Security framework and notions for Bitcoin contracting protocols

[ariard]

The problems of Bitcoin contracting protocols security promise interesting research tracks to
develop new security notions and framework, similar to the reasoning tools leveraged by day-to-day
cryptographers. Decades of theoritical and applied cryptography have proven that lack of careful
cryptoanalaysis in ciphers conceptions and deployment introduce subtle security issues.

Resarch in Bitcoin contracting protocol security in the last years where flaws have been found to
be common across protocols, sounds intuitevely to suggest that drawing out security frameworks
would greatly improve such protocols robustness.

At least few security notions could be started to be sketched out :

• contract integrity : an onchain execution of the contract should not be obstrucated by
  an attacker, at least without a measurable cost

• fee-bumping integrity : an onchain execution of the contract should not be obstrucated by
  an attacker to force useless fee-bumping

I don't believe those notions are logically equivalent. For e.g a Coinjoin might be fee-bumped
by a CPPF, this fee-bumping might be obstrucated by an attacker but utxo committed in the Coinjoin
are safe in themselves.

One starting paper in this direction is @jachiang's https://arxiv.org/pdf/2007.07528.pdf

I've also started recently L2-zoology : https://github.com/ariard/L2-zoology. I'm thinking more this new documentation as an experiments/observations/attacks howto scratchbook from which to collect theoretical, non-engineering problems that we can log back here :)

[ariard]

See #13 (comment) as a problem page starter.