

Abstract

Hyperbolic discounters value consumption-smoothing commitment contracts but fear the threat these could be renegotiated by future selves and banks. This creates a consumer protection problem even for sophisticated and informed consumers that can distort equilibrium contracts and behaviors (e.g. excess net borrowing or failure to contract at all). Banks' may then offer consumer protection via costly governance/ownership choices to limit renegotiation profits or by appeal to regulation. The framework establishes new behavioral micro-foundations for a theory of commercial non-profits, and explains patterns of contracts, ownership forms, and market structures in consumer banking and microfinance, and informs policy debates over claims of "excessive refinancing" and "overindebtedness." JEL Codes: O16, D03, D18

Commitments under Threat: Contracting with Present-Biased Consumers under Renegotiation Concerns

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1 Introduction

Hyperbolic discounters – consumers with present-biased and dynamically inconsistent preferences – struggle to stick to long-term plans. A substantial experimental and observational literature provides evidence that behaviors consistent with such preferences are widespread.¹ If this is so, a few reasonable and important questions follow: When will financial intermediaries supply the commitment services that may help present-biased consumers stick to long-term savings accumulation and/or debt management plans? When might they, instead, pander to or otherwise exploit those same consumer biases for opportunistic profit? More broadly, how much financial trade is lost or distorted to such concerns?

Strotz (1956) was first to formalize the idea that *sophisticated* hyperbolic consumers – those who correctly understand how their own changing preferences would lead future selves to try to undo earlier laid consumption plans – might demand and benefit from

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¹See for example Ariely & Wertenbroch (2002), Thaler & Benartzi (2004), Ashraf *et al.* (2006), Bauer *et al.* (2012). Bryan *et al.* (2010) survey this empirical literature.

contracts and other commitment devices to constrain their future choices.² Many elements of financial arrangements, ranging from automatic payroll deduction retirement savings or mortgage payment plans to the high-frequency repayment and joint-liability provisions on many heavily monitored microcredit have been interpreted as commitment mechanisms, designed to make future changes to long-term contract plans costly. Experimental evidence has demonstrated positive demand take-up and asset accumulation effects following the introduction of new financial commitment products.

The same evidence, however, can be turned around to highlight the apparent puzzle of why, if such contract innovations offer such apparent benefits, they were not already offered by the market (on this, see also [Laibson, 2015](#))? The *demand* for commitment services is one thing, but contracting for their *supply* has often proven to be difficult and costly. In particular, why should a financial intermediary’s own promise to help the consumer remain committed to the terms of a contract be credible and not itself be renegotiated? The bank understands that the consumer who demands commitment contracts in one period may, in later periods and with new preferences, willingly pay to refinance or renegotiate its terms – with the same bank or a new one. When this is the case, pandering to the consumer’s preference changes may increase bank profits, and since the consumer’s earlier self is no longer around to protest, most courts would judge such renegotiations as voluntary and legal.³

Effective commitment contracts must therefore “tie-the-hands” of both the intermediary as well as the consumer they serve. A rich literature has addressed contract design when renegotiation is possible with time-consistent consumers.⁴ The issue is summarized succinctly by [Bolton \(1990, p303\)](#):

Basically, the possibility of renegotiation amounts to the addition of another constraint on the set of feasible contracts: now contracts must be not only incentive compatible but also renegotiation-proof. (When parties can commit not to renegotiate they have a choice of when to allow for renegotiation and when not. If this commitment possibility is withdrawn they are forced to renegotiate whenever there are ex-post gains from renegotiation. Since the outcome of this renegotiation is perfectly predictable they might as well write renegotiation-proof contracts).

²For related reasons, naive consumers who underestimate how their future preferences will change, may also be advantaged by certain public regulations or certain forms of private paternalism of organizations that constrain individuals’ actions ([Spiegler, 2011](#)).

³In most countries including the United States courts do not penalize voluntary renegotiation, on the principle that there is no injured promisee (see discussion in [Laibson, 1997, p448](#)). We further discuss the issue of welfare judgments below.

⁴See [Hart & Moore \(1988\)](#); [Dewatripont \(1989\)](#); [Bolton \(1990\)](#) and [Rubinstein & Wolinsky \(1992\)](#).

Renegotiation concerns are also inherent to contracting situations between intermediaries such as banks and hyperbolic discounters except that the concerns arise from time-inconsistent preferences and not necessarily from asymmetric information as in the literature cited above. This is the focus of our paper. We argue that it is instructive to study not just the technology for tying consumer’s hands (commitment) but how the threat that these hands might be later untied at a cost by mutual agreement (renegotiation of commitment) will shape the terms of contracts.

A commitment contract, by definition, does not deliver a first-best outcome for the consumer’s future selves. Hence future selves and the bank should be interested in renegotiating the contracts they inherit. A no-renegotiation constraint is a requirement that limits the feasible contract set to those that so reduce the bank and consumers later selves’ gains to future renegotiation as to prevent renegotiation from happening. One way to deter future renegotiation is to simply *assume* the bank (and/or the consumer) live under credible fear that any such renegotiation will trigger a steep penalty (call it κ). If this threatened penalty is set at or above a threshold level $\bar{\kappa}$ that exceeds the maximal gains that could be transferred to the bank by later renegotiating then a first-best efficient contract can be sustained and the no-renegotiation constraint is met with slack. The question we study is of how contracts will be adapted as the size of the exogenous penalty κ is reduced below this threshold $\bar{\kappa}$. The no-renegotiation constraint then binds and the parties will be forced to resort to distort the terms of their contracts to create endogenous incentives to sustain commitment that substitute for the reduced availability of exogenous penalties.

As a practical example, when government is unable or unwilling to provide oversight and protection against firms’ opportunistic pandering to consumer biases, both intermediaries and consumers may suffer lower profits and lost or distorted financial trade. Various commentators have worried that opportunistic exploitation of consumer biases could lead firms to profit by leading consumers to situations that include “over-indebtedness,” “excessive” re-financing, or ‘raiding of savings.” We highlight however that there are circumstances where firms may be led to pursue costly strategies to provide their own forms of informal consumer protection, for instance by adopting commercial non-profit or hybrid ownership status (e.g. bringing on social investors) that serve as costly commitment to not engage in opportunistic renegotiation. Our model thus offers an explanation for commercial non-profits similar to that by [Hansmann \(1996\)](#) and formalized by [Glaeser & Shleifer \(2001\)](#) and others but set here on entirely different behavioral micro-foundations, with no appeal to asymmetric information. We study where endogenous consumer protection mechanisms are most likely to emerge or be undermined by increased competition.⁵ Similar to the modern theory of prudential regulation or banks, consumer protection policy should aim to understand and

⁵Section 6 contains a more detailed review of relevant literature and empirical evidence.

harness the mechanisms that give banks incentives to regulate their own opportunistic behavior (Dewatripont & Tirole, 1999).

We study a simple consumption-smoothing contract design problem to derive a parameterized spectrum of endogenous commitment contract forms (and later firm ownership structures). Under the assumption of CRRA utility we derive closed form contract solutions and teachable graphical demonstrations of mechanisms and tradeoffs. The tractable framework allows us pinpoint mechanisms and contract design features that have sometimes been obscured or understudied in previous work.

To see what is gained by this focus, consider the classic Laibson (1997) study of how savings placed into lower return illiquid investments may serve as a costly strategy by sophisticated hyperbolic discounters to constrain their future selves' ability to raid saved resources. The adoption and design of such commitment strategies is shaped by two interrelated factors. First, that it is costly (but not prohibitively so) to undo the plan – in Laibson (1997) liquidation is costly because illiquid assets can only be accessed with a time delay. Second and more subtly, the consumption-savings path must also be adjusted sufficiently in the direction of accommodating future selves' preferences that undoing earlier laid plans does not provide enough incremental gains as to make them want to incur those liquidation costs. This second endogenous enforcement element is required wherever the exogenous mechanism (the liquidation penalty the consumer and/or the bank incur withdrawing illiquid savings) is not sufficient by itself to deter deviations from the consumer's earlier period self's desired plans.

This points to an interesting tradeoff between the cost of breaking commitment and the need to accommodate future selves' preferences. We bring this tradeoff to the fore. Employing a simple parameterized 'renegotiation cost' technology, we isolate the impact of these tradeoffs on savings and borrowing behaviors. In a later section, we extend the framework to allow the exogenous renegotiation cost to become endogenously manipulable by banks via costly ownership and governance choices. This leads to a theory of bank ownership forms that can help understand historical and contemporary experiences. We demonstrate how results depend crucially on consumer type (sophisticated or naive), market structure (monopoly or competition)⁶, and costs of renegotiation.

