

Land Reform

ONUSAL was partially successful in reintegrating former combatants into Salvadoran society. The Chapultepec agreement provided for the transfer of land to former FMLN combatants, members of the armed forces, and squatters who had occupied land in the conflict areas during the war.⁴⁰ A maximum of 7,500 former FMLN combatants, 15,000 former military soldiers, and 25,000 landholders in the zone of conflict were to be reintegrated.⁴¹ They were given credit to purchase land, agricultural training, basic household goods, agricultural tools, housing, and technical assistance. The available land would come from territory that landowners abandoned or were forced off of during the civil war. The National Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (Comisión Nacional para la Consolidación de la Paz, or COPAZ) was responsible for administering the land-transfer program. But the agreement's vagueness on several issues created numerous problems. It said nothing, for example, about the size of the plots to which the beneficiaries were entitled, the amount of government credit available to beneficiaries, and the practical arrangements under which the land was to be transferred.⁴² COPAZ was also ineffective at mediating land disputes. By the end of 1994, land titles had been issued to only 40 percent of potential beneficiaries. Setbacks continued over the subsequent several years for a number of reasons: coordination problems among Salvadoran government agencies, payment delays, legal problems, and some owners' refusal to sell their land.⁴³

⁴⁰ UN/DPI (1995a, pp. 206–209).

⁴¹ UN/DPI (1995a, p. 29).

⁴² Timothy A. Wilkins, "The El Salvador Peace Accords: Using International and Domestic Law Norms to Build Peace," in Michael W. Doyle, Ian Johnstone, and Robert C. Orr, eds., *Keeping the Peace: Multidimensional UN Operations in Cambodia and El Salvador*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997, pp. 275–277.

⁴³ Del Castillo (1997, pp. 342–365).