

2018补天白帽大会暨补天五周年盛典

HACK FOR SECURITY



Dynamic Analysis Skills of Reverse Engineering

Atum

About me

- Atum
 - CTF Player @Eur3kA @blue-lotus @Tea Deliverers
 - Master candidate @ICST SECLAB, Peking University
 - <http://atum.li> lgcpku@gmail.com
- Software Security
 - Focus on Vulnerability Discovering & Exploiting & Defense
 - Active in CTF, PWN/Reverse



Static Analysis VS Dynamic Analysis

- Static Analysis
 - A fundamental skill
 - Works well on small binary
 - Open IDA pro, audit->eat->sleep->audit
- Dynamic Analysis
 - A tricky skill
 - Useful when reversing large binary
 - A complementary technique to static analysis
 - Various tools available, run->audit->guessing

Dynamic Analysis techniques


- Debugging
- Tracing
- Symbolic Execution
- Dynamic Taint Analysis

Debugging

- The most popular dynamic analysis skill
- Some tricks:
 - Source Level Debugging without source code
 - Hardware breakpoint
 - Record & Replay (Reverse Debugging)

Source Level Debugging without source code

- IDA hex-rays debugger
 - Stepping F5 code
 - Debugging while Auditing
 - Full-platform support
 - Characteristic UI



Record & Replay

- gdb reverse step/continue
 - Use record command to record execution trace
 - Use reverse-* command to reverse debugging
- Example: QBCTF hide
- This technique is also supported by ollydbg

```

0x400a08 <frame_dummy+40> jmp    0x400960 <register_tm_clones>
0x400a0d <main+0>      push   rbp
0x400a0e <main+1>      mov    rbp, rsp
-> 0x400a11 <main+4>    lea    rsp, [rsp-0x1020]
0x400a19 <main+12>     or     QWORD PTR [rsp], 0x0
0x400a1e <main+17>     lea    rsp, [rsp+0x1020]
0x400a26 <main+25>     lea    rsi, [rip+0x2b69b3]      # 0x6b7
0x400a2d <main+32>     lea    rdi, [rip+0x8c750]      # 0x48d1
0x400a34 <main+39>     mov    eax, 0x0

[#0] Id 1, Name: "readme_revenge", stopped, reason: BREAKPOINT
[#0] 0x400a11->Name: main()

gef> record full
gef> reverse-
reverse-continue  reverse-next      reverse-search  reverse-stepi
reverse-finish    reverse-nexti    reverse-step
gef> reverse-step

```

Record & Replay

- VEX instruction set is not supported by gdb record
- rr project
 - <http://rr-project.org>
 - a replacement of gdb record
 - not a living debugging

```
->0x55555554a95 <main+4>
0x55555554a99 <main+8>
0x55555554a9c <main+11>
0x55555554aa0 <main+15>
0x55555554aa5 <main+20>
0x55555554aaa <main+25>

sub    rsp, 0x20
       DWORD PTR [rbp-0x14], edi
       QWORD PTR [rbp-0x20], rsi
       eax, 0x0
       call   0x55555554993 <menu>
       mov    eax, 0x0
```

```
[#0] Id 1, Name: "300", stopped, reason: BREAKPOINT
```

```
[#0] 0x55555554a95->Name: main()
```

```
gef> record full
```

```
gef> c
```

Continuing.

Process record does not support instruction 0xc5 at address 0xfffff7b738c5.
Process record: failed to record execution log.

```
atum@AtumNUC:~/Research/intelpt/test/300$ rr record ./300
rr: Saving execution to trace directory `/home/atum/.local/share/rr/300-1'.
1) alloc
2) write
3) print
4) free
^C
atum@AtumNUC:~/Research/intelpt/test/300$ rr replay
```

Tracing

- Records program execution, one of most useful techniques
- Trace Levels
 - Instruction tracing / Basic block tracing / Function tracing / API tracing etc.
- Trace Techniques
 - Debugger based tracing (easy to use)
 - Injected based tracing (use on anti-dbg program)
 - Hardware based tracing (trace kernel code, low overhead)