This paper is organized as follows. In Sections 2 and 3, we lay out the model and explore the feasibility of the first-best 'full-smoothing commitment contract' and make clear how this depends on market structure and a sufficiently high (explicit or implied) external 'cost of renegotiation'.⁷ Simple graphical analysis can illustrate most of our points. All else equal,

⁶In Laibson (1997) and other papers the market for later-period contracts is assumed competitive (new or existing banks can offer new contracts) so only the consumer's own renegotiation costs matter. In our analysis we also study situations where later-period contracts remain exclusive or monopolized.

⁷Under hyperbolic discounting, there is no obvious measure of welfare. Our focus is on how renegotiation

full-smoothing is relatively more feasible under competition than under monopoly. This is not due to any superior ability to commit on the part of a monopolist but to the fact that monopolists leave less surplus with consumers to begin with. At lower levels of consumption, the potential future gains from renegotiation are also lower, making renegotiation less profitable and hence commitment less costly to maintain.

Next, in Section 4, we establish properties of the second-best ‘imperfect-smoothing commitment contract’ that will be implemented under the threat of renegotiation – when the first-best cannot be credibly sustained. This contract represents the compromise between present and future preferences necessary to make future renegotiation unprofitable. Under monopoly contracts, the possibility of renegotiation results in *larger* loans for sophisticated consumers but *smaller* loans for naive consumers. Large loans are in practice often viewed as opening the door to exploitation but in this case we isolate a mechanism where the opposite is true. Intuitively, larger loans today reduce future surplus and make renegotiation less attractive (good for sophisticates), while the opposite is true for smaller loans (allowing the bank to make a second round of profits from renegotiation).

In Section 5, we extend the framework to allow firms to make strategic firm ownership and capital structure choices as a costly strategy to provide endogenous consumer protection. By operating as a nonprofit (or as a ‘hybrid’ ownership bank), the bank agrees to legal or governance restrictions on how any profits generated from any such opportunistic renegotiation can be distributed and enjoyed. Such choices can credibly convince the sophisticated consumer that it will be less likely to renegotiate the contract in the future, raising the contracting surplus and therefore how much can be ultimately extracted by the bank’s stakeholders. The firm’s decision about whether to adopt such strategies rests on a trade-off, which itself is sensitive to market structure and the exclusivity of contracts. Thus nonprofit and hybrid ownership firms survive and compete even in the absence of motivated agents or asymmetric information.

Finally, Section 6 discusses related literature and real-world applications. How important are these issues? Judging by the often loaded language often employed in the popular press and academic writing (particularly by legal scholars) there appears to be a fairly widespread perception that failures of commitment can distort financial behaviors and create socially destructive outcomes. Commentators describe ‘overindebtedness’ in the market for micro-credit and ‘debt traps’ and ‘excessive’ debt rollovers in payday lending. Also described are behaviors such as the ‘raiding of equity or savings’ or ‘excessive refinancing’ of home mortgage loans. Blame for these perceived problems is variously placed on the consumer and/or the financial intermediary: on consumers for supposedly exhibiting present-bias and weak

concerns affect the initial contract. Accordingly, we define ‘full smoothing or ‘first-best’ as the contract that maximizes the discounted utility of the initial signatory.

self-control, and on financial intermediaries for failing to restrain their impulses to opportunistically exploit those biases using possibly deceptive and socially destructive methods. Claimed misbehavior by financial intermediaries is, in turn, frequently attributed to ‘failures of governance’ and/or the failures of regulation to provide sufficient consumer protections and market policing. In the United States, legal scholar Elizabeth Warren rose to the status of Senator and populist presidential candidate based in part on her fame campaigning for consumer financial protections to limit problems of this sort (Sullivan *et al.* , 2000).

Although many analyses are framed in terms of the need to protect ‘naive’ hyperbolic discounters who would fail to understand how their own changing future preferences leave them vulnerable to exploitation, financial firms themselves often grudgingly acknowledge they will lose business and profits unless they address consumer protection concerns and put a check on certain types of destructive competition. Microfinance industry funded campaigns such as the ‘Smart Campaign’⁸ have launched with marketing slogans such as “[p]rotecting clients is not only the right thing to do; it’s the smart thing to do.” Such campaigns seek to get financial intermediaries to make public pledges to consumer protection principles to prevent aggressive loan sales and protect against client ‘overindebtedness.’

Our framework extends beyond the simple ‘for-profit/non-profit’ dichotomy of some earlier commercial non-profit literature in order to explore a fuller spectrum of ‘hybrid’ ownership firms, for example for-profit financial intermediaries variously owned and controlled by ‘social’ as private investors. This helps make sense of the ownership and capital structures observed historically in consumer banking intermediaries in the United States and other now developed countries as well as in microfinance in developing countries to this day, where non-profit and hybrid ownership forms often dominate (Cull *et al.* , 2009). The model can also make sense of recent episodes where rising competition and ‘commercialization’ appear to have been associated with periods of rising refinancing, multiple borrowing and indebtedness and rising complaints of insufficient consumer protection. In some instances this has led to financial crash and strong political backlash as in the case of the 2010 microfinance crisis in Andra Pradesh or the 2008 sub-prime loan financial crisis.

Our model provides a consistent framework for understanding many of these issues and concerns. As such it is a complement to the paper by Bubb & Kaufman (2013) which also builds a model of endogenous firm ownership structure as a form of consumer protection, but the underlying behavioral stories are quite different. In their analysis firms hide non-contractible penalties in loan contracts and opportunistically charge such fees on a mix of suspecting (sophisticated) and unsuspecting (naive) risk-neutral customers. Theirs is not so much a model of conflicting selves as a model of hidden penalties that requires a population of exploitable naive borrowers to produce an inefficiency. In contrast our model is built up on

⁸<https://www.smartcampaign.org>

a contract-renegotiation problem that survives even with sophisticated customers and full information. By setting aside repayment enforcement and information asymmetries, we aim to emphasize the implications and importance of renegotiation concerns.

2 The model: setup

We work with a three-period consumption smoothing model for a present-biased consumer with quasi-hyperbolic preferences that allows for saving (repayment) or borrowing (dissaving) in each period. In any period $t \in \{0, 1, 2\}$, the consumer's instantaneous utility from consumption level c_t is given by a CRRA function defined over all non-negative consumption:

$$u(c_t) \equiv \frac{c_t^{1-\rho}}{1-\rho} \quad (1)$$

with some $\rho > 0$ as the coefficient of relative risk aversion.⁹

We model the consumer ‘as a sequence of temporal selves ... indexed by their respective periods of control over the consumption decision Laibson (1997, p.451)’. Given a consumption stream $C_t \equiv (c_t, \dots, c_2)$, the period- t self's discounted utility is:

$$U_t(C_t) \equiv u(c_t) + \beta \sum_{i=t+1}^2 \delta^{i-t} u(c_i) \quad (2)$$

This describes quasi-hyperbolic preferences, with a standard exponential discount factor $\delta \in (0, 1]$ and a hyperbolic discount factor $\beta \in (0, 1)$. In any period t , the individual (henceforth referred to as the “ t -self”) discounts the entire future stream of utilities by β . As a result, when faced with any tradeoff between consumption in periods t and $t+x$, the t -self places greater relative weight on period- t consumption than her earlier selves would have done. The consumer could be sophisticated (her time-inconsistency is common knowledge across all t -selves) or naive (she believes her future selves to be exponential discounters with a discount factor of δ). (O'Donoghue & Rabin, 2001).

The Zero-self begins with an endowment of claims to an arbitrary positive income stream over the three periods, $Y_0 \equiv (y_0, y_1, y_2)$. Her objective is to rearrange this into a preferable consumption stream C_0 to maximize $U_0(C_0)$ in (2) using what financial contracting or other saving/borrowing strategies as may be available.

In the absence of access to the financing and commitment-services offered by a bank the consumer can only achieve an ‘autarky’ consumption stream which delivers a corresponding autarky utility denoted U_0^A . The simplest assumption is that this autarky consumption

⁹When $\rho = 1$ the function becomes $u(c_t) = \ln(c_t)$.

stream corresponds to the endowment income stream. More realistically, the autarky consumption stream is what might be achieved via the more limited financing and commitment services available through informal banking or self-commitment strategies.

