

This is especially true when terrorist groups are involved in an insurgency. Insurgencies are usually of short duration only if the indigenous government collapses at an early stage. An analysis of all insurgencies since 1945 shows that successful counterinsurgency campaigns last for an average of 14 years, and unsuccessful ones last for an average of 11 years. Many also end in a draw, with neither side winning. Insurgencies can also have long tails: Approximately 25 percent of insurgencies won by the government and 11 percent won by insurgents last more than 20 years.³⁸ Since indigenous forces eventually have to win the war on their own, they must develop the capacity to do so. If they do not develop this capacity, indigenous forces are likely to lose the war once international assistance ends.³⁹ Second, local forces usually know the population and terrain better than external actors and are better able to gather and exploit intelligence. Third, the population may interpret an outsider playing a lead role as an occupation, eliciting nationalist reactions that impede success.⁴⁰ Fourth, a lead indigenous role can provide a focus for national aspirations and show the population that they—and not foreign forces—control their destiny. Competent governments that can provide services to their population in a timely manner can best prevent and overcome terrorist groups.

³⁸ See David C. Gompert, John Gordon IV, Adam Grissom, David R. Frelinger, Seth G. Jones, Martin C. Libicki, Edward O'Connell, Brooke K. Stearns, and Robert E. Hunter, *War by Other Means: Building Complete and Balanced Capabilities for Counterinsurgency (RAND Counterinsurgency Study: Final Report)*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MG-595/2-OSD, 2008, Appendix A. On time, also see Galula (1964, p. 10).

³⁹ On rentier states, see Barnett R. Rubin, *The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System*, 2nd ed., New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2002, pp. 81–105; Charles Tilly and Gabriel Ardant, *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975; and Hazem Beblawi and Giacomo Luciani, eds., *The Rentier State*, London and New York: Croom Helm, 1987.

⁴⁰ David Edelstein, "Occupational Hazards: Why Military Occupations Succeed or Fail," *International Security*, Vol. 29, No. 1, Summer 2004, pp. 49–91, p. 51.