

In commit f9476a6 ("drm/i915: Refactor platform specifics out of intel_get_shared_dpll()"), the ibx_get_dpll() function lacked an error check, that can lead to a NULL pointer dereference when trying to enable three pipes. BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000068 IP: [<ffffffffa0482275>] intel_reference_shared_dpll+0x15/0x100 [i915] PGD cec87067 PUD d30ce067 PMD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Modules linked in: snd_hda_intel i915 drm_kms_helper drm intel_gtt sch_fq_codel cfg80211 binfmt_misc i2c_algo_bit cfbfillrect syscopyarea cfbimgblt sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops cfbcopyarea intel_rapl iosf_mbi x86_pkg_temp_thermal coretemp agpgart kvm_intel snd_hda_codec_hdmi kvm iTCO_wdt snd_hda_codec_realtek snd_hda_codec_generic irqbypass aesni_intel aes_x86_64 glue_helper lrw gf128mul ablk_helper cryptd psmouse pcspkr snd_hda_codec i2c_i801 snd_hwdep snd_hda_core snd_pcm snd_timer lpc_ich mfd_core snd soundcore wmi evdev tpm_tis tpm [last unloaded: drm] CPU: 3 PID: 5810 Comm: kms_flip Tainted: G U W 4.6.0-test+ #3 Hardware name: /DZ77BH-55K, BIOS BHZ7710H.86A.0100.2013.0517.0942 05/17/2013 task: ffff8800d3908040 ti: ffff8801166c8000 task.ti: ffff8801166c8000 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa0482275>] [<ffffffffa0482275>] intel_reference_shared_dpll+0x15/0x100 [i915] RSP: 0018:ffff8801166cba60 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000002 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffff8800d07f1bf8 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ffff8801166cba88 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: ffff8800d32e5698 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffff8800cc89ac88 R12: ffff8800d07f1bf8 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007f4c3fc8d8c0(0000) GS:ffff88011bcc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000068 CR3: 00000000d3b4c000 CR4: 00000000001406e0 Stack: 0000000000000000 ffff8800d07f1bf8 0000000000000000 ffff8800d04c0000 0000000000000000 ffff8801166cbaa8 ffffffffa04823a7 ffff8800d07f1bf8 ffff8800d32e5698 ffff8801166cbab8 ffffffffa04840cf ffff8801166cbaf0 Call Trace: [<ffffffffa04823a7>] ibx_get_dpll+0x47/0xa0 [i915] [<ffffffffa04840cf>] intel_get_shared_dpll+0x1f/0x50 [i915] [<ffffffffa046d080>] ironlake_crtc_compute_clock+0x280/0x430 [i915] [<ffffffffa0472ac0>] intel_crtc_atomic_check+0x240/0x320 [i915] [<ffffffffa03da18e>] drm_atomic_helper_check_planes+0x14e/0x1d0 [drm_kms_helper] [<ffffffffa0474a0c>] intel_atomic_check+0x5dc/0x1110 [i915] [<ffffffffa029d3aa>] drm_atomic_check_only+0x14a/0x660 [drm] [<ffffffffa029d086>] ? drm_atomic_set_crtc_for_connector+0x96/0x100 [drm] [<ffffffffa029d8d7>] drm_atomic_commit+0x17/0x60 [drm] [<ffffffffa03dc3b7>] restore_fbdev_mode+0x237/0x260 [drm_kms_helper] [<ffffffffa029c65a>] ? drm_modeset_lock_all_ctx+0x9a/0xb0 [drm] [<ffffffffa03de9b3>] drm_fb_helper_restore_fbdev_mode_unlocked+0x33/0x80 [drm_kms_helper] [<ffffffffa03dea2d>] drm_fb_helper_set_par+0x2d/0x50 [drm_kms_helper] [<ffffffffa03de93a>] drm_fb_helper_hotplug_event+0xaa/0xf0 [drm_kms_helper] [<ffffffffa03de9d6>] drm_fb_helper_restore_fbdev_mode_unlocked+0x56/0x80 [drm_kms_helper] [<ffffffffa0490f72>] intel_fbdev_restore_mode+0x22/0x80 [i915] [<ffffffffa04ba45e>] i915_driver_lastclose+0xe/0x20 [i915] [<ffffffffa02810de>] drm_lastclose+0x2e/0x130 [drm] [<ffffffffa028148c>] drm_release+0x2ac/0x4b0 [drm] [<ffffffff811a6b2d>] __fput+0xed/0x1f0 [<ffffffff811a6c6e>] ____fput+0xe/0x10 [<ffffffff81079156>] task_work_run+0x76/0xb0 [<ffffffff8105aaab>] do_exit+0x3ab/0xc60 [<ffffffff810a145f>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x12f/0x1c0 [<ffffffff8105c67e>] do_group_exit+0x4e/0xc0 [<ffffffff8105c704>] SyS_exit_group+0x14/0x20 [<ffffffff8158bb25>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x18/0xa8 Code: 14 80 48 8d 34 90 b8 01 00 00 00 d3 e0 09 04 b3 5b 41 5c 5d c3 90 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 41 57 41 56 49 89 fe 41 55 41 54 53 <44> 8b 67 68 48 89 f3 48 8b be 08 02 00 00 4c 8b 2e e8 15 9d fd RIP [<ffffffffa0482275>] intel_reference_shared_dpll+0x15/0x100 [i915] RSP <ffff8801166cba60> CR2: 0000000000000068 Cc: Ville Syrjälä <ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com> Cc: drm-intel-fixes@lists.freedesktop.org Reported-by: Ville Syrjälä <ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com> Fixes: f9476a6 ("drm/i915: Refactor platform specifics out of intel_get_shared_dpll()") Signed-off-by: Ander Conselvan de Oliveira <ander.conselvan.de.oliveira@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Ville Syrjälä <ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com> Tested-by: Ville Syrjälä <ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com> Link: http://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/1463748426-5956-1-git-send-email-ander.conselvan.de.oliveira@intel.com (cherry picked from commit bb14316) Signed-off-by: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@intel.com>

The kbuild test robot noticed some problems with the newhaven lcd driver. 1. lcd_of_match is not NULL terminated at line 606 2. Use ARRAY_SIZE instead of dividing sizeof array with sizeof an element 3. Random config test warnings: drivers/built-in.o: In function `brightness_store': >> newhaven_lcd.c:(.text+0xd2225): undefined reference to `i2c_master_send' drivers/built-in.o: In function `lcd_init': >> newhaven_lcd.c:(.init.text+0x8a9e): undefined reference to `i2c_register_driver' drivers/built-in.o: In function `lcd_exit': >> newhaven_lcd.c:(.exit.text+0x439): undefined reference to `i2c_del_driver' drivers/built-in.o: In function `lcd_remove': >> newhaven_lcd.c:(.exit.text+0x462): undefined reference to `i2c_master_send' This patch squashes the two patches they kindly sent us plus adds a Kconfig fix for the warnings in #3 above. Signed-off-by: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Alan Tull <atull@opensource.altera.com>

[ Upstream commit 361cad3 ] We've seen this in a packet capture - I've intermixed what I think was going on. The fix here is to grab the so_lock sooner. 1964379 -> #1 open (for write) reply seqid=1 1964393 -> #2 open (for read) reply seqid=2 __nfs4_close(), state->n_wronly-- nfs4_state_set_mode_locked(), changes state->state = [R] state->flags is [RW] state->state is [R], state->n_wronly == 0, state->n_rdonly == 1 1964398 -> #3 open (for write) call -> because close is already running 1964399 -> downgrade (to read) call seqid=2 (close of #1) 1964402 -> #3 open (for write) reply seqid=3 __update_open_stateid() nfs_set_open_stateid_locked(), changes state->flags state->flags is [RW] state->state is [R], state->n_wronly == 0, state->n_rdonly == 1 new sequence number is exposed now via nfs4_stateid_copy() next step would be update_open_stateflags(), pending so_lock 1964403 -> downgrade reply seqid=2, fails with OLD_STATEID (close of #1) nfs4_close_prepare() gets so_lock and recalcs flags -> send close 1964405 -> downgrade (to read) call seqid=3 (close of #1 retry) __update_open_stateid() gets so_lock * update_open_stateflags() updates state->n_wronly. nfs4_state_set_mode_locked() updates state->state state->flags is [RW] state->state is [RW], state->n_wronly == 1, state->n_rdonly == 1 * should have suppressed the preceding nfs4_close_prepare() from sending open_downgrade 1964406 -> write call 1964408 -> downgrade (to read) reply seqid=4 (close of #1 retry) nfs_clear_open_stateid_locked() state->flags is [R] state->state is [RW], state->n_wronly == 1, state->n_rdonly == 1 1964409 -> write reply (fails, openmode) Signed-off-by: Andrew Elble <aweits@rit.edu> Cc: stable@vger,kernel.org Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>

[ Upstream commit bb431ba ] After thermal zone device registered, as we have not read any temperature before, thus tz->temperature should not be 0, which actually means 0C, and thermal trend is not available. In this case, we need specially handling for the first thermal_zone_device_update(). Both thermal core framework and step_wise governor is enhanced to handle this. And since the step_wise governor is the only one that uses trends, so it's the only thermal governor that needs to be updated. CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org> #3.18+ Tested-by: Manuel Krause <manuelkrause@netscape.net> Tested-by: szegad <szegadlo@poczta.onet.pl> Tested-by: prash <prash.n.rao@gmail.com> Tested-by: amish <ammdispose-arch@yahoo.com> Tested-by: Matthias <morpheusxyz123@yahoo.de> Reviewed-by: Javi Merino <javi.merino@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Zhang Rui <rui.zhang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Chen Yu <yu.c.chen@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>

[ Upstream commit ff140fe ] Current thermal code does not handle system sleep well because 1. the cooling device cooling state may be changed during suspend 2. the previous temperature reading becomes invalid after resumed because it is got before system sleep 3. updating thermal zone device during suspending/resuming is wrong because some devices may have already been suspended or may have not been resumed. Thus, the proper way to do this is to cancel all thermal zone device update requirements during suspend/resume, and after all the devices have been resumed, reset and update every registered thermal zone devices. This also fixes a regression introduced by: Commit 19593a1 ("ACPI / fan: convert to platform driver") Because, with above commit applied, all the fan devices are attached to the acpi_general_pm_domain, and they are turned on by the pm_domain automatically after resume, without the awareness of thermal core. CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org> #3.18+ Reference: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=78201 Reference: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=91411 Tested-by: Manuel Krause <manuelkrause@netscape.net> Tested-by: szegad <szegadlo@poczta.onet.pl> Tested-by: prash <prash.n.rao@gmail.com> Tested-by: amish <ammdispose-arch@yahoo.com> Tested-by: Matthias <morpheusxyz123@yahoo.de> Reviewed-by: Javi Merino <javi.merino@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Zhang Rui <rui.zhang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Chen Yu <yu.c.chen@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>

[ Upstream commit 4511f71 ] When a new cooling device is registered, we need to update the thermal zone to set the new registered cooling device to a proper state. This fixes a problem that the system is cool, while the fan devices are left running on full speed after boot, if fan device is registered after thermal zone device. Here is the history of why current patch looks like this: https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/7273041/ CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org> #3.18+ Reference:https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=92431 Tested-by: Manuel Krause <manuelkrause@netscape.net> Tested-by: szegad <szegadlo@poczta.onet.pl> Tested-by: prash <prash.n.rao@gmail.com> Tested-by: amish <ammdispose-arch@yahoo.com> Reviewed-by: Javi Merino <javi.merino@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Zhang Rui <rui.zhang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Chen Yu <yu.c.chen@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>

[ Upstream commit 3d5fe03 ] We can end up allocating a new compression stream with GFP_KERNEL from within the IO path, which may result is nested (recursive) IO operations. That can introduce problems if the IO path in question is a reclaimer, holding some locks that will deadlock nested IOs. Allocate streams and working memory using GFP_NOIO flag, forbidding recursive IO and FS operations. An example: inconsistent {IN-RECLAIM_FS-W} -> {RECLAIM_FS-ON-W} usage. git/20158 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE1:SE1] takes: (jbd2_handle){+.+.?.}, at: start_this_handle+0x4ca/0x555 {IN-RECLAIM_FS-W} state was registered at: __lock_acquire+0x8da/0x117b lock_acquire+0x10c/0x1a7 start_this_handle+0x52d/0x555 jbd2__journal_start+0xb4/0x237 __ext4_journal_start_sb+0x108/0x17e ext4_dirty_inode+0x32/0x61 __mark_inode_dirty+0x16b/0x60c iput+0x11e/0x274 __dentry_kill+0x148/0x1b8 shrink_dentry_list+0x274/0x44a prune_dcache_sb+0x4a/0x55 super_cache_scan+0xfc/0x176 shrink_slab.part.14.constprop.25+0x2a2/0x4d3 shrink_zone+0x74/0x140 kswapd+0x6b7/0x930 kthread+0x107/0x10f ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70 irq event stamp: 138297 hardirqs last enabled at (138297): debug_check_no_locks_freed+0x113/0x12f hardirqs last disabled at (138296): debug_check_no_locks_freed+0x33/0x12f softirqs last enabled at (137818): __do_softirq+0x2d3/0x3e9 softirqs last disabled at (137813): irq_exit+0x41/0x95 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(jbd2_handle); <Interrupt> lock(jbd2_handle); *** DEADLOCK *** 5 locks held by git/20158: #0: (sb_writers#7){.+.+.+}, at: [<ffffffff81155411>] mnt_want_write+0x24/0x4b #1: (&type->i_mutex_dir_key#2/1){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff81145087>] lock_rename+0xd9/0xe3 #2: (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#11){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff8114f8e2>] lock_two_nondirectories+0x3f/0x6b #3: (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#11/4){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff8114f909>] lock_two_nondirectories+0x66/0x6b #4: (jbd2_handle){+.+.?.}, at: [<ffffffff811e31db>] start_this_handle+0x4ca/0x555 stack backtrace: CPU: 2 PID: 20158 Comm: git Not tainted 4.1.0-rc7-next-20150615-dbg-00016-g8bdf555-dirty #211 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x4c/0x6e mark_lock+0x384/0x56d mark_held_locks+0x5f/0x76 lockdep_trace_alloc+0xb2/0xb5 kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x32/0x1e2 zcomp_strm_alloc+0x25/0x73 [zram] zcomp_strm_multi_find+0xe7/0x173 [zram] zcomp_strm_find+0xc/0xe [zram] zram_bvec_rw+0x2ca/0x7e0 [zram] zram_make_request+0x1fa/0x301 [zram] generic_make_request+0x9c/0xdb submit_bio+0xf7/0x120 ext4_io_submit+0x2e/0x43 ext4_bio_write_page+0x1b7/0x300 mpage_submit_page+0x60/0x77 mpage_map_and_submit_buffers+0x10f/0x21d ext4_writepages+0xc8c/0xe1b do_writepages+0x23/0x2c __filemap_fdatawrite_range+0x84/0x8b filemap_flush+0x1c/0x1e ext4_alloc_da_blocks+0xb8/0x117 ext4_rename+0x132/0x6dc ? mark_held_locks+0x5f/0x76 ext4_rename2+0x29/0x2b vfs_rename+0x540/0x636 SyS_renameat2+0x359/0x44d SyS_rename+0x1e/0x20 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6f [minchan@kernel.org: add stable mark] Signed-off-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com> Acked-by: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org> Cc: Kyeongdon Kim <kyeongdon.kim@lge.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>

[ Upstream commit 09dc9cd ] The code produces the following trace: [1750924.419007] general protection fault: 0000 [#3] SMP [1750924.420364] Modules linked in: nfnetlink autofs4 rpcsec_gss_krb5 nfsv4 dcdbas rfcomm bnep bluetooth nfsd auth_rpcgss nfs_acl dm_multipath nfs lockd scsi_dh sunrpc fscache radeon ttm drm_kms_helper drm serio_raw parport_pc ppdev i2c_algo_bit lpc_ich ipmi_si ib_mthca ib_qib dca lp parport ib_ipoib mac_hid ib_cm i3000_edac ib_sa ib_uverbs edac_core ib_umad ib_mad ib_core ib_addr tg3 ptp dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log psmouse pps_core [1750924.420364] CPU: 1 PID: 8401 Comm: python Tainted: G D 3.13.0-39-generic #66-Ubuntu [1750924.420364] Hardware name: Dell Computer Corporation PowerEdge 860/0XM089, BIOS A04 07/24/2007 [1750924.420364] task: ffff8800366a9800 ti: ffff88007af1c000 task.ti: ffff88007af1c000 [1750924.420364] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa0131d51>] [<ffffffffa0131d51>] qib_mcast_qp_free+0x11/0x50 [ib_qib] [1750924.420364] RSP: 0018:ffff88007af1dd70 EFLAGS: 00010246 [1750924.420364] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffff88007b822688 RCX: 000000000000000f [1750924.420364] RDX: ffff88007b822688 RSI: ffff8800366c15a0 RDI: 6764697200000000 [1750924.420364] RBP: ffff88007af1dd78 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 [1750924.420364] R10: 0000000000000011 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: ffff88007baa1d98 [1750924.420364] R13: ffff88003ecab000 R14: ffff88007b822660 R15: 0000000000000000 [1750924.420364] FS: 00007ffff7fd8740(0000) GS:ffff88007fc80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [1750924.420364] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [1750924.420364] CR2: 00007ffff597c750 CR3: 000000006860b000 CR4: 00000000000007e0 [1750924.420364] Stack: [1750924.420364] ffff88007b822688 ffff88007af1ddf0 ffffffffa0132429 000000007af1de20 [1750924.420364] ffff88007baa1dc8 ffff88007baa0000 ffff88007af1de70 ffffffffa00cb313 [1750924.420364] 00007fffffffde88 0000000000000000 0000000000000008 ffff88003ecab000 [1750924.420364] Call Trace: [1750924.420364] [<ffffffffa0132429>] qib_multicast_detach+0x1e9/0x350 [ib_qib] [1750924.568035] [<ffffffffa00cb313>] ? ib_uverbs_modify_qp+0x323/0x3d0 [ib_uverbs] [1750924.568035] [<ffffffffa0092d61>] ib_detach_mcast+0x31/0x50 [ib_core] [1750924.568035] [<ffffffffa00cc213>] ib_uverbs_detach_mcast+0x93/0x170 [ib_uverbs] [1750924.568035] [<ffffffffa00c61f6>] ib_uverbs_write+0xc6/0x2c0 [ib_uverbs] [1750924.568035] [<ffffffff81312e68>] ? apparmor_file_permission+0x18/0x20 [1750924.568035] [<ffffffff812d4cd3>] ? security_file_permission+0x23/0xa0 [1750924.568035] [<ffffffff811bd214>] vfs_write+0xb4/0x1f0 [1750924.568035] [<ffffffff811bdc49>] SyS_write+0x49/0xa0 [1750924.568035] [<ffffffff8172f7ed>] system_call_fastpath+0x1a/0x1f [1750924.568035] Code: 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 31 c0 5d c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 53 48 89 fb 48 8b 7f 10 <f0> ff 8f 40 01 00 00 74 0e 48 89 df e8 8e f8 06 e1 5b 5d c3 0f [1750924.568035] RIP [<ffffffffa0131d51>] qib_mcast_qp_free+0x11/0x50 [ib_qib] [1750924.568035] RSP <ffff88007af1dd70> [1750924.650439] ---[ end trace 73d5d4b3f8ad4851 ] The fix is to note the qib_mcast_qp that was found. If none is found, then return EINVAL indicating the error. Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Dennis Dalessandro <dennis.dalessandro@intel.com> Reported-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com> Signed-off-by: Mike Marciniszyn <mike.marciniszyn@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>