Section 3.1 describes the benchmark optimal consumption smoothing stream C_0^F and associated utility level U_0^F that Zero-self could achieve if she had perfect access to borrowing and/or saving at competitive interest rates with all the commitment required to make sure the contract is not renegotiated. There are many reasons why in practice autarky consumption plans might fall short of this optimum. For example, if the consumer's income is back-heavy, borrowing constraints might mean she must consume income as it arrives. If her income is front-heavy she may be able to construct a somewhat smoothed consumption stream but there may be technological restrictions to saving that place the return to savings well below the market rate – the insecurity of storing cash at home being one obvious explanation. More pivotal to our analysis, however, is that even with access to perfectly secure savings or borrowing, a consumer with time-inconsistent preferences cannot trust her later selves to follow her optimal consumption path. While remaining deliberately agnostic about autarky technologies, the rest of the paper focuses on the reasonable and interesting case $U_0^A < U_0^F$ where there are potential gains to financial contracting with a new intermediary.

The consumer will have the option to contract with one or many risk-neutral banks, depending on whether the period 0 market structure is monopolized or competitive. Each bank can access funds at interest rate opportunity cost r . At this market interest rate, the present value of the consumer's income stream is:

$$y \equiv \sum_{i=0}^2 \frac{y_i}{(1+r)^{i-t}} \quad (3)$$

A period 0 financial contract allows the consumer to exchange income stream Y_0 for a new smoother consumption path C_0 . A bank will participate if and only if it can expect to earn non-negative profits $\Pi_0(C_0; Y_0)$, where profits are defined as:

$$\Pi_t(C_t; Y_t) \equiv \sum_{i=t}^2 \frac{(y_i - c_i)}{(1+r)^{i-t}} \quad (4)$$

The contract may involve borrowing (or dissaving) and/or savings (or paying down debt) in period t depending on whether $(c_t > y_t)$ or $(c_t < y_t)$, respectively. We begin by assuming contracts can only be initiated in period 0.¹⁰ Contracts may however be renegotiated by the consumer and the original bank or possibly a new one in period 1. If this happens, we assume the bank incurs a non-monetary cost¹¹, $\kappa \geq 0$. This could be interpreted as a

¹⁰This assumption is made to simplify the analysis. It is discussed further and lifted in the Conclusion.

¹¹We discuss the source and nature of such costs in depth in section 6. The bank could incur monetary

concern for the consumer’s well-being, own reputation, or pure transactions costs.

In each contracting scenario the sophisticated consumer’s Zero-self has a bias for present consumption but wants to smooth future consumption across periods one and two. She correctly anticipates that her One-self will have a change of preferences that will lead her to want to ‘raid savings’ and/or take on new debt to drive up period one consumption at the expense of period two consumption, thereby undoing Zero-self’s early intent to balance consumption across the two periods. In every case below, Zero-self chooses a contract anticipating One-self’s and bank reactions, possibly limited by the bank’s exogenously or endogenously enforced commitment to not renegotiate with One-self. In contrast, the naive consumer does not anticipate possible renegotiation (an error the bank may choose to exploit).

3 Optimal commitment contracts

We first characterize optimal consumption-smoothing contracts when the consumer can perfectly and costlessly bind their latter selves to not renegotiate contracts with the same bank or other banks. We do this for the case of competition and monopoly. The credibility of a bank’s own commitment to not renegotiate the contract with the consumer’s future selves ultimately must rest on the assumption that the bank would face a credible deterrent penalty cost for doing so. It will be useful to derive the minimum deterrent penalties required to sustain optimal consumption smoothing in different settings.

3.1 Competitive Contracts

A consumer with time-inconsistent preferences cannot trust her latter selves to stick to her preferred consumption plans. Similar to a Stackelberg-leader in a Cournot game, Zero-self’s strategic saving/borrowing choices will be affected by her anticipation of One-self’s and the banks’ best renegotiation response.

If banks can be assumed to credibly and costlessly commit to never renegotiate¹² then the sophisticated consumer’s self-control problem is removed. Competition for period 0 contracts ensures Zero-self will, in effect, choose a preferred contract that commits her One- and Two-selves to follow the chosen consumption plan. This is a standard utility maximization problem subject to an inter-temporal budget constraint (i.e. to the financial

costs in addition to the non-pecuniary ones but we assume these to be 0 as they can be netted out and do not affect the analysis in any important way.

¹²For now this also means such contracts are ‘exclusive’ in that in later periods no new bank can enter to ‘buy out’ or renegotiate a contract or, equivalently, that they too are dissuaded from it by credible penalties.

intermediary's zero-profit condition). Zero-self chooses C_0 to solve:

$$\max_{C_0} U_0(C_0) \tag{5}$$

$$\text{s.t. } \Pi_0(C_0; Y_0) \geq 0 \tag{6}$$

The familiar first-order necessary conditions are:

$$u'(c_0) = \beta\delta(1+r)u'(c_1) = \beta\delta^2(1+r)^2u'(c_2) \tag{7}$$

An increase or decrease to the term $\delta(1+r)$ essentially ‘tilts’ the consumption profile to generally rising or falling over time as $\delta \gtrless \frac{1}{1+r}$. As this across-the-board tilt will not alter key tradeoffs of interest (unlike the degree of present-bias β parameter which does) we shall impose the assumption that $\delta = \frac{1}{1+r} = 1$ for the remainder of the analysis. This is without loss of generality and greatly unclutters the math. The simplified first-order conditions are:

$$u'(c_0) = \beta u'(c_1) = \beta u'(c_2) \tag{8}$$

The binding bank zero profit constraint and first-order conditions allow us to solve for the competitive efficient full-smoothing commitment contract C_0^F . For the CRRA case, a closed form solution for C_0^F is easily found (41)¹³ and the FOCs can be written:

$$c_1^F = c_2^F = \beta^{\frac{1}{\rho}} c_0^F \tag{9}$$

Zero-self indulges her present bias (by tilting consumption toward herself) and then allocates remaining resources evenly across the remaining two periods. Consider the simple example where $\beta = 0.5$, $\rho = 1$ and endowment income has present value $\sum y_t = 300$. Zero-self's preferred commitment contract will be $C_0^F = (150, 75, 75)$. If the total income arrives evenly across periods as $Y_0 = (100, 100, 100)$ then this consumption plan would imply borrowing of $c_0^F - y_0 = 50$ in period 0 to be repaid in equal installments of 25 in periods 1 and 2. Had the stream instead been $Y_0 = (200, 50, 50)$ the consumer would save 50 in period 0 to raise consumption by 25 in each of periods 1 and 2. We'll return to these simple numerical examples below to illustrate why, when commitment becomes costly and imperfect One-self may carry ‘too much debt’ or ‘not save enough’ relative to Zero's preferred choices.¹⁴

¹³All CRRA derivations and closed-form solutions are in the appendix.

¹⁴These parameter values are chosen for expositional purposes. In particular $\rho = 1$ implies that period zero consumption will be the same with or without commitment but the analysis is easily adapted to other values.

3.2 Monopoly Contracts

When the bank has monopoly power in period 0 the optimal contract will maximize bank profits subject to a consumer participation constraint:

$$\max_{C_0} \Pi_0(C_0; Y_0) \quad (10)$$

$$\text{s.t. } U_0(C_0) \geq U_0^A \quad (11)$$

The first-order tangency conditions are again given by expressions (8). Substituting these into Zero-self's binding participation constraint, which must bind at a monopoly optimum, we can solve for the optimal contract C_0^{mF} and corresponding bank profits $\Pi_0(C_0^{mF}; Y_0)$. Closed form solutions for the CRRA case appear as appendix equations (42) and (43). Consumption C_0^{mF} rises and profits fall with the consumer's reservation autarky utility U_0^A .

Conceptually, the equilibrium contract under competition was found at the tangency between the highest iso-utility surface just touching the budget hyper-plane. Under monopoly, the optimum will be at the tangency point where the highest iso-profit plane just touches the iso-utility surface associated with Zero-self's reservation utility. Since the monopoly bank fully captures the gains to trade, consumption in each period will be lower than under competition.

4 The Renegotiation Problem

Now to the heart of the paper: when is commitment credible, how is it sustained, and at what cost? At issue is the fact that One-self always prefers higher period 1 consumption than what Zero-self wants to build into a contract, so there may be tempting gains to trade from breaking earlier contract commitments. The credibility of the bank's commitment must in turn rest on the threat of a sufficiently costly punishment κ to deter it from such renegotiation. Below we first derive the minimum deterrent punishment required to sustain efficient contracting and then study contract adaptations when available deterrents fall short of this threshold.