Application Scenarios Examples

- Find hidden code
 - 家徒四壁 @ HITCON CTF / hide @ QWB CTF
- Find key code when reversing large binary
 - Usually combine with hardware breakpoint, I think
 - API trace to find which function called a socket/recv/read call
- Get control flow information
 - Fuzzing
 - Use hardware trace to trace kernel

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Useful tracing tools

- IDA tracer
 - Trace with IDA debugger
- gdb tracer
 - record & replay
- strace
 - Trace system call on Linux
 - Easy to use
 - Strace /path/to/bin

The screenshot shows the IDA Pro interface with the following components:

- Left Panel (Assembly View):** Displays assembly code with addresses starting from 0x00403910. The code includes instructions like `int printf`, `push ebp`, `mov edx, [ebp+format]`, and `call sub_403AFC`.
- Center Panel (Trace Window):** A table showing the trace results. It includes columns for Thread, Address, Name, Instruction, and Result. One row is highlighted with a red box, showing the instruction `ret` at address 0x00403932 with the result `printf returned to _text:main+61`.
- Right Panel (Registers View):** Shows the general registers (EAX, EBX, ECX, EDX, ESI, EDI, EBP, ESP, EIP, EFL) and their current values. The values for EBP (0012FF8C), ESP (0012FF5C), and EIP (00403932) are highlighted with red boxes.
- Status Bar:** Shows CPU flags: CF=0, PF=0, AF=0, ZF=0, SF=0, TF=0, IF=1, DF=0, OF=0.

Useful tracing tools

- Pin (injected tracing)
 - Pin is a tool for the instrumentation of programs.
 - <https://software.intel.com/en-us/articles/pin-a-dynamic-binary-instrumentation-tool>

```
int main(int argc, char * argv[])
{
    // Initialize pin
    if (PIN_Init(argc, argv)) return Usage();

    OutFile.open(KnobOutputFile.Value().c_str());

    // Register Instruction to be called to instrument instructions
    INS_AddInstrumentFunction(Instruction, 0);

    // Register Fini to be called when the application exits
    PIN_AddFiniFunction(Fini, 0);

    // Start the program, never returns
    PIN_StartProgram();

    return 0;
}
```

Useful tracing tools

- API monitor (**injected tracing**)
 - Monitor and control API calls made by applications and services on **windows**
 - An easy-to-use Filter
 - <http://www.rohitab.com/apimonitor#Download>
- Traceview
 - API tracing for android application
 - <https://developer.android.com/studio/profile/traceview.html>

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API monitor

Call Stack: NtCreateFile (Ntdll.dll)

#	Module	Offset	Location
1	kernel32.dll	0x12d98	CreateFileW
2	kernel32.dll	0x22c0a	GetVolumeNameForVolumeMountPoint
3	kernel32.dll	0x22ccd	GetVolumePathName
4	kernel32.dll	0x40178	CreateProcessAsUser
5	SHELL32.dll	0x66c47	SHCreateShell
6	SHELL32.dll	0x666b8	SHCreateShell
7	SHELL32.dll	0x97a8c	Ordinal:757 - SHGetFolderPath
8	SHELL32.dll	0x98523	SHGetFolderPath
9	SHELL32.dll	0x96b69	Ordinal:757 - SHBindToObject
10	SHELL32.dll	0x8e54f	SHBindToObject

API Monitor: Breakpoint Before Call

Module: notepad.exe
Process: Notepad (notepad.exe)
Process ID: 5564 Kill
Thread ID: 5404 Kill

#	Type	Name	Value
1	LPCTSTR	IpFileName	0x00e3a9c0
	TCHAR		c:\windows\system32\drivers\etc\hosts
2	DWORD	dwDesiredAccess	GENERIC_READ

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API monitor

Summary | 18 of 55 calls | 67% dropped | 31 KB used

The screenshot shows the API monitor tool interface with the following details:

#	Relative Time	TID	Module	API	Return Value
31	0:00:00:062	6432	MSVBVM60.DLL	CoGetClassObject (Microsoft WinSock Control, version 6.0 <MSWinsock.Winsock.1>, LoadLibraryExA ("CLBCatQ.DLL", NULL, 0)	S_OK
32	0:00:00:062	6432	ole32.dll	...DIIIMain (0x76de0000, DLL_PROCESS_ATTACH, NULL)	0x76de0000
33	0:00:00:062	6432	ntdll.dll	LoadLibraryExW ("C:\Windows\SysWow64\MSWINSCK.OCX", NULL, LOAD_WITH...	TRUE
34	0:00:00:062	6432	ole32.dll	...DIIIMain (0x77c70000, DLL_PROCESS_ATTACH, NULL)	0x22170000
35	0:00:00:062	6432	ntdll.dll	...DIIIMain (0x75c70000, DLL_PROCESS_ATTACH, NULL)	TRUE
36	0:00:00:062	6432	ntdll.dll	...DIIIMain (0x735e0000, DLL_PROCESS_ATTACH, NULL)	TRUE
37	0:00:00:062	6432	ntdll.dll	...DIIIMain (0x22170000, DLL_PROCESS_ATTACH, NULL)	TRUE
38	0:00:00:062	6432	ntdll.dll	WSAStartup (257, 0x0018dd68)	0
39	0:00:00:062	6432	MSWINSCK.OCX	LoadLibraryExW ("version.dll", NULL, 0)	0x73610000
40	0:00:00:062	6432	WS2_32.dll	LoadLibraryExW ("d:\Desktop\vb6\Project.exe", NULL, LOAD_LIBRARY_A...)	0x00400000
41	0:00:00:062	6432	VERSION.dll	LoadLibraryExW ("d:\Desktop\vb6\Project.exe", NULL, LOAD_LIBRARY_A...)	0x00400000
42	0:00:00:062	6432	VERSION.dll	CreateWindowExA (0, "NMNotifyWindowClass", "Notification Window", W...	0x0034051c
43	0:00:00:078	6432	MSWINSCK.OCX	DIIIMain (...)	0
44	0:00:00:078	6432	ole32.dll	LoadLibraryExA ("ADVAPI32.dll", NULL, 0)	0x77310000
45	0:00:00:078	6432	USP10.dll	LoadLibraryExW ("C:\Windows\syswow64\MSCTF.dll", NULL, LOAD_WITH_ALTERED...	0x75950000
46	0:00:00:093	6432	USER32.dll	DIIIMain (0x22170000, DLL_PROCESS_DETACH, 0x00000001)	TRUE
47	0:00:01:060	6432	ntdll.dll	DIIIMain (0x735e0000, DLL_PROCESS_DETACH, 0x00000001)	TRUE
48	0:00:01:060	6432	ntdll.dll		

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Traceview

Name		Incl Cpu Tir	Incl Cpu Time	Excl Cpu Time %	Excl Cpu Time	Incl Real Time %	Incl Real Time	Excl Real
▼ 16 android.os.Parcel.writeInt (I)V		9.2%	0.562	5.5%	0.335	4.5%	0.558	
▼ Parents								
20 android.os.Parcel.writeValue (Ljava/lang/Object;)V		53.4%	0.300			53.4%	0.298	
9 android.os.BaseBundle.writeToParcelInNative (Landroid/os/BaseBundle;Landroid/os/Parcel;I)V		15.5%	0.087			15.4%	0.086	
18 android.content.Intent.writeToParcel (Landroid/content/Intent;Landroid/os/Parcel;I)V		14.4%	0.081			14.5%	0.081	
5 android.app.ActivityManagerProxy.startService (Landroid/app/ActivityManager;Landroid/os/Binder\$IBinder;Ljava/lang/String;Landroid/app/Service;Landroid/app/Service\$IBinder;Landroid/os/Bundle;I)V		9.1%	0.051			9.0%	0.050	
13 android.os.Parcel.writeArrayMapInternal (Landroid/os/Parcel;Ljava/util/Map;Z)V		4.8%	0.027			4.7%	0.026	
119 android.net.Uri.writeToParcel (Landroid/net/Uri;Landroid/os/Parcel;I)V		2.8%	0.016			3.0%	0.017	
▼ Children								
self		59.6%	0.335			59.7%	0.333	
33 android.os.Parcel.nativeWriteInt (JI)V		40.4%	0.227			40.3%	0.225	
► 17 android.os.BaseBundle.putInt (Ljava/lang/String;I)V		8.1%	0.498	1.2%	0.072	4.2%	0.518	
► 18 android.content.Intent.writeToParcel (Landroid/content/Intent;Landroid/os/Parcel;I)V		8.1%	0.496	0.5%	0.033	4.0%	0.497	
► 19 android.util.ArrayMap.put (Ljava/lang/Object;Ljava/lang/Object;)V		7.3%	0.447	3.4%	0.210	3.8%	0.468	
► 20 android.os.Parcel.writeValue (Ljava/lang/Object;)V		7.1%	0.437	1.6%	0.098	3.5%	0.434	
► 21 android.view.IWindow\$Stub.onTransact (ILandroid/os/Binder;IZ)V		6.9%	0.420	1.1%	0.065	5.4%	0.668	
► 22 android.app.Activity.isTopOfTask ()Z		6.7%	0.410	0.2%	0.012	5.0%	0.619	

