

ISNIFF GPS

Virtual Wardriving

SyScan Singapore 2013

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
INFINITE LOOP / THE APPLE ECOSYSTEM

Anatomy of a leak: how iPhones spill the ID of networks they access

Yes, iPhones and other Apple devices routinely *do* expose the unique ...

by Dan Goodin - Mar 27 2012, 6:30pm CEST

WHITE HAT 94



Ars Technica article - March 2012

Introducing iSniff GPS...

```
if p.haslayer(ARP):
    arp = p.getlayer(ARP)
    dot11 = p.getlayer(Dot11)
    mode = ''
    try:
        target_bssid = dot11.addr1 # on wifi, BSSID (mac) of AP currently connected to
        source_mac = dot11.addr2 # wifi client mac
        target_mac = dot11.addr3 # if we're sniffing wifi (mon0) the other-AP bssid disclosure will be here in 802.11 dest
        if dot11.FCfield == 1 and target_bssid != 'ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff' and arp.op == 1 and \
        target_mac != 'ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff' and source_mac != target_mac:
            print ('%s [%s] '+great_success('ARP')+' who has %s? tell %s -> %s [%s] on BSSID %s') % \
            (get_manuf(source_mac),source_mac,arp.pdst,arp.psrc,get_manuf(target_mac),target_mac,target_bssid)
            UpdateDB(clientmac=source_mac, time=p.time, BSSID=target_mac)
```

iSniff_import.py uses scapy to sniff:

- Client MAC addresses
- Unicast ARPs (RFC 4436)
- MDNS (Bonjour) broadcasts
- SSID probes (802.11 Probe Requests)

Stored in Django backend database / web interface

```
$ ./isniff_import.py -h  
usage: isniff_import.py [-h] [-r PCAP] [-i INTERFACE]
```

iSniff GPS Server

optional arguments:

- h, --help show this help message and exit
- r PCAP pcap file to read
- i INTERFACE interface to sniff (default mon0)

```
$ ./isniff_import.py -r ../chan11-03.cap
```

Reading ../chan11-03.cap...

Intel [00:24:d7:e2:61:5c] probe for LabPrivate

Intel [00:24:d7:e2:61:5c] probe for pentestdmz

Intel [00:24:d6:5c:e4:b6] probe for 101

Apple [40:a6:d9:7a:fe:21] probe for hidd3n_from_U

Apple [40:a6:d9:7a:fe:21] probe for iSniff Channel 11

40:a6:d9:7a:fe:21 is Hans-Musters-iPhone

Updated name of 40:a6:d9:7a:fe:21 to Hans-Musters-iPhone

Apple [40:a6:d9:7a:fe:21] **ARP** who has 192.168.1.254? tell 192.168.1.14 ->

Cisco [00:16:c8:30:cf:f4] on BSSID 00:14:6c:6c:48:48

Murata [00:37:6d:a2:f1:4f] probe for MerPoular

Murata [00:37:6d:a2:f1:4f] probe for BIGPOND

Murata [00:37:6d:a2:f1:4f] probe for WLAN

Overview of clients detected

iSniff GPS v0.1

[Clients](#) | [Networks](#) | [Apple WiFi Geolocation](#) | [SSID Search](#) | [Stats](#)

1337 devices probing for 3543 networks detected

MAC Name	Manufacturer	Probed for
00:c0:ca: ALFA		BlackHat
00:21:e9: Apple		ARP:00:14:7f: ARP:00:14:6c: Open Test Secure WiFi iSniff Channel 11
00:23:6c: Apple		BlackHat
00:23:df: Dannys-iPhone	Apple	
...		
74:e1:b6: Apple	hhonors	
74:e1:b6: Apple	linksys majorhome	
74:e1:b6: Apple	BlackHat ARP:00:0b:86: iSniff Channel 11 home-down BTOpenzone-H BTHub3-CGF3 TALKTALK-69B453 SKY47597 fulwith BTHomeHub-85B2 ARP:00:b0:0c:	
74:e1:b6: Apple	gogoinflight SFO-WiFi testline AMT Claremont WiFi greenwood pier SPH SPH_244 Ratna Ling Public sandpiper house Gaia_Anderson9 The Cottages BCC-WiFi Larkspur fiend fiend_EXT	

Overview by network...

