

other states' behavior, including on issues related to terrorism.³ In addition, the resolution of conflicts in such places as Kashmir and Palestinian territory may take generations and is not a primary reason for al Qaeda's existence or support. We must therefore look elsewhere for an effective strategy that helps prioritize resources and attention. While numerous terrorist groups have ended because of a political solution, al Qaeda's broad goals make this unlikely. Since its goal remains the establishment of a pan-Islamic caliphate, there is little reason to expect that a negotiated settlement with governments in the Middle East is possible.

Based on our analysis of how terrorist groups end, a more effective approach would be adopting a two-front strategy. First, policing and intelligence should be the backbone of U.S. efforts. In Europe, North America, North Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, al Qaeda consists of an amorphous network of individuals who need to be tracked down and arrested. In Pakistan, for example, the most successful efforts to capture or kill al Qaeda leaders after the September 2001 attacks—such as Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Ramzi Binalshibh, Abu Faraj al-Libbi, and Abu Zubeida—occurred because of careful police and intelligence work, not military force. This strategy should include careful work abroad from such organizations as the CIA and FBI, as well as their cooperation with local police and intelligence agencies.

Second, military forces, but not necessarily U.S. military forces, are a necessary component when al Qaeda is directly involved in an insurgency. Even in these cases, local military forces frequently have more legitimacy to operate than the United States does and a better understanding of the operating environment. This means a light U.S. footprint or none at all. The U.S. military can play a critical role in building indigenous capacity but should generally resist being drawn

³ See, for example, Robert A. Pape "Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work," *International Security*, Vol. 22, No. 2, Autumn 1997, pp. 90–136; Robert A. Pape, "Why Economic Sanctions Still Do Not Work," *International Security*, Vol. 23, No. 1, Summer 1998, pp. 66–77; T. Clifton Morgan and Valerie L. Schwebach, "Fools Suffer Gladly: The Use of Economic Sanctions in International Crises," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 41, No. 1, March 1997, pp. 27–50; David Cortright and George A. Lopez, *The Sanctions Decade: Assessing UN Strategies in the 1990s*, Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000.