Figure 1 depicts the potential renegotiation problem for the case where renegotiation costs are set to $\kappa = 0$ which is to say where One-self and a bank can rewrite any contract at zero penalty. Assume – just for the sake of argument now – that the consumer had (naively as it will turn out) accepted a full-smoothing commitment contract C_0^F in period zero (or C_0^{mF} in the monopoly case). The associated continuation contract is depicted at point F in the $c_1 - c_2$ plane. This contract satisfies Zero-self's first-order condition $u'(c_1) = u'(c_2)$ as indicated by the fact that Zero-self's indifference curve is tangent to the bank's iso-profit line, or equivalently that F lies on the $c_2 = c_1$ ray. Since One-self discounts period 2

utility more heavily, this bundle however provides ‘too much’ period 2 consumption for their preferences, since $u'(c_1) > \beta u'(c_2)$. There are mutual gains-to-trade that could be shared by recontracting from F to any new tangency point between point R and P along the $c_2 = \beta^{\frac{1}{\rho}} c_1$ ray where One-self’s first-order conditions are met. Point R is the renegotiated contract least favorable to One-self (chosen if the bank could act as monopolist in period 1) and point P which is the most favorable to One-self (chosen under competitive renegotiation).

Being a sophisticate, Zero-self of course anticipates this problem and will only agree to contracts that satisfy a no-renegotiation constraint to deter the bank(s) and her future self from any such harmful renegotiations. The addition of a new binding constraint can however only reduce the feasible contract space, hence reducing consumer welfare and/or bank profits and trade. When the market for period 0 contracts is competitive, consumer welfare will be reduced. If instead the market is monopolized bank profits will suffer as the bank can no longer offer the least cost (most profitable) smoothing contract.

4.1 Renegotiated contracts

To derive a no-renegotiation constraint we must understand the terms of renegotiated contracts even if, in equilibrium, no renegotiations will take place. Consider a contract $C_0^0 = (c_0^0, c_1^0, c_2^0)$ and the period 1 subgame determined by its associated continuation contract $C_1^0 = (c_1^0, c_2^0)$. A renegotiation takes place when One-self and a bank agree to replace continuation contract (c_1^0, c_2^0) by a new contract (c_1^1, c_2^1) .

First consider the case when period 1 banks compete to replace contract C_1^0 with renegotiated contract $C_1^1(C_1^0)$. The contract renegotiation problem becomes:

$$C_1^1(C_1^0) = \arg \max U_1(C_1) \quad (12)$$

$$s.t. \Pi_1(C_1; C_1^0) \geq \kappa \quad (13)$$

where the bank participation constraint (13) can be stated as $(c_1^0 + c_2^0) - (c_1 + c_2) \geq \kappa$. To entice a bank to participate the renegotiated contract must reduce contract expenses (increase bank profits) by an amount that equals or exceeds the renegotiation cost. Competition insures this constraint exactly binds. We can solve for an interior competitive renegotiation contract $C_1^1(C_1^0)$ using the first-order condition $u'(c_1^1) = \beta u'(c_2^1)$ and binding condition (13).¹⁵ For example, with zero renegotiation costs ($\kappa = 0$) contract F in Figure 1 would be renegotiated to P . For positive κ (but less than $\bar{\kappa}$ in the figure) the consumer will surrender just enough surplus to the bank as to get them to participate, resulting in a contract that lies between P and R .

¹⁵For CRRA utility, the contract will be renegotiated to $c_1 = \frac{c_1^0 + c_2^0 - \kappa}{1 + \beta^{\frac{1}{\rho}}}$ and $c_2 = \beta^{\frac{1}{\rho}} c_1$




Figure 1: Optimal competitive contract and renegotiation threat

If a bank is a monopolist in period 1, and κ is not so high as to make renegotiation infeasible, the bank's preferred renegotiated contract would solve:

$$C_1^{1m}(C_1^0) = \arg \max_{C_1} \Pi_1(C_1; C_1^0) - \kappa \quad (14)$$

$$\text{s.t. } U(C_1) \geq U(C_1^0) \quad (15)$$

In Figure 1 the monopolist would renegotiate contract F to a point just *above* R to entice One-self to participate, captures (practically) all the gains to renegotiation for the monopolist. Appendix equation (47) shows the monopolist's preferred renegotiated contract for any continuation contract C_1^0 .

These renegotiations will not happen in equilibrium but are needed to determine the path of equilibrium play.

4.2 The 'no-renegotiation' condition

When will a contract *not* be renegotiated in period 1? Assuming a tie-breaking rule in favor of Zero-self's preferences, depending on whether the market structure in period 1 is monopolized or competitive, respectively, the conditions for no renegotiation in period 1 can be described by:

$$U_1(C_1^1(C_1^0)) \leq U_1(C_1^0) \quad (16)$$

$$\Pi_1(C_1^{1m}(C_1^0); C_1^0) \leq \kappa \quad (17)$$

In fact these two conditions express the same thing: a period 0 contract will be renegotiation-proof if and only if it is *not* possible in period 1 for a bank and One-self to agree to a new contract that simultaneously (a) leaves One-self with at least as much discounted utility as the original contract, and (b) generates a profit gain of at least κ to the bank. In short, the contract will be renegotiation-proof as long as renegotiation costs are large enough to exhaust any potential gains to trade between the two parties. These requirements can be expressed as a single no-renegotiation condition. For the CRRA case:

$$u(c_1^0) + \beta u(c_2^0) \geq u\left(\frac{c_1^0 + c_2^0 - \kappa}{1 + \beta^{\frac{1}{\rho}}}\right) (1 + \beta^{\frac{1}{\rho}}) \quad (18)$$

The determination of the boundary between renegotiation-proof and non-renegotiation proof contracts in $c_1 - c_2$ space is illustrated in Figure 2. Consider a candidate continuation contract (c_1^0, c_2^0) such as at point C . One-self would renegotiate this to any contract lying




Figure 2: The no-renegotiation constraint

above their indifference curve running through C . The bank, however, will only agree to a proposed renegotiation if it can lower contract costs to below existing costs net of the renegotiation cost κ . In diagram terms, the bank will agree only if the renegotiated contract falls *below* the lower of the drawn isocost lines with period 1 cost $c_1^0 + c_2^0 - \kappa$. Contract C is renegotiation-proof because even the most generous renegotiation that One-self can offer the bank (contract R) falls just short of raising the banks profits by enough to compensate for renegotiation costs. Contract F , which smooths consumption efficiently between period 1 and period 2 under Zero-self's preferences, is not renegotiation-proof for the given renegotiation cost κ illustrated in the earlier Figure 1. Contract F only becomes renegotiation-proof if external renegotiation costs rise to $\bar{\kappa}$ or larger, a threshold we determine in the next section.

The no-renegotiation constraint (for a given κ) is indicated in Figure 2. Contracts that are renegotiation-proof must lie below this constraint. The boundaries are described by a binding equation (18).¹⁶ When the no-renegotiation constraint binds in our profit or utility maximization problem, the bank must offer a contract along this boundary.¹⁷

We can now turn back to the period 0 optimization problem. When that market is competitive the optimal contract (given any κ) will be determined by the maximization problem described by Zero-self's objective (5) subject to both the bank participation constraint (6) and no-renegotiation constraint (18). When the market for period 0 contracts is monopolized the bank maximizes (10) subject to Zero-self's participation constraint (6) and the same no-renegotiation constraint (18). We study these problems in section 5 below.

4.3 Threshold external renegotiation costs

What is the minimum renegotiation cost sufficient to deter the renegotiation of a full-smoothing commitment contract? This can be found by setting $c_1^0 = c_1^F = c_2^0$ in the no-renegotiation condition (18) and solving for κ . A competitive full-smoothing commitment contract will survive if and only if

$$\kappa \geq \bar{\kappa} \equiv c_1^F \cdot \Upsilon \quad (19)$$

while a monopolistic full-smoothing commitment contract will survive if and only if:

$$\kappa \geq \bar{\kappa}^m \equiv c_1^{mF} \cdot \Upsilon \quad (20)$$

¹⁶From an examination of the no-renegotiation constraint (18) it is clear there are, in fact, two non-linear boundaries that satisfy this condition. However, given any curvature in $u(c)$, the upper boundary must always bind first, so this is the one we depict and focus on. When $\kappa = 0$ the region coincides with the $c_2 = \beta^{\frac{1}{\rho}}$ line. See online appendix.

¹⁷Recall that by assumption ties are broken in favor of Zero-self's preferences so no-renegotiation is weakly preferred here.

where Υ is the constant in (51).