1337 devices probing for 3543 networks detected

SSID / BSSID	Probed for by	Last probed for
BlackHat	612 d0:23:db:a7:ea:a5 58:1f:aa:71:3b:35 00:f4:b9:3f:e1:99 e4:ce:8f:d1:92:06 78:d6:f0:8d:9e:f5 ...	July 26, 2012, 10:11 p.m.
linksys	55 e4:ce:8f:39:0c:9a 5c:0a:5b:23:84:fc d4:20:6d:27:24:d7 b0:65:bd:45:fd:bf c8:aa:21:81:08:a3 ...	July 26, 2012, 10:09 p.m.
CaesarsLV-Convention-Cox	52 d0:23:db:a7:ea:a5 e4:ce:8f:39:0c:9a d8:a2:5e:1f:74:1e ec:85:2f:07:b5:ce 00:27:10:09:d2:6c ...	July 26, 2012, 10:06 p.m.
Boingo Hotspot	49 e4:ce:8f:39:0c:9a d0:23:db:a2:50:d4 28:6a:ba:63:5d:61 88:c6:63:3a:9a:39 34:51:c9:d3:81:3d ...	July 26, 2012, 10:06 p.m.
gogoinflight	49 a4:67:06:06:94:8a d0:23:db:a2:50:d4 28:6a:ba:63:5d:61 a4:67:06:c0:b6:e6 d0:23:db:b4:7b:bc ...	July 26, 2012, 10:04 p.m.
ibahn	41 a4:67:06:06:94:8a a4:67:06:c0:b6:e6 28:6a:ba:34:6f:08 7c:6d:62:cf:cf:5b b8:ff:61:7c:7f:f5 ...	July 26, 2012, 10:04 p.m.
hhonors	38 d0:23:db:a2:50:d4 e0:b9:ba:4a:bd:de 8c:58:77:83:80:23 10:bf:48:ca:53:07 28:6a:ba:a6:9b:13 ...	July 26, 2012, 10:09 p.m.
McCarran WiFi	31 e4:ce:8f:d1:92:06 64:b9:e8:61:b2:ef 60:fa:cd:71:56:c6 a4:67:06:40:ef:6b 3c:d0:f8:d5:d9:bf ...	July 26, 2012, 10:10 p.m.
Cox-CaesarsLV-Rooms	30 e4:ce:8f:d1:92:06 a4:67:06:c0:b6:e6 9c:20:7b:61:62:f7 60:fa:cd:71:56:c6 70:56:81:8c:71:e1 ...	July 26, 2012, 10:06 p.m.
SFO-WiFi	28 e4:ce:8f:e3:4d:b6 68:09:27:c2:1b:87 68:a8:6d:6f:16:09 b8:ff:61:7c:7f:f5 18:34:51:16:32:39 ...	July 26, 2012, 10:02 p.m.

Clients probing for a particular network

Clients probing for network HACKER (Unknown)

MAC	Name
7c:6d:62:  	
7c:6d:62:  	
f0:cb:a1:  	

SSID	BSSID	Lat	Lon	Comment	Last probe observed	Locate
BlackHat		36.11669159	-115.18044281		July 26, 2012, 10:11 p.m.	
	00:0b:86:				July 26, 2012, 9:46 p.m.	
iSniff Channel 11					July 26, 2012, 9:31 p.m.	
home-down					July 25, 2012, 10:16 p.m.	
BTOpenzone-H					July 25, 2012, 10:16 p.m.	
BTHub3-CGF3					July 25, 2012, 10:16 p.m.	
TALKTALK-69B453					July 25, 2012, 10:16 p.m.	
SKY47597					July 25, 2012, 10:16 p.m.	
fulwith					July 25, 2012, 10:16 p.m.	
BTHomeHub-85B2					July 25, 2012, 10:16 p.m.	
	00:b0:0c:	53.	-2.		July 25, 2012, 10:21 p.m.	

Display a menu



wigle.netTM

Wireless Geographic Logging Engine: Making maps of wireless networks since 2001

92,907,539 wifi 2,267,952 cellular 1,803,941,848 unique observations

Logged in as wigle909 [Logout](#)

news:

WiGLE and Google help locate stolen laptop

Sat Apr 20 11:05:01 2013

WiGLE and Google help [locate a stolen laptop](#). Yay for data.

-bobzilla

90 MEGANETS!

Wed Apr 3 18:18:34 2013

TROMOS has passed the 90M net mark, using WiGLE WiFi. I feel like sooner or later, we're destined for a scene like the one in ghostbusters, where we're forced to shut down the containment grid...

AND ALL THE NETWORKS ESCAPE AND WREAK HAVOC!


-arkasha

New Geographic Statistics

Mon Feb 25 02:32:27 2013

It took 3 months of crunching, but we now have [Geographic Statistics](#) up. See what countries / states / postal codes have the most networks or the best crypto habits! Thanks to [Security B-Sides](#) at [DNA Lounge](#) for providing the

Help WiGLE: Please [\[donate\]](#) your points to the WiGLE commercial dataset



The wireless world this morning (GMT-6:00).



Find a wireless network by [\[searching\]](#) or [\[browsing the interactive map\]](#)




Add a wireless network to WiGLE [\[from a stumble file\]](#) or [\[by hand\]](#)





Add [\[remarks\]](#) to an existing network

Locations for SSID 'BlackHat' from wigle.net



How to locate a wifi router by MAC address?

