Repository navigation
[Bug] Auto review 下 ask_user_question 的人类授权对 reviewer 不可见 / Human authorization via ask_user_question is invisible to the Auto review reviewer
#8020
Replies: 3 comments
|
补充复核(0.2.0-rc.2 复验 + 答案投递渠道实测) / Additional verification 原报告锚定 0.1.7-rc.2。我在 0.2.0-rc.2(当前 npm 1. 0.2.0-rc.2 上相关代码逐字未变
→ 这不是"已修版本上的旧结论":0.2.0-rc.2 依然成立。 2. 答案投递渠道实测:96/96 全是 全量帧感知解码本机 292 份 → 真实使用中,答案只走 §3.1 那条对 reviewer 不可见的通道;timed 模式下唯一会落成 3. §3.3 的同族缺口: 即便迟到答复出现, → 所以"改用 timed 模式让答案变成 user message"这条规避也不成立:两条投递路径都被堵死。 复核方式:会话日志是多帧 Zstandard, 环境:Windows build 22631(23H2)· Node v24.21.0(DSH 打包运行时)· 对本文 §6 的修复建议没有异议,尤其同意"授权判定必须在代码里做布尔、不能交给 reviewer 判语义"与"范围只能取人类选中的文本"这两条。唯一想补的是排序意见:§6-A 第 1 条(换一等事件载体)应优先于把 |
|
追加证据:reviewer 会把「已作答」误报成「仍在 pending」 / Follow-up: an answered question is mis-reported as still pending 同一台机器上的全量扫描(292 份会话日志,帧感知解码)里找到了比 §4 更强的形态:reviewer 不只是"看不到答案",而是把已经有答案的问题描述成"仍在等待作答"。 时间线(同一会话,
两个要点:
补充统计(同一时刻快照):全量 292 份会话里 9 个会话共 34 条 Auto review 拒绝事件(含 对 §6-A 的补充含义:本例也说明"把 隐私口径:本例取自一个本地私人写作项目的会话,因此只引用事件类型 / |
|
补充确认:0.2.2-rc.1 仍然复现,和主帖描述一致。 环境:Windows 11 / DSH 0.2.2-rc.1 / @deepseek-ai/dsh-experimental-auto-review 0.2.2-rc.1。 复现:
结果:Auto review 仍以“未获得明确授权”拒绝;ask 策略下会再弹一次审批卡。个别会话里 reviewer 甚至把已经回答过的问题说成 “still pending”。 根因与主帖一致:ask_user_question 的答案只以 tool/result 落盘,而 snapshotAutoReview() 重建历史时只读 user/message 和 assistant/message,tool/result 被整体忽略;textRole() 也不把 user-question-reply 当作可授权角色。 本地 fork 的思路(供参考):在 snapshotAutoReview 里预扫描 tool/call,建立 callId → 原始问题的映射;遇到 ask_user_question 的 tool/result 时解析 answers,过滤空选择和跳过项,生成一条 role 为 user-instruction 的合成历史项,只带原问题、被选中的 option label 和 custom 文本;同时在 REVIEW_POLICY 里明确“问题文本、未选项和 agent 措辞都不是授权”。timed 模式的 user-question-reply 也映射为 user-instruction。 这个 workaround 在我这里能放行后续操作。但同意楼上:正式修复最好换成一等事件载体,并在代码里做布尔判定;只把 tool/result 塞进历史、让 reviewer 自己判语义仍然不可靠。 |
Uh oh!
There was an error while loading. Please reload this page.
Uh oh!
There was an error while loading. Please reload this page.