Here $\bar{\kappa}$ and $\bar{\kappa}^m$ are the threshold minimum renegotiation costs required to deter the renegotiation of the first-best efficient smoothing commitment contract. The greater the consumption levels in the efficient contract (the greater the scope for profitable contract rearrangements in period 1), the more costly it becomes to deter renegotiation. Under competition c_1^F is independent of autarky utility (given a fixed value of y) so $\bar{\kappa}$ does not depend on how close or far from optimal consumption smoothing the consumer is in autarky. With monopoly in period 0 the threshold $\bar{\kappa}^m$ which rises linearly with c_1^{mF} will be increasing in autarky utility U_0^A (see 42). Since $c_1^F > c_1^{mF}$ for any initial Y_0 we must also always have $\bar{\kappa}^m < \bar{\kappa}$. Proposition 1 summarizes:

Proposition 1. *Given renegotiation cost thresholds $\bar{\kappa}$ and $\bar{\kappa}^m$ as defined by 19 and 20.*

- (a) *The competitive full-smoothing commitment contract survives if and only if $\kappa \geq \bar{\kappa}$.*
- (b) *The monopolistic full-smoothing commitment contract survives if and only if $\kappa \geq \bar{\kappa}^m$ with $\bar{\kappa}^m$ strictly rising in the consumer's autarky utility.*
- (c) *$\bar{\kappa}^m < \bar{\kappa}$.*

An implication of statement (b) is that under monopoly, consumers with better autarky options are less likely to get full-smoothing commitment contracts. A consumer with higher autarky utility must be offered higher consumption by the monopolist, and the no-renegotiation condition is harder to satisfy at higher levels of consumption. This dampens the advantages of improved outside options for sophisticated hyperbolic discounters contracting with monopoly banks.

A monopolist is relatively better at delivering efficient-smoothing commitment contracts than under competition ($\bar{\kappa}^m < \bar{\kappa}$), but this is not because monopolists are inherently better at committing; this follows from the fact that having at the outset extracted surplus by offering the consumer a contract with the lowest possible consumption, there is relatively less surplus left to be captured via renegotiation in period 1.¹⁸

5 Constrained Commitment Contracts

When bank renegotiation costs are not high enough to sustain efficient-smoothing commitment contracts, that is where $\kappa < \bar{\kappa}$ under competition or $\kappa < \bar{\kappa}^m$ under monopoly, commitment or renegotiation-proofness will require contract distortions which we now characterize.

¹⁸There may be other reasons outside of this model that make monopolists better at committing (i.e. having a higher κ). Our point is that this is not necessary for monopolists to offer better smoothing in more circumstances than competitive firms.

A bank that contracts with naifs will capitalize on the consumer's failure to anticipate harmful future renegotiations (Section 4.3). A sophisticated consumer is wise to the problem and will only agree to renegotiation-proof contracts (Sections 4.2 and 4.3). In the absence of sufficiently high external renegotiation penalties however the parties will resort to additional endogenous enforcement mechanisms by shifting the terms of continuation contracts closer to One-self's preferred choices as a costly strategy to reduce the gains to renegotiation. We label these 'imperfect-smoothing commitment' contracts. They are still technically 'full commitment' contracts in the sense that renegotiation is avoided in equilibrium but they generally provide less than perfect or efficient consumption smoothing from Zero-self's perspective compared to contracts with stronger external enforcement penalties.

For expositional convenience, we first discuss the monopoly case.

5.1 Monopoly

When the market for period 0 contracts is monopolized the bank will want to maximize multi-period profits subject to Zero-self's participation and the no-renegotiation constraint

$$\max_{C_0} \Pi_0 (C_0; Y_0) \quad (21)$$

$$s.t. U_0 (C_0) \geq U_0^A \quad (22)$$

$$\Pi_1 (C_1^1 (C_1); C_1) \leq \kappa \quad (23)$$

A consumer rationally anticipates how her later self may be tempted to renegotiate and will insist on renegotiation-proofness. When $\kappa < \bar{\kappa}^M$ however this will imply distortion away from efficient smoothing which can only harm bank profits since this raises the contract cost of keeping the consumer at their reservation utility. Hence the monopoly bank itself will insist on renegotiation-proof contracts and, as we shall see, may be willing to spend to improve externally imposed renegotiation penalties.

The bank wants to search for the most profitable renegotiation-proof contract that lies on Zero's participation constraint (11). Consider a candidate level of period 0 consumption c_0^0 . The associated continuation contract C_1^0 must lie along Zero-self's autarky utility surface which can be projected as indifference curve $\beta [u(c_1^0) + u(c_2^0)] = U_0^A - u(c_0^0)$ in $c_1 - c_2$ space. Let this be represented by Zero-self's indifference curve in Figure 2. Note this indifference curve shifts down or up as we increase or decrease c_0^0 , which for the moment we take as given. Many continuation contracts are both renegotiation-proof and satisfy Zero-self's participation (all in the area above the indifference curve and below the no-renegotiation boundary) but the most profitable amongst these will be at point C in Figure 2 at the intersection

of the two constraints. This gives us the optimal renegotiation-proof continuation contract $C_1^m(c_0^0)$ from any c_0^0 . The monopolist's optimal contract is then determined by choosing over c_0^0 .

5.1.1 Properties of the contract

The renegotiation-proof contract can be explicitly derived for the CRRA case of $\kappa = 0$ (Equation 71). For, $0 < \kappa < \bar{\kappa}^m$, the contract cannot be derived in closed form because there are two points where the participation constraint and no-renegotiation constraint are satisfied with equality (at the upper and lower boundaries of the set of renegotiation-proof contracts). However, the key properties of the equilibrium contract can be established and it can be easily solved for numerically.

Proposition 2. *Suppose $\kappa < \bar{\kappa}^m$ and the consumer is sophisticated. Under monopoly, the profit-maximizing renegotiation-proof contract (C_0^{mP}) has the following properties:*

- (i) $\Pi_0(C_0^{mP}; Y_0) < \Pi_0(C_0^{mF}; Y_0)$
- (ii) $c_0^{mP} > c_0^{mF}$

Proposition 2 compares the renegotiation-proof contract to the full-smoothing commitment contract when the renegotiation-proofness constraint binds. First, bank profits will be lower than under full-smoothing commitment. The bank wishes it could promise to not renegotiate but it cannot make such a promise credible without giving up some profits. The monopolist would be better off with higher external renegotiation penalties since in equilibrium renegotiation does not take place.

A related observation is that the bank will prefer not to contract with individuals who have minimal smoothing needs; for individuals whose autarky utility is close enough to U_0^F , the bank would make negative profits under the best renegotiation-proof contract, so there will be lost trade.

The second statement of the proposition is about the terms of the contract – when full-smoothing commitment is not feasible, the renegotiation-proof contract will involve higher consumption in period 0 (i.e. either a smaller loan or less savings) compared to full-smoothing commitment. The following is a sketch of the argument (the proof in the appendix uses some additional notation for logical clarity which we describe intuitively here).¹⁹

Any contract C_0 can be fully described in terms of three variables, c_0 , s , and α . Here, c_0 is period 0 consumption and s is the total consumption allocated to periods 1 and 2. α determines the share of s that is consumed in period 1. So, $C_0 = (c_0, \alpha s, (1 - \alpha)s)$.

¹⁹If the reader prefers to skip this, we present a purely intuitive explanation of the results near the end of Section 4.2.2.

This notation serves two purposes. First, α captures renegotiation concerns. Under full-smoothing, $\alpha = \frac{1}{2}$, as this is optimal from Zero-self's perspective. When the no-renegotiation constraint binds, we get a function $\alpha(s)$ which tells us how much larger c_1 must be relative to c_2 so that further renegotiation would be unprofitable (54). As total consumption in periods 1 and 2 s rises the parties must rely more on distorting self-enforcement mechanisms to supplement the fixed no-renegotiation penalty κ as a sufficient deterrent to renegotiation. Zero-self must in effect become more accommodating of One-self's preferences so period 1 must get a bigger share. This is indicated by the shape of the upper boundary of the set of renegotiation-proof contracts in Figure 2.

Define the continuation utility from Zero-self's perspective as $V(s, \alpha) \equiv \beta[u(\alpha s) + u((1 - \alpha)s)]$. At any contract that constitutes an optimum, the following must be true:

$$\frac{du(c_0)}{dc_0} = \frac{dV}{ds} \quad (24)$$

Otherwise, the bank could raise profits by reallocating consumption from period 0 to the future or vice versa. This is just a restatement of the first-order condition.