Hardware tracing

- Intel Last Branch Record
 - store the source and destination addresses related to recently executed branches using corresponding LastBranchToIP and LastBranchFromIP MSRs
 - No additional overhead
 - perf
- Branch Trace Store
 - Similar as LBR, but using either cache-as-RAM or system DRAM
 - 50%+ overhead
 - perf

Hardware tracing

- Intel Processor Tracing
 - Introduced since Broadwell, very active techniques
 - 5% trace overhead (use for fuzz?), 100x decoding overhead
 - gdb/perf/windowspt/simplept
 - perf record -e intel_pt//u ls
 - perf report / perf script

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Hardware tracing

```
7fc3def8e0cc __GI__libc_write (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc-2.26.so) =>      55e233a288ec myputs (/home/atum/Research/intelpt/test/300/300)
55e233a288fd myputs (/home/atum/Research/intelpt/test/300/300) =>      55e233a28748 __init (/home/atum/Research/intelpt/test/300/300)
55e233a28748 __init (/home/atum/Research/intelpt/test/300/300) =>      7fc3def8e0b0 __GI__libc_write (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc-2.26.so)
7fc3def8e0c2 __GI__libc_write (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc-2.26.so) =>          0 [unknown] ([unknown])
    0 [unknown] ([unknown]) =>      7fc3def8e0c4 __GI__libc_write (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc-2.26.so)
7fc3def8e0cc __GI__libc_write (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc-2.26.so) =>      55e233a28902 myputs (/home/atum/Research/intelpt/test/300/300)
55e233a28904 myputs (/home/atum/Research/intelpt/test/300/300) =>      55e233a289bb menu (/home/atum/Research/intelpt/test/300/300)
55e233a289c2 menu (/home/atum/Research/intelpt/test/300/300) =>      55e233a288c0 myputs (/home/atum/Research/intelpt/test/300/300)
55e233a288d3 myputs (/home/atum/Research/intelpt/test/300/300) =>      55e233a28750 __init (/home/atum/Research/intelpt/test/300/300)
55e233a28750 __init (/home/atum/Research/intelpt/test/300/300) =>      7fc3df0088c0 __strlen_avx2 (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc-2.26.so)
7fc3df0088cf __strlen_avx2 (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc-2.26.so) =>      7fc3df0088f0 __strlen_avx2 (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc-2.26.so)
7fc3df008915 __strlen_avx2 (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc-2.26.so) =>      55e233a288d8 myputs (/home/atum/Research/intelpt/test/300/300)
55e233a288e7 myputs (/home/atum/Research/intelpt/test/300/300) =>      55e233a28748 __init (/home/atum/Research/intelpt/test/300/300)
55e233a28748 __init (/home/atum/Research/intelpt/test/300/300) =>      7fc3def8e0b0 __GI__libc_write (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc-2.26.so)
7fc3def8e0c2 __GI__libc_write (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc-2.26.so) =>          0 [unknown] ([unknown])
    0 [unknown] ([unknown]) =>      7fc3def8e0c4 __GI__libc_write (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc-2.26.so)
7fc3def8e0cc __GI__libc_write (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc-2.26.so) =>      55e233a288ec myputs (/home/atum/Research/intelpt/test/300/300)
55e233a288fd myputs (/home/atum/Research/intelpt/test/300/300) =>      55e233a28748 __init (/home/atum/Research/intelpt/test/300/300)
55e233a28748 __init (/home/atum/Research/intelpt/test/300/300) =>      7fc3def8e0b0 __GI__libc_write (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc-2.26.so)
7fc3def8e0c2 __GI__libc_write (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc-2.26.so) =>          0 [unknown] ([unknown])
    0 [unknown] ([unknown]) =>      7fc3def8e0c4 __GI__libc_write (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc-2.26.so)
7fc3def8e0cc __GI__libc_write (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc-2.26.so) =>      55e233a28902 myputs (/home/atum/Research/intelpt/test/300/300)
55e233a28904 myputs (/home/atum/Research/intelpt/test/300/300) =>      55e233a289c7 menu (/home/atum/Research/intelpt/test/300/300)
55e233a289c9 menu (/home/atum/Research/intelpt/test/300/300) =>      55e233a28aaa main (/home/atum/Research/intelpt/test/300/300)
55e233a28aaaf main (/home/atum/Research/intelpt/test/300/300) =>      55e233a28905 read_int (/home/atum/Research/intelpt/test/300/300)
55e233a2893d read_int (/home/atum/Research/intelpt/test/300/300) =>      55e233a28760 __init (/home/atum/Research/intelpt/test/300/300)
55e233a28760 __init (/home/atum/Research/intelpt/test/300/300) =>      7fc3def8e010 read (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc-2.26.so)
```