Bug report:Auto review 下
ask_user_question的人类授权对 reviewer 不可见Bug report: human authorization given through
ask_user_questionis invisible to the Auto review reviewer0.1.7-rc.2(the local DSH installation,dsh web --port 12073)@deepseek-ai/dsh-experimental-auto-review0.1.7-rc.2@deepseek-ai/dsh-tool-ask-user0.1.7-rc.2@deepseek-ai/dsh-user-questions0.1.7-rc.2@deepseek-ai/dsh-user-approval0.1.7-rc.2Auto review(permission/preset = auto,approval/policy = ask)1. 摘要 / Summary
中文:在 Auto review 模式下,模型先用
ask_user_question向用户请求授权、用户明确选择了批准选项,紧接着执行该动作时,reviewer 仍以「未获明确授权」为由拒绝。原因是ask_user_question的答案以普通工具结果(tool/result事件,message.role = "tool",message.source.kind = "tool")落盘,而 Auto review 重建评审输入时只读取user/message与assistant/message,所有tool/result事件(连同approval/asked、approval/decided)都被整体忽略。于是「人给的授权」在 reviewer 眼里不存在:它既不在FILTERED_HISTORY里,也无法由模型在正文里复述(assistant 正文与 reasoning 同样被排除)。English:Under the Auto review preset, a model asks the user for authorization via
ask_user_question, the user explicitly selects the approve option, and the very next call is still denied by the reviewer as "not explicitly authorized". The cause: the answer is persisted as an ordinary tool result (tool/resultevent,message.role = "tool",message.source.kind = "tool"), while the reviewer rebuilds its input fromuser/messageandassistant/messageonly — everytool/result(andapproval/asked/approval/decided) event is silently ignored. The authorization the human actually gave therefore does not exist for the reviewer, and the model cannot repair it by restating it (assistant text and reasoning are excluded too).期望 / Expected:人经
ask_user_question给出的、与待审动作的动作/目标/范围一致的授权,应能让 reviewer 判定medium + allow(或至少让 reviewer 看到该授权并只对其范围之外的部分要求人工审批)。Expected: an authorization the human gave through
ask_user_question, matching the pending action's action / target / scope, should let the reviewer classifymedium + allow(or at minimum be visible to it, so only out-of-scope parts escalate to a human).实际 / Actual:reviewer 判
medium + deny,理由为授权缺失;ask策略下升级为人工审批卡,用户只能再点一次「允许」才执行。在无人值守 / 自动续跑(goal auto-continuation)或子代理(never策略)下,这一步直接变成硬拒绝,没有补救通道。Actual: the reviewer returns
medium + denyfor lack of authorization; underaskthe call escalates to an approval card and the user has to click "allow" a second time. Under unattended / auto-continuation runs, or in a child agent (fixedneverpolicy), the same step becomes a final, unrecoverable denial.2. 复现步骤 / Reproduction
/permission auto,或权限选择器里带EXP的 Auto review)。 / Switch the session permission to Auto review.git push、向公开 Discussion 发帖、在 root 等价的生产机上执行不可逆操作)先用ask_user_question征求授权;选项里放一个明确的批准项。 / Have the agent request authorization viaask_user_questionfor a medium action (e.g.git pushto a public repo, posting to a public Discussion, an irreversible op on a root-equivalent production host), with an explicit approve option.pwsh/bash/write…)。 / The agent then calls the tool that performs the action.是否稳定复现 / Determinism:代码路径是确定性的(答案以
tool/result落盘 ⇒ 必然不进评审输入),因此每次都成立;下面 §4 给出一次完整的真实会话记录。Deterministic: the code path is unconditional (the answer is always a