[ Upstream commit d144dfe ] If we use USB ID pin as wakeup source, and there is a USB block device on this USB OTG (ID) cable, the system will be deadlock after system resume. The root cause for this problem is: the workqueue ci_otg may try to remove hcd before the driver resume has finished, and hcd will disconnect the device on it, then, it will call device_release_driver, and holds the device lock "dev->mutex", but it is never unlocked since it waits workqueue writeback to run to flush the block information, but the workqueue writeback is freezable, it is not thawed before driver resume has finished. When the driver (device: sd 0:0:0:0:) resume goes to dpm_complete, it tries to get its device lock "dev->mutex", but it can't get it forever, then the deadlock occurs. Below call stacks show the situation. So, in order to fix this problem, we need to change workqueue ci_otg as freezable, then the work item in this workqueue will be run after driver's resume, this workqueue will not be blocked forever like above case since the workqueue writeback has been thawed too. Tested at: i.mx6qdl-sabresd and i.mx6sx-sdb. [ 555.178869] kworker/u2:13 D c07de74c 0 826 2 0x00000000 [ 555.185310] Workqueue: ci_otg ci_otg_work [ 555.189353] Backtrace: [ 555.191849] [<c07de4fc>] (__schedule) from [<c07dec6c>] (schedule+0x48/0xa0) [ 555.198912] r10:ee471ba0 r9:00000000 r8:00000000 r7:00000002 r6:ee470000 r5:ee471ba4 [ 555.206867] r4:ee470000 [ 555.209453] [<c07dec24>] (schedule) from [<c07e2fc4>] (schedule_timeout+0x15c/0x1e0) [ 555.217212] r4:7fffffff r3:edc2b000 [ 555.220862] [<c07e2e68>] (schedule_timeout) from [<c07df6c8>] (wait_for_common+0x94/0x144) [ 555.229140] r8:00000000 r7:00000002 r6:ee470000 r5:ee471ba4 r4:7fffffff [ 555.235980] [<c07df634>] (wait_for_common) from [<c07df790>] (wait_for_completion+0x18/0x1c) [ 555.244430] r10:00000001 r9:c0b5563c r8:c0042e48 r7:ef086000 r6:eea4372c r5:ef131b00 [ 555.252383] r4:00000000 [ 555.254970] [<c07df778>] (wait_for_completion) from [<c0043cb8>] (flush_work+0x19c/0x234) [ 555.263177] [<c0043b1c>] (flush_work) from [<c0043fac>] (flush_delayed_work+0x48/0x4c) [ 555.271106] r8:ed5b5000 r7:c0b38a3c r6:eea439cc r5:eea4372c r4:eea4372c [ 555.277958] [<c0043f64>] (flush_delayed_work) from [<c00eae18>] (bdi_unregister+0x84/0xec) [ 555.286236] r4:eea43520 r3:20000153 [ 555.289885] [<c00ead94>] (bdi_unregister) from [<c02c2154>] (blk_cleanup_queue+0x180/0x29c) [ 555.298250] r5:eea43808 r4:eea43400 [ 555.301909] [<c02c1fd4>] (blk_cleanup_queue) from [<c0417914>] (__scsi_remove_device+0x48/0xb8) [ 555.310623] r7:00000000 r6:20000153 r5:ededa950 r4:ededa800 [ 555.316403] [<c04178cc>] (__scsi_remove_device) from [<c0415e90>] (scsi_forget_host+0x64/0x68) [ 555.325028] r5:ededa800 r4:ed5b5000 [ 555.328689] [<c0415e2c>] (scsi_forget_host) from [<c0409828>] (scsi_remove_host+0x78/0x104) [ 555.337054] r5:ed5b5068 r4:ed5b5000 [ 555.340709] [<c04097b0>] (scsi_remove_host) from [<c04cdfcc>] (usb_stor_disconnect+0x50/0xb4) [ 555.349247] r6:ed5b56e4 r5:ed5b5818 r4:ed5b5690 r3:00000008 [ 555.355025] [<c04cdf7c>] (usb_stor_disconnect) from [<c04b3bc8>] (usb_unbind_interface+0x78/0x25c) [ 555.363997] r8:c13919b4 r7:edd3c000 r6:edd3c020 r5:ee551c68 r4:ee551c00 r3:c04cdf7c [ 555.371892] [<c04b3b50>] (usb_unbind_interface) from [<c03dc248>] (__device_release_driver+0x8c/0x118) [ 555.381213] r10:00000001 r9:edd90c00 r8:c13919b4 r7:ee551c68 r6:c0b546e0 r5:c0b5563c [ 555.389167] r4:edd3c020 [ 555.391752] [<c03dc1bc>] (__device_release_driver) from [<c03dc2fc>] (device_release_driver+0x28/0x34) [ 555.401071] r5:edd3c020 r4:edd3c054 [ 555.404721] [<c03dc2d4>] (device_release_driver) from [<c03db304>] (bus_remove_device+0xe0/0x110) [ 555.413607] r5:edd3c020 r4:ef17f04c [ 555.417253] [<c03db224>] (bus_remove_device) from [<c03d8128>] (device_del+0x114/0x21c) [ 555.425270] r6:edd3c028 r5:edd3c020 r4:ee551c00 r3:00000000 [ 555.431045] [<c03d8014>] (device_del) from [<c04b1560>] (usb_disable_device+0xa4/0x1e8) [ 555.439061] r8:edd3c000 r7:eded8000 r6:00000000 r5:00000001 r4:ee551c00 [ 555.445906] [<c04b14bc>] (usb_disable_device) from [<c04a8e54>] (usb_disconnect+0x74/0x224) [ 555.454271] r9:edd90c00 r8:ee551000 r7:ee551c68 r6:ee551c9c r5:ee551c00 r4:00000001 [ 555.462156] [<c04a8de0>] (usb_disconnect) from [<c04a8fb8>] (usb_disconnect+0x1d8/0x224) [ 555.470259] r10:00000001 r9:edd90000 r8:ee471e2c r7:ee551468 r6:ee55149c r5:ee551400 [ 555.478213] r4:00000001 [ 555.480797] [<c04a8de0>] (usb_disconnect) from [<c04ae5ec>] (usb_remove_hcd+0xa0/0x1ac) [ 555.488813] r10:00000001 r9:ee471eb0 r8:00000000 r7:ef3d9500 r6:eded810c r5:eded80b0 [ 555.496765] r4:eded8000 [ 555.499351] [<c04ae54c>] (usb_remove_hcd) from [<c04d4158>] (host_stop+0x28/0x64) [ 555.506847] r6:eeb50010 r5:eded8000 r4:eeb51010 [ 555.511563] [<c04d4130>] (host_stop) from [<c04d09b8>] (ci_otg_work+0xc4/0x124) [ 555.518885] r6:00000001 r5:eeb50010 r4:eeb502a0 r3:c04d4130 [ 555.524665] [<c04d08f4>] (ci_otg_work) from [<c00454f0>] (process_one_work+0x194/0x420) [ 555.532682] r6:ef086000 r5:eeb502a0 r4:edc44480 [ 555.537393] [<c004535c>] (process_one_work) from [<c00457b0>] (worker_thread+0x34/0x514) [ 555.545496] r10:edc44480 r9:ef086000 r8:c0b1a100 r7:ef086034 r6:00000088 r5:edc44498 [ 555.553450] r4:ef086000 [ 555.556032] [<c004577c>] (worker_thread) from [<c004bab4>] (kthread+0xdc/0xf8) [ 555.563268] r10:00000000 r9:00000000 r8:00000000 r7:c004577c r6:edc44480 r5:eddc15c0 [ 555.571221] r4:00000000 [ 555.573804] [<c004b9d8>] (kthread) from [<c000fef0>] (ret_from_fork+0x14/0x24) [ 555.581040] r7:00000000 r6:00000000 r5:c004b9d8 r4:eddc15c0 [ 553.429383] sh D c07de74c 0 694 691 0x00000000 [ 553.435801] Backtrace: [ 553.438295] [<c07de4fc>] (__schedule) from [<c07dec6c>] (schedule+0x48/0xa0) [ 553.445358] r10:edd3c054 r9:edd3c078 r8:edddbd50 r7:edcbbc00 r6:c1377c34 r5:60000153 [ 553.453313] r4:eddda000 [ 553.455896] [<c07dec24>] (schedule) from [<c07deff8>] (schedule_preempt_disabled+0x10/0x14) [ 553.464261] r4:edd3c058 r3:0000000a [ 553.467910] [<c07defe8>] (schedule_preempt_disabled) from [<c07e0bbc>] (mutex_lock_nested+0x1a0/0x3e8) [ 553.477254] [<c07e0a1c>] (mutex_lock_nested) from [<c03e927c>] (dpm_complete+0xc0/0x1b0) [ 553.485358] r10:00561408 r9:edd3c054 r8:c0b4863c r7:edddbd90 r6:c0b485d8 r5:edd3c020 [ 553.493313] r4:edd3c0d0 [ 553.495896] [<c03e91bc>] (dpm_complete) from [<c03e9388>] (dpm_resume_end+0x1c/0x20) [ 553.503652] r9:00000000 r8:c0b1a9d0 r7:c1334ec0 r6:c1334edc r5:00000003 r4:00000010 [ 553.511544] [<c03e936c>] (dpm_resume_end) from [<c0079894>] (suspend_devices_and_enter+0x158/0x504) [ 553.520604] r4:00000000 r3:c1334efc [ 553.524250] [<c007973c>] (suspend_devices_and_enter) from [<c0079e74>] (pm_suspend+0x234/0x2cc) [ 553.532961] r10:00561408 r9:ed6b7300 r8:00000004 r7:c1334eec r6:00000000 r5:c1334ee8 [ 553.540914] r4:00000003 [ 553.543493] [<c0079c40>] (pm_suspend) from [<c0078a6c>] (state_store+0x6c/0xc0) [ 555.703684] 7 locks held by kworker/u2:13/826: [ 555.708140] #0: ("%s""ci_otg"){++++.+}, at: [<c0045484>] process_one_work+0x128/0x420 [ 555.716277] #1: ((&ci->work)){+.+.+.}, at: [<c0045484>] process_one_work+0x128/0x420 [ 555.724317] #2: (usb_bus_list_lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<c04ae5e4>] usb_remove_hcd+0x98/0x1ac [ 555.732626] #3: (&dev->mutex){......}, at: [<c04a8e28>] usb_disconnect+0x48/0x224 [ 555.740403] #4: (&dev->mutex){......}, at: [<c04a8e28>] usb_disconnect+0x48/0x224 [ 555.748179] #5: (&dev->mutex){......}, at: [<c03dc2f4>] device_release_driver+0x20/0x34 [ 555.756487] #6: (&shost->scan_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<c04097d0>] scsi_remove_host+0x20/0x104 Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> #v3.14+ Cc: Jun Li <jun.li@nxp.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Chen <peter.chen@nxp.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>

[ Upstream commit 9b29972 ] Fix null pointer dereference by changing register_cache() to return an int instead of being void. This allows it to return -ENOMEM or -ENODEV and enables upper layers to handle the OOM case without NULL pointer issues. See this thread: http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kernel.bcache.devel/3521 Fixes this error: gargamel:/sys/block/md5/bcache# echo /dev/sdh2 > /sys/fs/bcache/register bcache: register_cache() error opening sdh2: cannot allocate memory BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000000000009b8 IP: [<ffffffffc05a7e8d>] cache_set_flush+0x102/0x15c [bcache] PGD 120dff067 PUD 1119a3067 PMD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: veth ip6table_filter ip6_tables (...) CPU: 4 PID: 3371 Comm: kworker/4:3 Not tainted 4.4.2-amd64-i915-volpreempt-20160213bc1 #3 Hardware name: System manufacturer System Product Name/P8H67-M PRO, BIOS 3904 04/27/2013 Workqueue: events cache_set_flush [bcache] task: ffff88020d5dc280 ti: ffff88020b6f8000 task.ti: ffff88020b6f8000 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffc05a7e8d>] [<ffffffffc05a7e8d>] cache_set_flush+0x102/0x15c [bcache] Signed-off-by: Eric Wheeler <bcache@linux.ewheeler.net> Tested-by: Marc MERLIN <marc@merlins.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>

[ Upstream commit 81ad427 ] In some cases, platform thermal driver may report invalid trip points, thermal core should not take any action for these trip points. This fixed a regression that bogus trip point starts to screw up thermal control on some Lenovo laptops, after commit bb431ba Author: Zhang Rui <rui.zhang@intel.com> Date: Fri Oct 30 16:31:47 2015 +0800 Thermal: initialize thermal zone device correctly After thermal zone device registered, as we have not read any temperature before, thus tz->temperature should not be 0, which actually means 0C, and thermal trend is not available. In this case, we need specially handling for the first thermal_zone_device_update(). Both thermal core framework and step_wise governor is enhanced to handle this. And since the step_wise governor is the only one that uses trends, so it's the only thermal governor that needs to be updated. Tested-by: Manuel Krause <manuelkrause@netscape.net> Tested-by: szegad <szegadlo@poczta.onet.pl> Tested-by: prash <prash.n.rao@gmail.com> Tested-by: amish <ammdispose-arch@yahoo.com> Tested-by: Matthias <morpheusxyz123@yahoo.de> Reviewed-by: Javi Merino <javi.merino@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Zhang Rui <rui.zhang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Chen Yu <yu.c.chen@intel.com> CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org> #3.18+ Link: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1317190 Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=114551 Signed-off-by: Zhang Rui <rui.zhang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>

…pt() [ Upstream commit 7834c10 ] Since 4.4, I've been able to trigger this occasionally: =============================== [ INFO: suspicious RCU usage. ] 4.5.0-rc7-think+ #3 Not tainted Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160315012054.GA17765@codemonkey.org.uk Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> ------------------------------- ./arch/x86/include/asm/msr-trace.h:47 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage! other info that might help us debug this: RCU used illegally from idle CPU! rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 1 RCU used illegally from extended quiescent state! no locks held by swapper/3/0. stack backtrace: CPU: 3 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/3 Not tainted 4.5.0-rc7-think+ #3 ffffffff92f821e0 1f3e5c340597d7fc ffff880468e07f10 ffffffff92560c2a ffff880462145280 0000000000000001 ffff880468e07f40 ffffffff921376a6 ffffffff93665ea0 0000cc7c876d28da 0000000000000005 ffffffff9383dd60 Call Trace: <IRQ> [<ffffffff92560c2a>] dump_stack+0x67/0x9d [<ffffffff921376a6>] lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0xe6/0x100 [<ffffffff925ae7a7>] do_trace_write_msr+0x127/0x1a0 [<ffffffff92061c83>] native_apic_msr_eoi_write+0x23/0x30 [<ffffffff92054408>] smp_trace_call_function_interrupt+0x38/0x360 [<ffffffff92d1ca60>] trace_call_function_interrupt+0x90/0xa0 <EOI> [<ffffffff92ac5124>] ? cpuidle_enter_state+0x1b4/0x520 Move the entering_irq() call before ack_APIC_irq(), because entering_irq() tells the RCU susbstems to end the extended quiescent state, so that the following trace call in ack_APIC_irq() works correctly. Suggested-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Fixes: 4787c36 "x86/tracing: Add irq_enter/exit() in smp_trace_reschedule_interrupt()" Signed-off-by: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>

The renesas-intc-irqpin interrupt controller is cascaded to the GIC. Hence when propagating wake-up settings to its parent interrupt controller, the following lockdep warning is printed: ============================================= [ INFO: possible recursive locking detected ] 4.2.0-armadillo-10725-g50fcd7643c034198 #781 Not tainted --------------------------------------------- s2ram/1179 is trying to acquire lock: (&irq_desc_lock_class){-.-...}, at: [<c005bb54>] __irq_get_desc_lock+0x78/0x94 but task is already holding lock: (&irq_desc_lock_class){-.-...}, at: [<c005bb54>] __irq_get_desc_lock+0x78/0x94 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(&irq_desc_lock_class); lock(&irq_desc_lock_class); *** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation 7 locks held by s2ram/1179: #0: (sb_writers#7){.+.+.+}, at: [<c00c9708>] __sb_start_write+0x64/0xb8 #1: (&of->mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<c0125a00>] kernfs_fop_write+0x78/0x1a0 #2: (s_active#23){.+.+.+}, at: [<c0125a08>] kernfs_fop_write+0x80/0x1a0 #3: (autosleep_lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<c0058244>] pm_autosleep_lock+0x18/0x20 #4: (pm_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<c0057e50>] pm_suspend+0x54/0x248 #5: (&dev->mutex){......}, at: [<c0243a20>] __device_suspend+0xdc/0x240 #6: (&irq_desc_lock_class){-.-...}, at: [<c005bb54>] __irq_get_desc_lock+0x78/0x94 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 1179 Comm: s2ram Not tainted 4.2.0-armadillo-10725-g50fcd7643c034198 Hardware name: Generic R8A7740 (Flattened Device Tree) [<c00129f4>] (dump_backtrace) from [<c0012bec>] (show_stack+0x18/0x1c) [<c0012bd4>] (show_stack) from [<c03f5d94>] (dump_stack+0x20/0x28) [<c03f5d74>] (dump_stack) from [<c00514d4>] (__lock_acquire+0x67c/0x1b88) [<c0050e58>] (__lock_acquire) from [<c0052df8>] (lock_acquire+0x9c/0xbc) [<c0052d5c>] (lock_acquire) from [<c03fb068>] (_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x44/0x58) [<c03fb024>] (_raw_spin_lock_irqsave) from [<c005bb54>] (__irq_get_desc_lock+0x78/0x94 [<c005badc>] (__irq_get_desc_lock) from [<c005c3d8>] (irq_set_irq_wake+0x28/0x100) [<c005c3b0>] (irq_set_irq_wake) from [<c01e50d0>] (intc_irqpin_irq_set_wake+0x24/0x4c) [<c01e50ac>] (intc_irqpin_irq_set_wake) from [<c005c17c>] (set_irq_wake_real+0x3c/0x50 [<c005c140>] (set_irq_wake_real) from [<c005c414>] (irq_set_irq_wake+0x64/0x100) [<c005c3b0>] (irq_set_irq_wake) from [<c02a19b4>] (gpio_keys_suspend+0x60/0xa0) [<c02a1954>] (gpio_keys_suspend) from [<c023b750>] (platform_pm_suspend+0x3c/0x5c) Avoid this false positive by using a separate lockdep class for INTC External IRQ Pin interrupts. Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be> Cc: Grygorii Strashko <grygorii.strashko@ti.com> Cc: Magnus Damm <magnus.damm@gmail.com> Cc: Jason Cooper <jason@lakedaemon.net> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1441798974-25716-3-git-send-email-geert%2Brenesas@glider.be Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> (cherry picked from commit 769b5cf) Signed-off-by: Simon Horman <horms+renesas@verge.net.au>

The renesas-irqc interrupt controller is cascaded to the GIC. Hence when propagating wake-up settings to its parent interrupt controller, the following lockdep warning is printed: ============================================= [ INFO: possible recursive locking detected ] 4.2.0-ape6evm-10725-g50fcd7643c034198 #280 Not tainted --------------------------------------------- s2ram/1072 is trying to acquire lock: (&irq_desc_lock_class){-.-...}, at: [<c008d3fc>] __irq_get_desc_lock+0x58/0x98 but task is already holding lock: (&irq_desc_lock_class){-.-...}, at: [<c008d3fc>] __irq_get_desc_lock+0x58/0x98 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(&irq_desc_lock_class); lock(&irq_desc_lock_class); *** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation 6 locks held by s2ram/1072: #0: (sb_writers#7){.+.+.+}, at: [<c012eb14>] __sb_start_write+0xa0/0xa8 #1: (&of->mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<c019396c>] kernfs_fop_write+0x4c/0x1bc #2: (s_active#24){.+.+.+}, at: [<c0193974>] kernfs_fop_write+0x54/0x1bc #3: (pm_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<c008213c>] pm_suspend+0x10c/0x510 #4: (&dev->mutex){......}, at: [<c02af3c4>] __device_suspend+0xdc/0x2cc #5: (&irq_desc_lock_class){-.-...}, at: [<c008d3fc>] __irq_get_desc_lock+0x58/0x98 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 1072 Comm: s2ram Not tainted 4.2.0-ape6evm-10725-g50fcd7643c034198 #280 Hardware name: Generic R8A73A4 (Flattened Device Tree) [<c0018078>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c00144f0>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14) [<c00144f0>] (show_stack) from [<c0451f14>] (dump_stack+0x88/0x98) [<c0451f14>] (dump_stack) from [<c007b29c>] (__lock_acquire+0x15cc/0x20e4) [<c007b29c>] (__lock_acquire) from [<c007c6e0>] (lock_acquire+0xac/0x12c) [<c007c6e0>] (lock_acquire) from [<c0457c00>] (_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x40/0x54) [<c0457c00>] (_raw_spin_lock_irqsave) from [<c008d3fc>] (__irq_get_desc_lock+0x58/0x98) [<c008d3fc>] (__irq_get_desc_lock) from [<c008ebbc>] (irq_set_irq_wake+0x20/0xf8) [<c008ebbc>] (irq_set_irq_wake) from [<c0260770>] (irqc_irq_set_wake+0x20/0x4c) [<c0260770>] (irqc_irq_set_wake) from [<c008ec28>] (irq_set_irq_wake+0x8c/0xf8) [<c008ec28>] (irq_set_irq_wake) from [<c02cb8c0>] (gpio_keys_suspend+0x74/0xc0) [<c02cb8c0>] (gpio_keys_suspend) from [<c02ae8cc>] (dpm_run_callback+0x54/0x124) Avoid this false positive by using a separate lockdep class for IRQC interrupts. Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be> Cc: Grygorii Strashko <grygorii.strashko@ti.com> Cc: Magnus Damm <magnus.damm@gmail.com> Cc: Jason Cooper <jason@lakedaemon.net> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1441798974-25716-2-git-send-email-geert%2Brenesas@glider.be Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> (cherry picked from commit b137065) Signed-off-by: Simon Horman <horms+renesas@verge.net.au>

The kbuild test robot noticed some problems with the newhaven lcd driver. 1. lcd_of_match is not NULL terminated at line 606 2. Use ARRAY_SIZE instead of dividing sizeof array with sizeof an element 3. Random config test warnings: drivers/built-in.o: In function `brightness_store': >> newhaven_lcd.c:(.text+0xd2225): undefined reference to `i2c_master_send' drivers/built-in.o: In function `lcd_init': >> newhaven_lcd.c:(.init.text+0x8a9e): undefined reference to `i2c_register_driver' drivers/built-in.o: In function `lcd_exit': >> newhaven_lcd.c:(.exit.text+0x439): undefined reference to `i2c_del_driver' drivers/built-in.o: In function `lcd_remove': >> newhaven_lcd.c:(.exit.text+0x462): undefined reference to `i2c_master_send' This patch squashes the two patches they kindly sent us plus adds a Kconfig fix for the warnings in #3 above. Signed-off-by: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Alan Tull <atull@opensource.altera.com>

[ Upstream commit 9b29972 ] Fix null pointer dereference by changing register_cache() to return an int instead of being void. This allows it to return -ENOMEM or -ENODEV and enables upper layers to handle the OOM case without NULL pointer issues. See this thread: http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kernel.bcache.devel/3521 Fixes this error: gargamel:/sys/block/md5/bcache# echo /dev/sdh2 > /sys/fs/bcache/register bcache: register_cache() error opening sdh2: cannot allocate memory BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000000000009b8 IP: [<ffffffffc05a7e8d>] cache_set_flush+0x102/0x15c [bcache] PGD 120dff067 PUD 1119a3067 PMD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: veth ip6table_filter ip6_tables (...) CPU: 4 PID: 3371 Comm: kworker/4:3 Not tainted 4.4.2-amd64-i915-volpreempt-20160213bc1 #3 Hardware name: System manufacturer System Product Name/P8H67-M PRO, BIOS 3904 04/27/2013 Workqueue: events cache_set_flush [bcache] task: ffff88020d5dc280 ti: ffff88020b6f8000 task.ti: ffff88020b6f8000 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffc05a7e8d>] [<ffffffffc05a7e8d>] cache_set_flush+0x102/0x15c [bcache] Signed-off-by: Eric Wheeler <bcache@linux.ewheeler.net> Tested-by: Marc MERLIN <marc@merlins.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>

[ Upstream commit 81ad427 ] In some cases, platform thermal driver may report invalid trip points, thermal core should not take any action for these trip points. This fixed a regression that bogus trip point starts to screw up thermal control on some Lenovo laptops, after commit bb431ba Author: Zhang Rui <rui.zhang@intel.com> Date: Fri Oct 30 16:31:47 2015 +0800 Thermal: initialize thermal zone device correctly After thermal zone device registered, as we have not read any temperature before, thus tz->temperature should not be 0, which actually means 0C, and thermal trend is not available. In this case, we need specially handling for the first thermal_zone_device_update(). Both thermal core framework and step_wise governor is enhanced to handle this. And since the step_wise governor is the only one that uses trends, so it's the only thermal governor that needs to be updated. Tested-by: Manuel Krause <manuelkrause@netscape.net> Tested-by: szegad <szegadlo@poczta.onet.pl> Tested-by: prash <prash.n.rao@gmail.com> Tested-by: amish <ammdispose-arch@yahoo.com> Tested-by: Matthias <morpheusxyz123@yahoo.de> Reviewed-by: Javi Merino <javi.merino@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Zhang Rui <rui.zhang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Chen Yu <yu.c.chen@intel.com> CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org> #3.18+ Link: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1317190 Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=114551 Signed-off-by: Zhang Rui <rui.zhang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>