Now suppose the optimal renegotiation-proof contract specified the same level of period 0 consumption as the full-smoothing contract, so $c_0^{mP} = c_0^{mF}$. Since any future consumption must be split unevenly, in order to continue to satisfy the consumer's period 0 participation constraint, it must be true that $s^{mP} > s^{mF}$. We show in the appendix that s^{mP} would have to be large enough that, at these values,

$$\frac{du(c_0^{mP})}{dc_0} > \frac{dV}{ds} \quad (25)$$

so this contract could not be profit-maximizing. In other words, a switch from full-smoothing commitment to renegotiation-proofness while maintaining the same c_0 would require such a large jump in future total consumption (to continue satisfying Zero-self's participation constraint) that the marginal utility of future consumption would be low. So the bank could do better by raising period 0 consumption at the expense of future consumption.

The bank limits renegotiation possibilities by transferring consumption away from the future (when renegotiation is a temptation) to the present. Relative to full-smoothing commitment, consumers get contracts with larger loans or less savings.

5.2 Competition

When the market for period 0 contracts is competitive the optimal contract solves:

$$\max_{C_0} U_0(C_0) \quad (5)$$

$$\text{s.t. } \Pi_0(C_0; Y_0) \geq 0 \quad (6)$$

$$\Pi_1(C_1^1(C_1); C_1) \leq \kappa \quad (17)$$

As noted in section 4.2, the no-renegotiation constraint 17 assures that gains-to-trade from renegotiation fall short of bank renegotiation costs. Even if new banks could enter in period 1 to offer part or all of the surplus from renegotiation to One-self in period 1 the constraint deters renegotiation as long as those banks also face renegotiation cost κ .²⁰

We can reuse Figure 2 to interpret the contract design. Zero-self wants to search for the most profitable renegotiation-proof contract that lies on the bank's participation constraint (the outer budget line). Suppose Zero-self has chosen a candidate period 0 level of consumption c_0^0 . To be part of an optimum renegotiation-proof contract Zero-self must ensure that the continuation contract is renegotiation proof and satisfies the bank's zero-profit constraint $c_1^0 + c_2^0 = y - c_0^0$. Many continuation contracts are both renegotiation-proof and satisfy the zero-profit constraint (all below both the zero-profit line and within the no-renegotiation boundary) but the most-preferred by Zero will be at point C in Figure 2 at the intersection of the two constraints.²¹ This gives us the optimal renegotiation-proof continuation contract $C_1(c_0^0)$ from any c_0^0 . Zero-self's optimal contract is then determined by backward induction, choosing over c_0^0 .

In the special case of perfect competition with costless renegotiation ($\kappa = 0$) there will be a unique solution and a closed form. In figure 2 think of how C slides down the bank's zero-profit line as κ shrinks until we get to a point where One-self's indifference curve is tangent to the zero-profit line. This continuation contract is 'renegotiation-proof' only in the very narrow sense that it won't be renegotiated because it already delivers One-self's preferred consumption choice. This contract is explicitly solved in expression (72).

Consider the practical interpretation of a simple example: with $\beta = 0.5$ and $\rho = 1$ and $\kappa = 0$ the best available competitive contract $C_0^P = (150, 100, 50)$ offers considerably less consumption smoothing in later periods compared to the benchmark full-smoothing $C_0^F = (150, 75, 75)$. If the consumer's initial income stream were arranged as $Y_0 = (100, 100, 100)$ we would interpret the absence of commitment case ($\kappa = 0$) as rolling over period one debt that Zero would have preferred to have seen repaid. The entire burden of the debt that

²⁰Later we discuss the empirically relevant cases where competing banks might enter in period 1 and offer to renegotiate at lower or zero renegotiation cost).

²¹Note that while we are reusing Figure 2 to describe both the monopoly and the competitive contract design problem because, conceptually, they are very similar, optimal consumption levels will be generally higher under competition so the point C is not the same in both cases.

Zero took out in period 0 but would prefer to have been shared equally between periods 1 and 2 is ‘rolled over’ and placed now on period 2. Had the income stream instead been $Y_0 = (200, 50, 50)$ then we might interpret the consumer in period one as ‘raiding savings’ that, with commitment, Zero-self would have protected for period 2 consumption.

5.2.1 Properties of the contract

Suppose contract C_0^P is the solution to the maximization problem described by 5, 6 and 17.

Proposition 3. *Suppose $\kappa < \bar{\kappa}$ and the consumer is sophisticated. The competitive renegotiation-proof contract that maximizes Zero-self’s discounted utility (C_0^P) has the following properties:*

- (i) $U_0(C_0^P) < U_0(C_0^F)$
- (ii) *The relationship between c_0^P and c_0^F is ambiguous. There is some $\hat{\rho}$ such that: if $\rho \leq \hat{\rho}$, then $c_0^P > c_0^F$; if $\rho > \hat{\rho}$, then there are parameter values under which $c_0^P < c_0^F$.*

The first statement is straightforward: Since $\kappa < \bar{\kappa}$ means the new renegotiation-proofness constraint (17) binds full-smoothing smoothing cannot be achieved and the consumer’s welfare must be lower than under the first-best contract.

Now, will period 0 consumption be higher or lower than under full-smoothing commitment? The proposition is that this depends on parameter values, in particular the intertemporal elasticity of substitution $\frac{1}{\rho}$. Consider the competitive full-smoothing commitment contract C_0^F . Following the modified notation of Section 5.1.1 and first-order condition (8), it must be true that:

$$\frac{du(c_0^F)}{dc_0} = \frac{dV(s^F, \frac{1}{2})}{ds} \quad (26)$$

Now suppose the competitive renegotiation-proof contract C_0^P involves the same period 0 consumption as under full-smoothing commitment, so that $c_0^P = c_0^F$. By the bank’s zero-profit constraint, the contract will also have $s^P = s^F$, but consumption will be split in period 1’s favor. If the utility function is relatively linear (low ρ), then an imbalanced split of s results in a lower marginal utility than from a balanced split. So:

$$\frac{du(c_0^F)}{dc_0} > \frac{dV(s^F, \alpha(s^F))}{ds} \quad (27)$$

In such a case, the renegotiation-proof contract must involve higher period 0 consumption than the full-smoothing commitment contract.

If, on the other hand, the utility function is highly convex (high ρ), then an imbalanced split results in higher marginal utility relative to full-smoothing. In such cases, the renegotiation-proof contract will have lower period 0 consumption than under full-smoothing

commitment under certain parameter values.²² This can be seen more explicitly in the case of $\kappa = 0$ (Equation 72).

So, under competition, the renegotiation-proofness constraint could change the contract in either direction: a larger loan (less saved) or a smaller loan (more saved). Period 2 consumption however always falls relative to the full-smoothing commitment case, even in the cases when Zero-self saves more/borrows less. In fact for CRRA utility the adjustment of period 0 consumption (in the absence of commitment compared to with commitment) is always relatively small while the adjustment to period 1 and period 2 consumption is relatively much larger.²³ In other words despite having a first-mover advantage, Zero-self can do little other than to partially accommodate the consumption pattern that One-self wants to impose.

The contrast between monopoly and competition can be explained using the intuition of income and substitution effects. In either case, a move from full-smoothing commitment can be viewed as a rise in the “price” of delivering a unit of future utility from Zero-self’s perspective. As a result, substitution effects will lead to an increase in period 0 consumption and a drop in future consumption. Under monopoly, since the consumer is always left at her autarky utility, there are no income effects. When the renegotiation-proofness constraint binds, the price of future utility effectively rises, as a result of which substitution effects lead to greater period 0 consumption. Under competition, income and substitution effects work against each other; the net result depends on the shape of the consumer’s utility function.²⁴

5.3 Contracts with Naive Discounters

For naive agents, the problem of renegotiation does not generally lead to a renegotiation-proof contract. The naif believes she will not be tempted to renegotiate. Banks therefore offer contracts that take into account the potential renegotiation. Under monopoly, the bank adds to its profits by engaging in renegotiation that was not anticipated by the consumer in period 0. Under competition, banks return the potential surplus from renegotiation to the Zero-self.²⁵

²²The precise construction of the cutoff value $\hat{\rho}$ is somewhat complicated, as $\frac{dV}{ds}$ depends not just on $u'(c_1)$ and $u'(c_2)$, but also on how the sharing rule, $\alpha(s)$, changes with s .

²³To illustrate, with $\kappa = 0$ at no point does period 0 consumption rise or fall by more than six percent for any value $\rho \in (0, \infty)$ and $\beta \in (0, 1)$ but at reasonable parameter values such as $\rho = 0.5$ and $\beta = 0.5$ in the absence of commitment period 1 consumption rises to 149 percent of the level it would be with commitment, and period 2 consumption falls to just 37 percent of what it would be.