tool/result, andtool/resultis never read), so it happens every time. §4 below is a complete real transcript.3. 根因 / Root cause
3.1 答案以普通工具结果落盘 / The answer is persisted as an ordinary tool result
@deepseek-ai/dsh-tool-ask-user/lib/index.js工具结果在会话日志里的形态(
tool/result事件;字段形状可对照@deepseek-ai/dsh-session/lib/index.js里回合收尾时合成该事件的那段代码,:788-833即其一):真实样本(本机会话,见 §4)/ Real sample (from the session in §4):
{"type":"tool/result","seq":200,"data":{"message":{"role":"tool", "toolCallId":"call_00_nqLawH6JnUY0hxOYNGIO3856", "source":{"kind":"tool","callId":"call_00_nqLawH6JnUY0hxOYNGIO3856"}, "content":[{"type":"text","text":"{\"answers\":[{\"id\":\"post_reply\",\"selected\":[\"<approve option>\"]}, ...]}"}]}}, "surfaceOp":"append"}3.2 reviewer 的历史重建只认两类事件 / The reviewer's history rebuild reads only two event types
@deepseek-ai/dsh-experimental-auto-review/lib/index.js,snapshotAutoReview()的主循环(第 253-309 行):⇒ 第 268 行的
continue就是本 bug 的现场:tool/result事件既不是user/message也不是assistant/message,直接落进else被忽略。注意当前会话格式里工具结果走tool/result事件(surfaceOp: "append"),并不会进入user/message分支,所以连第 256 行那个兼容判断都到不了。补充(独立复核实测):第 256 行是 v0→v1 迁移期的旧格式防御 ——
@deepseek-ai/dsh-session-format-v0-to-v1会把旧日志里的工具结果落成role:"user"+source.kind:"tool",这一行就是为它准备的。在本机 342 个会话的全量扫描中,这类真实事件 0 例;全域 19 个会话共 41 条ask_user_question答案事件全部是role="tool"+source.kind="tool"的tool/result⇒ 现代格式下它们连这一行都到不了。⇒ Line 268 is the defect: a
tool/resultevent is neitheruser/messagenorassistant/message, so it falls through the loop and is ignored. In the current session format, tool results aretool/resultevents, so they never even reach the legacysource.kind === "tool"guard on line 256.3.3 就算进了历史,它的角色也不可授权 / Even if it entered the history, its role could not authorize
isHumanInstruction()(第 89-92 行)只认source.kind === "user" && typeof source.rpcId === "string";textRole()(第 120-125 行)把其它一切归为fact。而固定策略明确排除用事实授权:⇒ 因此最小修复不能只是「把
tool/result也塞进 history」:答案的source.kind是"tool",只会得到role: "fact",按第 39 行仍然不能授权 medium。必须同时给它一个可授权的人类角色(见 §6)。⇒ A minimal fix therefore cannot be "just include
tool/resultin the history": itssource.kindis"tool", so it would only becomerole: "fact", which line 39 still refuses to accept as medium authorization. The fix must also give it an authorizing human role (see §6).3.4 评审输入的四分区 / The reviewer's four data sections
reviewUserText()(第 322-333 行)只发送ENVIRONMENT/PROJECT_INSTRUCTIONS/FILTERED_HISTORY/PENDING_ACTION四段数据,外加固定的REVIEW_POLICY段(合计五个分区)。ask_user_question的调用(作为tool-callfact,第 290-296 行)会出现在FILTERED_HISTORY里,答案不会。这正好解释了现场里 reviewer 的措辞:它看得见"模型问过什么",看不见"人答了什么"。reviewUserText()sends onlyENVIRONMENT/PROJECT_INSTRUCTIONS/FILTERED_HISTORY/PENDING_ACTIONas data, on top of the fixedREVIEW_POLICYsection (five sections in total). The call toask_user_questiondoes appear inFILTERED_HISTORYas atool-callfact (lines 290-296); the answer does not. That is exactly what the on-scene reviewer wording shows: it can see the question, never the answer.3.5 这是明示的设计取舍,不是实现疏漏 / This is a deliberate trade-off, not an oversight
官方 README 的「理解实现」一节原文即写明:主 agent 的
system/message节点、assistant 正文与 reasoning、tool results 全部排除。排除工具结果有正当理由(工具输出不可信,可被注入内容操纵 reviewer)—— 本 bug 是这条取舍的副作用:把"人类输入"也一并当成"工具输出"排除了。修复应在保留该防御的前提下,为人类来源的工具结果开一条窄通道。The official README's implementation section states it plainly: main-agent
