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[Rule Tuning] Suspicious Entra ID OAuth User Impersonation Scope Detected #5190

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[Rule Tuning] Suspicious Entra ID OAuth User Impersonation Scope Detected #5190

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39 changes: 36 additions & 3 deletions rules/integrations/azure/initial_access_entra_id_oauth_user_impersonation_scope.toml
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Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
creation_date = "2025/07/03"
integration = ["azure"]
maturity = "production"
updated_date = "2025/09/26"
updated_date = "2025/10/06"

[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
Expand All @@ -18,10 +18,10 @@ from = "now-9m"
index = ["filebeat-*", "logs-azure.signinlogs-*"]
language = "kuery"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Suspicious Entra ID OAuth User Impersonation Scope Detected"
name = "Entra ID OAuth user_impersonation Scope for Unusual User and Client"
note = """## Triage and Analysis

### Investigating Suspicious Entra ID OAuth User Impersonation Scope Detected
### Investigating Entra ID OAuth user_impersonation Scope for Unusual User and Client

Identifies rare occurrences of OAuth workflow for a user principal that is single factor authenticated, with an OAuth scope containing `user_impersonation`, and a token issuer type of `AzureAD`. This rule is designed to detect suspicious
OAuth user impersonation attempts in Microsoft Entra ID, particularly those involving the `user_impersonation` scope, which is often used by adversaries to gain unauthorized access to user accounts. The rule focuses on sign-in events where
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -82,9 +82,42 @@ event.dataset: azure.signinlogs and
azure.signinlogs.properties.token_issuer_type: "AzureAD" and
azure.signinlogs.properties.token_protection_status_details.sign_in_session_status: "unbound" and
azure.signinlogs.properties.user_type: "Member" and
azure.signinlogs.properties.conditional_access_status: "notApplied" and
not user_agent.original: Mozilla*PKeyAuth/1.0 and
not azure.signinlogs.properties.device_detail.operating_system: (Ios* or Android*) and
event.outcome: "success"
and not azure.signinlogs.properties.app_id: (
"a5f63c0-b750-4f38-a71c-4fc0d58b89e2" or
"6bc3b958-689b-49f5-9006-36d165f30e00" or
"66a88757-258c-4c72-893c-3e8bed4d6899" or
"cc15fd57-2c6c-4117-a88c-83b1d56b4bbe" or
"0000000c-0000-0000-c000-000000000000"
)
'''

[rule.investigation_fields]
field_names = [
"@timestamp",
"azure.correlation_id",
"azure.signinlogs.category",
"azure.signinlogs.identity",
"azure.signinlogs.properties.app_display_name",
"azure.signinlogs.properties.app_id",
"azure.signinlogs.properties.app_owner_tenant_id",
"azure.signinlogs.properties.authentication_requirement",
"azure.signinlogs.properties.client_credential_type",
"azure.signinlogs.properties.conditional_access_status",
"azure.signinlogs.properties.device_detail.operating_system",
"azure.signinlogs.properties.is_interactive",
"azure.signinlogs.properties.session_id",
"azure.signinlogs.properties.user_principal_name",
"azure.signinlogs.properties.user_type",
"azure.signinlogs.result_signature",
"azure.tenant_id",
"source.address",
"user.id"
]


[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
Expand Down
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