

Indeed, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat, or GSPC) officially merged with al Qa'ida in September 2006, subsequently changed its name to al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb and attacked a U.S. contractor bus in December 2006 in greater Algiers, marking its first attack against a U.S. entity.³⁸

The *affiliated units* were loosely knit cells of radicals who had some direct connection with al Qa'ida. Unlike the previous category, these units were not large insurgent organizations attempting to overthrow their local governments. Some had prior terrorism experience in such campaigns as Algeria, the Balkans, Chechnya, Afghanistan, or Iraq and may have trained in an al Qa'ida facility before September 2001. Others had no prior experience, such as the individuals involved in the July 2005 bombing in London and led by Mohammad Sidique Khan. In all of these cases, the terrorists had some direct link with al Qa'ida.³⁹

Finally, the broader *al Qa'ida network* included Islamic radicals with no direct connection with al Qa'ida but were still willing to conduct attacks in support of al Qa'ida's jihadi agenda. They were motivated by hatred toward the United States and the West, as well as toward allied regimes in the Middle East, such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia. However, the relationship with al Qa'ida was inspirational.⁴⁰ One example was the four men charged in June 2007 with plotting to blow up fuel tanks, terminal buildings, and the web of fuel lines running beneath John F. Kennedy International Airport (which the plotters code-named "chicken farm"). They had no direct connections with al Qa'ida but were prepared to conduct attacks in solidarity with it.⁴¹

³⁸ DoS (2007, p. 269).

³⁹ Hoffman (2006, pp. 285–289).

⁴⁰ Hoffman (2006, pp. 285–289).

⁴¹ New York City Police Department, *Threat Analysis: Subject: JFK Airport/Pipeline Plot*, New York, June 2, 2007.