system/messagenodes, assistant text and reasoning, and all tool results are excluded. Excluding tool results is well-motivated (tool output is untrusted and can be shaped by injected content to steer the reviewer) — this bug is the side effect: human input was excluded along with tool output. A fix should keep that defence and open a narrow channel for human-sourced tool results only.4. 实证:一次真实会话的完整现场 / Evidence: a complete real session transcript
会话 / Session:
session-<redacted>(本机会话日志目录,v4 格式)日志摘录(
seq为会话事件序号;事件类型 / seq / 结构为原文,涉及会话内容的文本已按上面的最小化口径处理)/ Log excerpt (event types, seq numbers and structure are verbatim; session-content text is minimized as stated above):assistant/messagetool-call ask_user_question({"questions":[{"id":"post_reply","options":[{"label":"<approve option>"},…]}]})tool/resultsource={"kind":"tool","callId":"call_00_nqLawH6JnUY0hxOYNGIO3856"},内容 ={"answers":[{"id":"post_reply","selected":["<approve option>"]}]}(选项文案已按隐私口径最小化) ← 人类授权发生在这里assistant/messagetool-call pwsh({"command":"… addDiscussionComment …"})tool/callname=pwsh(GraphQLaddDiscussionComment)approval/askedAuto review denied tool "pwsh": 这是以用户公开身份(<account>)向第三方仓库 deepseek-ai/deepseek-harness 的 Discussion #7802 做不可逆的对外公开发帖(非敏感外部写入 ⇒ 中风险)。当前唯一的人类指令只是一条"查看他人回复"的请求(原话已按隐私口径最小化),仅授权查看,未授权发帖;历史中 ask_user_question 的选项(一个中文批准项,文案已最小化)没有任何获批结果作为证据,因此对动作、目标(具体 discussionId)与内容的授权缺失。approval/decidedoutcome = "allowed-once"← 用户随后又批准了一次(独立复算:与 seq 218 相隔约 9.8 分钟,不是几秒)tool/resultdiscussioncomment-18615815)这个现场本身就是证明:人类授权(seq 200)在 reviewer 判定(seq 218)之前 18 个事件就发生了,而 reviewer 明确写出「ask_user_question 的选项……没有任何获批结果作为证据」。它看到的只是问题,不是答案。
The transcript is the proof: the human authorization (seq 200) precedes the reviewer's decision (seq 218) by 18 events, and the reviewer itself writes that the
ask_user_questionselection "has no approved result as evidence". It sees the question, not the answer.离线复核 / Offline replay(把该会话按⚠️ 这是一个一致性检查:只要"只读两类事件"的规则不变,它必然得到"答案进历史 = 0",因此本身不构成独立验证 —— 独立验证来自 §8 的两路复核(各自重写脚本、逐条排除可能的读取路径)。结果:
snapshotAutoReview()的过滤规则重放一遍,脚本见 §8)。FILTERED_HISTORY/ entered historysession-<redacted>session-<redacted-2>被忽略的事件类型集合 =
{session, system/message, tool/result}—— 与代码逐条对应。5. 影响 / Impact
中文
授权通道闭环缺失:Auto review 规定 medium 必须「当前人类或直接父级明确授权」,但 Web 会话里最自然的授权机制(
ask_user_question)的答案恰恰对 reviewer 不可见(§7 那种"让用户打字发一条普通消息"确实能授权,但代价高、可发现性差)。模型无法自救:复述授权属 assistant 正文(被排除),写进工具参数属 fact(明确不能授权)。自动化场景直接失败:无人值守、goal 自动续跑、子代理(策略固定
never)下没有"再点一次"的机会 ⇒ 任务硬停在拒绝上。审批疲劳,反向削弱安全性:每次 medium 动作都要用户重复点一次「允许」(现场 219 就是第二次),用户会习惯性无脑点过;同时模型有动机把动作包装成"看起来更低风险"的形式以绕过评审 ⇒ 这是让合法授权路径失效带来的安全负收益。
子代理侧是不对称的:⚠️ 反过来说,子代理侧无法核验父级指令是否真的来自人类授权 —— 授权链的一端「看不见真授权」、另一端「无法核验授权来源」。
ask_user_question对受 Runtime 拥有的子代理直接以DELEGATED_CALLER拒绝(设计如此),所以子代理拿不到人类授权;但父代理的委派指令对子代理的 reviewer 属direct-parent-instruction(auto-review专为子代理的创建 prompt 实现了这条判定),策略明确允许它授权 medium ⇒ 缺的是人类原话的传递,而不是「无路可走」。不止 Web 入口:
isHumanInstruction()要求source.kind === "user"且带rpcId(代码注释自述只认 shipped-Web)。ACP / SDK / Headless / 斜杠命令等入口的人类消息都是{kind:"user"}而无rpcId⇒ 一律降级为fact⇒ 在这些形态下,人类指令同样无法授权任何 medium 动作(独立复核在 Auto 会话里量到 7462 条user/message中 5406 条无rpcId)。English
