

### Intelligence Collection

Until the Tokyo attack, Aum Shinrikyo had benefited from a loosely organized and relatively weak Japanese intelligence apparatus. This was largely a legacy of Japan's World War II military government. To some extent, this resulted from limitations in the Japanese constitution. For instance, there were legal bans on the police use of preventive surveillance techniques.<sup>7</sup> Shielded by limited governmental powers, Aum Shinrikyo was able to accumulate extensive stockpiles of cash and dangerous chemical and biological weapons without raising police suspicion. In addition, Japan's intelligence service, the Public Security Intelligence Agency, was set up at the height of the Korean War in 1952 to monitor and target communist groups in Japan. But since the end of the Cold War and the collapse of communism, the absence of clear enemy forces undermined its position and status.<sup>8</sup>

However, this changed in the aftermath of the Tokyo subway attack. Japanese police and intelligence agencies began a major intelligence-collection and investigation effort. The Public Security Intelligence Agency placed Aum Shinrikyo under surveillance in accordance with the Act Pertaining to Control of Organizations That Commit Indiscriminate Murder, which was enacted after the Tokyo attack.<sup>9</sup> Aum Shinrikyo members fled across the country, concealing various pieces of evidence. The Japanese Criminal Affairs Bureau and the Security Bureau jointly established the Task Force for Toxic Agent Attack in Tokyo Subways at the National Police Agency. The investigational headquarters for the crime, led by the director of criminal investigation, was established at the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department's Tsukiji station so that police could pursue an initial

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<sup>7</sup> Robyn Pang, "Consequence Management in the 1995 Sarin Attacks on the Japanese Subway System," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol. 25, No. 6, November–December 2002, pp. 421–448, p. 422.

<sup>8</sup> Ian Reader, "Spectres and Shadows: Aum Shinrikyo and the Road to Megiddo," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Volume 14, Number 1, Spring 2002, pp. 145–186; Peter J. Katzenstein, "Same War: Different Views: Germany, Japan, and Counterterrorism," *International Organization*, Vol. 57, No. 4, Autumn 2003, pp. 731–760.

<sup>9</sup> Mizukoshi Hideaki, "Terrorists, Terrorism, and Japan's Counter-Terrorism Policy," *Gaiko Forum*, Vol. 3, No. 2, Summer 2003, pp. 53–63.