…pt() [ Upstream commit 7834c10 ] Since 4.4, I've been able to trigger this occasionally: =============================== [ INFO: suspicious RCU usage. ] 4.5.0-rc7-think+ #3 Not tainted Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160315012054.GA17765@codemonkey.org.uk Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> ------------------------------- ./arch/x86/include/asm/msr-trace.h:47 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage! other info that might help us debug this: RCU used illegally from idle CPU! rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 1 RCU used illegally from extended quiescent state! no locks held by swapper/3/0. stack backtrace: CPU: 3 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/3 Not tainted 4.5.0-rc7-think+ #3 ffffffff92f821e0 1f3e5c340597d7fc ffff880468e07f10 ffffffff92560c2a ffff880462145280 0000000000000001 ffff880468e07f40 ffffffff921376a6 ffffffff93665ea0 0000cc7c876d28da 0000000000000005 ffffffff9383dd60 Call Trace: <IRQ> [<ffffffff92560c2a>] dump_stack+0x67/0x9d [<ffffffff921376a6>] lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0xe6/0x100 [<ffffffff925ae7a7>] do_trace_write_msr+0x127/0x1a0 [<ffffffff92061c83>] native_apic_msr_eoi_write+0x23/0x30 [<ffffffff92054408>] smp_trace_call_function_interrupt+0x38/0x360 [<ffffffff92d1ca60>] trace_call_function_interrupt+0x90/0xa0 <EOI> [<ffffffff92ac5124>] ? cpuidle_enter_state+0x1b4/0x520 Move the entering_irq() call before ack_APIC_irq(), because entering_irq() tells the RCU susbstems to end the extended quiescent state, so that the following trace call in ack_APIC_irq() works correctly. Suggested-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Fixes: 4787c36 "x86/tracing: Add irq_enter/exit() in smp_trace_reschedule_interrupt()" Signed-off-by: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>

[ Upstream commit 84a5358 ] The SRv6 layer allows defining HMAC data that can later be used to sign IPv6 Segment Routing Headers. This configuration is realised via netlink through four attributes: SEG6_ATTR_HMACKEYID, SEG6_ATTR_SECRET, SEG6_ATTR_SECRETLEN and SEG6_ATTR_ALGID. Because the SECRETLEN attribute is decoupled from the actual length of the SECRET attribute, it is possible to provide invalid combinations (e.g., secret = "", secretlen = 64). This case is not checked in the code and with an appropriately crafted netlink message, an out-of-bounds read of up to 64 bytes (max secret length) can occur past the skb end pointer and into skb_shared_info: Breakpoint 1, seg6_genl_sethmac (skb=<optimized out>, info=<optimized out>) at net/ipv6/seg6.c:208 208 memcpy(hinfo->secret, secret, slen); (gdb) bt #0 seg6_genl_sethmac (skb=<optimized out>, info=<optimized out>) at net/ipv6/seg6.c:208 #1 0xffffffff81e012e9 in genl_family_rcv_msg_doit (skb=skb@entry=0xffff88800b1f9f00, nlh=nlh@entry=0xffff88800b1b7600, extack=extack@entry=0xffffc90000ba7af0, ops=ops@entry=0xffffc90000ba7a80, hdrlen=4, net=0xffffffff84237580 <init_net>, family=<optimized out>, family=<optimized out>) at net/netlink/genetlink.c:731 #2 0xffffffff81e01435 in genl_family_rcv_msg (extack=0xffffc90000ba7af0, nlh=0xffff88800b1b7600, skb=0xffff88800b1f9f00, family=0xffffffff82fef6c0 <seg6_genl_family>) at net/netlink/genetlink.c:775 #3 genl_rcv_msg (skb=0xffff88800b1f9f00, nlh=0xffff88800b1b7600, extack=0xffffc90000ba7af0) at net/netlink/genetlink.c:792 #4 0xffffffff81dfffc3 in netlink_rcv_skb (skb=skb@entry=0xffff88800b1f9f00, cb=cb@entry=0xffffffff81e01350 <genl_rcv_msg>) at net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2501 #5 0xffffffff81e00919 in genl_rcv (skb=0xffff88800b1f9f00) at net/netlink/genetlink.c:803 #6 0xffffffff81dff6ae in netlink_unicast_kernel (ssk=0xffff888010eec800, skb=0xffff88800b1f9f00, sk=0xffff888004aed000) at net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1319 #7 netlink_unicast (ssk=ssk@entry=0xffff888010eec800, skb=skb@entry=0xffff88800b1f9f00, portid=portid@entry=0, nonblock=<optimized out>) at net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1345 #8 0xffffffff81dff9a4 in netlink_sendmsg (sock=<optimized out>, msg=0xffffc90000ba7e48, len=<optimized out>) at net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1921 ... (gdb) p/x ((struct sk_buff *)0xffff88800b1f9f00)->head + ((struct sk_buff *)0xffff88800b1f9f00)->end $1 = 0xffff88800b1b76c0 (gdb) p/x secret $2 = 0xffff88800b1b76c0 (gdb) p slen $3 = 64 '@' The OOB data can then be read back from userspace by dumping HMAC state. This commit fixes this by ensuring SECRETLEN cannot exceed the actual length of SECRET. Reported-by: Lucas Leong <wmliang.tw@gmail.com> Tested: verified that EINVAL is correctly returned when secretlen > len(secret) Fixes: 4f4853d ("ipv6: sr: implement API to control SR HMAC structure") Signed-off-by: David Lebrun <dlebrun@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 2f44013 ] During stress testing with CONFIG_SMP disabled, KASAN reports as below: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __mutex_lock+0xe5/0xc30 Read of size 8 at addr ffff8881094223f8 by task stress/7789 CPU: 0 PID: 7789 Comm: stress Not tainted 6.0.0-rc1-00002-g0d53d2e882f9 #3 Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 0.5.1 01/01/2011 Call Trace: <TASK> .. __mutex_lock+0xe5/0xc30 .. z_erofs_do_read_page+0x8ce/0x1560 .. z_erofs_readahead+0x31c/0x580 .. Freed by task 7787 kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 kasan_set_track+0x20/0x30 kasan_set_free_info+0x20/0x40 __kasan_slab_free+0x10c/0x190 kmem_cache_free+0xed/0x380 rcu_core+0x3d5/0xc90 __do_softirq+0x12d/0x389 Last potentially related work creation: kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 __kasan_record_aux_stack+0x97/0xb0 call_rcu+0x3d/0x3f0 erofs_shrink_workstation+0x11f/0x210 erofs_shrink_scan+0xdc/0x170 shrink_slab.constprop.0+0x296/0x530 drop_slab+0x1c/0x70 drop_caches_sysctl_handler+0x70/0x80 proc_sys_call_handler+0x20a/0x2f0 vfs_write+0x555/0x6c0 ksys_write+0xbe/0x160 do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 The root cause is that erofs_workgroup_unfreeze() doesn't reset to orig_val thus it causes a race that the pcluster reuses unexpectedly before freeing. Since UP platforms are quite rare now, such path becomes unnecessary. Let's drop such specific-designed path directly instead. Fixes: 73f5c66 ("staging: erofs: fix `erofs_workgroup_{try_to_freeze, unfreeze}'") Reviewed-by: Yue Hu <huyue2@coolpad.com> Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220902045710.109530-1-hsiangkao@linux.alibaba.com Signed-off-by: Gao Xiang <hsiangkao@linux.alibaba.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

* Update SoC FPGA hwmon documentation and devicetrees - Documentation/devicetree/bindings/hwmon/intel,soc64-hwmon.yaml Add additional details about the potential sensor locations available in each device family. - arch/arm64/boot/dts/intel/socfpga_agilex_n6000.dts - arch/arm64/boot/dts/intel/socfpga_agilex_socdk.dts - arch/arm64/boot/dts/intel/socfpga_agilex_socdk_nand.dts Modify the example temperature sensor locations to demonstrate the maximum temperature value rather than the individual diode values. - arch/arm64/boot/dts/intel/socfpga_n5x_socdk.dts Modify the example temperature sensor locations to demonstrate only the main die sensor. This device family does not appear to implement any other temperature sensors. Signed-off-by: Rod Frazer <rod.frazer@intel.com> * Update N5X hwmon documentation and devicetrees - Documentation/devicetree/bindings/hwmon/intel,soc64-hwmon.yaml Update the Voltage Monitor descriptions for the N5X device to align with the descriptions from the N5X documentation. - arch/arm64/boot/dts/intel/socfpga_n5x_socdk.dts Update the Voltage Monitor labels for the N5X device to align with the descriptions from the N5X documentation. Signed-off-by: Rod Frazer <rod.frazer@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Rod Frazer <rod.frazer@intel.com>

This reverts commit 92991a0.

[ Upstream commit 8e93f29 ] The lag_lock is taken from both process and softirq contexts which results lockdep warning[0] about potential deadlock. However, just disabling softirqs by using *_bh spinlock API is not enough since it will cause warning in some contexts where the lock is obtained with hard irqs disabled. To fix the issue save current irq state, disable them before obtaining the lock an re-enable irqs from saved state after releasing it. [0]: [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ================================ [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] WARNING: inconsistent lock state [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] 5.19.0_for_upstream_debug_2022_08_04_16_06 #1 Not tainted [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] -------------------------------- [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] inconsistent {SOFTIRQ-ON-W} -> {IN-SOFTIRQ-W} usage. [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] swapper/0/0 [HC0[0]:SC1[1]:HE1:SE0] takes: [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ffffffffa06dc0d8 (lag_lock){+.?.}-{2:2}, at: mlx5_lag_is_shared_fdb+0x1f/0x120 [mlx5_core] [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] {SOFTIRQ-ON-W} state was registered at: [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] lock_acquire+0x1c1/0x550 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] _raw_spin_lock+0x2c/0x40 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] mlx5_lag_add_netdev+0x13b/0x480 [mlx5_core] [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] mlx5e_nic_enable+0x114/0x470 [mlx5_core] [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] mlx5e_attach_netdev+0x30e/0x6a0 [mlx5_core] [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] mlx5e_resume+0x105/0x160 [mlx5_core] [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] mlx5e_probe+0xac3/0x14f0 [mlx5_core] [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] auxiliary_bus_probe+0x9d/0xe0 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] really_probe+0x1e0/0xaa0 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] __driver_probe_device+0x219/0x480 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] driver_probe_device+0x49/0x130 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] __driver_attach+0x1e4/0x4d0 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] bus_for_each_dev+0x11e/0x1a0 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] bus_add_driver+0x3f4/0x5a0 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] driver_register+0x20f/0x390 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] __auxiliary_driver_register+0x14e/0x260 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] mlx5e_init+0x38/0x90 [mlx5_core] [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] vhost_iotlb_itree_augment_rotate+0xcb/0x180 [vhost_iotlb] [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] do_one_initcall+0xc4/0x400 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] do_init_module+0x18a/0x620 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] load_module+0x563a/0x7040 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] __do_sys_finit_module+0x122/0x1d0 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x90 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] irq event stamp: 3596508 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] hardirqs last enabled at (3596508): [<ffffffff813687c2>] __local_bh_enable_ip+0xa2/0x100 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] hardirqs last disabled at (3596507): [<ffffffff813687da>] __local_bh_enable_ip+0xba/0x100 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] softirqs last enabled at (3596488): [<ffffffff81368a2a>] irq_exit_rcu+0x11a/0x170 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] softirqs last disabled at (3596495): [<ffffffff81368a2a>] irq_exit_rcu+0x11a/0x170 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] other info that might help us debug this: [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] CPU0 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ---- [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] lock(lag_lock); [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] <Interrupt> [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] lock(lag_lock); [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] *** DEADLOCK *** [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] 4 locks held by swapper/0/0: [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] #0: ffffffff84643260 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: mlx5e_napi_poll+0x43/0x20a0 [mlx5_core] [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] #1: ffffffff84643260 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: netif_receive_skb_list_internal+0x2d7/0xd60 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] #2: ffff888144a18b58 (&br->hash_lock){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: br_fdb_update+0x301/0x570 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] #3: ffffffff84643260 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: atomic_notifier_call_chain+0x5/0x1d0 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] stack backtrace: [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.19.0_for_upstream_debug_2022_08_04_16_06 #1 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] Call Trace: [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] <IRQ> [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] dump_stack_lvl+0x57/0x7d [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] mark_lock.part.0.cold+0x5f/0x92 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? lock_chain_count+0x20/0x20 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? unwind_next_frame+0x1c4/0x1b50 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0xcd/0xdb [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? mlx5e_napi_poll+0x4e9/0x20a0 [mlx5_core] [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? mlx5e_napi_poll+0x4e9/0x20a0 [mlx5_core] [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? stack_access_ok+0x1d0/0x1d0 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? start_kernel+0x3a7/0x3c5 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] __lock_acquire+0x1260/0x6720 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? lock_chain_count+0x20/0x20 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? lock_chain_count+0x20/0x20 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? register_lock_class+0x1880/0x1880 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? mark_lock.part.0+0xed/0x3060 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? stack_trace_save+0x91/0xc0 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] lock_acquire+0x1c1/0x550 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? mlx5_lag_is_shared_fdb+0x1f/0x120 [mlx5_core] [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x400/0x400 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? __lock_acquire+0xd6f/0x6720 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] _raw_spin_lock+0x2c/0x40 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? mlx5_lag_is_shared_fdb+0x1f/0x120 [mlx5_core] [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] mlx5_lag_is_shared_fdb+0x1f/0x120 [mlx5_core] [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] mlx5_esw_bridge_rep_vport_num_vhca_id_get+0x1a0/0x600 [mlx5_core] [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? mlx5_esw_bridge_update_work+0x90/0x90 [mlx5_core] [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? lock_acquire+0x1c1/0x550 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] mlx5_esw_bridge_switchdev_event+0x185/0x8f0 [mlx5_core] [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? mlx5_esw_bridge_port_obj_attr_set+0x3e0/0x3e0 [mlx5_core] [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? check_chain_key+0x24a/0x580 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] atomic_notifier_call_chain+0xd7/0x1d0 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] br_switchdev_fdb_notify+0xea/0x100 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? br_switchdev_set_port_flag+0x310/0x310 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] fdb_notify+0x11b/0x150 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] br_fdb_update+0x34c/0x570 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? lock_chain_count+0x20/0x20 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? br_fdb_add_local+0x50/0x50 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? br_allowed_ingress+0x5f/0x1070 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? check_chain_key+0x24a/0x580 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] br_handle_frame_finish+0x786/0x18e0 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? check_chain_key+0x24a/0x580 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? br_handle_local_finish+0x20/0x20 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? __lock_acquire+0xd6f/0x6720 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? sctp_inet_bind_verify+0x4d/0x190 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? xlog_unpack_data+0x2e0/0x310 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? br_handle_local_finish+0x20/0x20 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] br_nf_hook_thresh+0x227/0x380 [br_netfilter] [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? setup_pre_routing+0x460/0x460 [br_netfilter] [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? br_handle_local_finish+0x20/0x20 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? br_nf_pre_routing_ipv6+0x48b/0x69c [br_netfilter] [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] br_nf_pre_routing_finish_ipv6+0x5c2/0xbf0 [br_netfilter] [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? br_handle_local_finish+0x20/0x20 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] br_nf_pre_routing_ipv6+0x4c6/0x69c [br_netfilter] [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? br_validate_ipv6+0x9e0/0x9e0 [br_netfilter] [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? br_nf_forward_arp+0xb70/0xb70 [br_netfilter] [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? br_nf_pre_routing+0xacf/0x1160 [br_netfilter] [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] br_handle_frame+0x8a9/0x1270 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? br_handle_frame_finish+0x18e0/0x18e0 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? register_lock_class+0x1880/0x1880 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? br_handle_local_finish+0x20/0x20 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? bond_handle_frame+0xf9/0xac0 [bonding] [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? br_handle_frame_finish+0x18e0/0x18e0 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] __netif_receive_skb_core+0x7c0/0x2c70 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? check_chain_key+0x24a/0x580 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? generic_xdp_tx+0x5b0/0x5b0 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? __lock_acquire+0xd6f/0x6720 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? register_lock_class+0x1880/0x1880 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? check_chain_key+0x24a/0x580 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] __netif_receive_skb_list_core+0x2d7/0x8a0 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? lock_acquire+0x1c1/0x550 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? process_backlog+0x960/0x960 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x129/0x400 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? kvm_clock_get_cycles+0x14/0x20 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] netif_receive_skb_list_internal+0x5f4/0xd60 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? do_xdp_generic+0x150/0x150 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? mlx5e_poll_rx_cq+0xf6b/0x2960 [mlx5_core] [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? mlx5e_poll_ico_cq+0x3d/0x1590 [mlx5_core] [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] napi_complete_done+0x188/0x710 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] mlx5e_napi_poll+0x4e9/0x20a0 [mlx5_core] [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? __queue_work+0x53c/0xeb0 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] __napi_poll+0x9f/0x540 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] net_rx_action+0x420/0xb70 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? napi_threaded_poll+0x470/0x470 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? __common_interrupt+0x79/0x1a0 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] __do_softirq+0x271/0x92c [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] irq_exit_rcu+0x11a/0x170 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] common_interrupt+0x7d/0xa0 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] </IRQ> [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] <TASK> [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] asm_common_interrupt+0x22/0x40 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] RIP: 0010:default_idle+0x42/0x60 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] Code: c1 83 e0 07 48 c1 e9 03 83 c0 03 0f b6 14 11 38 d0 7c 04 84 d2 75 14 8b 05 6b f1 22 02 85 c0 7e 07 0f 00 2d 80 3b 4a 00 fb f4 <c3> 48 c7 c7 e0 07 7e 85 e8 21 bd 40 fe eb de 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] RSP: 0018:ffffffff84407e18 EFLAGS: 00000242 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffffffff84ec4a68 RCX: 1ffffffff0afc0fc [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] RDX: 0000000000000004 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffffffff835b1fac [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff8884d2c44ac3 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] R10: ffffed109a588958 R11: 00000000ffffffff R12: 0000000000000000 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] R13: ffffffff84efac20 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: dffffc0000000000 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? default_idle_call+0xcc/0x460 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] default_idle_call+0xec/0x460 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] do_idle+0x394/0x450 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? arch_cpu_idle_exit+0x40/0x40 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] cpu_startup_entry+0x19/0x20 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] rest_init+0x156/0x250 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] arch_call_rest_init+0xf/0x15 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] start_kernel+0x3a7/0x3c5 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0xcd/0xdb [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] </TASK> Fixes: ff9b752 ("net/mlx5: Bridge, support LAG") Signed-off-by: Vlad Buslov <vladbu@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Mark Bloch <mbloch@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

commit 7177dd0 upstream. Following process may lead to fs corruption: 1. ext4_create(dir/foo) ext4_add_nondir ext4_add_entry ext4_dx_add_entry a. add_dirent_to_buf ext4_mark_inode_dirty ext4_handle_dirty_metadata // dir inode bh is recorded into journal b. ext4_append // dx_get_count(entries) == dx_get_limit(entries) ext4_bread(EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_CREATE) ext4_getblk ext4_map_blocks ext4_ext_map_blocks ext4_mb_new_blocks dquot_alloc_block dquot_alloc_space_nodirty inode_add_bytes // update dir's i_blocks ext4_ext_insert_extent ext4_ext_dirty // record extent bh into journal ext4_handle_dirty_metadata(bh) // record new block into journal inode->i_size += inode->i_sb->s_blocksize // new size(in mem) c. ext4_handle_dirty_dx_node(bh2) // record dir's new block(dx_node) into journal d. ext4_handle_dirty_dx_node((frame - 1)->bh) e. ext4_handle_dirty_dx_node(frame->bh) f. do_split // ret err! g. add_dirent_to_buf ext4_mark_inode_dirty(dir) // update raw_inode on disk(skipped) 2. fsck -a /dev/sdb drop last block(dx_node) which beyonds dir's i_size. /dev/sdb: recovering journal /dev/sdb contains a file system with errors, check forced. /dev/sdb: Inode 12, end of extent exceeds allowed value (logical block 128, physical block 3938, len 1) 3. fsck -fn /dev/sdb dx_node->entry[i].blk > dir->i_size Pass 2: Checking directory structure Problem in HTREE directory inode 12 (/dir): bad block number 128. Clear HTree index? no Problem in HTREE directory inode 12: block #3 has invalid depth (2) Problem in HTREE directory inode 12: block #3 has bad max hash Problem in HTREE directory inode 12: block #3 not referenced Fix it by marking inode dirty directly inside ext4_append(). Fetch a reproducer in [Link]. Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=216466 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Zhihao Cheng <chengzhihao1@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220911045204.516460-1-chengzhihao1@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit dd80fb2 ] "BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in strncpy+0x30/0x68" Linux-ATF interface is using 16 bytes of SMC payload. In case clock name is longer than 15 bytes, string terminated NULL character will not be received by Linux. Add explicit NULL character at last byte to fix issues when clock name is longer. This fixes below bug reported by KASAN: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in strncpy+0x30/0x68 Read of size 1 at addr ffff0008c89a7410 by task swapper/0/1 CPU: 1 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.4.0-00396-g81ef9e7-dirty #3 Hardware name: Xilinx Versal vck190 Eval board revA (QSPI) (DT) Call trace: dump_backtrace+0x0/0x1e8 show_stack+0x14/0x20 dump_stack+0xd4/0x108 print_address_description.isra.0+0xbc/0x37c __kasan_report+0x144/0x198 kasan_report+0xc/0x18 __asan_load1+0x5c/0x68 strncpy+0x30/0x68 zynqmp_clock_probe+0x238/0x7b8 platform_drv_probe+0x6c/0xc8 really_probe+0x14c/0x418 driver_probe_device+0x74/0x130 __device_attach_driver+0xc4/0xe8 bus_for_each_drv+0xec/0x150 __device_attach+0x160/0x1d8 device_initial_probe+0x10/0x18 bus_probe_device+0xe0/0xf0 device_add+0x528/0x950 of_device_add+0x5c/0x80 of_platform_device_create_pdata+0x120/0x168 of_platform_bus_create+0x244/0x4e0 of_platform_populate+0x50/0xe8 zynqmp_firmware_probe+0x370/0x3a8 platform_drv_probe+0x6c/0xc8 really_probe+0x14c/0x418 driver_probe_device+0x74/0x130 device_driver_attach+0x94/0xa0 __driver_attach+0x70/0x108 bus_for_each_dev+0xe4/0x158 driver_attach+0x30/0x40 bus_add_driver+0x21c/0x2b8 driver_register+0xbc/0x1d0 __platform_driver_register+0x7c/0x88 zynqmp_firmware_driver_init+0x1c/0x24 do_one_initcall+0xa4/0x234 kernel_init_freeable+0x1b0/0x24c kernel_init+0x10/0x110 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18 The buggy address belongs to the page: page:ffff0008f9be1c88 refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 raw: 0008d00000000000 ffff0008f9be1c90 ffff0008f9be1c90 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected addr ffff0008c89a7410 is located in stack of task swapper/0/1 at offset 112 in frame: zynqmp_clock_probe+0x0/0x7b8 this frame has 3 objects: [32, 44) 'response' [64, 80) 'ret_payload' [96, 112) 'name' Memory state around the buggy address: ffff0008c89a7300: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffff0008c89a7380: 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 04 f2 f2 00 00 f2 f2 >ffff0008c89a7400: 00 00 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ^ ffff0008c89a7480: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffff0008c89a7500: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ================================================================== Signed-off-by: Ian Nam <young.kwan.nam@xilinx.com> Signed-off-by: Shubhrajyoti Datta <shubhrajyoti.datta@xilinx.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220510070154.29528-3-shubhrajyoti.datta@xilinx.com Acked-by: Michal Simek <michal.simek@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Stephen Boyd <sboyd@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