ask_user_question) produces an answer the reviewer never reads (§7's "type a normal message" does work, at a cost and with poor discoverability). The model cannot compensate: restating it is assistant text (excluded); putting it into tool arguments is a fact (explicitly non-authorizing).never), there is no second click available.ask_user_questionrefuses Runtime-owned children withDELEGATED_CALLERby design, so a child cannot obtain human authorization; but the parent's delegation text is adirect-parent-instructionfor the child's reviewer (the preset implements that rule specifically for child creation prompts) and may authorize medium. What is missing is the transfer of the human's own words, not the existence of a route.isHumanInstruction()requiressource.kind === "user"with anrpcId(its comment says shipped-Web). Human messages arriving through ACP / SDK / headless / slash-command entry points are{kind:"user"}with norpcIdand are therefore degraded tofact— so in those forms the human cannot authorize a medium action either (an independent review measured 5406 of 7462user/messageevents in Auto sessions lackingrpcId).6. 建议修复 / Suggested fix
中文(分层)
ask_user_question给出的答案"作为人类来源纳入评审输入 —— 但判定必须在代码里做,不能交给 reviewer 判语义。这一条不能照"把
tool/result塞进历史、让模型自己判断授权"的方式实现;独立复核已给出三条可击破路径:① 只凭"存在该形状事件 +callId映射到名为ask_user_question的调用"就能伪造(回合收尾合成的tool/result、PTC 内层调用、日志改写);② 授权绑在"提问那次调用"上,而待审动作是模型任选的下一个调用 —— 人可以给出一个范围很宽的批准,模型拿去git push --force;③ 只排除selected:[]会漏掉 custom-only、非批准项、multi_select,而"选项文本是否含授权语义"又是 LLM 判语义。安全做法:tool/result"的身份出现(它与模型可见的工具输出无法区分),改为一个一等事件(例如user-questions/answered),使"人类回答"成为独立、可核验的事件类型。callId精确绑定那次提问;!isError;恰好 1 条结果;答案seq早于待审调用;一次性消费(同一答案不得授权第二个动作);selected精确等于声明的批准项;custom必须为空;multi_select直接拒绝。question.intent = { kind, approve, callId }(校验在@deepseek-ai/dsh-user-questions的ask()内,目前唯一使用者是 plan-mode)—— 安全实现应建立在intent之上,而不是新造一套自由文本判语义。现状"没有intent⇒ 一律只能算 fact"本身就是很好的默认拒绝姿态。high与never的边界要显式化:新增的human-answer角色不得放宽high(恒拒)、不得覆盖更早的人类限制;并明确never策略下不开这条新授权通道(never关的是审批提示,不等于关授权)。approval/decided也纳入授权(见 B):否则又多一条可伪造的授权通道,先只把它降级成参考事实。selected;custom-only;非批准项;multi_select;伪造 / 合成的tool/result;同一答案跨动作复用;isError=true;答案seq晚于待审调用。approval/decided { outcome: "allowed-once" }目前只作为 session 事件存在,reviewer 完全看不到,于是同一授权范围内的下一个动作又要重新审批(本次现场 seq 547/548 → 580 就是这种重复)。建议至少把它作为"刚刚被人类一次性批准"的证据提供给 reviewer,并明确"仅限该动作与范围、不可外推"。assistant(tool-call ask_user_question)→tool/result(answers)→tool/call(medium action),断言FILTERED_HISTORY含human-answer,且 reviewer 能看到该授权(而不是输出"授权缺失")。dsh-experimental-auto-review的 README「已知限制」应至少写明这条(当前措辞只说"模型分类可能出错",未提"人类经提问给出的授权对 reviewer 不可见")。PENDING_ACTION.arguments(以及历史里的tool-call.arguments)成了模型可控文本唯一直达 reviewer 的通道。现有策略只禁止基于 constraints / checkpoints / facts 授权,并未点名"我在参数里写了『人类已授权』"这一情形 —— 独立复核未能真机攻破,仅指出该策略空白。English
ask_user_questionas a human-sourced input, but do the deciding in code, never as reviewer semantics.This must not be implemented as "put
