development is that eliminating key nodes in multiple places is more difficult than doing it one country.

Indeed, its organizational structure makes it vulnerable to a policing and intelligence strategy. This structure includes a bottomup approach (encouraging independent thought and action from lowlevel operatives) and a top-down one (issuing orders and still coordinating a far-flung terrorist enterprise with both highly synchronized and autonomous moving parts). Al Qa'ida is a broad network. Successfully targeting this network requires a painstaking process of collecting intelligence on al Qa'ida, penetrating cells, and eventually arresting or killing its key members. As Mark Sageman argued, the most effective tools to defeating al Qa'ida and the global Salafi jihad "simply amount to good police work."10 Unlike a hierarchical organization that can be eliminated through decapitation of its leadership, a network resists fragmentation because of its dense interconnectivity. A significant fraction of nodes can be randomly removed without much impact on its integrity. A network is vulnerable, however, at its hubs. If enough hubs are destroyed, the network breaks down into isolated, noncommunicating islands of nodes.<sup>11</sup> Hubs in a social network are vulnerable because most communications go through them. With good intelligence, law-enforcement authorities should be able to identify and arrest these hubs. This includes intercepting and monitoring terrorist communication through telephone, landline phone, email, facsimiles, and Internet chat rooms, as well as tracking couriers used by al Qa'ida officials in such places as Pakistan.

Police and intelligence services are best placed to implement these activities. This approach can include a range of steps: intelligence collection and analysis, capture of key leaders, and legal and other measures.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Sageman (2004, p. 175).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> On networks and terrorism, see Seth G. Jones, "Fighting Networked Terror Groups: Lessons from Israel," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol. 30, No. 4, April 2007b, pp. 281–302; and Jackson (2006).