commit c3ed222 upstream. Send along the already-allocated fattr along with nfs4_fs_locations, and drop the memcpy of fattr. We end up growing two more allocations, but this fixes up a crash as: PID: 790 TASK: ffff88811b43c000 CPU: 0 COMMAND: "ls" #0 [ffffc90000857920] panic at ffffffff81b9bfde #1 [ffffc900008579c0] do_trap at ffffffff81023a9b #2 [ffffc90000857a10] do_error_trap at ffffffff81023b78 #3 [ffffc90000857a58] exc_stack_segment at ffffffff81be1f45 #4 [ffffc90000857a80] asm_exc_stack_segment at ffffffff81c009de #5 [ffffc90000857b08] nfs_lookup at ffffffffa0302322 [nfs] #6 [ffffc90000857b70] __lookup_slow at ffffffff813a4a5f #7 [ffffc90000857c60] walk_component at ffffffff813a86c4 #8 [ffffc90000857cb8] path_lookupat at ffffffff813a9553 #9 [ffffc90000857cf0] filename_lookup at ffffffff813ab86b Suggested-by: Trond Myklebust <trondmy@hammerspace.com> Fixes: 9558a00 ("NFS: Remove the label from the nfs4_lookup_res struct") Signed-off-by: Benjamin Coddington <bcodding@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 4f40a5b upstream. This was missed in c3ed222 ("NFSv4: Fix free of uninitialized nfs4_label on referral lookup.") and causes a panic when mounting with '-o trunkdiscovery': PID: 1604 TASK: ffff93dac3520000 CPU: 3 COMMAND: "mount.nfs" #0 [ffffb79140f738f8] machine_kexec at ffffffffaec64bee #1 [ffffb79140f73950] __crash_kexec at ffffffffaeda67fd #2 [ffffb79140f73a18] crash_kexec at ffffffffaeda76ed #3 [ffffb79140f73a30] oops_end at ffffffffaec2658d #4 [ffffb79140f73a50] general_protection at ffffffffaf60111e [exception RIP: nfs_fattr_init+0x5] RIP: ffffffffc0c18265 RSP: ffffb79140f73b08 RFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff93dac304a800 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: ffffb79140f73bb0 RSI: ffff93dadc8cbb40 RDI: d03ee11cfaf6bd50 RBP: ffffb79140f73be8 R8: ffffffffc0691560 R9: 0000000000000006 R10: ffff93db3ffd3df8 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff93dac4040000 R13: ffff93dac2848e00 R14: ffffb79140f73b60 R15: ffffb79140f73b30 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #5 [ffffb79140f73b08] _nfs41_proc_get_locations at ffffffffc0c73d53 [nfsv4] #6 [ffffb79140f73bf0] nfs4_proc_get_locations at ffffffffc0c83e90 [nfsv4] #7 [ffffb79140f73c60] nfs4_discover_trunking at ffffffffc0c83fb7 [nfsv4] #8 [ffffb79140f73cd8] nfs_probe_fsinfo at ffffffffc0c0f95f [nfs] #9 [ffffb79140f73da0] nfs_probe_server at ffffffffc0c1026a [nfs] RIP: 00007f6254fce26e RSP: 00007ffc69496ac8 RFLAGS: 00000246 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f6254fce26e RDX: 00005600220a82a0 RSI: 00005600220a64d0 RDI: 00005600220a6520 RBP: 00007ffc69496c50 R8: 00005600220a8710 R9: 003035322e323231 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffc69496c50 R13: 00005600220a8440 R14: 0000000000000010 R15: 0000560020650ef9 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5 CS: 0033 SS: 002b Fixes: c3ed222 ("NFSv4: Fix free of uninitialized nfs4_label on referral lookup.") Signed-off-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com> Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit b740d80 upstream. Syzbot reported the following lockdep splat ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.0.0-rc7-syzkaller-18095-gbbed346d5a96 #0 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ syz-executor307/3029 is trying to acquire lock: ffff0000c02525d8 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: __might_fault+0x54/0xb4 mm/memory.c:5576 but task is already holding lock: ffff0000c958a608 (btrfs-root-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_read_lock fs/btrfs/locking.c:134 [inline] ffff0000c958a608 (btrfs-root-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_tree_read_lock fs/btrfs/locking.c:140 [inline] ffff0000c958a608 (btrfs-root-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_read_lock_root_node+0x13c/0x1c0 fs/btrfs/locking.c:279 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #3 (btrfs-root-00){++++}-{3:3}: down_read_nested+0x64/0x84 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1624 __btrfs_tree_read_lock fs/btrfs/locking.c:134 [inline] btrfs_tree_read_lock fs/btrfs/locking.c:140 [inline] btrfs_read_lock_root_node+0x13c/0x1c0 fs/btrfs/locking.c:279 btrfs_search_slot_get_root+0x74/0x338 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:1637 btrfs_search_slot+0x1b0/0xfd8 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:1944 btrfs_update_root+0x6c/0x5a0 fs/btrfs/root-tree.c:132 commit_fs_roots+0x1f0/0x33c fs/btrfs/transaction.c:1459 btrfs_commit_transaction+0x89c/0x12d8 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:2343 flush_space+0x66c/0x738 fs/btrfs/space-info.c:786 btrfs_async_reclaim_metadata_space+0x43c/0x4e0 fs/btrfs/space-info.c:1059 process_one_work+0x2d8/0x504 kernel/workqueue.c:2289 worker_thread+0x340/0x610 kernel/workqueue.c:2436 kthread+0x12c/0x158 kernel/kthread.c:376 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:860 -> #2 (&fs_info->reloc_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock_common+0xd4/0xca8 kernel/locking/mutex.c:603 __mutex_lock kernel/locking/mutex.c:747 [inline] mutex_lock_nested+0x38/0x44 kernel/locking/mutex.c:799 btrfs_record_root_in_trans fs/btrfs/transaction.c:516 [inline] start_transaction+0x248/0x944 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:752 btrfs_start_transaction+0x34/0x44 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:781 btrfs_create_common+0xf0/0x1b4 fs/btrfs/inode.c:6651 btrfs_create+0x8c/0xb0 fs/btrfs/inode.c:6697 lookup_open fs/namei.c:3413 [inline] open_last_lookups fs/namei.c:3481 [inline] path_openat+0x804/0x11c4 fs/namei.c:3688 do_filp_open+0xdc/0x1b8 fs/namei.c:3718 do_sys_openat2+0xb8/0x22c fs/open.c:1313 do_sys_open fs/open.c:1329 [inline] __do_sys_openat fs/open.c:1345 [inline] __se_sys_openat fs/open.c:1340 [inline] __arm64_sys_openat+0xb0/0xe0 fs/open.c:1340 __invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:38 [inline] invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:52 [inline] el0_svc_common+0x138/0x220 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:142 do_el0_svc+0x48/0x164 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:206 el0_svc+0x58/0x150 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:636 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xf0 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:654 el0t_64_sync+0x18c/0x190 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:581 -> #1 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}-{0:0}: percpu_down_read include/linux/percpu-rwsem.h:51 [inline] __sb_start_write include/linux/fs.h:1826 [inline] sb_start_intwrite include/linux/fs.h:1948 [inline] start_transaction+0x360/0x944 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:683 btrfs_join_transaction+0x30/0x40 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:795 btrfs_dirty_inode+0x50/0x140 fs/btrfs/inode.c:6103 btrfs_update_time+0x1c0/0x1e8 fs/btrfs/inode.c:6145 inode_update_time fs/inode.c:1872 [inline] touch_atime+0x1f0/0x4a8 fs/inode.c:1945 file_accessed include/linux/fs.h:2516 [inline] btrfs_file_mmap+0x50/0x88 fs/btrfs/file.c:2407 call_mmap include/linux/fs.h:2192 [inline] mmap_region+0x7fc/0xc14 mm/mmap.c:1752 do_mmap+0x644/0x97c mm/mmap.c:1540 vm_mmap_pgoff+0xe8/0x1d0 mm/util.c:552 ksys_mmap_pgoff+0x1cc/0x278 mm/mmap.c:1586 __do_sys_mmap arch/arm64/kernel/sys.c:28 [inline] __se_sys_mmap arch/arm64/kernel/sys.c:21 [inline] __arm64_sys_mmap+0x58/0x6c arch/arm64/kernel/sys.c:21 __invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:38 [inline] invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:52 [inline] el0_svc_common+0x138/0x220 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:142 do_el0_svc+0x48/0x164 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:206 el0_svc+0x58/0x150 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:636 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xf0 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:654 el0t_64_sync+0x18c/0x190 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:581 -> #0 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{3:3}: check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3095 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3214 [inline] validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3829 [inline] __lock_acquire+0x1530/0x30a4 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5053 lock_acquire+0x100/0x1f8 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5666 __might_fault+0x7c/0xb4 mm/memory.c:5577 _copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:134 [inline] copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:160 [inline] btrfs_ioctl_get_subvol_rootref+0x3a8/0x4bc fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:3203 btrfs_ioctl+0xa08/0xa64 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:5556 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:870 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:856 [inline] __arm64_sys_ioctl+0xd0/0x140 fs/ioctl.c:856 __invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:38 [inline] invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:52 [inline] el0_svc_common+0x138/0x220 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:142 do_el0_svc+0x48/0x164 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:206 el0_svc+0x58/0x150 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:636 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xf0 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:654 el0t_64_sync+0x18c/0x190 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:581 other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: &mm->mmap_lock --> &fs_info->reloc_mutex --> btrfs-root-00 Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(btrfs-root-00); lock(&fs_info->reloc_mutex); lock(btrfs-root-00); lock(&mm->mmap_lock); *** DEADLOCK *** 1 lock held by syz-executor307/3029: #0: ffff0000c958a608 (btrfs-root-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_read_lock fs/btrfs/locking.c:134 [inline] #0: ffff0000c958a608 (btrfs-root-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_tree_read_lock fs/btrfs/locking.c:140 [inline] #0: ffff0000c958a608 (btrfs-root-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_read_lock_root_node+0x13c/0x1c0 fs/btrfs/locking.c:279 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 3029 Comm: syz-executor307 Not tainted 6.0.0-rc7-syzkaller-18095-gbbed346d5a96 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/30/2022 Call trace: dump_backtrace+0x1c4/0x1f0 arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:156 show_stack+0x2c/0x54 arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:163 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x104/0x16c lib/dump_stack.c:106 dump_stack+0x1c/0x58 lib/dump_stack.c:113 print_circular_bug+0x2c4/0x2c8 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2053 check_noncircular+0x14c/0x154 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2175 check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3095 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3214 [inline] validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3829 [inline] __lock_acquire+0x1530/0x30a4 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5053 lock_acquire+0x100/0x1f8 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5666 __might_fault+0x7c/0xb4 mm/memory.c:5577 _copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:134 [inline] copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:160 [inline] btrfs_ioctl_get_subvol_rootref+0x3a8/0x4bc fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:3203 btrfs_ioctl+0xa08/0xa64 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:5556 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:870 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:856 [inline] __arm64_sys_ioctl+0xd0/0x140 fs/ioctl.c:856 __invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:38 [inline] invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:52 [inline] el0_svc_common+0x138/0x220 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:142 do_el0_svc+0x48/0x164 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:206 el0_svc+0x58/0x150 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:636 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xf0 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:654 el0t_64_sync+0x18c/0x190 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:581 We do generally the right thing here, copying the references into a temporary buffer, however we are still holding the path when we do copy_to_user from the temporary buffer. Fix this by freeing the path before we copy to user space. Reported-by: syzbot+4ef9e52e464c6ff47d9d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.19+ Reviewed-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit 8895617 ] When sending packets between nodes in netns, it calls tipc_lxc_xmit() for peer node to receive the packets where tipc_sk_mcast_rcv()/tipc_sk_rcv() might be called, and it's pretty much like in tipc_rcv(). Currently the local 'node rw lock' is held during calling tipc_lxc_xmit() to protect the peer_net not being freed by another thread. However, when receiving these packets, tipc_node_add_conn() might be called where the peer 'node rw lock' is acquired. Then a dead lock warning is triggered by lockdep detector, although it is not a real dead lock: WARNING: possible recursive locking detected -------------------------------------------- conn_server/1086 is trying to acquire lock: ffff8880065cb020 (&n->lock#2){++--}-{2:2}, \ at: tipc_node_add_conn.cold.76+0xaa/0x211 [tipc] but task is already holding lock: ffff8880065cd020 (&n->lock#2){++--}-{2:2}, \ at: tipc_node_xmit+0x285/0xb30 [tipc] other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(&n->lock#2); lock(&n->lock#2); *** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation 4 locks held by conn_server/1086: #0: ffff8880036d1e40 (sk_lock-AF_TIPC){+.+.}-{0:0}, \ at: tipc_accept+0x9c0/0x10b0 [tipc] #1: ffff8880036d5f80 (sk_lock-AF_TIPC/1){+.+.}-{0:0}, \ at: tipc_accept+0x363/0x10b0 [tipc] #2: ffff8880065cd020 (&n->lock#2){++--}-{2:2}, \ at: tipc_node_xmit+0x285/0xb30 [tipc] #3: ffff888012e13370 (slock-AF_TIPC){+...}-{2:2}, \ at: tipc_sk_rcv+0x2da/0x1b40 [tipc] Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x44/0x5b __lock_acquire.cold.77+0x1f2/0x3d7 lock_acquire+0x1d2/0x610 _raw_write_lock_bh+0x38/0x80 tipc_node_add_conn.cold.76+0xaa/0x211 [tipc] tipc_sk_finish_conn+0x21e/0x640 [tipc] tipc_sk_filter_rcv+0x147b/0x3030 [tipc] tipc_sk_rcv+0xbb4/0x1b40 [tipc] tipc_lxc_xmit+0x225/0x26b [tipc] tipc_node_xmit.cold.82+0x4a/0x102 [tipc] __tipc_sendstream+0x879/0xff0 [tipc] tipc_accept+0x966/0x10b0 [tipc] do_accept+0x37d/0x590 This patch avoids this warning by not holding the 'node rw lock' before calling tipc_lxc_xmit(). As to protect the 'peer_net', rcu_read_lock() should be enough, as in cleanup_net() when freeing the netns, it calls synchronize_rcu() before the free is continued. Also since tipc_lxc_xmit() is like the RX path in tipc_rcv(), it makes sense to call it under rcu_read_lock(). Note that the right lock order must be: rcu_read_lock(); tipc_node_read_lock(n); tipc_node_read_unlock(n); tipc_lxc_xmit(); rcu_read_unlock(); instead of: tipc_node_read_lock(n); rcu_read_lock(); tipc_node_read_unlock(n); tipc_lxc_xmit(); rcu_read_unlock(); and we have to call tipc_node_read_lock/unlock() twice in tipc_node_xmit(). Fixes: f73b128 ("tipc: improve throughput between nodes in netns") Reported-by: Shuang Li <shuali@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/5bdd1f8fee9db695cfff4528a48c9b9d0523fb00.1670110641.git.lucien.xin@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 93c660c ] ASAN reports an use-after-free in btf_dump_name_dups: ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address 0xffff927006db at pc 0xaaaab5dfb618 bp 0xffffdd89b890 sp 0xffffdd89b928 READ of size 2 at 0xffff927006db thread T0 #0 0xaaaab5dfb614 in __interceptor_strcmp.part.0 (test_progs+0x21b614) #1 0xaaaab635f144 in str_equal_fn tools/lib/bpf/btf_dump.c:127 #2 0xaaaab635e3e0 in hashmap_find_entry tools/lib/bpf/hashmap.c:143 #3 0xaaaab635e72c in hashmap__find tools/lib/bpf/hashmap.c:212 #4 0xaaaab6362258 in btf_dump_name_dups tools/lib/bpf/btf_dump.c:1525 #5 0xaaaab636240c in btf_dump_resolve_name tools/lib/bpf/btf_dump.c:1552 #6 0xaaaab6362598 in btf_dump_type_name tools/lib/bpf/btf_dump.c:1567 #7 0xaaaab6360b48 in btf_dump_emit_struct_def tools/lib/bpf/btf_dump.c:912 #8 0xaaaab6360630 in btf_dump_emit_type tools/lib/bpf/btf_dump.c:798 #9 0xaaaab635f720 in btf_dump__dump_type tools/lib/bpf/btf_dump.c:282 #10 0xaaaab608523c in test_btf_dump_incremental tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/btf_dump.c:236 #11 0xaaaab6097530 in test_btf_dump tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/btf_dump.c:875 #12 0xaaaab6314ed0 in run_one_test tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_progs.c:1062 #13 0xaaaab631a0a8 in main tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_progs.c:1697 #14 0xffff9676d214 in __libc_start_main ../csu/libc-start.c:308 #15 0xaaaab5d65990 (test_progs+0x185990) 0xffff927006db is located 11 bytes inside of 16-byte region [0xffff927006d0,0xffff927006e0) freed by thread T0 here: #0 0xaaaab5e2c7c4 in realloc (test_progs+0x24c7c4) #1 0xaaaab634f4a0 in libbpf_reallocarray tools/lib/bpf/libbpf_internal.h:191 #2 0xaaaab634f840 in libbpf_add_mem tools/lib/bpf/btf.c:163 #3 0xaaaab636643c in strset_add_str_mem tools/lib/bpf/strset.c:106 #4 0xaaaab6366560 in strset__add_str tools/lib/bpf/strset.c:157 #5 0xaaaab6352d70 in btf__add_str tools/lib/bpf/btf.c:1519 #6 0xaaaab6353e10 in btf__add_field tools/lib/bpf/btf.c:2032 #7 0xaaaab6084fcc in test_btf_dump_incremental tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/btf_dump.c:232 #8 0xaaaab6097530 in test_btf_dump tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/btf_dump.c:875 #9 0xaaaab6314ed0 in run_one_test tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_progs.c:1062 #10 0xaaaab631a0a8 in main tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_progs.c:1697 #11 0xffff9676d214 in __libc_start_main ../csu/libc-start.c:308 #12 0xaaaab5d65990 (test_progs+0x185990) previously allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0xaaaab5e2c7c4 in realloc (test_progs+0x24c7c4) #1 0xaaaab634f4a0 in libbpf_reallocarray tools/lib/bpf/libbpf_internal.h:191 #2 0xaaaab634f840 in libbpf_add_mem tools/lib/bpf/btf.c:163 #3 0xaaaab636643c in strset_add_str_mem tools/lib/bpf/strset.c:106 #4 0xaaaab6366560 in strset__add_str tools/lib/bpf/strset.c:157 #5 0xaaaab6352d70 in btf__add_str tools/lib/bpf/btf.c:1519 #6 0xaaaab6353ff0 in btf_add_enum_common tools/lib/bpf/btf.c:2070 #7 0xaaaab6354080 in btf__add_enum tools/lib/bpf/btf.c:2102 #8 0xaaaab6082f50 in test_btf_dump_incremental tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/btf_dump.c:162 #9 0xaaaab6097530 in test_btf_dump tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/btf_dump.c:875 #10 0xaaaab6314ed0 in run_one_test tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_progs.c:1062 #11 0xaaaab631a0a8 in main tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_progs.c:1697 #12 0xffff9676d214 in __libc_start_main ../csu/libc-start.c:308 #13 0xaaaab5d65990 (test_progs+0x185990) The reason is that the key stored in hash table name_map is a string address, and the string memory is allocated by realloc() function, when the memory is resized by realloc() later, the old memory may be freed, so the address stored in name_map references to a freed memory, causing use-after-free. Fix it by storing duplicated string address in name_map. Fixes: 919d2b1 ("libbpf: Allow modification of BTF and add btf__add_str API") Signed-off-by: Xu Kuohai <xukuohai@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20221011120108.782373-2-xukuohai@huaweicloud.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

…g the sock [ Upstream commit 3cf7203 ] There is a race condition in vxlan that when deleting a vxlan device during receiving packets, there is a possibility that the sock is released after getting vxlan_sock vs from sk_user_data. Then in later vxlan_ecn_decapsulate(), vxlan_get_sk_family() we will got NULL pointer dereference. e.g. #0 [ffffa25ec6978a38] machine_kexec at ffffffff8c669757 #1 [ffffa25ec6978a90] __crash_kexec at ffffffff8c7c0a4d #2 [ffffa25ec6978b58] crash_kexec at ffffffff8c7c1c48 #3 [ffffa25ec6978b60] oops_end at ffffffff8c627f2b #4 [ffffa25ec6978b80] page_fault_oops at ffffffff8c678fcb #5 [ffffa25ec6978bd8] exc_page_fault at ffffffff8d109542 #6 [ffffa25ec6978c00] asm_exc_page_fault at ffffffff8d200b62 [exception RIP: vxlan_ecn_decapsulate+0x3b] RIP: ffffffffc1014e7b RSP: ffffa25ec6978cb0 RFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000008 RBX: ffff8aa000888000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 000000000000000e RSI: ffff8a9fc7ab803e RDI: ffff8a9fd1168700 RBP: ffff8a9fc7ab803e R8: 0000000000700000 R9: 00000000000010ae R10: ffff8a9fcb748980 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8a9fd1168700 R13: ffff8aa000888000 R14: 00000000002a0000 R15: 00000000000010ae ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #7 [ffffa25ec6978ce8] vxlan_rcv at ffffffffc10189cd [vxlan] #8 [ffffa25ec6978d90] udp_queue_rcv_one_skb at ffffffff8cfb6507 #9 [ffffa25ec6978dc0] udp_unicast_rcv_skb at ffffffff8cfb6e45 #10 [ffffa25ec6978dc8] __udp4_lib_rcv at ffffffff8cfb8807 #11 [ffffa25ec6978e20] ip_protocol_deliver_rcu at ffffffff8cf76951 #12 [ffffa25ec6978e48] ip_local_deliver at ffffffff8cf76bde #13 [ffffa25ec6978ea0] __netif_receive_skb_one_core at ffffffff8cecde9b #14 [ffffa25ec6978ec8] process_backlog at ffffffff8cece139 #15 [ffffa25ec6978f00] __napi_poll at ffffffff8ceced1a #16 [ffffa25ec6978f28] net_rx_action at ffffffff8cecf1f3 #17 [ffffa25ec6978fa0] __softirqentry_text_start at ffffffff8d4000ca #18 [ffffa25ec6978ff0] do_softirq at ffffffff8c6fbdc3 Reproducer: https://github.com/Mellanox/ovs-tests/blob/master/test-ovs-vxlan-remove-tunnel-during-traffic.sh Fix this by waiting for all sk_user_data reader to finish before releasing the sock. Reported-by: Jianlin Shi <jishi@redhat.com> Suggested-by: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com> Fixes: 6a93cc9 ("udp-tunnel: Add a few more UDP tunnel APIs") Signed-off-by: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

