

place their officers within newly formed police units, could not staff up as quickly as police units were growing. Perhaps the most significant change was that the new police, in contrast to their predecessors, were willing to fight. As recently as August 2006, half of the police officers in Fallujah stayed home in the face of AQI threats.<sup>26</sup> By January, they were standing their ground.<sup>27</sup> A simultaneous alienation of other insurgent groups also became visible. Competing insurgent groups had seen defections deplete their ranks, and their leadership was attacked and assassinated. AQI's growing dominance of organized crime cut into the revenues on which competing groups counted. Furthermore, whereas all the major insurgent groups employed the Salafi discourse, none but AQI made the restoration of the caliphate their primary or even preferred objective.

A large share of the new police force was made up of former members of insurgent groups. One sheikh, Abu Azzam, said that the 2,300 men in his movement included members of fierce Sunni groups, such as 1920 Revolution Brigades and the Mujahideen Army, which had fought U.S. forces.<sup>28</sup> In late 2006, one report concluded that "elders of the Abu Soda tribe recently helped U.S. forces find IEDs [improvised explosive devices] that had been planted by their own tribesmen, and they have identified kidnappers and other local bad guys for the Americans to arrest." Sheikh Sattar added, "Even some tribes that were with the insurgency follow us."<sup>29</sup>

For three months, Anbar Salvation Council battled with AQI, primarily in the Ramadi area.<sup>30</sup> In the absence of set-piece battles, con-

---

<sup>26</sup> Solomon Moore and Louise Roug, "Deaths Across Iraq Show It Is a Nation of Many Wars, with U.S. in the Middle," *Los Angeles Times*, October 7, 2006, p. 1.

<sup>27</sup> Perry (2006).

<sup>28</sup> Richard A. Oppel, "Mistrust as Iraqi Troops Encounter New U.S. Allies," *New York Times*, July 16, 2007, p. A1.

<sup>29</sup> Sarah Childress, "Retaking Ramadi: All the Sheikh's Men: U.S. Commanders Are Hoping Tribal Levies Can Help Fill the Ranks of Anbar's Police and Tackle Al Qaeda," *Newsweek*, December 18, 2006, p. 43.

<sup>30</sup> The course of conflict ran somewhat differently in al Anbar's far-western section (e.g., al-Qaim), its center-west section (e.g., Haditha, Ramadi), and its eastern section (e.g., Fallujah). The far-western section was already partially pacified in 2006, and, while ISI was the major