Samy Kamkar “How I met your girlfriend”



Geolocation via XSS

- Upon MAC acquisition, ask the Google
- See FF source for Location Services

POST /loc/json HTTP/1.0
Host: www.google.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U; Intel Mac OS X 10.6; en-US; rv: 1.9.2b4) Gecko/20091124 Firefox/3.6b4
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: none
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7
Keep-Alive: 115
Connection: keep-alive
Content-Length: 127
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Pragma: no-cache
Cache-Control: no-cache

```
{"version": "1.1.0", "request_address": true, "wifi_towers": [{"mac_address": "Smac", "ssid": "g", "signal_strength": -72}]}]
```

How to locate a wifi router by MAC address?



- Google (<http://samy.pl/androidmap/>)

Google curbs Web map exposing phone locations

Google limits access to geolocation database linking Wi-Fi devices with physical locations after a CNET article highlights potential privacy concerns.



by Declan McCullagh | June 27, 2011 4:00 AM PDT



Google API restricted...

The screenshot shows a web browser window with the title bar "mapping MAC addresses – samy kamkar". The address bar contains the URL "samy.pl/androidmap/". The main content area displays the "android map - by samy kamkar" page. The page text describes the tool's purpose: "android map exposes the data that Google has been collecting from virtually all Android devices and street view cars, using them essentially as global wardriving machines. You can use this tool to accurately locate **virtually any router in the world**, as well as position iPhones and Android phones." It explains how the phone detects wireless networks and sends BSSID and GPS coordinates to "the mothership". The page also notes that iPhones send BSSID and "Cell Tower Information" to Apple. A note at the bottom states: "Note: Google has taken steps to stop my tool from working, including explicitly blocking me directly. Additionally, their geolocation API will now only share information that Google has on *you* only if you provide them not only information about your router, but unwittingly provide information about *other* people's routers." Below this note is a form for entering a MAC Address / BSSID, with "00:11:24:EC:72:CF" entered. A "Probe" button is present below the input field. At the bottom, there is a Facebook "Like" button with the text "2,862 people like this. Be the first of your friends."

mapping MAC addresses – samy kamkar

samy.pl/androidmap/ Reader

android map - by [samy kamkar](#)

android map exposes the data that Google has been collecting from virtually all Android devices and street view cars, using them essentially as global wardriving machines. You can use this tool to accurately locate **virtually any router in the world**, as well as position iPhones and Android phones.

When the phone detects any wireless network, encrypted or otherwise, it sends the BSSID (MAC address) of the router along with signal strength, and most importantly, GPS coordinates up to [the mothership](#).

This page allows you to ping that database and find exactly where any wi-fi router in the world is located. Note that iPhones also send this BSSID and [Cell Tower Information](#) up to Apple, as well.

You can enter any router BSSID/MAC address to locate the exact physical location below, or try the demonstration router by hitting "Probe" below.

[Follow me on twitter](#) to hear about more of my extremely thrilling projects.

Note: Google has taken steps to stop my tool from working, including explicitly blocking me directly. Additionally, their geolocation API will now only share information that Google has on *you* only if you provide them not only information about your router, but unwittingly provide information about *other* people's routers.

MAC Address / BSSID

00:11:24:EC:72:CF

Probe

[Like](#) 2,862 people like this. Be the first of your friends.

iOS device HTTPS request to Apple - Where am I?

Intercept History Options

Filter: Hiding CSS, image and general binary content ?

#	Host	Method	URL	Params	Modified	Status	Length
100	https://gs-loc.apple.com	POST	/clls/wloc	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	200	586

Request Response

Raw Params Headers Hex

```
POST /clls/wloc HTTP/1.1
Host: gs-loc.apple.com
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Accept-Language: en-us
Connection: keep-alive
Accept: /*
Content-Length: 236
User-Agent: locationd/1491.2.1 CFNetwork/609 Darwin/13.0.0

en_US com.apple.locationd 6.0.1.10A525[]

0:1c:28[][]
0:1c:4a[][]
0:22:3f[][]
0:23:8:[][]
0:23:8:[][]
74:31:7[][]
a2:5:43[][]
e0:ca:9[][]
e0:cb:4[][]
```

Response from Apple

Intercept History Options

Filter: Hiding CSS, image and general binary content ?

#	Host	Method	URL	Params	Modified	Status	Length
100	https://gs-loc.apple.com	POST	/clls/wloc	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	200	586

Request Response

Raw Headers

HTTP/1.1 200 OK

Wifi BSSID : e0:91:f5:fe:f6:60
Latitude : 48.87655264
Longitude : 2.32190334
Confiance : 42

Wifi BSSID : 0:1e:8c:4c:25:7b
Latitude : 48.87650626
Longitude : 2.32187509
Confiance : 42


Wifi BSSID : e0:a1:d7:73:94:0c
Latitude : 48.87662076
Longitude : 2.32189691
Confiance : 45

...


HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: Jetty(8.1.7.v20120910)
Content-Length: 514

- /
0:1c:28:
0:26:4d:
0:1c:4a:
0:22:3f:
0:23:8:7
0:23:8:f
74:31:70
a2:5:43:
e0:ca:94
e0:cb:4e

Response from Apple (Visualization)



Response from Apple (Visualization)



iOS device HTTPS request to Apple - Contributing data

Intercept History Options

Filter: Hiding script, CSS, image and general binary content

#	Host	Method	URL	Params	Modified	Status	Length
38	https://gsp10-ssl.apple.com	POST	/hcy/pbcwloc	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	200	83

Request Response

Raw Params Headers Hex

```
POST /hcy/pbcwloc HTTP/1.1
Host: gsp10-ssl.apple.com
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Accept-Language: en-us
Connection: keep-alive
Accept: /*
Content-Length: 1196
User-Agent: locationd/1491.92 CFNetwork/609.1.1
en_US com.apple.locationd/6.1.1.10B145d x
N94AP iPhone OS6.1.1/10B145 ^

28:37:3 0:60:6 28:37:3 0:60:6 0:1b:1 84:1b:0 0:26:f e0:46: a4:b1: f-----*
  f-----* Z v ≤ABz é <tk Z v ≤ABz é <tk Z l&±ABz é Ü9R Z l&±ABz é Ü9R Z l&±ABz é Ü9R Z G&EABz é bär Z G&EABz é bär Z G&EABz é bär Z G&EABz é bär
  -----* -----* -----* -----* -----* -----* -----* -----* -----*
```

POST /hcy/pbcwloc HTTP/1.1 Host: gsp10-ssl.apple.com
Langue : en_US
Version hardware : N88AP Version OS: iPhone OS5.1/9
Wifi BSSID : 36:87:24:79:2a:61
channel : 12
signal_strength : -96
latitude : 48.6252640167
longitude : 2.44375416667
timestamp : 359480148.357 --> 23/05 17:35:48

Wifi BSSID : f4:ca:e5:ac:6:49
channel : 1
signal_strength : -95
latitude : 48.6252640167
longitude : 2.44375416667
timestamp : 359480148.357 --> 23/05 17:35:48

Decoded sample request from <http://fxaguessy.fr/rapport-pfe-interception-ssl-analyse-donnees-localisation-smartphones/>

Opt Out?

Google Maps

Search M

Home On Browser On Android On iPhone Tips and Tricks Blog Help

Help home

Fix an issue

System requirements

Report a problem or fix the map

Issues while using Internet Explorer and Windows

Issues while using Firefox or other browsers

Configure access points with Google Location Service

To improve your use of location-based services, Google, as a location service provider, uses publicly broadcast Wi-Fi data from wireless access points, as well as GPS and cell tower data.

Location services play an important part in enabling many of today's most popular location-aware applications, in particular on smart phones, laptops and other devices that are WiFi enabled. The inclusion of your WiFi access point in the Google Location Service enables applications like Google Maps to work better and more accurately.

Only publicly broadcast Wi-Fi information is used to estimate the location of a device.

You can control whether or not your access point is included in GLS by following the steps below.


▼ [How do I opt out?](#)

You can opt out by changing the SSID (name) of your WiFi access point (your wireless network name) so that it ends with "_nomap". For example, if your SSID is "12345," you would need to change it to "12345_nomap".

You can click on the link below that corresponds to the manufacturer of your access point, to find specific instructions on changing your access point's SSID. If you received your access point from your ISP, you may wish to contact them to find out how to change the SSID.

- Apple
- Belkin
- Linksys (Cisco)
- Netgear

Apple iOS...



^ Makes no difference...

Experiment (Sample size = 2)



Netgear DG834 v3

Turned on 2013-02-27

SSID
“NETGEAR” (Broadcast
disabled), no clients

First found in Apple
Database 2013-03-15

~16 days



**Netgear CG3100
Cable Modem**


Turned on 2013-03-05


SSID broadcast enabled

First found in Apple
Database 2013-03-18

~13 days











Browsable Map o' the World



BSSID d8:c7:c8:d2:6a:21

2174 APs (0 added)



BSSID d8:c7:c8:d2:6a:21

114 APs matching aruba



iSniff GPS KML export in Google Earth



THANKS

iSniff GPS tool and slides by @hubert3
hubert(a)pentest.com

<https://github.com/hubert3/isniff-gps>

Using code published by François-Xavier Aguessy and Côme Demoustier

<http://fxaguessy.fr/rapport-pfe-interception-ssl-analyse-donnees-localisation-smartphones/>