tion in the political system and a role in forming a political party.[44] In each of these cases, the group had narrow-enough goals that a negotiated settlement was possible.

The second logic can best be described as a transition to *civic action*. Unlike the peace-settlement option, terrorist groups that pursue this path do not necessarily reach a formal agreement with the government. In some cases, the government may grant amnesty to terrorists. In Italy, for example, the government established a policy of repentance in the 1980s, which provided "the extension of leniency in return for disassociation."[45] The Italian policy encouraged individual exit from terrorist groups. The Italian government offered reduced prison sentences in exchange for information that would enable the government to dismantle terrorist groups. By 1989, 389 terrorists had repented.[46]

In general, we should expect that, the narrower the goals, the more difficult it is for terrorists to achieve them, and the more likely terrorist groups may be willing to seek nonviolent means. This is especially true where terrorist groups are small and their goals sufficiently narrow. In such cases, pursuing their goals through nonviolence has greater benefits and lower costs. Indeed, most terrorist organizations are implicitly strategic calculators.[47] They use violence to achieve specific political purposes, such as coercing a target government to change policy, mobilizing additional recruits and financial support, or achieving independence. They usually have a set of hierarchically ordered goals and choose strategies that best advance them.

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[44] María Eugenia Vásquez Perdomo, *My Life as a Colombian Revolutionary: Reflections of a Former Guerrillera*, Philadelphia, Pa.: Temple University Press, 2005; Americas Watch Committee, *The Killings in Colombia*, Washington, D.C., 1989.

[45] Leonard Weinberg, and William Lee Eubank, *The Rise and Fall of Italian Terrorism*, Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1987, p. 129.

[46] Weinberg and Eubank (1987).

[47] See Crenshaw (1990, p. 117); Pape (2003); Jonathan Schachter, *The Eye of the Believer: Psychological Influences on Counter-Terrorism Policy-Making*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RGSD-166, 2002, p. 96; and Andrew Kydd and Barbara F. Walter, "Sabotaging the Peace: The Politics of Extremist Violence," *International Organization*, Vol. 56, No. 2, Spring 2002, pp. 263–296, pp. 279–289.