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Don't allow containers by default setexec setfscreate #386
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Signed-off-by: Daniel J Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
Reviewer's GuideThis PR tightens the container SELinux policy by removing default permissions for setexec and setfscreate file operations in container.te and thus prevents containers from executing or creating filesystem objects by default. File-Level Changes
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Summary of Changes
Hello @rhatdan, I'm Gemini Code Assist1! I'm currently reviewing this pull request and will post my feedback shortly. In the meantime, here's a summary to help you and other reviewers quickly get up to speed!
This pull request significantly enhances the security posture of containers by tightening their default SELinux permissions. It revokes the implicit ability for containers to manipulate SELinux execution and file creation contexts, instead introducing an explicit opt-in mechanism via a new tunable. This change aims to reduce the attack surface for container escapes by limiting sensitive capabilities by default.
Highlights
- Security Hardening for Containers: I've removed the
setexec
andsetfscreate
permissions from the defaultcontainer_domain
SELinux policy. These permissions, which allow a process to change its execution domain or set default security contexts for new files, are now explicitly disallowed by default for containers to enhance security. - New SELinux Tunable for Label Manipulation: A new SELinux tunable,
container_modify_selinux_labels
, has been introduced. This tunable defaults tofalse
and gates thesetexec
andsetfscreate
permissions. This means that administrators must explicitly enable this tunable if a container requires the ability to manipulate SELinux labels. - Policy Module Version Update: The
container.te
policy module version has been incremented from2.239.0
to2.240.0
, reflecting the policy changes implemented in this pull request.
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Code Review
This pull request enhances security by removing the setexec
and setfscreate
permissions from container domains by default. These permissions are moved behind a new SELinux boolean container_modify_selinux_labels
, which is disabled by default. This is a solid security improvement. My only suggestion is to improve the clarity of the description for the new tunable to better inform administrators of its purpose.
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## <desc> | ||
## <p> | ||
## Allow containers to manipulate SELinux labels |
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The description for this new tunable is a bit generic. "manipulate SELinux labels" could refer to many different permissions. For better clarity for administrators who might need to enable this, consider making it more specific to the permissions being granted (setexec
and setfscreate
).
A more descriptive comment could be:
## Allow containers to set the security context on process execution and file creation.
This more accurately reflects what enabling this tunable does.
## Allow containers to set the security context on process execution and file creation
Ephemeral COPR build failed. @containers/packit-build please check. |
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LGTM
centos job failures look like dnf repo issues. Nothing we can do about it apart from maybe wait.
[APPROVALNOTIFIER] This PR is APPROVED This pull-request has been approved by: lsm5, rhatdan, sourcery-ai[bot] The full list of commands accepted by this bot can be found here. The pull request process is described here
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Summary by Sourcery
Enhancements: