

and Iraq. This suggests that the most vulnerable hubs of al Qaeda may sometimes be local substate actors.

The data in Chapter Five indicated that, when insurgent groups have ended, they negotiated a settlement with the government nearly half the time. One-quarter of the time, the group achieved victory, and just under a quarter of the time, military forces defeated the insurgent group. A negotiated settlement with al Qaeda is unlikely, since governments in North America, Europe, the Middle East, and Asia would never agree to this outcome. This means that, in cases in which al Qaeda is involved in an insurgency, limited military force may be necessary. Force was necessary in Afghanistan in 2001, for example, to target al Qaeda's base of operations. But U.S. military and intelligence forces acted primarily in support of the Northern Alliance, which conducted most of the ground fighting.³⁶ In the majority of cases, the United States should avoid direct, large-scale military force in the Muslim world to target al Qaeda, or it risks increasing local resentment and creating new terrorist recruits.

The U.S. focus outside of its borders should be to work by, with, and through indigenous forces. As some jihadists have argued, direct military engagement with the United States has been good for the jihadi movement. It rallies the locals behind the movement and pits the fight between Islam and the West. One of al Qaeda's primary objectives, then, is "to put America's armies, which occupy the region and set up military bases in it without resistance, in a state of war with the masses in the region. It is obvious at this very moment that it stirs up movements that increase the jihadi expansion and create legions among the youth who contemplate and plan for resistance."³⁷

In addition, outside forces can rarely win insurgencies for local forces. First, outside military forces are unlikely to remain for the duration of any counterterrorist effort, at least as a major combatant force.

³⁶ On the overthrow of the Taliban regime, see Schroen (2005); Stephen D. Biddle, *Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy*, Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, November 2002; Gary Berntsen and Ralph Pezzullo, *Jawbreaker: The Attack on Bin Laden and Al Qaeda*, New York: Crown Publishers, 2005; and Bob Woodward, *Bush at War*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002.

³⁷ Naji (2006, p. 20).