terrorist organization's goals, the more likely the government and terrorist group are to be able to agree on a settlement. Second, the narrower the goals, the more difficult it is for terrorists to achieve them, and the more willing they will be to seek nonviolent means.

One path to politics includes an explicit *peace settlement*. It involves a bargaining process with the government in which terrorist groups reach an agreement to disband their militant wings and transition to a political party.[35] This could be for a number of reasons. One is because structural conditions have changed, such as the loss of outside state support. The collapse of the Soviet Union meant that a number of groups, such as the FMLN in El Salvador, saw their outside assistance quickly begin to dry up. Or it could be because the two sides have reached a stalemate. "If," Paul Pillar wrote, "the stakes are indivisible, so that neither side can get most of what it wants without depriving the other of most of what it wants, negotiations are less apt to be successful."[36] Terrorism may persist in a country precisely because the goals that the government and the terrorist group are pursuing are so far apart, "with nothing in between to contribute to the give and take of negotiation and bargaining."[37] Terrorists fighting for broad goals, such as social revolution or empire, are less likely to reach a negotiated settlement than are groups fighting for limited aims, such as policy change or territorial change. Where a terrorist group's goals are minimal, there may be a middle ground from which to draw a compromise settlement.

As Figure 2.3 highlights, terrorist goals can range from narrow ones (such as securing a policy change) to broader ones (such as changing a country's social order). The further right on the x-axis, the broader the goals, beginning with the status quo and moving through policy

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[35] Crenshaw (1996, pp. 266–268); USIP (1999).

[36] Paul R. Pillar, *Negotiating Peace: War Termination as a Bargaining Process*, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1983, p. 24.

[37] I. William Zartman, "The Unfinished Agenda: Negotiating Internal Conflicts," in Roy E. Licklider, ed., *Stopping the Killing: How Civil Wars End*, New York: New York University Press, 1993, pp. 25–26; also see Stephen John Stedman, "Negotiation and Mediation in Internal Conflict," in Michael E. Brown, ed., *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict*, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996, pp. 341–376.