@m

commit 11933cf upstream. The propagate_mnt() function handles mount propagation when creating mounts and propagates the source mount tree @source_mnt to all applicable nodes of the destination propagation mount tree headed by @dest_mnt. Unfortunately it contains a bug where it fails to terminate at peers of @source_mnt when looking up copies of the source mount that become masters for copies of the source mount tree mounted on top of slaves in the destination propagation tree causing a NULL dereference. Once the mechanics of the bug are understood it's easy to trigger. Because of unprivileged user namespaces it is available to unprivileged users. While fixing this bug we've gotten confused multiple times due to unclear terminology or missing concepts. So let's start this with some clarifications: * The terms "master" or "peer" denote a shared mount. A shared mount belongs to a peer group. * A peer group is a set of shared mounts that propagate to each other. They are identified by a peer group id. The peer group id is available in @shared_mnt->mnt_group_id. Shared mounts within the same peer group have the same peer group id. The peers in a peer group can be reached via @shared_mnt->mnt_share. * The terms "slave mount" or "dependent mount" denote a mount that receives propagation from a peer in a peer group. IOW, shared mounts may have slave mounts and slave mounts have shared mounts as their master. Slave mounts of a given peer in a peer group are listed on that peers slave list available at @shared_mnt->mnt_slave_list. * The term "master mount" denotes a mount in a peer group. IOW, it denotes a shared mount or a peer mount in a peer group. The term "master mount" - or "master" for short - is mostly used when talking in the context of slave mounts that receive propagation from a master mount. A master mount of a slave identifies the closest peer group a slave mount receives propagation from. The master mount of a slave can be identified via @slave_mount->mnt_master. Different slaves may point to different masters in the same peer group. * Multiple peers in a peer group can have non-empty ->mnt_slave_lists. Non-empty ->mnt_slave_lists of peers don't intersect. Consequently, to ensure all slave mounts of a peer group are visited the ->mnt_slave_lists of all peers in a peer group have to be walked. * Slave mounts point to a peer in the closest peer group they receive propagation from via @slave_mnt->mnt_master (see above). Together with these peers they form a propagation group (see below). The closest peer group can thus be identified through the peer group id @slave_mnt->mnt_master->mnt_group_id of the peer/master that a slave mount receives propagation from. * A shared-slave mount is a slave mount to a peer group pg1 while also a peer in another peer group pg2. IOW, a peer group may receive propagation from another peer group. If a peer group pg1 is a slave to another peer group pg2 then all peers in peer group pg1 point to the same peer in peer group pg2 via ->mnt_master. IOW, all peers in peer group pg1 appear on the same ->mnt_slave_list. IOW, they cannot be slaves to different peer groups. * A pure slave mount is a slave mount that is a slave to a peer group but is not a peer in another peer group. * A propagation group denotes the set of mounts consisting of a single peer group pg1 and all slave mounts and shared-slave mounts that point to a peer in that peer group via ->mnt_master. IOW, all slave mounts such that @slave_mnt->mnt_master->mnt_group_id is equal to @shared_mnt->mnt_group_id. The concept of a propagation group makes it easier to talk about a single propagation level in a propagation tree. For example, in propagate_mnt() the immediate peers of @dest_mnt and all slaves of @dest_mnt's peer group form a propagation group propg1. So a shared-slave mount that is a slave in propg1 and that is a peer in another peer group pg2 forms another propagation group propg2 together with all slaves that point to that shared-slave mount in their ->mnt_master. * A propagation tree refers to all mounts that receive propagation starting from a specific shared mount. For example, for propagate_mnt() @dest_mnt is the start of a propagation tree. The propagation tree ecompasses all mounts that receive propagation from @dest_mnt's peer group down to the leafs. With that out of the way let's get to the actual algorithm. We know that @dest_mnt is guaranteed to be a pure shared mount or a shared-slave mount. This is guaranteed by a check in attach_recursive_mnt(). So propagate_mnt() will first propagate the source mount tree to all peers in @dest_mnt's peer group: for (n = next_peer(dest_mnt); n != dest_mnt; n = next_peer(n)) { ret = propagate_one(n); if (ret) goto out; } Notice, that the peer propagation loop of propagate_mnt() doesn't propagate @dest_mnt itself. @dest_mnt is mounted directly in attach_recursive_mnt() after we propagated to the destination propagation tree. The mount that will be mounted on top of @dest_mnt is @source_mnt. This copy was created earlier even before we entered attach_recursive_mnt() and doesn't concern us a lot here. It's just important to notice that when propagate_mnt() is called @source_mnt will not yet have been mounted on top of @dest_mnt. Thus, @source_mnt->mnt_parent will either still point to @source_mnt or - in the case @source_mnt is moved and thus already attached - still to its former parent. For each peer @m in @dest_mnt's peer group propagate_one() will create a new copy of the source mount tree and mount that copy @child on @m such that @child->mnt_parent points to @m after propagate_one() returns. propagate_one() will stash the last destination propagation node @m in @last_dest and the last copy it created for the source mount tree in @last_source. Hence, if we call into propagate_one() again for the next destination propagation node @m, @last_dest will point to the previous destination propagation node and @last_source will point to the previous copy of the source mount tree and mounted on @last_dest. Each new copy of the source mount tree is created from the previous copy of the source mount tree. This will become important later. The peer loop in propagate_mnt() is straightforward. We iterate through the peers copying and updating @last_source and @last_dest as we go through them and mount each copy of the source mount tree @child on a peer @m in @dest_mnt's peer group. After propagate_mnt() handled the peers in @dest_mnt's peer group propagate_mnt() will propagate the source mount tree down the propagation tree that @dest_mnt's peer group propagates to: for (m = next_group(dest_mnt, dest_mnt); m; m = next_group(m, dest_mnt)) { /* everything in that slave group */ n = m; do { ret = propagate_one(n); if (ret) goto out; n = next_peer(n); } while (n != m); } The next_group() helper will recursively walk the destination propagation tree, descending into each propagation group of the propagation tree. The important part is that it takes care to propagate the source mount tree to all peers in the peer group of a propagation group before it propagates to the slaves to those peers in the propagation group. IOW, it creates and mounts copies of the source mount tree that become masters before it creates and mounts copies of the source mount tree that become slaves to these masters. It is important to remember that propagating the source mount tree to each mount @m in the destination propagation tree simply means that we create and mount new copies @child of the source mount tree on @m such that @child->mnt_parent points to @m. Since we know that each node @m in the destination propagation tree headed by @dest_mnt's peer group will be overmounted with a copy of the source mount tree and since we know that the propagation properties of each copy of the source mount tree we create and mount at @m will mostly mirror the propagation properties of @m. We can use that information to create and mount the copies of the source mount tree that become masters before their slaves. The easy case is always when @m and @last_dest are peers in a peer group of a given propagation group. In that case we know that we can simply copy @last_source without having to figure out what the master for the new copy @child of the source mount tree needs to be as we've done that in a previous call to propagate_one(). The hard case is when we're dealing with a slave mount or a shared-slave mount @m in a destination propagation group that we need to create and mount a copy of the source mount tree on. For each propagation group in the destination propagation tree we propagate the source mount tree to we want to make sure that the copies @child of the source mount tree we create and mount on slaves @m pick an ealier copy of the source mount tree that we mounted on a master @m of the destination propagation group as their master. This is a mouthful but as far as we can tell that's the core of it all. But, if we keep track of the masters in the destination propagation tree @m we can use the information to find the correct master for each copy of the source mount tree we create and mount at the slaves in the destination propagation tree @m. Let's walk through the base case as that's still fairly easy to grasp. If we're dealing with the first slave in the propagation group that @dest_mnt is in then we don't yet have marked any masters in the destination propagation tree. We know the master for the first slave to @dest_mnt's peer group is simple @dest_mnt. So we expect this algorithm to yield a copy of the source mount tree that was mounted on a peer in @dest_mnt's peer group as the master for the copy of the source mount tree we want to mount at the first slave @m: for (n = m; ; n = p) { p = n->mnt_master; if (p == dest_master || IS_MNT_MARKED(p)) break; } For the first slave we walk the destination propagation tree all the way up to a peer in @dest_mnt's peer group. IOW, the propagation hierarchy can be walked by walking up the @mnt->mnt_master hierarchy of the destination propagation tree @m. We will ultimately find a peer in @dest_mnt's peer group and thus ultimately @dest_mnt->mnt_master. Btw, here the assumption we listed at the beginning becomes important. Namely, that peers in a peer group pg1 that are slaves in another peer group pg2 appear on the same ->mnt_slave_list. IOW, all slaves who are peers in peer group pg1 point to the same peer in peer group pg2 via their ->mnt_master. Otherwise the termination condition in the code above would be wrong and next_group() would be broken too. So the first iteration sets: n = m; p = n->mnt_master; such that @p now points to a peer or @dest_mnt itself. We walk up one more level since we don't have any marked mounts. So we end up with: n = dest_mnt; p = dest_mnt->mnt_master; If @dest_mnt's peer group is not slave to another peer group then @p is now NULL. If @dest_mnt's peer group is a slave to another peer group then @p now points to @dest_mnt->mnt_master points which is a master outside the propagation tree we're dealing with. Now we need to figure out the master for the copy of the source mount tree we're about to create and mount on the first slave of @dest_mnt's peer group: do { struct mount *parent = last_source->mnt_parent; if (last_source == first_source) break; done = parent->mnt_master == p; if (done && peers(n, parent)) break; last_source = last_source->mnt_master; } while (!done); We know that @last_source->mnt_parent points to @last_dest and @last_dest is the last peer in @dest_mnt's peer group we propagated to in the peer loop in propagate_mnt(). Consequently, @last_source is the last copy we created and mount on that last peer in @dest_mnt's peer group. So @last_source is the master we want to pick. We know that @last_source->mnt_parent->mnt_master points to @last_dest->mnt_master. We also know that @last_dest->mnt_master is either NULL or points to a master outside of the destination propagation tree and so does @p. Hence: done = parent->mnt_master == p; is trivially true in the base condition. We also know that for the first slave mount of @dest_mnt's peer group that @last_dest either points @dest_mnt itself because it was initialized to: last_dest = dest_mnt; at the beginning of propagate_mnt() or it will point to a peer of @dest_mnt in its peer group. In both cases it is guaranteed that on the first iteration @n and @parent are peers (Please note the check for peers here as that's important.): if (done && peers(n, parent)) break; So, as we expected, we select @last_source, which referes to the last copy of the source mount tree we mounted on the last peer in @dest_mnt's peer group, as the master of the first slave in @dest_mnt's peer group. The rest is taken care of by clone_mnt(last_source, ...). We'll skip over that part otherwise this becomes a blogpost. At the end of propagate_mnt() we now mark @m->mnt_master as the first master in the destination propagation tree that is distinct from @dest_mnt->mnt_master. IOW, we mark @dest_mnt itself as a master. By marking @dest_mnt or one of it's peers we are able to easily find it again when we later lookup masters for other copies of the source mount tree we mount copies of the source mount tree on slaves @m to @dest_mnt's peer group. This, in turn allows us to find the master we selected for the copies of the source mount tree we mounted on master in the destination propagation tree again. The important part is to realize that the code makes use of the fact that the last copy of the source mount tree stashed in @last_source was mounted on top of the previous destination propagation node @last_dest. What this means is that @last_source allows us to walk the destination propagation hierarchy the same way each destination propagation node @m does. If we take @last_source, which is the copy of @source_mnt we have mounted on @last_dest in the previous iteration of propagate_one(), then we know @last_source->mnt_parent points to @last_dest but we also know that as we walk through the destination propagation tree that @last_source->mnt_master will point to an earlier copy of the source mount tree we mounted one an earlier destination propagation node @m. IOW, @last_source->mnt_parent will be our hook into the destination propagation tree and each consecutive @last_source->mnt_master will lead us to an earlier propagation node @m via @last_source->mnt_master->mnt_parent. Hence, by walking up @last_source->mnt_master, each of which is mounted on a node that is a master @m in the destination propagation tree we can also walk up the destination propagation hierarchy. So, for each new destination propagation node @m we use the previous copy of @last_source and the fact it's mounted on the previous propagation node @last_dest via @last_source->mnt_master->mnt_parent to determine what the master of the new copy of @last_source needs to be. The goal is to find the _closest_ master that the new copy of the source mount tree we are about to create and mount on a slave @m in the destination propagation tree needs to pick. IOW, we want to find a suitable master in the propagation group. As the propagation structure of the source mount propagation tree we create mirrors the propagation structure of the destination propagation tree we can find @m's closest master - i.e., a marked master - which is a peer in the closest peer group that @m receives propagation from. We store that closest master of @m in @p as before and record the slave to that master in @n We then search for this master @p via @last_source by walking up the master hierarchy starting from the last copy of the source mount tree stored in @last_source that we created and mounted on the previous destination propagation node @m. We will try to find the master by walking @last_source->mnt_master and by comparing @last_source->mnt_master->mnt_parent->mnt_master to @p. If we find @p then we can figure out what earlier copy of the source mount tree needs to be the master for the new copy of the source mount tree we're about to create and mount at the current destination propagation node @m. If @last_source->mnt_master->mnt_parent and @n are peers then we know that the closest master they receive propagation from is @last_source->mnt_master->mnt_parent->mnt_master. If not then the closest immediate peer group that they receive propagation from must be one level higher up. This builds on the earlier clarification at the beginning that all peers in a peer group which are slaves of other peer groups all point to the same ->mnt_master, i.e., appear on the same ->mnt_slave_list, of the closest peer group that they receive propagation from. However, terminating the walk has corner cases. If the closest marked master for a given destination node @m cannot be found by walking up the master hierarchy via @last_source->mnt_master then we need to terminate the walk when we encounter @source_mnt again. This isn't an arbitrary termination. It simply means that the new copy of the source mount tree we're about to create has a copy of the source mount tree we created and mounted on a peer in @dest_mnt's peer group as its master. IOW, @source_mnt is the peer in the closest peer group that the new copy of the source mount tree receives propagation from. We absolutely have to stop @source_mnt because @last_source->mnt_master either points outside the propagation hierarchy we're dealing with or it is NULL because @source_mnt isn't a shared-slave. So continuing the walk past @source_mnt would cause a NULL dereference via @last_source->mnt_master->mnt_parent. And so we have to stop the walk when we encounter @source_mnt again. One scenario where this can happen is when we first handled a series of slaves of @dest_mnt's peer group and then encounter peers in a new peer group that is a slave to @dest_mnt's peer group. We handle them and then we encounter another slave mount to @dest_mnt that is a pure slave to @dest_mnt's peer group. That pure slave will have a peer in @dest_mnt's peer group as its master. Consequently, the new copy of the source mount tree will need to have @source_mnt as it's master. So we walk the propagation hierarchy all the way up to @source_mnt based on @last_source->mnt_master. So terminate on @source_mnt, easy peasy. Except, that the check misses something that the rest of the algorithm already handles. If @dest_mnt has peers in it's peer group the peer loop in propagate_mnt(): for (n = next_peer(dest_mnt); n != dest_mnt; n = next_peer(n)) { ret = propagate_one(n); if (ret) goto out; } will consecutively update @last_source with each previous copy of the source mount tree we created and mounted at the previous peer in @dest_mnt's peer group. So after that loop terminates @last_source will point to whatever copy of the source mount tree was created and mounted on the last peer in @dest_mnt's peer group. Furthermore, if there is even a single additional peer in @dest_mnt's peer group then @last_source will __not__ point to @source_mnt anymore. Because, as we mentioned above, @dest_mnt isn't even handled in this loop but directly in attach_recursive_mnt(). So it can't even accidently come last in that peer loop. So the first time we handle a slave mount @m of @dest_mnt's peer group the copy of the source mount tree we create will make the __last copy of the source mount tree we created and mounted on the last peer in @dest_mnt's peer group the master of the new copy of the source mount tree we create and mount on the first slave of @dest_mnt's peer group__. But this means that the termination condition that checks for @source_mnt is wrong. The @source_mnt cannot be found anymore by propagate_one(). Instead it will find the last copy of the source mount tree we created and mounted for the last peer of @dest_mnt's peer group again. And that is a peer of @source_mnt not @source_mnt itself. IOW, we fail to terminate the loop correctly and ultimately dereference @last_source->mnt_master->mnt_parent. When @source_mnt's peer group isn't slave to another peer group then @last_source->mnt_master is NULL causing the splat below. For example, assume @dest_mnt is a pure shared mount and has three peers in its peer group: =================================================================================== mount-id mount-parent-id peer-group-id =================================================================================== (@dest_mnt) mnt_master[216] 309 297 shared:216 \ (@source_mnt) mnt_master[218]: 609 609 shared:218 (1) mnt_master[216]: 607 605 shared:216 \ (P1) mnt_master[218]: 624 607 shared:218 (2) mnt_master[216]: 576 574 shared:216 \ (P2) mnt_master[218]: 625 576 shared:218 (3) mnt_master[216]: 545 543 shared:216 \ (P3) mnt_master[218]: 626 545 shared:218 After this sequence has been processed @last_source will point to (P3), the copy generated for the third peer in @dest_mnt's peer group we handled. So the copy of the source mount tree (P4) we create and mount on the first slave of @dest_mnt's peer group: =================================================================================== mount-id mount-parent-id peer-group-id =================================================================================== mnt_master[216] 309 297 shared:216 / / (S0) mnt_slave 483 481 master:216 \ \ (P3) mnt_master[218] 626 545 shared:218 \ / \/ (P4) mnt_slave 627 483 master:218 will pick the last copy of the source mount tree (P3) as master, not (S0). When walking the propagation hierarchy via @last_source's master hierarchy we encounter (P3) but not (S0), i.e., @source_mnt. We can fix this in multiple ways: (1) By setting @last_source to @source_mnt after we processed the peers in @dest_mnt's peer group right after the peer loop in propagate_mnt(). (2) By changing the termination condition that relies on finding exactly @source_mnt to finding a peer of @source_mnt. (3) By only moving @last_source when we actually venture into a new peer group or some clever variant thereof. The first two options are minimally invasive and what we want as a fix. The third option is more intrusive but something we'd like to explore in the near future. This passes all LTP tests and specifically the mount propagation testsuite part of it. It also holds up against all known reproducers of this issues. Final words. First, this is a clever but __worringly__ underdocumented algorithm. There isn't a single detailed comment to be found in next_group(), propagate_one() or anywhere else in that file for that matter. This has been a giant pain to understand and work through and a bug like this is insanely difficult to fix without a detailed understanding of what's happening. Let's not talk about the amount of time that was sunk into fixing this. Second, all the cool kids with access to unshare --mount --user --map-root --propagation=unchanged are going to have a lot of fun. IOW, triggerable by unprivileged users while namespace_lock() lock is held. [ 115.848393] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000010 [ 115.848967] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 115.849386] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 115.849803] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 115.850012] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI [ 115.850354] CPU: 0 PID: 15591 Comm: mount Not tainted 6.1.0-rc7 #3 [ 115.850851] Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006 [ 115.851510] RIP: 0010:propagate_one.part.0+0x7f/0x1a0 [ 115.851924] Code: 75 eb 4c 8b 05 c2 25 37 02 4c 89 ca 48 8b 4a 10 49 39 d0 74 1e 48 3b 81 e0 00 00 00 74 26 48 8b 92 e0 00 00 00 be 01 00 00 00 <48> 8b 4a 10 49 39 d0 75 e2 40 84 f6 74 38 4c 89 05 84 25 37 02 4d [ 115.853441] RSP: 0018:ffffb8d5443d7d50 EFLAGS: 00010282 [ 115.853865] RAX: ffff8e4d87c41c80 RBX: ffff8e4d88ded780 RCX: ffff8e4da4333a00 [ 115.854458] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff8e4d88ded780 [ 115.855044] RBP: ffff8e4d88ded780 R08: ffff8e4da4338000 R09: ffff8e4da43388c0 [ 115.855693] R10: 0000000000000002 R11: ffffb8d540158000 R12: ffffb8d5443d7da8 [ 115.856304] R13: ffff8e4d88ded780 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 115.856859] FS: 00007f92c90c9800(0000) GS:ffff8e4dfdc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 115.857531] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 115.858006] CR2: 0000000000000010 CR3: 0000000022f4c002 CR4: 00000000000706f0 [ 115.858598] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 115.859393] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 115.860099] Call Trace: [ 115.860358] <TASK> [ 115.860535] propagate_mnt+0x14d/0x190 [ 115.860848] attach_recursive_mnt+0x274/0x3e0 [ 115.861212] path_mount+0x8c8/0xa60 [ 115.861503] __x64_sys_mount+0xf6/0x140 [ 115.861819] do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x80 [ 115.862117] ? do_faccessat+0x123/0x250 [ 115.862435] ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x17/0x40 [ 115.862826] ? do_syscall_64+0x67/0x80 [ 115.863133] ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x17/0x40 [ 115.863527] ? do_syscall_64+0x67/0x80 [ 115.863835] ? do_syscall_64+0x67/0x80 [ 115.864144] ? do_syscall_64+0x67/0x80 [ 115.864452] ? exc_page_fault+0x70/0x170 [ 115.864775] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd [ 115.865187] RIP: 0033:0x7f92c92b0ebe [ 115.865480] Code: 48 8b 0d 75 4f 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 49 89 ca b8 a5 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 42 4f 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 [ 115.866984] RSP: 002b:00007fff000aa728 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5 [ 115.867607] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055a77888d6b0 RCX: 00007f92c92b0ebe [ 115.868240] RDX: 000055a77888d8e0 RSI: 000055a77888e6e0 RDI: 000055a77888e620 [ 115.868823] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001 [ 115.869403] R10: 0000000000001000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000055a77888e620 [ 115.869994] R13: 000055a77888d8e0 R14: 00000000ffffffff R15: 00007f92c93e4076 [ 115.870581] </TASK> [ 115.870763] Modules linked in: nft_fib_inet nft_fib_ipv4 nft_fib_ipv6 nft_fib nft_reject_inet nf_reject_ipv4 nf_reject_ipv6 nft_reject nft_ct nft_chain_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 ip_set rfkill nf_tables nfnetlink qrtr snd_intel8x0 sunrpc snd_ac97_codec ac97_bus snd_pcm snd_timer intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common snd vboxguest intel_powerclamp video rapl joydev soundcore i2c_piix4 wmi fuse zram xfs vmwgfx crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel polyval_clmulni polyval_generic drm_ttm_helper ttm e1000 ghash_clmulni_intel serio_raw ata_generic pata_acpi scsi_dh_rdac scsi_dh_emc scsi_dh_alua dm_multipath [ 115.875288] CR2: 0000000000000010 [ 115.875641] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [ 115.876135] RIP: 0010:propagate_one.part.0+0x7f/0x1a0 [ 115.876551] Code: 75 eb 4c 8b 05 c2 25 37 02 4c 89 ca 48 8b 4a 10 49 39 d0 74 1e 48 3b 81 e0 00 00 00 74 26 48 8b 92 e0 00 00 00 be 01 00 00 00 <48> 8b 4a 10 49 39 d0 75 e2 40 84 f6 74 38 4c 89 05 84 25 37 02 4d [ 115.878086] RSP: 0018:ffffb8d5443d7d50 EFLAGS: 00010282 [ 115.878511] RAX: ffff8e4d87c41c80 RBX: ffff8e4d88ded780 RCX: ffff8e4da4333a00 [ 115.879128] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff8e4d88ded780 [ 115.879715] RBP: ffff8e4d88ded780 R08: ffff8e4da4338000 R09: ffff8e4da43388c0 [ 115.880359] R10: 0000000000000002 R11: ffffb8d540158000 R12: ffffb8d5443d7da8 [ 115.880962] R13: ffff8e4d88ded780 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 115.881548] FS: 00007f92c90c9800(0000) GS:ffff8e4dfdc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 115.882234] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 115.882713] CR2: 0000000000000010 CR3: 0000000022f4c002 CR4: 00000000000706f0 [ 115.883314] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 115.883966] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Fixes: f2ebb3a ("smarter propagate_mnt()") Fixes: 5ec0811 ("propogate_mnt: Handle the first propogated copy being a slave") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Reported-by: Ditang Chen <ditang.c@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee (Digital Ocean) <sforshee@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit b18cba0 ] Commit 9130b8d ("SUNRPC: allow for upcalls for the same uid but different gss service") introduced `auth` argument to __gss_find_upcall(), but in gss_pipe_downcall() it was left as NULL since it (and auth->service) was not (yet) determined. When multiple upcalls with the same uid and different service are ongoing, it could happen that __gss_find_upcall(), which returns the first match found in the pipe->in_downcall list, could not find the correct gss_msg corresponding to the downcall we are looking for. Moreover, it might return a msg which is not sent to rpc.gssd yet. We could see mount.nfs process hung in D state with multiple mount.nfs are executed in parallel. The call trace below is of CentOS 7.9 kernel-3.10.0-1160.24.1.el7.x86_64 but we observed the same hang w/ elrepo kernel-ml-6.0.7-1.el7. PID: 71258 TASK: ffff91ebd4be0000 CPU: 36 COMMAND: "mount.nfs" #0 [ffff9203ca3234f8] __schedule at ffffffffa3b8899f #1 [ffff9203ca323580] schedule at ffffffffa3b88eb9 #2 [ffff9203ca323590] gss_cred_init at ffffffffc0355818 [auth_rpcgss] #3 [ffff9203ca323658] rpcauth_lookup_credcache at ffffffffc0421ebc [sunrpc] #4 [ffff9203ca3236d8] gss_lookup_cred at ffffffffc0353633 [auth_rpcgss] #5 [ffff9203ca3236e8] rpcauth_lookupcred at ffffffffc0421581 [sunrpc] #6 [ffff9203ca323740] rpcauth_refreshcred at ffffffffc04223d3 [sunrpc] #7 [ffff9203ca3237a0] call_refresh at ffffffffc04103dc [sunrpc] #8 [ffff9203ca3237b8] __rpc_execute at ffffffffc041e1c9 [sunrpc] #9 [ffff9203ca323820] rpc_execute at ffffffffc0420a48 [sunrpc] The scenario is like this. Let's say there are two upcalls for services A and B, A -> B in pipe->in_downcall, B -> A in pipe->pipe. When rpc.gssd reads pipe to get the upcall msg corresponding to service B from pipe->pipe and then writes the response, in gss_pipe_downcall the msg corresponding to service A will be picked because only uid is used to find the msg and it is before the one for B in pipe->in_downcall. And the process waiting for the msg corresponding to service A will be woken up. Actual scheduing of that process might be after rpc.gssd processes the next msg. In rpc_pipe_generic_upcall it clears msg->errno (for A). The process is scheduled to see gss_msg->ctx == NULL and gss_msg->msg.errno == 0, therefore it cannot break the loop in gss_create_upcall and is never woken up after that. This patch adds a simple check to ensure that a msg which is not sent to rpc.gssd yet is not chosen as the matching upcall upon receiving a downcall. Signed-off-by: minoura makoto <minoura@valinux.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Hiroshi Shimamoto <h-shimamoto@nec.com> Tested-by: Hiroshi Shimamoto <h-shimamoto@nec.com> Cc: Trond Myklebust <trondmy@hammerspace.com> Fixes: 9130b8d ("SUNRPC: allow for upcalls for same uid but different gss service") Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