²⁴This intuition applies to CRRA and widely across other standard utility functions, but there are exceptions. As shown in Basu (2020), it is possible to construct utility functions where even as the overall price of delivering future utility goes up, at some points the *marginal* price does not. In such cases, even under monopoly the change in contract terms from full-smoothing to imperfect-smoothing commitment contract could be ambiguous.

²⁵A similar analysis could be carried out if consumers were misinformed not about their own preferences but about κ .

5.3.1 Monopoly

Relative to a sophisticated consumer, with a naive consumer the monopolist bank can make additional profits on two margins. First, since there is no perceived renegotiation problem, the consumer is willing to accept a contract that is more profitable for the bank up-front; subsequently, possible renegotiation generates additional profits for the bank.²⁶

The bank must choose between a renegotiation-proof contract and one that will be renegotiated upon. If κ is sufficiently large there is little to gain from renegotiation and the consumer will be offered the full-smoothing commitment contract. But when κ is relatively small, the bank might prefer to offer a contract that will subsequently be renegotiated. In such cases, the bank solves the following problem:²⁷

$$\max_{C_0} \quad \Pi_0(C_0; Y_0) + \Pi_1(C_1^{m1}; C_1) - \kappa \quad (28)$$

$$s.t. \quad U_0(C_0) \geq U_0^A \quad (29)$$

Let the solution be denoted C_0^{mN} . This is explicitly derived in the appendix (78, 79). The bank maximizes profits by offering a contract that divides future consumption as much in favor of period 2 as possible. The greater the imbalance between the contracted c_1 and c_2 , the greater the bank's profits from renegotiation. We show that if $\rho < 1$, the contract is at a corner solution where $c_1 = 0$. If $\rho > 1$, an explicit solution does not exist, but maximization pushes the contract to a point where c_2 approaches infinity.²⁸ This contract can be compared to both the full-smoothing commitment contract and the renegotiation-proof contract for sophisticates. In particular, it will involve lower period 0 consumption than under both full-smoothing commitment and renegotiation-proofness. This result might appear counter-intuitive. In the case of lending, it does not reinforce the narrative of banks preying on naive consumers by offering them relatively large loans with steep repayments. Indeed, there are other considerations beyond the scope of this model, such as the possibility of collateral seizure, that could generate large loans. But our limited model helps to highlight a particular aspect of contracting with naive hyperbolic discounters: here, the bank offers them relatively *small* loans because its gains from renegotiation depend on the surplus that the initial contract delivers to periods 1 and 2. In order to fully take advantage of the consumer's naiveté[Ⓢ], the consumer must start out with sufficiently small repayments that

²⁶There is an additional consideration – that naive hyperbolic discounters might be inaccurately optimistic about autarky outcomes because of a failure to anticipate commitment problems. This would have the interesting effect of tightening the participation constraint and reducing surplus available to the monopolist

²⁷We do not need to worry about a renegotiation-proofness constraint here. Since period 0 believes her period 1 preferences are consistent with her own, she expects any renegotiation of the period 0 contract to yield the same discounted utility as the contract itself.

²⁸This could be dealt with by a reasonable assumption of an upper bound on contract terms.

the bank could profit from rearranging them.

The next proposition summarizes the above discussion.

Proposition 4. *Suppose the consumer is naive. Under monopoly:*

- (i) *If κ is sufficiently higher than $\bar{\kappa}^m$, the firm will offer the agent the full-smoothing commitment contract (C_0^{mF}) and it will not be renegotiated.*
- (ii) *Otherwise, the contract C_0^{mN} will satisfy $c_0^{mN} < c_0^{mF} < c_0^{mP}$ (either explicitly or in the limit), and it will be renegotiated in period 1.*

5.3.2 Competition

Under competition, with naive consumers contracts must account for renegotiation to have firms continue earning zero profits. First, note that if contracts are not exclusive, the consumer gets offered the full-smoothing commitment contract, which then gets renegotiated if $\kappa < \bar{\kappa}$. This is because the firm offering the contract in period 0 does not expect to benefit from renegotiation, so the contract gets competed down to the one that maximizes the naive Zero-self's perceived utility while delivering zero profits to the bank.

Under exclusive contracts, anticipated profits from future renegotiation will be returned to the consumer through more favorable initial contracts. If κ is sufficiently small, the equilibrium contract involves renegotiation and satisfies:

$$\max_{C_0} U_0(C_0) \tag{30}$$

$$s.t. \Pi_0(C_0; Y_0) + \Pi_1(C_1^{m1}; C_1) \geq \kappa \tag{31}$$

Let the solution be denoted C_0^N . This is explicitly derived in the appendix (83 and 84). As under monopoly, contracts divide future consumption as much in favor of period 2 as possible. This maximizes the potential gains from renegotiation. In the context of loans, this suggests contracts where the debt burden is heaviest in the intermediate stages, resulting in renegotiation to postpone payments.

Unlike under monopoly, competition returns anticipated renegotiation gains to the consumer. Some of these gains are returned to the Zero-self, so there is no clear prediction about whether period 0 consumption will be lower or higher than under full-smoothing commitment.

Proposition 5. *Suppose the consumer is naive. Under competition:*

- (a) *If contracts are not exclusive: The consumer will accept the full-smoothing commitment contract, C_0^F . The contract will be renegotiated in period 1 if and only if $\kappa < \bar{\kappa}$.*
- (b) *If contracts are exclusive:*

(i) If κ is sufficiently higher than $\bar{\kappa}$, the consumer will accept the full-smoothing commitment contract (C_0^F) and it will not be renegotiated.

(ii) Otherwise, the consumer will accept a contract C_0^N with the following properties: if $\rho < 1$, $c_0^N < c_0^F$. If $\rho > 1$, then there are parameter values under which $c_0^N > c_0^F$.

6 Not-for-profit and Hybrid ownership forms

Consider next the case of a firm that, in a pre-contract stage, has the possibility of choosing its ownership structure say by incorporating as a legal non-profit or, more broadly, by choosing a degree of ‘hybrid’ ownership, for example by retaining for-profit status but allowing social investors to establish considerable ownership stakes and managerial control. In the spirit of [Hansmann \(1996\)](#) and the discussion in the introduction, we model this as a restriction on the firm’s ability to distribute raw profits to managers and shareholders:

Definition. Given ‘raw profits’ Π_0 , a ‘nonprofit’ firm retains ‘captured profits’ $f(\Pi_0)$, where $f(0) = 0$, $f'(\Pi_0) \in (0, 1)$, and $f''(\Pi_0) \leq 0$.

This formulation follows [Glaeser & Shleifer \(2001\)](#) who argued that though the principals of a non-profit may be technically legally barred from tying compensation to cash profits, they can in practice capture a fraction of those profits in costly and imperfect ways via the consumption of perquisites or ‘dividends in kind’ (e.g. the lavish expense account). The ability of perquisites to substitute for unrestricted consumption falls as profits get larger.

Setting aside welfare concerns that might drive firms to adopt nonprofit or hybrid status, we examine when purely profit-minded firms might make such governance choices; i.e. when can a voluntary restriction on the ability to enjoy profits make a self-interested firm better off?²⁹ This has parallels to the explanation for commercial nonprofits due to [Hansmann \(1996\)](#) and modeled by [Glaeser & Shleifer \(2001\)](#) but established on quite different behavioral grounds.³⁰

At the outset, it should be noted that profit-oriented principals have no incentive to switch to hybrid/nonprofit status when consumers are naive. Since the consumer does not perceive a need for commitment, any promise of superior commitment is of no value to her. The analysis with sophisticated consumers follows.

²⁹Indeed, welfare concerns could directly improve consumer outcomes by either allowing Zero-self’s participation constraint to be slack or by raising the costs of renegotiation κ . We consider the latter point in an example below.

³⁰In those accounts a firm delivers less than a promised quantity or quality of a good or service, unambiguously harming the time-consistent client. The client discovers this after the fact but cannot challenge the contract breach only because it is too difficult or costly. In contrast in our model the firm and the One-self customer both gain from voluntarily breaking existing contract commitments and Zero-self is no longer around to mount a challenge.

As a non-profit, the firm has an opportunity to extract greater surplus from the consumer (by providing commitment), but now faces restrictions on the ability of managers and shareholders to enjoy this surplus. This trade-off is sensitive to market structure. Under competition, a lender's ability to provide effective commitment through non-profit status depends on the exclusivity of contracts. When long-term contracts can be made exclusive, the tradeoff disappears and all active firms function as non-profits. This is because of the zero-profit condition – since firms do not make profits anyway, there is nothing to lose from switching to non-profit status. On the other hand, there are profits to be gained – if all other firms are for-profit, a firm could make positive profits by offering superior commitment as a non-profit (this is valuable even if its enjoyment of these profits is limited).

