

to combat Soviet aggression, since they were the first line of defense against subversive forces. Robert Komer, President Kennedy's key National Security Council staff member on overseas internal security assistance, argued that viable foreign police in vulnerable countries were the necessary "preventive medicine" to thwart Soviet inroads.³⁴ Komer argued that the police were in regular contact with the population; could serve as an early warning against potential subversion; and could be used to control riots, demonstrations, and subversives before they became serious threats.

Military Force

Military force is sometimes necessary to end terrorist groups, especially when they are engaged in insurgencies. In most cases, however, local forces have been most effective to take the lead. Local forces—with assistance from intelligence units and special operations forces—can contest areas to regain government presence and control and then conduct military and civil-military programs to expand the control and edge out terrorists.³⁵ The focus should be on consolidating and holding ground that is clearly progovernment, deploying forces to conduct offensive operations, and holding territory once it is cleared. Holding territory has often been the most difficult facet of clear-and-hold strategies used against al Qa'ida and other groups in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq. Sufficient numbers of forces are needed to hold territory once it is cleared, or insurgents can retake it. Local forces may not always be government forces, as the United States discovered in Afghanistan

³⁴ William Rosenau, "The Kennedy Administration, U.S. Foreign Internal Security Assistance and the Challenge of 'Subterranean War,' 1961–63," *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, Vol. 14, No. 3, Autumn 2003, pp. 65–99, p. 80; also see Maxwell D. Taylor, "Address at International Police Academy Graduation," press release, U.S. Agency for International Development, December 17, 1965.

³⁵ The clear, hold, and build section draws extensively from U.S. Department of the Army and U.S. Marine Corps, *Counterinsurgency*, Washington, D.C., field manual 3-24, 2006; and Joseph D. Celeski, *Operationalizing COIN*, Hurlburt Field, Fla.: JSOU Press, report 05-2, 2005.