commit 76d588d upstream. Current imc-pmu code triggers a WARNING with CONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP and CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING enabled, while running a thread_imc event. Command to trigger the warning: # perf stat -e thread_imc/CPM_CS_FROM_L4_MEM_X_DPTEG/ sleep 5 Performance counter stats for 'sleep 5': 0 thread_imc/CPM_CS_FROM_L4_MEM_X_DPTEG/ 5.002117947 seconds time elapsed 0.000131000 seconds user 0.001063000 seconds sys Below is snippet of the warning in dmesg: BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.c:580 in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 1, non_block: 0, pid: 2869, name: perf-exec preempt_count: 2, expected: 0 4 locks held by perf-exec/2869: #0: c00000004325c540 (&sig->cred_guard_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: bprm_execve+0x64/0xa90 #1: c00000004325c5d8 (&sig->exec_update_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: begin_new_exec+0x460/0xef0 #2: c0000003fa99d4e0 (&cpuctx_lock){-...}-{2:2}, at: perf_event_exec+0x290/0x510 #3: c000000017ab8418 (&ctx->lock){....}-{2:2}, at: perf_event_exec+0x29c/0x510 irq event stamp: 4806 hardirqs last enabled at (4805): [<c000000000f65b94>] _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x94/0xd0 hardirqs last disabled at (4806): [<c0000000003fae44>] perf_event_exec+0x394/0x510 softirqs last enabled at (0): [<c00000000013c404>] copy_process+0xc34/0x1ff0 softirqs last disabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0 CPU: 36 PID: 2869 Comm: perf-exec Not tainted 6.2.0-rc2-00011-g1247637727f2 #61 Hardware name: 8375-42A POWER9 0x4e1202 opal:v7.0-16-g9b85f7d961 PowerNV Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x98/0xe0 (unreliable) __might_resched+0x2f8/0x310 __mutex_lock+0x6c/0x13f0 thread_imc_event_add+0xf4/0x1b0 event_sched_in+0xe0/0x210 merge_sched_in+0x1f0/0x600 visit_groups_merge.isra.92.constprop.166+0x2bc/0x6c0 ctx_flexible_sched_in+0xcc/0x140 ctx_sched_in+0x20c/0x2a0 ctx_resched+0x104/0x1c0 perf_event_exec+0x340/0x510 begin_new_exec+0x730/0xef0 load_elf_binary+0x3f8/0x1e10 ... do not call blocking ops when !TASK_RUNNING; state=2001 set at [<00000000fd63e7cf>] do_nanosleep+0x60/0x1a0 WARNING: CPU: 36 PID: 2869 at kernel/sched/core.c:9912 __might_sleep+0x9c/0xb0 CPU: 36 PID: 2869 Comm: sleep Tainted: G W 6.2.0-rc2-00011-g1247637727f2 #61 Hardware name: 8375-42A POWER9 0x4e1202 opal:v7.0-16-g9b85f7d961 PowerNV NIP: c000000000194a1c LR: c000000000194a18 CTR: c000000000a78670 REGS: c00000004d2134e0 TRAP: 0700 Tainted: G W (6.2.0-rc2-00011-g1247637727f2) MSR: 9000000000021033 <SF,HV,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 48002824 XER: 00000000 CFAR: c00000000013fb64 IRQMASK: 1 The above warning triggered because the current imc-pmu code uses mutex lock in interrupt disabled sections. The function mutex_lock() internally calls __might_resched(), which will check if IRQs are disabled and in case IRQs are disabled, it will trigger the warning. Fix the issue by changing the mutex lock to spinlock. Fixes: 8f95faa ("powerpc/powernv: Detect and create IMC device") Reported-by: Michael Petlan <mpetlan@redhat.com> Reported-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Kajol Jain <kjain@linux.ibm.com> [mpe: Fix comments, trim oops in change log, add reported-by tags] Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230106065157.182648-1-kjain@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit 9e17f99 ] The 'TCA_MPLS_LABEL' attribute is of 'NLA_U32' type, but has a validation type of 'NLA_VALIDATE_FUNCTION'. This is an invalid combination according to the comment above 'struct nla_policy': " Meaning of `validate' field, use via NLA_POLICY_VALIDATE_FN: NLA_BINARY Validation function called for the attribute. All other Unused - but note that it's a union " This can trigger the warning [1] in nla_get_range_unsigned() when validation of the attribute fails. Despite being of 'NLA_U32' type, the associated 'min'/'max' fields in the policy are negative as they are aliased by the 'validate' field. Fix by changing the attribute type to 'NLA_BINARY' which is consistent with the above comment and all other users of NLA_POLICY_VALIDATE_FN(). As a result, move the length validation to the validation function. No regressions in MPLS tests: # ./tdc.py -f tc-tests/actions/mpls.json [...] # echo $? 0 [1] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 17743 at lib/nlattr.c:118 nla_get_range_unsigned+0x1d8/0x1e0 lib/nlattr.c:117 Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 17743 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 6.1.0-rc8 #3 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.13.0-48-gd9c812dda519-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:nla_get_range_unsigned+0x1d8/0x1e0 lib/nlattr.c:117 [...] Call Trace: <TASK> __netlink_policy_dump_write_attr+0x23d/0x990 net/netlink/policy.c:310 netlink_policy_dump_write_attr+0x22/0x30 net/netlink/policy.c:411 netlink_ack_tlv_fill net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2454 [inline] netlink_ack+0x546/0x760 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2506 netlink_rcv_skb+0x1b7/0x240 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2546 rtnetlink_rcv+0x18/0x20 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6109 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1319 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x5e9/0x6b0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1345 netlink_sendmsg+0x739/0x860 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1921 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:714 [inline] sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:734 [inline] ____sys_sendmsg+0x38f/0x500 net/socket.c:2482 ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2536 [inline] __sys_sendmsg+0x197/0x230 net/socket.c:2565 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2574 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2572 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x42/0x50 net/socket.c:2572 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x2b/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/CAO4mrfdmjvRUNbDyP0R03_DrD_eFCLCguz6OxZ2TYRSv0K9gxA@mail.gmail.com/ Fixes: 2a2ea50 ("net: sched: add mpls manipulation actions to TC") Reported-by: Wei Chen <harperchen1110@gmail.com> Tested-by: Wei Chen <harperchen1110@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Alexander Duyck <alexanderduyck@fb.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230107171004.608436-1-idosch@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit b2c3ccb ] When CONFIG_ARM64_LSE_ATOMICS=y, each use of an LL/SC atomic results in a fragment of code being generated in a subsection without a clear association with its caller. A trampoline in the caller branches to the LL/SC atomic with with a direct branch, and the atomic directly branches back into its trampoline. This breaks backtracing, as any PC within the out-of-line fragment will be symbolized as an offset from the nearest prior symbol (which may not be the function using the atomic), and since the atomic returns with a direct branch, the caller's PC may be missing from the backtrace. For example, with secondary_start_kernel() hacked to contain atomic_inc(NULL), the resulting exception can be reported as being taken from cpus_are_stuck_in_kernel(): | Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000000 | Mem abort info: | ESR = 0x0000000096000004 | EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits | SET = 0, FnV = 0 | EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 | FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault | Data abort info: | ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004 | CM = 0, WnR = 0 | [0000000000000000] user address but active_mm is swapper | Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] PREEMPT SMP | Modules linked in: | CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Not tainted 5.19.0-11219-geb555cb5b794-dirty #3 | Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) | pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) | pc : cpus_are_stuck_in_kernel+0xa4/0x120 | lr : secondary_start_kernel+0x164/0x170 | sp : ffff80000a4cbe90 | x29: ffff80000a4cbe90 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: 0000000000000000 | x26: 0000000000000000 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 0000000000000000 | x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 0000000000000000 x21: 0000000000000000 | x20: 0000000000000001 x19: 0000000000000001 x18: 0000000000000008 | x17: 3030383832343030 x16: 3030303030307830 x15: ffff80000a4cbab0 | x14: 0000000000000001 x13: 5d31666130663133 x12: 3478305b20313030 | x11: 3030303030303078 x10: 3020726f73736563 x9 : 726f737365636f72 | x8 : ffff800009ff2ef0 x7 : 0000000000000003 x6 : 0000000000000000 | x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000100 | x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : ffff0000029bd880 x0 : 0000000000000000 | Call trace: | cpus_are_stuck_in_kernel+0xa4/0x120 | __secondary_switched+0xb0/0xb4 | Code: 35ffffa3 17fffc6c d53cd040 f9800011 (885f7c01) | ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- This is confusing and hinders debugging, and will be problematic for CONFIG_LIVEPATCH as these cases cannot be unwound reliably. This is very similar to recent issues with out-of-line exception fixups, which were removed in commits: 35d6779 ("arm64: lib: __arch_clear_user(): fold fixups into body") 4012e0e ("arm64: lib: __arch_copy_from_user(): fold fixups into body") 139f9ab ("arm64: lib: __arch_copy_to_user(): fold fixups into body") When the trampolines were introduced in commit: addfc38 ("arm64: atomics: avoid out-of-line ll/sc atomics") The rationale was to improve icache performance by grouping the LL/SC atomics together. This has never been measured, and this theoretical benefit is outweighed by other factors: * As the subsections are collapsed into sections at object file granularity, these are spread out throughout the kernel and can share cachelines with unrelated code regardless. * GCC 12.1.0 has been observed to place the trampoline out-of-line in specialised __ll_sc_*() functions, introducing more branching than was intended. * Removing the trampolines has been observed to shrink a defconfig kernel Image by 64KiB when building with GCC 12.1.0. This patch removes the LL/SC trampolines, meaning that the LL/SC atomics will be inlined into their callers (or placed in out-of line functions using regular BL/RET pairs). When CONFIG_ARM64_LSE_ATOMICS=y, the LL/SC atomics are always called in an unlikely branch, and will be placed in a cold portion of the function, so this should have minimal impact to the hot paths. Other than the improved backtracing, there should be no functional change as a result of this patch. Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220817155914.3975112-2-mark.rutland@arm.com Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Stable-dep-of: 031af50 ("arm64: cmpxchg_double*: hazard against entire exchange variable") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

commit 8ccc993 upstream. The referenced commit changed the error code returned by the kernel when preventing a non-established socket from attaching the ktls ULP. Before to such a commit, the user-space got ENOTCONN instead of EINVAL. The existing self-tests depend on such error code, and the change caused a failure: RUN global.non_established ... tls.c:1673:non_established:Expected errno (22) == ENOTCONN (107) non_established: Test failed at step #3 FAIL global.non_established In the unlikely event existing applications do the same, address the issue by restoring the prior error code in the above scenario. Note that the only other ULP performing similar checks at init time - smc_ulp_ops - also fails with ENOTCONN when trying to attach the ULP to a non-established socket. Reported-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net> Fixes: 2c02d41 ("net/ulp: prevent ULP without clone op from entering the LISTEN status") Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/7bb199e7a93317fb6f8bf8b9b2dc71c18f337cde.1674042685.git.pabeni@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

ASAN reports an use-after-free in btf_dump_name_dups: ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address 0xffff927006db at pc 0xaaaab5dfb618 bp 0xffffdd89b890 sp 0xffffdd89b928 READ of size 2 at 0xffff927006db thread T0 #0 0xaaaab5dfb614 in __interceptor_strcmp.part.0 (test_progs+0x21b614) #1 0xaaaab635f144 in str_equal_fn tools/lib/bpf/btf_dump.c:127 #2 0xaaaab635e3e0 in hashmap_find_entry tools/lib/bpf/hashmap.c:143 #3 0xaaaab635e72c in hashmap__find tools/lib/bpf/hashmap.c:212 #4 0xaaaab6362258 in btf_dump_name_dups tools/lib/bpf/btf_dump.c:1525 #5 0xaaaab636240c in btf_dump_resolve_name tools/lib/bpf/btf_dump.c:1552 #6 0xaaaab6362598 in btf_dump_type_name tools/lib/bpf/btf_dump.c:1567 #7 0xaaaab6360b48 in btf_dump_emit_struct_def tools/lib/bpf/btf_dump.c:912 #8 0xaaaab6360630 in btf_dump_emit_type tools/lib/bpf/btf_dump.c:798 #9 0xaaaab635f720 in btf_dump__dump_type tools/lib/bpf/btf_dump.c:282 #10 0xaaaab608523c in test_btf_dump_incremental tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/btf_dump.c:236 #11 0xaaaab6097530 in test_btf_dump tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/btf_dump.c:875 #12 0xaaaab6314ed0 in run_one_test tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_progs.c:1062 #13 0xaaaab631a0a8 in main tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_progs.c:1697 #14 0xffff9676d214 in __libc_start_main ../csu/libc-start.c:308 #15 0xaaaab5d65990 (test_progs+0x185990) 0xffff927006db is located 11 bytes inside of 16-byte region [0xffff927006d0,0xffff927006e0) freed by thread T0 here: #0 0xaaaab5e2c7c4 in realloc (test_progs+0x24c7c4) #1 0xaaaab634f4a0 in libbpf_reallocarray tools/lib/bpf/libbpf_internal.h:191 #2 0xaaaab634f840 in libbpf_add_mem tools/lib/bpf/btf.c:163 #3 0xaaaab636643c in strset_add_str_mem tools/lib/bpf/strset.c:106 #4 0xaaaab6366560 in strset__add_str tools/lib/bpf/strset.c:157 #5 0xaaaab6352d70 in btf__add_str tools/lib/bpf/btf.c:1519 #6 0xaaaab6353e10 in btf__add_field tools/lib/bpf/btf.c:2032 #7 0xaaaab6084fcc in test_btf_dump_incremental tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/btf_dump.c:232 #8 0xaaaab6097530 in test_btf_dump tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/btf_dump.c:875 #9 0xaaaab6314ed0 in run_one_test tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_progs.c:1062 #10 0xaaaab631a0a8 in main tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_progs.c:1697 #11 0xffff9676d214 in __libc_start_main ../csu/libc-start.c:308 #12 0xaaaab5d65990 (test_progs+0x185990) previously allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0xaaaab5e2c7c4 in realloc (test_progs+0x24c7c4) #1 0xaaaab634f4a0 in libbpf_reallocarray tools/lib/bpf/libbpf_internal.h:191 #2 0xaaaab634f840 in libbpf_add_mem tools/lib/bpf/btf.c:163 #3 0xaaaab636643c in strset_add_str_mem tools/lib/bpf/strset.c:106 #4 0xaaaab6366560 in strset__add_str tools/lib/bpf/strset.c:157 #5 0xaaaab6352d70 in btf__add_str tools/lib/bpf/btf.c:1519 #6 0xaaaab6353ff0 in btf_add_enum_common tools/lib/bpf/btf.c:2070 #7 0xaaaab6354080 in btf__add_enum tools/lib/bpf/btf.c:2102 #8 0xaaaab6082f50 in test_btf_dump_incremental tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/btf_dump.c:162 #9 0xaaaab6097530 in test_btf_dump tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/btf_dump.c:875 #10 0xaaaab6314ed0 in run_one_test tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_progs.c:1062 #11 0xaaaab631a0a8 in main tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_progs.c:1697 #12 0xffff9676d214 in __libc_start_main ../csu/libc-start.c:308 #13 0xaaaab5d65990 (test_progs+0x185990) The reason is that the key stored in hash table name_map is a string address, and the string memory is allocated by realloc() function, when the memory is resized by realloc() later, the old memory may be freed, so the address stored in name_map references to a freed memory, causing use-after-free. Fix it by storing duplicated string address in name_map. Fixes: 919d2b1 ("libbpf: Allow modification of BTF and add btf__add_str API") Signed-off-by: Xu Kuohai <xukuohai@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20221011120108.782373-2-xukuohai@huaweicloud.com

[ Upstream commit 3c938cc ] In case of PREEMPT_RT, there is a raw_spinlock -> spinlock dependency as the lockdep report shows. __irq_set_handler irq_get_desc_buslock __irq_get_desc_lock raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&desc->lock, *flags); // raw spinlock get here __irq_do_set_handler mask_ack_irq dwapb_irq_ack spin_lock_irqsave(&gc->bgpio_lock, flags); // sleep able spinlock irq_put_desc_busunlock Replace with a raw lock to avoid BUGs. This lock is only used to access registers, and It's safe to replace with the raw lock without bad influence. [ 15.090359][ T1] ============================= [ 15.090365][ T1] [ BUG: Invalid wait context ] [ 15.090373][ T1] 5.10.59-rt52-00983-g186a6841c682-dirty #3 Not tainted [ 15.090386][ T1] ----------------------------- [ 15.090392][ T1] swapper/0/1 is trying to lock: [ 15.090402][ T1] 70ff00018507c188 (&gc->bgpio_lock){....}-{3:3}, at: _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x1c/0x28 [ 15.090470][ T1] other info that might help us debug this: [ 15.090477][ T1] context-{5:5} [ 15.090485][ T1] 3 locks held by swapper/0/1: [ 15.090497][ T1] #0: c2ff0001816de1a0 (&dev->mutex){....}-{4:4}, at: __device_driver_lock+0x98/0x104 [ 15.090553][ T1] #1: ffff90001485b4b8 (irq_domain_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: irq_domain_associate+0xbc/0x6d4 [ 15.090606][ T1] #2: 4bff000185d7a8e0 (lock_class){....}-{2:2}, at: _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x1c/0x28 [ 15.090654][ T1] stack backtrace: [ 15.090661][ T1] CPU: 4 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.10.59-rt52-00983-g186a6841c682-dirty #3 [ 15.090682][ T1] Hardware name: Horizon Robotics Journey 5 DVB (DT) [ 15.090692][ T1] Call trace: ...... [ 15.090811][ T1] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x1c/0x28 [ 15.090828][ T1] dwapb_irq_ack+0xb4/0x300 [ 15.090846][ T1] __irq_do_set_handler+0x494/0xb2c [ 15.090864][ T1] __irq_set_handler+0x74/0x114 [ 15.090881][ T1] irq_set_chip_and_handler_name+0x44/0x58 [ 15.090900][ T1] gpiochip_irq_map+0x210/0x644 Signed-off-by: Schspa Shi <schspa@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@gmail.com> Acked-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org> Acked-by: Doug Berger <opendmb@gmail.com> Acked-by: Serge Semin <fancer.lancer@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <brgl@bgdev.pl> Stable-dep-of: e546427 ("gpio: mxc: Protect GPIO irqchip RMW with bgpio spinlock") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 6c4ca03 ] During EEH error injection testing, a deadlock was encountered in the tg3 driver when tg3_io_error_detected() was attempting to cancel outstanding reset tasks: crash> foreach UN bt ... PID: 159 TASK: c0000000067c6000 CPU: 8 COMMAND: "eehd" ... #5 [c00000000681f990] __cancel_work_timer at c00000000019fd18 #6 [c00000000681fa30] tg3_io_error_detected at c00800000295f098 [tg3] #7 [c00000000681faf0] eeh_report_error at c00000000004e25c ... PID: 290 TASK: c000000036e5f800 CPU: 6 COMMAND: "kworker/6:1" ... #4 [c00000003721fbc0] rtnl_lock at c000000000c940d8 #5 [c00000003721fbe0] tg3_reset_task at c008000002969358 [tg3] #6 [c00000003721fc60] process_one_work at c00000000019e5c4 ... PID: 296 TASK: c000000037a65800 CPU: 21 COMMAND: "kworker/21:1" ... #4 [c000000037247bc0] rtnl_lock at c000000000c940d8 #5 [c000000037247be0] tg3_reset_task at c008000002969358 [tg3] #6 [c000000037247c60] process_one_work at c00000000019e5c4 ... PID: 655 TASK: c000000036f49000 CPU: 16 COMMAND: "kworker/16:2" ...:1 #4 [c0000000373ebbc0] rtnl_lock at c000000000c940d8 #5 [c0000000373ebbe0] tg3_reset_task at c008000002969358 [tg3] #6 [c0000000373ebc60] process_one_work at c00000000019e5c4 ... Code inspection shows that both tg3_io_error_detected() and tg3_reset_task() attempt to acquire the RTNL lock at the beginning of their code blocks. If tg3_reset_task() should happen to execute between the times when tg3_io_error_deteced() acquires the RTNL lock and tg3_reset_task_cancel() is called, a deadlock will occur. Moving tg3_reset_task_cancel() call earlier within the code block, prior to acquiring RTNL, prevents this from happening, but also exposes another deadlock issue where tg3_reset_task() may execute AFTER tg3_io_error_detected() has executed: crash> foreach UN bt PID: 159 TASK: c0000000067d2000 CPU: 9 COMMAND: "eehd" ... #4 [c000000006867a60] rtnl_lock at c000000000c940d8 #5 [c000000006867a80] tg3_io_slot_reset at c0080000026c2ea8 [tg3] #6 [c000000006867b00] eeh_report_reset at c00000000004de88 ... PID: 363 TASK: c000000037564000 CPU: 6 COMMAND: "kworker/6:1" ... #3 [c000000036c1bb70] msleep at c000000000259e6c #4 [c000000036c1bba0] napi_disable at c000000000c6b848 #5 [c000000036c1bbe0] tg3_reset_task at c0080000026d942c [tg3] #6 [c000000036c1bc60] process_one_work at c00000000019e5c4 ... This issue can be avoided by aborting tg3_reset_task() if EEH error recovery is already in progress. Fixes: db84bf4 ("tg3: tg3_reset_task() needs to use rtnl_lock to synchronize") Signed-off-by: David Christensen <drc@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Pavan Chebbi <pavan.chebbi@broadcom.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230124185339.225806-1-drc@linux.vnet.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