tool/resultinto the history and let the reviewer judge the authorization". An independent review identified three breakable paths: (1) the current shape check — "an event of this shape exists and itscallIdmaps to a call namedask_user_question" — can be forged (end-of-turn synthesizedtool/resultevents, PTC inner calls, rewritten logs); (2) the authorization is bound to the asking call while the pending action is whichever call the model picks next, so a broad approval from the human can be stretched togit push --force; (3) excluding onlyselected: []misses custom-only answers, non-approve options andmulti_select, and "does the option label carry authorization semantics" is again an LLM judgement. A safe design:tool/result(indistinguishable from model-visible tool output); emit a first-class event (e.g.user-questions/answered) so that "the human answered" becomes a distinct, verifiable event type.callIdexactly bound to that question;!isError; exactly one result; answerseqearlier than the pending call; single-use (one answer cannot authorize a second action);selectedexactly equal to the declared approve option;custommust be empty;multi_selectrejected outright.question.intent = { kind, approve, callId }(validated inside@deepseek-ai/dsh-user-questions'ask(); currently only plan-mode uses it). A safe fix should build onintentrather than inventing free-text semantics. The present rule — "nointent⇒ only a fact" — is itself a good fail-closed default.highandneverboundaries explicit: the newhuman-answerrole must never widenhigh(always denied) nor override an earlier human restriction, and the new channel must not open under theneverpolicy (neverdisables approval prompts, not authorization).approval/decidedas authorization in the first version (see B): that would add another forgeable authorization channel; keep it as a reference fact only.selected; custom-only; non-approve option;multi_select; forged/synthesizedtool/result; the same answer reused across actions;isError=true; answerseqlater than the pending call.approval/decided { outcome: "allowed-once" }exists only as a session event, invisible to the reviewer, so the next action in the same authorization scope is challenged again (seq 547/548 → 580 in this session). At minimum, expose it as evidence that the human just approved once, scoped to exactly that action.assistant(tool-call ask_user_question)→tool/result(answers)→tool/call(medium action); assertFILTERED_HISTORYcontainshuman-answerand that the authorization is visible.dsh-experimental-auto-reviewREADME "known limitations" should state this explicitly (the current wording only mentions model misclassification).PENDING_ACTION.arguments(and historicaltool-call.arguments) are the only model-controlled text reaching the reviewer. The policy currently forbids authorizing from constraints / checkpoints / facts but never names the case "I wrote 'the human authorized this' into the arguments" (an independent review could not break this in practice; it flags the policy gap).7. 规避手段(临时)/ Workaround (temporary)
中文:在 Auto review 下需要 medium 授权时,不要用
ask_user_question的选项,请让用户直接在输入框里发一条普通消息(例如「允许你把 X 推到 Y 仓库」)。普通消息的source.kind === "user"且带rpcId,会被 reviewer 当作human-instruction(第 89-92 行),因此有效。代价:多一轮往返、必须打全动作与范围,且无法借提问卡的结构化选项。English: under Auto review, do not rely on