Symbolic Execution

- Not very practical yet
- Used to solve boring constraints
 - use_your_ida @LCTF 2017
 - RedVelvet @Codegate CTF 2018
- Used to deflate flatting codes
 - obf @QWB CTF 2018
 - <https://security.tencent.com/index.php/blog/msg/112>

```
st = p.factory.blank_state(addr=0x401284)
st.regs.rbp = 0xffffffffd800000
st.regs.rsp = 0xffffffe800000
flag = claripy.BVS('flag', 26*8)

for i in flag.chop(8):
    st.add_constraints(i >= 0x20)
    st.add_constraints(i <= 0x7f)

st.memory.store(st.regs.rbp-0x100, flag)
p.hook(0x40140E, UserHook(user_func=ptrace, length=5))

sm = p.factory.simgr(st)
sm.explore(find=0x401527)

found = sm.found[0]
print(found.se.eval(flag, cast_to=str))
```

Dynamics Taint Analysis

- Mostly, this term is only refer to a academic technique
- But there are still some simple practical usage
 - Pattern create/pattern offset
 - Find function pointer by filling pattern to memory
 - LFA @ 34C3 CTF , solidcore @ QWBCTF
 - <http://atum.li/2017/12/31/LFA/>

```
gdb-peda$ pattern create 100  
'AAA%AAsAABAA$AAnAACAA-AA(AADAA;AA  
gdb-peda$ pattern offset AEAA  
AEAA found at offset: 35  
gdb-peda$ 
```

```
payload="A"*4*$ooa_size  
  
while i<$ooa_size do  
    payload_u=u64(payload[j,j+8])  
    $arr[i]=toint(payload_u&0xffffffff)  
    $arr[i+1]=toint(payload_u>>32)  
    i=i+2  
    j=j+8  
end
```

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Call For Players

- Team Eur3kA
 - Champion of HCTF2017 & N1CTF 2018
 - Sponsored by JD.com
- Future Schedule
 - XCTF League & Other National CTF (Eur3kA)
 - OCTF/TCTF (lotus-r3kapig = blue-lotus + flappypig + Eur3kA)
 - DEFCON China CTF/WCTF/HITCON CTF/Nuit du Hack CTF/TMCTF/HITB Singapore/HITB Amsterdam (JD-r3kapig = flappypig + Eur3kA)
- eu@r3ka.eu



Thanks
Questions are welcome