…ress [ Upstream commit 6f1d64b ] Bug report and analysis from Ding Hui. During iSCSI session logout, if another task accesses the shost ipaddress attr, we can get a KASAN UAF report like this: [ 276.942144] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x78/0xe0 [ 276.942535] Write of size 4 at addr ffff8881053b45b8 by task cat/4088 [ 276.943511] CPU: 2 PID: 4088 Comm: cat Tainted: G E 6.1.0-rc8+ #3 [ 276.943997] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 11/12/2020 [ 276.944470] Call Trace: [ 276.944943] <TASK> [ 276.945397] dump_stack_lvl+0x34/0x48 [ 276.945887] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x86/0x1e7 [ 276.946421] print_report+0x36/0x4f [ 276.947358] kasan_report+0xad/0x130 [ 276.948234] kasan_check_range+0x35/0x1c0 [ 276.948674] _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x78/0xe0 [ 276.949989] iscsi_sw_tcp_host_get_param+0xad/0x2e0 [iscsi_tcp] [ 276.951765] show_host_param_ISCSI_HOST_PARAM_IPADDRESS+0xe9/0x130 [scsi_transport_iscsi] [ 276.952185] dev_attr_show+0x3f/0x80 [ 276.953005] sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x1fb/0x3e0 [ 276.953401] seq_read_iter+0x402/0x1020 [ 276.954260] vfs_read+0x532/0x7b0 [ 276.955113] ksys_read+0xed/0x1c0 [ 276.955952] do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90 [ 276.956347] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd [ 276.956769] RIP: 0033:0x7f5d3a679222 [ 276.957161] Code: c0 e9 b2 fe ff ff 50 48 8d 3d 32 c0 0b 00 e8 a5 fe 01 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 56 c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 83 ec 28 48 89 54 24 [ 276.958009] RSP: 002b:00007ffc864d16a8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000 [ 276.958431] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000020000 RCX: 00007f5d3a679222 [ 276.958857] RDX: 0000000000020000 RSI: 00007f5d3a4fe000 RDI: 0000000000000003 [ 276.959281] RBP: 00007f5d3a4fe000 R08: 00000000ffffffff R09: 0000000000000000 [ 276.959682] R10: 0000000000000022 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000020000 [ 276.960126] R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000557a26dada58 [ 276.960536] </TASK> [ 276.961357] Allocated by task 2209: [ 276.961756] kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 [ 276.962170] kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30 [ 276.962557] __kasan_kmalloc+0x7e/0x90 [ 276.962923] __kmalloc+0x5b/0x140 [ 276.963308] iscsi_alloc_session+0x28/0x840 [scsi_transport_iscsi] [ 276.963712] iscsi_session_setup+0xda/0xba0 [libiscsi] [ 276.964078] iscsi_sw_tcp_session_create+0x1fd/0x330 [iscsi_tcp] [ 276.964431] iscsi_if_create_session.isra.0+0x50/0x260 [scsi_transport_iscsi] [ 276.964793] iscsi_if_recv_msg+0xc5a/0x2660 [scsi_transport_iscsi] [ 276.965153] iscsi_if_rx+0x198/0x4b0 [scsi_transport_iscsi] [ 276.965546] netlink_unicast+0x4d5/0x7b0 [ 276.965905] netlink_sendmsg+0x78d/0xc30 [ 276.966236] sock_sendmsg+0xe5/0x120 [ 276.966576] ____sys_sendmsg+0x5fe/0x860 [ 276.966923] ___sys_sendmsg+0xe0/0x170 [ 276.967300] __sys_sendmsg+0xc8/0x170 [ 276.967666] do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90 [ 276.968028] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd [ 276.968773] Freed by task 2209: [ 276.969111] kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 [ 276.969449] kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30 [ 276.969789] kasan_save_free_info+0x2a/0x50 [ 276.970146] __kasan_slab_free+0x106/0x190 [ 276.970470] __kmem_cache_free+0x133/0x270 [ 276.970816] device_release+0x98/0x210 [ 276.971145] kobject_cleanup+0x101/0x360 [ 276.971462] iscsi_session_teardown+0x3fb/0x530 [libiscsi] [ 276.971775] iscsi_sw_tcp_session_destroy+0xd8/0x130 [iscsi_tcp] [ 276.972143] iscsi_if_recv_msg+0x1bf1/0x2660 [scsi_transport_iscsi] [ 276.972485] iscsi_if_rx+0x198/0x4b0 [scsi_transport_iscsi] [ 276.972808] netlink_unicast+0x4d5/0x7b0 [ 276.973201] netlink_sendmsg+0x78d/0xc30 [ 276.973544] sock_sendmsg+0xe5/0x120 [ 276.973864] ____sys_sendmsg+0x5fe/0x860 [ 276.974248] ___sys_sendmsg+0xe0/0x170 [ 276.974583] __sys_sendmsg+0xc8/0x170 [ 276.974891] do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90 [ 276.975216] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd We can easily reproduce by two tasks: 1. while :; do iscsiadm -m node --login; iscsiadm -m node --logout; done 2. while :; do cat \ /sys/devices/platform/host*/iscsi_host/host*/ipaddress; done iscsid | cat --------------------------------+--------------------------------------- |- iscsi_sw_tcp_session_destroy | |- iscsi_session_teardown | |- device_release | |- iscsi_session_release ||- dev_attr_show |- kfree | |- show_host_param_ | ISCSI_HOST_PARAM_IPADDRESS | |- iscsi_sw_tcp_host_get_param | |- r/w tcp_sw_host->session (UAF) |- iscsi_host_remove | |- iscsi_host_free | Fix the above bug by splitting the session removal into 2 parts: 1. removal from iSCSI class which includes sysfs and removal from host tracking. 2. freeing of session. During iscsi_tcp host and session removal we can remove the session from sysfs then remove the host from sysfs. At this point we know userspace is not accessing the kernel via sysfs so we can free the session and host. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230117193937.21244-2-michael.christie@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Mike Christie <michael.christie@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Lee Duncan <lduncan@suse.com> Acked-by: Ding Hui <dinghui@sangfor.com.cn> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

commit 60eed1e upstream. code path: ocfs2_ioctl_move_extents ocfs2_move_extents ocfs2_defrag_extent __ocfs2_move_extent + ocfs2_journal_access_di + ocfs2_split_extent //sub-paths call jbd2_journal_restart + ocfs2_journal_dirty //crash by jbs2 ASSERT crash stacks: PID: 11297 TASK: ffff974a676dcd00 CPU: 67 COMMAND: "defragfs.ocfs2" #0 [ffffb25d8dad3900] machine_kexec at ffffffff8386fe01 #1 [ffffb25d8dad3958] __crash_kexec at ffffffff8395959d #2 [ffffb25d8dad3a20] crash_kexec at ffffffff8395a45d #3 [ffffb25d8dad3a38] oops_end at ffffffff83836d3f #4 [ffffb25d8dad3a58] do_trap at ffffffff83833205 #5 [ffffb25d8dad3aa0] do_invalid_op at ffffffff83833aa6 #6 [ffffb25d8dad3ac0] invalid_op at ffffffff84200d18 [exception RIP: jbd2_journal_dirty_metadata+0x2ba] RIP: ffffffffc09ca54a RSP: ffffb25d8dad3b70 RFLAGS: 00010207 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9706eedc5248 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffff97337029ea28 RDI: ffff9706eedc5250 RBP: ffff9703c3520200 R8: 000000000f46b0b2 R9: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 00000001000000fe R12: ffff97337029ea28 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff9703de59bf60 R15: ffff9706eedc5250 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #7 [ffffb25d8dad3ba8] ocfs2_journal_dirty at ffffffffc137fb95 [ocfs2] #8 [ffffb25d8dad3be8] __ocfs2_move_extent at ffffffffc139a950 [ocfs2] #9 [ffffb25d8dad3c80] ocfs2_defrag_extent at ffffffffc139b2d2 [ocfs2] Analysis This bug has the same root cause of 'commit 7f27ec9 ("ocfs2: call ocfs2_journal_access_di() before ocfs2_journal_dirty() in ocfs2_write_end_nolock()")'. For this bug, jbd2_journal_restart() is called by ocfs2_split_extent() during defragmenting. How to fix For ocfs2_split_extent() can handle journal operations totally by itself. Caller doesn't need to call journal access/dirty pair, and caller only needs to call journal start/stop pair. The fix method is to remove journal access/dirty from __ocfs2_move_extent(). The discussion for this patch: https://oss.oracle.com/pipermail/ocfs2-devel/2023-February/000647.html Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230217003717.32469-1-heming.zhao@suse.com Signed-off-by: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com> Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com> Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org> Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com> Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn> Cc: Gang He <ghe@suse.com> Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit 3dca1f8 ] Don't hold sdw_dev_lock while calling the peripheral driver probe() and remove() callbacks. Holding sdw_dev_lock around the probe() and remove() calls causes a theoretical mutex inversion which lockdep will assert on. During probe() the sdw_dev_lock mutex is taken first and then ASoC/ALSA locks are taken by the probe() implementation. During normal operation ASoC can take its locks and then trigger a runtime resume of the component. The SoundWire resume will then take sdw_dev_lock. This is the reverse order compared to probe(). It's not necessary to hold sdw_dev_lock when calling the probe() and remove(), it is only used to prevent the bus core calling the driver callbacks if there isn't a driver or the driver is removing. All calls to the driver callbacks are guarded by the 'probed' flag. So if sdw_dev_lock is held while setting and clearing the 'probed' flag this is sufficient to guarantee the safety of callback functions. Removing the mutex from around the call to probe() means that it is now possible for a bus event (PING response) to be handled in parallel with the probe(). But sdw_bus_probe() already has handling for this by calling the device update_status() after the probe() has completed. Example lockdep assert: [ 46.098514] ====================================================== [ 46.104736] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [ 46.110961] 6.1.0-rc4-jamerson #1 Tainted: G E [ 46.116842] ------------------------------------------------------ [ 46.123063] mpg123/1130 is trying to acquire lock: [ 46.127883] ffff8b445031fb80 (&slave->sdw_dev_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: sdw_update_slave_status+0x26/0x70 [ 46.137225] but task is already holding lock: [ 46.143074] ffffffffc1455310 (&card->pcm_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: dpcm_fe_dai_open+0x49/0x830 [ 46.151536] which lock already depends on the new lock.[ 46.159732] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 46.167231] -> #4 (&card->pcm_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 46.173428] __mutex_lock+0x94/0x920 [ 46.177542] snd_soc_dpcm_runtime_update+0x2e/0x100 [ 46.182958] snd_soc_dapm_put_enum_double+0x1c2/0x200 [ 46.188548] snd_ctl_elem_write+0x10c/0x1d0 [ 46.193268] snd_ctl_ioctl+0x126/0x850 [ 46.197556] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x87/0xc0 [ 46.201845] do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90 [ 46.205959] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd [ 46.211553] -> #3 (&card->controls_rwsem){++++}-{3:3}: [ 46.218188] down_write+0x2b/0xd0 [ 46.222038] snd_ctl_add_replace+0x39/0xb0 [ 46.226672] snd_soc_add_controls+0x53/0x80 [ 46.231393] soc_probe_component+0x1e4/0x2a0 [ 46.236202] snd_soc_bind_card+0x51a/0xc80 [ 46.240836] devm_snd_soc_register_card+0x43/0x90 [ 46.246079] mc_probe+0x982/0xfe0 [snd_soc_sof_sdw] [ 46.251500] platform_probe+0x3c/0xa0 [ 46.255700] really_probe+0xde/0x390 [ 46.259814] __driver_probe_device+0x78/0x180 [ 46.264710] driver_probe_device+0x1e/0x90 [ 46.269347] __driver_attach+0x9f/0x1f0 [ 46.273721] bus_for_each_dev+0x78/0xc0 [ 46.278098] bus_add_driver+0x1ac/0x200 [ 46.282473] driver_register+0x8f/0xf0 [ 46.286759] do_one_initcall+0x58/0x310 [ 46.291136] do_init_module+0x4c/0x1f0 [ 46.295422] __do_sys_finit_module+0xb4/0x130 [ 46.300321] do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90 [ 46.304434] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd [ 46.310027] -> #2 (&card->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 46.315883] __mutex_lock+0x94/0x920 [ 46.320000] snd_soc_bind_card+0x3e/0xc80 [ 46.324551] devm_snd_soc_register_card+0x43/0x90 [ 46.329798] mc_probe+0x982/0xfe0 [snd_soc_sof_sdw] [ 46.335219] platform_probe+0x3c/0xa0 [ 46.339420] really_probe+0xde/0x390 [ 46.343532] __driver_probe_device+0x78/0x180 [ 46.348430] driver_probe_device+0x1e/0x90 [ 46.353065] __driver_attach+0x9f/0x1f0 [ 46.357437] bus_for_each_dev+0x78/0xc0 [ 46.361812] bus_add_driver+0x1ac/0x200 [ 46.366716] driver_register+0x8f/0xf0 [ 46.371528] do_one_initcall+0x58/0x310 [ 46.376424] do_init_module+0x4c/0x1f0 [ 46.381239] __do_sys_finit_module+0xb4/0x130 [ 46.386665] do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90 [ 46.391299] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd [ 46.397416] -> #1 (client_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 46.404307] __mutex_lock+0x94/0x920 [ 46.408941] snd_soc_add_component+0x24/0x2c0 [ 46.414345] devm_snd_soc_register_component+0x54/0xa0 [ 46.420522] cs35l56_common_probe+0x280/0x370 [snd_soc_cs35l56] [ 46.427487] cs35l56_sdw_probe+0xf4/0x170 [snd_soc_cs35l56_sdw] [ 46.434442] sdw_drv_probe+0x80/0x1a0 [ 46.439136] really_probe+0xde/0x390 [ 46.443738] __driver_probe_device+0x78/0x180 [ 46.449120] driver_probe_device+0x1e/0x90 [ 46.454247] __driver_attach+0x9f/0x1f0 [ 46.459106] bus_for_each_dev+0x78/0xc0 [ 46.463971] bus_add_driver+0x1ac/0x200 [ 46.468825] driver_register+0x8f/0xf0 [ 46.473592] do_one_initcall+0x58/0x310 [ 46.478441] do_init_module+0x4c/0x1f0 [ 46.483202] __do_sys_finit_module+0xb4/0x130 [ 46.488572] do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90 [ 46.493158] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd [ 46.499229] -> #0 (&slave->sdw_dev_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 46.506737] __lock_acquire+0x1121/0x1df0 [ 46.511765] lock_acquire+0xd5/0x300 [ 46.516360] __mutex_lock+0x94/0x920 [ 46.520949] sdw_update_slave_status+0x26/0x70 [ 46.526409] sdw_clear_slave_status+0xd8/0xe0 [ 46.531783] intel_resume_runtime+0x139/0x2a0 [ 46.537155] __rpm_callback+0x41/0x120 [ 46.541919] rpm_callback+0x5d/0x70 [ 46.546422] rpm_resume+0x531/0x7e0 [ 46.550920] __pm_runtime_resume+0x4a/0x80 [ 46.556024] snd_soc_pcm_component_pm_runtime_get+0x2f/0xc0 [ 46.562611] __soc_pcm_open+0x62/0x520 [ 46.567375] dpcm_be_dai_startup+0x116/0x210 [ 46.572661] dpcm_fe_dai_open+0xf7/0x830 [ 46.577597] snd_pcm_open_substream+0x54a/0x8b0 [ 46.583145] snd_pcm_open.part.0+0xdc/0x200 [ 46.588341] snd_pcm_playback_open+0x51/0x80 [ 46.593625] chrdev_open+0xc0/0x250 [ 46.598129] do_dentry_open+0x15f/0x430 [ 46.602981] path_openat+0x75e/0xa80 [ 46.607575] do_filp_open+0xb2/0x160 [ 46.612162] do_sys_openat2+0x9a/0x160 [ 46.616922] __x64_sys_openat+0x53/0xa0 [ 46.621767] do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90 [ 46.626352] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd [ 46.632414] other info that might help us debug this:[ 46.641862] Chain exists of: &slave->sdw_dev_lock --> &card->controls_rwsem --> &card->pcm_mutex[ 46.655145] Possible unsafe locking scenario:[ 46.662048] CPU0 CPU1 [ 46.667080] ---- ---- [ 46.672108] lock(&card->pcm_mutex); [ 46.676267] lock(&card->controls_rwsem); [ 46.683382] lock(&card->pcm_mutex); [ 46.690063] lock(&slave->sdw_dev_lock); [ 46.694574] *** DEADLOCK ***[ 46.701942] 2 locks held by mpg123/1130: [ 46.706356] #0: ffff8b4457b22b90 (&pcm->open_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: snd_pcm_open.part.0+0xc9/0x200 [ 46.715999] #1: ffffffffc1455310 (&card->pcm_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: dpcm_fe_dai_open+0x49/0x830 [ 46.725390] stack backtrace: [ 46.730752] CPU: 0 PID: 1130 Comm: mpg123 Tainted: G E 6.1.0-rc4-jamerson #1 [ 46.739703] Hardware name: AAEON UP-WHL01/UP-WHL01, BIOS UPW1AM19 11/10/2020 [ 46.747270] Call Trace: [ 46.750239] <TASK> [ 46.752857] dump_stack_lvl+0x56/0x73 [ 46.757045] check_noncircular+0x102/0x120 [ 46.761664] __lock_acquire+0x1121/0x1df0 [ 46.766197] lock_acquire+0xd5/0x300 [ 46.770292] ? sdw_update_slave_status+0x26/0x70 [ 46.775432] ? lock_is_held_type+0xe2/0x140 [ 46.780143] __mutex_lock+0x94/0x920 [ 46.784241] ? sdw_update_slave_status+0x26/0x70 [ 46.789387] ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80 [ 46.793750] ? sdw_update_slave_status+0x26/0x70 [ 46.798894] ? lock_release+0x147/0x2f0 [ 46.803262] ? lockdep_init_map_type+0x47/0x250 [ 46.808315] ? sdw_update_slave_status+0x26/0x70 [ 46.813456] sdw_update_slave_status+0x26/0x70 [ 46.818422] sdw_clear_slave_status+0xd8/0xe0 [ 46.823302] ? pm_generic_runtime_suspend+0x30/0x30 [ 46.828706] intel_resume_runtime+0x139/0x2a0 [ 46.833583] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x24/0x50 [ 46.838462] ? pm_generic_runtime_suspend+0x30/0x30 [ 46.843866] __rpm_callback+0x41/0x120 [ 46.848142] ? pm_generic_runtime_suspend+0x30/0x30 [ 46.853550] rpm_callback+0x5d/0x70 [ 46.857568] rpm_resume+0x531/0x7e0 [ 46.861578] ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x62/0x70 [ 46.866634] __pm_runtime_resume+0x4a/0x80 [ 46.871258] snd_soc_pcm_component_pm_runtime_get+0x2f/0xc0 [ 46.877358] __soc_pcm_open+0x62/0x520 [ 46.881634] ? dpcm_add_paths.isra.0+0x35d/0x4c0 [ 46.886784] dpcm_be_dai_startup+0x116/0x210 [ 46.891592] dpcm_fe_dai_open+0xf7/0x830 [ 46.896046] ? debug_mutex_init+0x33/0x50 [ 46.900591] snd_pcm_open_substream+0x54a/0x8b0 [ 46.905658] snd_pcm_open.part.0+0xdc/0x200 [ 46.910376] ? wake_up_q+0x90/0x90 [ 46.914312] snd_pcm_playback_open+0x51/0x80 [ 46.919118] chrdev_open+0xc0/0x250 [ 46.923147] ? cdev_device_add+0x90/0x90 [ 46.927608] do_dentry_open+0x15f/0x430 [ 46.931976] path_openat+0x75e/0xa80 [ 46.936086] do_filp_open+0xb2/0x160 [ 46.940194] ? lock_release+0x147/0x2f0 [ 46.944563] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x29/0x50 [ 46.949101] do_sys_openat2+0x9a/0x160 [ 46.953377] __x64_sys_openat+0x53/0xa0 [ 46.957733] do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90 [ 46.961829] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd [ 46.967402] RIP: 0033:0x7fa6397ccd3b [ 46.971506] Code: 25 00 00 41 00 3d 00 00 41 00 74 4b 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 67 44 89 e2 48 89 ee bf 9c ff ff ff b8 01 01 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 0f 87 91 00 00 00 48 8b 4c 24 28 64 48 33 0c 25 [ 46.991413] RSP: 002b:00007fff838e8990 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000101 [ 46.999580] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000080802 RCX: 00007fa6397ccd3b [ 47.007311] RDX: 0000000000080802 RSI: 00007fff838e8b50 RDI: 00000000ffffff9c [ 47.015047] RBP: 00007fff838e8b50 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000011 [ 47.022787] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000080802 [ 47.030539] R13: 0000000000000004 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00007fff838e8b50 [ 47.038289] </TASK> Signed-off-by: Richard Fitzgerald <rf@opensource.cirrus.com> Reviewed-by: Pierre-Louis Bossart <pierre-louis.bossart@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230123172520.339367-1-rf@opensource.cirrus.com Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul <vkoul@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

commit c611589 upstream. qxl_mode_dumb_create() dereferences the qobj returned by qxl_gem_object_create_with_handle(), but the handle is the only one holding a reference to it. A potential attacker could guess the returned handle value and closes it between the return of qxl_gem_object_create_with_handle() and the qobj usage, triggering a use-after-free scenario. Reproducer: int dri_fd =-1; struct drm_mode_create_dumb arg = {0}; void gem_close(int handle); void* trigger(void* ptr) { int ret; arg.width = arg.height = 0x20; arg.bpp = 32; ret = ioctl(dri_fd, DRM_IOCTL_MODE_CREATE_DUMB, &arg); if(ret) { perror("[*] DRM_IOCTL_MODE_CREATE_DUMB Failed"); exit(-1); } gem_close(arg.handle); while(1) { struct drm_mode_create_dumb args = {0}; args.width = args.height = 0x20; args.bpp = 32; ret = ioctl(dri_fd, DRM_IOCTL_MODE_CREATE_DUMB, &args); if (ret) { perror("[*] DRM_IOCTL_MODE_CREATE_DUMB Failed"); exit(-1); } printf("[*] DRM_IOCTL_MODE_CREATE_DUMB created, %d\n", args.handle); gem_close(args.handle); } return NULL; } void gem_close(int handle) { struct drm_gem_close args; args.handle = handle; int ret = ioctl(dri_fd, DRM_IOCTL_GEM_CLOSE, &args); // gem close handle if (!ret) printf("gem close handle %d\n", args.handle); } int main(void) { dri_fd= open("/dev/dri/card0", O_RDWR); printf("fd:%d\n", dri_fd); if(dri_fd == -1) return -1; pthread_t tid1; if(pthread_create(&tid1,NULL,trigger,NULL)){ perror("[*] thread_create tid1\n"); return -1; } while (1) { gem_close(arg.handle); } return 0; } This is a KASAN report: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in qxl_mode_dumb_create+0x3c2/0x400 linux/drivers/gpu/drm/qxl/qxl_dumb.c:69 Write of size 1 at addr ffff88801136c240 by task poc/515 CPU: 1 PID: 515 Comm: poc Not tainted 6.3.0 #3 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.0-debian-1.16.0-4 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack linux/lib/dump_stack.c:88 dump_stack_lvl+0x48/0x70 linux/lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_address_description linux/mm/kasan/report.c:319 print_report+0xd2/0x660 linux/mm/kasan/report.c:430 kasan_report+0xd2/0x110 linux/mm/kasan/report.c:536 __asan_report_store1_noabort+0x17/0x30 linux/mm/kasan/report_generic.c:383 qxl_mode_dumb_create+0x3c2/0x400 linux/drivers/gpu/drm/qxl/qxl_dumb.c:69 drm_mode_create_dumb linux/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_dumb_buffers.c:96 drm_mode_create_dumb_ioctl+0x1f5/0x2d0 linux/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_dumb_buffers.c:102 drm_ioctl_kernel+0x21d/0x430 linux/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_ioctl.c:788 drm_ioctl+0x56f/0xcc0 linux/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_ioctl.c:891 vfs_ioctl linux/fs/ioctl.c:51 __do_sys_ioctl linux/fs/ioctl.c:870 __se_sys_ioctl linux/fs/ioctl.c:856 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x13d/0x1c0 linux/fs/ioctl.c:856 do_syscall_x64 linux/arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x90 linux/arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc linux/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:120 RIP: 0033:0x7ff5004ff5f7 Code: 00 00 00 48 8b 05 99 c8 0d 00 64 c7 00 26 00 00 00 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 b8 10 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 69 c8 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007ff500408ea8 EFLAGS: 00000286 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007ff5004ff5f7 RDX: 00007ff500408ec0 RSI: 00000000c02064b2 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007ff500408ef0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 000000000000002a R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000286 R12: 00007fff1c6cdafe R13: 00007fff1c6cdaff R14: 00007ff500408fc0 R15: 0000000000802000 </TASK> Allocated by task 515: kasan_save_stack+0x38/0x70 linux/mm/kasan/common.c:45 kasan_set_track+0x25/0x40 linux/mm/kasan/common.c:52 kasan_save_alloc_info+0x1e/0x40 linux/mm/kasan/generic.c:510 ____kasan_kmalloc linux/mm/kasan/common.c:374 __kasan_kmalloc+0xc3/0xd0 linux/mm/kasan/common.c:383 kasan_kmalloc linux/./include/linux/kasan.h:196 kmalloc_trace+0x48/0xc0 linux/mm/slab_common.c:1066 kmalloc linux/./include/linux/slab.h:580 kzalloc linux/./include/linux/slab.h:720 qxl_bo_create+0x11a/0x610 linux/drivers/gpu/drm/qxl/qxl_object.c:124 qxl_gem_object_create+0xd9/0x360 linux/drivers/gpu/drm/qxl/qxl_gem.c:58 qxl_gem_object_create_with_handle+0xa1/0x180 linux/drivers/gpu/drm/qxl/qxl_gem.c:89 qxl_mode_dumb_create+0x1cd/0x400 linux/drivers/gpu/drm/qxl/qxl_dumb.c:63 drm_mode_create_dumb linux/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_dumb_buffers.c:96 drm_mode_create_dumb_ioctl+0x1f5/0x2d0 linux/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_dumb_buffers.c:102 drm_ioctl_kernel+0x21d/0x430 linux/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_ioctl.c:788 drm_ioctl+0x56f/0xcc0 linux/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_ioctl.c:891 vfs_ioctl linux/fs/ioctl.c:51 __do_sys_ioctl linux/fs/ioctl.c:870 __se_sys_ioctl linux/fs/ioctl.c:856 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x13d/0x1c0 linux/fs/ioctl.c:856 do_syscall_x64 linux/arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x90 linux/arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc linux/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:120 Freed by task 515: kasan_save_stack+0x38/0x70 linux/mm/kasan/common.c:45 kasan_set_track+0x25/0x40 linux/mm/kasan/common.c:52 kasan_save_free_info+0x2e/0x60 linux/mm/kasan/generic.c:521 ____kasan_slab_free linux/mm/kasan/common.c:236 ____kasan_slab_free+0x180/0x1f0 linux/mm/kasan/common.c:200 __kasan_slab_free+0x12/0x30 linux/mm/kasan/common.c:244 kasan_slab_free linux/./include/linux/kasan.h:162 slab_free_hook linux/mm/slub.c:1781 slab_free_freelist_hook+0xd2/0x1a0 linux/mm/slub.c:1807 slab_free linux/mm/slub.c:3787 __kmem_cache_free+0x196/0x2d0 linux/mm/slub.c:3800 kfree+0x78/0x120 linux/mm/slab_common.c:1019 qxl_ttm_bo_destroy+0x140/0x1a0 linux/drivers/gpu/drm/qxl/qxl_object.c:49 ttm_bo_release+0x678/0xa30 linux/drivers/gpu/drm/ttm/ttm_bo.c:381 kref_put linux/./include/linux/kref.h:65 ttm_bo_put+0x50/0x80 linux/drivers/gpu/drm/ttm/ttm_bo.c:393 qxl_gem_object_free+0x3e/0x60 linux/drivers/gpu/drm/qxl/qxl_gem.c:42 drm_gem_object_free+0x5c/0x90 linux/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_gem.c:974 kref_put linux/./include/linux/kref.h:65 __drm_gem_object_put linux/./include/drm/drm_gem.h:431 drm_gem_object_put linux/./include/drm/drm_gem.h:444 qxl_gem_object_create_with_handle+0x151/0x180 linux/drivers/gpu/drm/qxl/qxl_gem.c:100 qxl_mode_dumb_create+0x1cd/0x400 linux/drivers/gpu/drm/qxl/qxl_dumb.c:63 drm_mode_create_dumb linux/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_dumb_buffers.c:96 drm_mode_create_dumb_ioctl+0x1f5/0x2d0 linux/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_dumb_buffers.c:102 drm_ioctl_kernel+0x21d/0x430 linux/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_ioctl.c:788 drm_ioctl+0x56f/0xcc0 linux/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_ioctl.c:891 vfs_ioctl linux/fs/ioctl.c:51 __do_sys_ioctl linux/fs/ioctl.c:870 __se_sys_ioctl linux/fs/ioctl.c:856 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x13d/0x1c0 linux/fs/ioctl.c:856 do_syscall_x64 linux/arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x90 linux/arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc linux/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:120 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88801136c000 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-1k of size 1024 The buggy address is located 576 bytes inside of freed 1024-byte region [ffff88801136c000, ffff88801136c400) The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page:0000000089fc329b refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x11368 head:0000000089fc329b order:3 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:0 pincount:0 flags: 0xfffffc0010200(slab|head|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x1fffff) raw: 000fffffc0010200 ffff888007841dc0 dead000000000122 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080100010 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff88801136c100: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff88801136c180: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb >ffff88801136c200: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ^ ffff88801136c280: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff88801136c300: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ================================================================== Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint Instead of returning a weak reference to the qxl_bo object, return the created drm_gem_object and let the caller decrement the reference count when it no longer needs it. As a convenience, if the caller is not interested in the gobj object, it can pass NULL to the parameter and the reference counting is descremented internally. The bug and the reproducer were originally found by the Zero Day Initiative project (ZDI-CAN-20940). Link: https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/ Signed-off-by: Wander Lairson Costa <wander@redhat.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20230814165119.90847-1-wander@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit c7b87ce0dd10b64b68a0b22cb83bbd556e28fe81 ] libtraceevent parses and returns an array of argument fields, sometimes larger than RAW_SYSCALL_ARGS_NUM (6) because it includes "__syscall_nr", idx will traverse to index 6 (7th element) whereas sc->fmt->arg holds 6 elements max, creating an out-of-bounds access. This runtime error is found by UBsan. The error message: $ sudo UBSAN_OPTIONS=print_stacktrace=1 ./perf trace -a --max-events=1 builtin-trace.c:1966:35: runtime error: index 6 out of bounds for type 'syscall_arg_fmt [6]' #0 0x5c04956be5fe in syscall__alloc_arg_fmts /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:1966 altera-fpga#1 0x5c04956c0510 in trace__read_syscall_info /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:2110 altera-fpga#2 0x5c04956c372b in trace__syscall_info /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:2436 altera-fpga#3 0x5c04956d2f39 in trace__init_syscalls_bpf_prog_array_maps /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:3897 altera-fpga#4 0x5c04956d6d25 in trace__run /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:4335 altera-fpga#5 0x5c04956e112e in cmd_trace /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:5502 altera-fpga#6 0x5c04956eda7d in run_builtin /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/perf.c:351 altera-fpga#7 0x5c04956ee0a8 in handle_internal_command /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/perf.c:404 altera-fpga#8 0x5c04956ee37f in run_argv /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/perf.c:448 altera-fpga#9 0x5c04956ee8e9 in main /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/perf.c:556 altera-fpga#10 0x79eb3622a3b7 in __libc_start_call_main ../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58 altera-fpga#11 0x79eb3622a47a in __libc_start_main_impl ../csu/libc-start.c:360 altera-fpga#12 0x5c04955422d4 in _start (/home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/perf+0x4e02d4) (BuildId: 5b6cab2d59e96a4341741765ad6914a4d784dbc6) 0.000 ( 0.014 ms): Chrome_ChildIO/117244 write(fd: 238, buf: !, count: 1) = 1 Fixes: 5e58fcf ("perf trace: Allow allocating sc->arg_fmt even without the syscall tracepoint") Signed-off-by: Howard Chu <howardchu95@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250122025519.361873-1-howardchu95@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

…cal section [ Upstream commit 85b2b9c16d053364e2004883140538e73b333cdb ] A circular lock dependency splat has been seen involving down_trylock(): ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.12.0-41.el10.s390x+debug ------------------------------------------------------ dd/32479 is trying to acquire lock: 0015a20accd0d4f8 ((console_sem).lock){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: down_trylock+0x26/0x90 but task is already holding lock: 000000017e461698 (&zone->lock){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: rmqueue_bulk+0xac/0x8f0 the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> altera-fpga#4 (&zone->lock){-.-.}-{2:2}: -> altera-fpga#3 (hrtimer_bases.lock){-.-.}-{2:2}: -> altera-fpga#2 (&rq->__lock){-.-.}-{2:2}: -> altera-fpga#1 (&p->pi_lock){-.-.}-{2:2}: -> #0 ((console_sem).lock){-.-.}-{2:2}: The console_sem -> pi_lock dependency is due to calling try_to_wake_up() while holding the console_sem raw_spinlock. This dependency can be broken by using wake_q to do the wakeup instead of calling try_to_wake_up() under the console_sem lock. This will also make the semaphore's raw_spinlock become a terminal lock without taking any further locks underneath it. The hrtimer_bases.lock is a raw_spinlock while zone->lock is a spinlock. The hrtimer_bases.lock -> zone->lock dependency happens via the debug_objects_fill_pool() helper function in the debugobjects code. -> altera-fpga#4 (&zone->lock){-.-.}-{2:2}: __lock_acquire+0xe86/0x1cc0 lock_acquire.part.0+0x258/0x630 lock_acquire+0xb8/0xe0 _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0xb4/0x120 rmqueue_bulk+0xac/0x8f0 __rmqueue_pcplist+0x580/0x830 rmqueue_pcplist+0xfc/0x470 rmqueue.isra.0+0xdec/0x11b0 get_page_from_freelist+0x2ee/0xeb0 __alloc_pages_noprof+0x2c2/0x520 alloc_pages_mpol_noprof+0x1fc/0x4d0 alloc_pages_noprof+0x8c/0xe0 allocate_slab+0x320/0x460 ___slab_alloc+0xa58/0x12b0 __slab_alloc.isra.0+0x42/0x60 kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x304/0x350 fill_pool+0xf6/0x450 debug_object_activate+0xfe/0x360 enqueue_hrtimer+0x34/0x190 __run_hrtimer+0x3c8/0x4c0 __hrtimer_run_queues+0x1b2/0x260 hrtimer_interrupt+0x316/0x760 do_IRQ+0x9a/0xe0 do_irq_async+0xf6/0x160 Normally a raw_spinlock to spinlock dependency is not legitimate and will be warned if CONFIG_PROVE_RAW_LOCK_NESTING is enabled, but debug_objects_fill_pool() is an exception as it explicitly allows this dependency for non-PREEMPT_RT kernel without causing PROVE_RAW_LOCK_NESTING lockdep splat. As a result, this dependency is legitimate and not a bug. Anyway, semaphore is the only locking primitive left that is still using try_to_wake_up() to do wakeup inside critical section, all the other locking primitives had been migrated to use wake_q to do wakeup outside of the critical section. It is also possible that there are other circular locking dependencies involving printk/console_sem or other existing/new semaphores lurking somewhere which may show up in the future. Let just do the migration now to wake_q to avoid headache like this. Reported-by: yzbot+ed801a886dfdbfe7136d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250307232717.1759087-3-boqun.feng@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit b61e69bb1c049cf507e3c654fa3dc1568231bd07 ] syzbot report a deadlock in diFree. [1] When calling "ioctl$LOOP_SET_STATUS64", the offset value passed in is 4, which does not match the mounted loop device, causing the mapping of the mounted loop device to be invalidated. When creating the directory and creating the inode of iag in diReadSpecial(), read the page of fixed disk inode (AIT) in raw mode in read_metapage(), the metapage data it returns is corrupted, which causes the nlink value of 0 to be assigned to the iag inode when executing copy_from_dinode(), which ultimately causes a deadlock when entering diFree(). To avoid this, first check the nlink value of dinode before setting iag inode. [1] WARNING: possible recursive locking detected 6.12.0-rc7-syzkaller-00212-g4a5df3796467 #0 Not tainted -------------------------------------------- syz-executor301/5309 is trying to acquire lock: ffff888044548920 (&(imap->im_aglock[index])){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: diFree+0x37c/0x2fb0 fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:889 but task is already holding lock: ffff888044548920 (&(imap->im_aglock[index])){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: diAlloc+0x1b6/0x1630 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(&(imap->im_aglock[index])); lock(&(imap->im_aglock[index])); *** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation 5 locks held by syz-executor301/5309: #0: ffff8880422a4420 (sb_writers#9){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: mnt_want_write+0x3f/0x90 fs/namespace.c:515 altera-fpga#1: ffff88804755b390 (&type->i_mutex_dir_key#6/1){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: inode_lock_nested include/linux/fs.h:850 [inline] altera-fpga#1: ffff88804755b390 (&type->i_mutex_dir_key#6/1){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: filename_create+0x260/0x540 fs/namei.c:4026 altera-fpga#2: ffff888044548920 (&(imap->im_aglock[index])){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: diAlloc+0x1b6/0x1630 altera-fpga#3: ffff888044548890 (&imap->im_freelock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: diNewIAG fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:2460 [inline] altera-fpga#3: ffff888044548890 (&imap->im_freelock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: diAllocExt fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:1905 [inline] altera-fpga#3: ffff888044548890 (&imap->im_freelock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: diAllocAG+0x4b7/0x1e50 fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:1669 altera-fpga#4: ffff88804755a618 (&jfs_ip->rdwrlock/1){++++}-{3:3}, at: diNewIAG fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:2477 [inline] altera-fpga#4: ffff88804755a618 (&jfs_ip->rdwrlock/1){++++}-{3:3}, at: diAllocExt fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:1905 [inline] altera-fpga#4: ffff88804755a618 (&jfs_ip->rdwrlock/1){++++}-{3:3}, at: diAllocAG+0x869/0x1e50 fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:1669 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5309 Comm: syz-executor301 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc7-syzkaller-00212-g4a5df3796467 #0 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_deadlock_bug+0x483/0x620 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3037 check_deadlock kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3089 [inline] validate_chain+0x15e2/0x5920 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3891 __lock_acquire+0x1384/0x2050 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5202 lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5825 __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:608 [inline] __mutex_lock+0x136/0xd70 kernel/locking/mutex.c:752 diFree+0x37c/0x2fb0 fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:889 jfs_evict_inode+0x32d/0x440 fs/jfs/inode.c:156 evict+0x4e8/0x9b0 fs/inode.c:725 diFreeSpecial fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:552 [inline] duplicateIXtree+0x3c6/0x550 fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:3022 diNewIAG fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:2597 [inline] diAllocExt fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:1905 [inline] diAllocAG+0x17dc/0x1e50 fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:1669 diAlloc+0x1d2/0x1630 fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:1590 ialloc+0x8f/0x900 fs/jfs/jfs_inode.c:56 jfs_mkdir+0x1c5/0xba0 fs/jfs/namei.c:225 vfs_mkdir+0x2f9/0x4f0 fs/namei.c:4257 do_mkdirat+0x264/0x3a0 fs/namei.c:4280 __do_sys_mkdirat fs/namei.c:4295 [inline] __se_sys_mkdirat fs/namei.c:4293 [inline] __x64_sys_mkdirat+0x87/0xa0 fs/namei.c:4293 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Reported-by: syzbot+355da3b3a74881008e8f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=355da3b3a74881008e8f Signed-off-by: Edward Adam Davis <eadavis@qq.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp <dave.kleikamp@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 5da692e2262b8f81993baa9592f57d12c2703dea ] A cache device failing to resume due to mapping errors should not be retried, as the failure leaves a partially initialized policy object. Repeating the resume operation risks triggering BUG_ON when reloading cache mappings into the incomplete policy object. Reproduce steps: 1. create a cache metadata consisting of 512 or more cache blocks, with some mappings stored in the first array block of the mapping array. Here we use cache_restore v1.0 to build the metadata. cat <<EOF >> cmeta.xml <superblock uuid="" block_size="128" nr_cache_blocks="512" \ policy="smq" hint_width="4"> <mappings> <mapping cache_block="0" origin_block="0" dirty="false"/> </mappings> </superblock> EOF dmsetup create cmeta --table "0 8192 linear /dev/sdc 0" cache_restore -i cmeta.xml -o /dev/mapper/cmeta --metadata-version=2 dmsetup remove cmeta 2. wipe the second array block of the mapping array to simulate data degradations. mapping_root=$(dd if=/dev/sdc bs=1c count=8 skip=192 \ 2>/dev/null | hexdump -e '1/8 "%u\n"') ablock=$(dd if=/dev/sdc bs=1c count=8 skip=$((4096*mapping_root+2056)) \ 2>/dev/null | hexdump -e '1/8 "%u\n"') dd if=/dev/zero of=/dev/sdc bs=4k count=1 seek=$ablock 3. try bringing up the cache device. The resume is expected to fail due to the broken array block. dmsetup create cmeta --table "0 8192 linear /dev/sdc 0" dmsetup create cdata --table "0 65536 linear /dev/sdc 8192" dmsetup create corig --table "0 524288 linear /dev/sdc 262144" dmsetup create cache --notable dmsetup load cache --table "0 524288 cache /dev/mapper/cmeta \ /dev/mapper/cdata /dev/mapper/corig 128 2 metadata2 writethrough smq 0" dmsetup resume cache 4. try resuming the cache again. An unexpected BUG_ON is triggered while loading cache mappings. dmsetup resume cache Kernel logs: (snip) ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at drivers/md/dm-cache-policy-smq.c:752! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [altera-fpga#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 332 Comm: dmsetup Not tainted 6.13.4 altera-fpga#3 RIP: 0010:smq_load_mapping+0x3e5/0x570 Fix by disallowing resume operations for devices that failed the initial attempt. Signed-off-by: Ming-Hung Tsai <mtsai@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

JoePerches and others added 2 commits May 16, 2016 17:56

johanbhussin pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 8, 2022

Revert "Update SoC FPGA hwmon documentation and devicetrees (#3)" (#4)

83718e9

This reverts commit 92991a0.

Provide feedback

Saved searches

Use saved searches to filter your results more quickly

Uh oh!

Kraj/socfpga 4.1 ltsi #3

Kraj/socfpga 4.1 ltsi #3

Uh oh!

kraj commented May 17, 2016

Uh oh!

Uh oh!

Kraj/socfpga 4.1 ltsi #3

Kraj/socfpga 4.1 ltsi #3

Uh oh!

Conversation

kraj commented May 17, 2016

Uh oh!

Uh oh!