ask_user_questionoptions for medium authorization — ask the user to type a normal chat message instead (e.g. "you may push X to repo Y"). A normal message hassource.kind === "user"with anrpcIdand is therefore treated ashuman-instruction(lines 89-92). Cost: one extra round-trip, the user must spell out action and scope, and the structured options are lost.8. 附录:证据如何复核 / Appendix: how the evidence was verified
session.v4.jsonl.zstd;Node 的zstdDecompressSync()只解第一帧,必须按帧解码(本机按 magic28 B5 2F FD切帧并逐帧解压;@deepseek-ai/dsh-session-persistence-jsonl的PublicZstdFrameDecoder也是逐帧解压,可对照)。这点建议写进排障文档,否则任何"读会话日志"的工具都会静默只看到第一帧(平均 192 字节的session头)。/ Session logs are multi-frame Zstandard; Node's one-shot
zstdDecompressSync()decodes only the first frame, so frame-wise decoding is required. This deserves a line in troubleshooting docs: otherwise any tool that reads session logs silently sees only the first frame (typically the ~192-bytesessionheader).(local verification scripts)):frame-decode.mjs(多帧解码)、replay-filter.mjs(按snapshotAutoReview()规则重放并列出哪些事件被丢弃)、dump-approvals.mjs(导出approval/*时间线)、scan-autoreview.mjs/scan-ask3.mjs(全量会话扫描)。approval/asked的reason带 reviewer 理由)、5 个是硬拒形态(完全没有approval/asked,只有tool/result里的AutoReviewDeniedError/AUTO_REVIEW_DENIED)。这 22 个里有 12 个同时含ask_user_question的答案(限这 22 个会话内:事件级 31 条,其中 24 条含非空选择,7 条是selected: []的空答案)。也就是说,"答案就写在同一份日志里、reviewer 却看不见"不是孤例,而是可重复出现的常态。/ Full scan (snapshot of 339 session directories, 2026-09-27 14:1x): 22 sessions contain Auto review denials — 17 via the approval form (
approval/asked.reason) and 5 via hard denials (noapproval/askedat all; onlytool/resultcarryingAutoReviewDeniedError/AUTO_REVIEW_DENIED). 12 of the 22 also containask_user_questionanswers (within those 22 sessions: 31 answer events, 24 with a non-empty selection, 7 emptyselected: []). The answer sits in the very log the reviewer reads, yet is invisible to it — reproducible, not a one-off.user/message+source.kind==="tool"的真实事件 0 例;② 数据层 —— 自写"按 zstd 规范逐块遍历"的解码器,与作者实现解压结果在 342 个会话上逐字节相同,全域 19 个会话共 41 条ask_user_question答案事件全部是role="tool"+source.kind="tool"。本文数字即据此校正(含把一处审批响应时间更正为实测的约 9.8 分钟)。/ Independently reviewed twice (each reviewer rewrote its own scripts): source-level path elimination (0 real
user/message+source.kind==="tool"events) and a data-level recount with a spec-level frame-walking decoder that matched the author's output byte-for-byte across 342 sessions./ No synthetic end-to-end run was made because switching the preset would mutate the live session; the real transcript in §4 plus the source-mapped offline replay is used instead. That transcript is stronger than a synthetic scenario and can be verified byte-for-byte.
报告来源 / Reported from:本机安装的 DSH 0.1.7-rc.2(Windows 10.0.26200,Node v24.20.0)。代码引文来自该安装的
node_modules/@deepseek-ai/…;会话侧引用的事件类型 /seq/ 结构 / 统计为实测,会话内容文本已做最小化处理。Code quotations come from that installation's
node_modules/@deepseek-ai/…. Session-side event types,seqnumbers, structure and counts are as measured; session content text is minimized.All reactions