

## Policing and Intelligence

This strategy should include rebalancing U.S. resources and attention on police and intelligence work. It also means increasing budgets at the CIA, U.S. Department of Justice, and U.S. Department of State, and scaling back the U.S. Department of Defense's focus and resources on counterterrorism. U.S. special operations forces will remain critical, as will U.S. military operations to counter terrorist groups involved in insurgencies.

This also requires the development of a strategy with police and intelligence as its backbone. Unlike the military, local police and intelligence agencies usually have a permanent presence in cities and towns, a better understanding of local groups, and human sources. As Bruce Hoffman argued, a critical step in countering terrorist groups is for law-enforcement officials to

develop strong confidence-building ties with the communities from which terrorists are most likely to come or hide in. . . . The most effective and useful intelligence comes from places where terrorists conceal themselves and seek to establish and hide their infrastructure.<sup>8</sup>

Some have argued that history has little to offer, since al Qaeda's global breadth and decentralized organizational structure make it somewhat different from many other terrorist organizations, even religious ones. As Rohan Gunaratna argued, "Because there is no historical precedent for al Qaeda, the past offers very little guidance."<sup>9</sup> But this is not true. While al Qaeda is different from many other terrorist organizations because of its global reach, its modus operandi is not atypical. Like other groups, its members need to communicate with each other, raise funds, build a support network, plan and execute attacks, and establish a base (or bases) of operation. Most of these nodes are vulnerable to penetration by police and intelligence agencies. The downside of this

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<sup>8</sup> Hoffman (2006, p. 169).

<sup>9</sup> Gunaratna (2002, p. 296).