

ishment of perpetrators should be a matter for the wider criminal-justice system.²⁰ The barriers can sometimes be significant. Finding evidence that can be presented in court but that does not reveal sensitive information about sources and methods can be challenging. This is especially true if a terrorist has not perpetrated an attack yet. In many cases, it may be easier and more effective to arrest and punish terrorists for other offenses, such as drug trafficking, that have little direct connection to their terrorist activity. As one member of Antiterrorist Coordination Unit (l'Unité de Coordination de la Lutte Antiterroriste, or UCLAT) told us, "We have frequently detained possible terrorists for a number of crimes—such as criminal activity—that have little or nothing to do with terrorism. We can often build stronger legal cases against individuals by focusing on other crimes they have committed. The problem, of course, is that the punishment may be less severe."²¹ In nondemocratic countries, the policing approach is often drastically different, because laws and norms of behavior may be different. Consequently, Pakistani and Saudi police and intelligence agencies have frequently used repressive measures to target al Qa'ida terrorists operating in their countries.²²

The capture of terrorists—both low level and high level—is often a good source of information on leaders. Diaries, cell phones, and laptops can provide crucial information on code names of other terrorists, real names, addresses, phone numbers, and plans. For example, the 2004 capture of Muhammad Naeem Noor Khan led to a gold mine of information on al Qa'ida terrorist plots for the Pakistan government, United States, and other countries. He was a Pakistani national who was born in Karachi and earned a bachelor's degree in computer engineering in 2002. In March 2002, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed recruited

²⁰ See, for example, Clutterbuck (2004, pp. 142–144).

²¹ Interview with member of l'Unité de Coordination de la Lutte Antiterroriste by Seth G. Jones, Monterey, Calif., June 27, 2007.

²² On the dilemmas of U.S. assistance to the police of nondemocratic countries, see Seth G. Jones, Olga Oliker, Peter Chalk, C. Christine Fair, Rollie Lal, and James Dobbins, *Securing Tyrants or Fostering Reform? U.S. Internal Security Assistance to Repressive and Transitioning Regimes*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MG-550-OSI, 2006.