When contracts are not exclusive, commitment generated through non-profit status becomes impossible to achieve. Since non-profit firms would make zero profits anyway, each firm has an incentive to switch to for-profit status so it can take advantage of the opportunity to re-finance *other* banks' loans. As a result, for-profit firms must be active in equilibrium, and their presence will eliminate the possibility of non-profit commitment.

This could, for example, partly explain a key difference between traditional monopolistic non-profit microfinance, which is rigid, and say competitive commercial credit card lending which offers refinancing flexibility (credit card punishments gain salience because they are *less* strict, not more).

6.1 Monopoly

In a pre-contract phase the firm now first establishes its type via the adoption of legal non-profit status and/or by choosing credible and stable ownership and governance structures that commit it to those limitations. If the monopoly firm were to operate as a nonprofit or a hybrid, when facing a sophisticated hyperbolic discounter it would design a renegotiation-proof contract to solve:

$$\max_{C_0} f(\Pi_0(C_0; Y_0)) \quad (32)$$

$$\text{s.t. } U_0(C_0) \geq U_0^A \quad (33)$$

$$f(\Pi(C_0; Y_0) + \Pi_1(C_1^{m1}; C_1)) - f(\Pi(C_0; Y_0)) \leq \kappa \quad (34)$$

Why might a profit-maximizing firm choose to operate as a nonprofit when that reduces its ability to capture profits? The answer lies in the loosening of the no-renegotiation constraint (34). Any gains from renegotiation are worth less than they would be to the for-profit firm. Clearly, the for-profit monopolist's contract (C_0^{mP}) would now leave the no-renegotiation constraint slack. Because the non-profit can more credibly commit to not

renegotiate contracts that offer greater consumption smoothing across periods 1 and 2, Zero-self becomes more willing to pay for this consumption stream.

The captured-profits maximizing solution gives a contract that we denote C_0^{mNP} . If $\kappa < \bar{\kappa}^m$, with a relaxed renegotiation-proof constraint $\Pi_0(C_0^{mNP}; Y_0) > \Pi_0(C_0^{mP}; Y_0)$ but whether or not it will be in the bank principals' best interest to strategically convert to non-profit status depends on whether the captured profits under non-profit status exceed the profits they could earn as a pure for-profit, in other words on whether $f(\Pi_0(C_0^{mNP}; Y_0)) > f(\Pi_0(C_0^{mP}; Y_0))$. The monopolist faces a tradeoff in considering non-profit status: higher raw profits (as the commitment problem is partly solved) but a diminished capture of those raw profits.

Does the rise in extracted surplus outweigh the fact that all profits are now discounted? Proposition 6 (in Section 5.2) establishes the existence of captured profit functions that would be strictly preferred to for-profit status for monopoly firms. This is easy to see: the possible concavity of f could leave the enjoyment of profits relatively unaffected while significantly loosening the no-renegotiation constraint (since renegotiation would raise profits further, and since f is concave, these additional profits would count for little).

Given particular captured profit functions, we can also ask which consumers are more likely to be served by nonprofit monopolists. If consumers are far from optimal in autarky, then the for-profit firm would anyway be making substantial profits. In this case, the non-profit's credibility advantages are not enough to outweigh the fact that it loses a significant amount of enjoyment of its profits due to legal restrictions.

However, for consumers with higher autarky utility, the gains that can be captured from nonprofit status are large relative to the profits that a for-profit would have made, so the firm prefers to operate as a nonprofit. As an example, consider an autarky consumption bundle at which the for-profit firm would earn zero profits. Now, the nonprofit firm can earn positive profits, so regardless of f nonprofit status dominates.

6.1.1 An example

Let us consider a situation where a firm may choose its degree of hybrid-ness or for-profit orientation, indexed by a parameter $\alpha \in [0, 1]$. For a chosen α , let the captured profits function be linear:

$$f(\Pi_0) = \alpha \Pi_0 \tag{35}$$

We can interpret α as the maximum fraction of raw profits that could be distributed to managers and shareholders. An $\alpha = 1$ would represent a pure for-profit investor-led firm, $\alpha = 0$ a strictly regulated non-profit.

We can also allow α to directly affect the non-pecuniary renegotiation cost the firm's

principals incur when they opportunistically break contractual promises to customers. A more hybrid or non-profit firm dominated by social investors is more likely to hire staff and managers that internalize client welfare and social investor motivations and therefore are more likely to feel non-pecuniary costs associated with guilt, shame or loss of reputation from breaking promises. If we now label the cost of renegotiation $\eta(\alpha)$ – replacing our earlier κ – this idea is captured by assuming that function η falls weakly in α . Putting both mechanisms together gives us modified no-renegotiation constraint (36) which states that the fraction of raw profits Π_1 that can be captured from renegotiating a contract must not exceed renegotiation costs:

$$\alpha \Pi_1(C_1^{m1}(C_1); C_1) \leq \eta(\alpha) \quad (36)$$

If we define $\kappa(\alpha) \equiv \frac{\eta(\alpha)}{\alpha}$, this no-renegotiation constraint can be written as

$$\Pi_1(C_1^{m1}(C_1); C_1) \leq \kappa(\alpha) \quad (37)$$

which looks like the earlier constraint (23) except κ is now a function of α . The earlier renegotiation problems were for the special case of a pure for-profit firm with $\alpha = 1$ but we can now analyze contracting, captured profits, and client welfare at any level of α and ownership choices in a strategic equilibrium.

To the extent that the loosening of the no-renegotiation constraint happens through the right-hand side (i.e. via term $\eta(\alpha)$, which represents the firm's motivation to honor the initial agreement), the firm benefits unambiguously—it is able to offer better commitment *and* fully retain the added profits.

In Figure 3 we illustrate the case where non-pecuniary costs to breaking a promise not to renegotiate fall with α according to $\eta(\alpha) = 10(1 - \alpha)$ and hence that the overall cost to renegotiation varies with α according to $\kappa(\alpha) = 10(1 - \alpha)/\alpha$. The plots depict captured profits that would be achieved at different levels of α starting from three different initial endowment streams. These three streams - (60, 120, 120), (90, 105, 105) and (120, 90, 90) – are equal in their present value of 300 but differ in terms of period 0 income (with remaining income allocated equally across period 1 and 2). The higher of the two curved lines represents ‘raw’ profits $\Pi_0(C_0^{mNP}; Y_0)$ and the lower curve captured profits $\alpha \Pi_0(C_0^{mNP}; Y_0)$. A horizontal line has been drawn in to indicate the level of profits $\Pi_0(C_0^{mP}; Y_0)$ captured by a pure for-profit ($\alpha = 1$). Consider the top panel where the customer has initial income (60, 120, 120). As this type of customer wants to borrow heavily in period 0, profits to the bank are large, even in the case of renegotiation-proof contracts. Adopting non-profit status by lowering α confers limited profit gain however: the cost of lowering alpha (giving up a share of already high profits) is not compensated for by the gains from being able to credibly commit to a smoother contract. However at (90, 105, 105) the tradeoff is different and profits




Figure 3: Captured rent by ownership status and endowment income

can be increased. In the picture any non-profit with an α between approximately 0.7 and less than one captures more profits than a pure for-profit. Finally for customers with an endowment (120, 90, 90) are already fairly close to their preferred consumption stream so the profits to be captured even under full commitment are not that large. Indeed in this case a pure for-profit cannot earn positive profits. Here the cost of adopting non-profit status is low compared to the gains, and we the simulation reveal that any non-profit status firm captures more profits than a pure for-profit, and maximum captured profits are achieved at around $\alpha = 0.7$.

6.2 Competition

6.2.1 Exclusive contracts

Consider what would happen in the competitive market situation now if contracts can be assumed to remain exclusive, so that any new surplus in the event of a renegotiation between the bank and the One-self goes to the bank (this grants the bank monopoly power in period 1). In this setting, a nonprofit/hybrid firm will be led to offer contract terms to solve:

$$\max_{C_0} U_0(C_0) \tag{38}$$

$$\text{s.t. } f(\Pi_0(C_0; Y_0)) \geq 0 \tag{39}$$

$$f(\Pi(C_0; Y_0) + \Pi_1(C_1^{m1}; C_1)) - f(\Pi(C_0; Y_0)) \leq \kappa \tag{40}$$

Let the contract that solves this program be denoted C_0^{eNP} . Consider first a field where all firms start as pure for-profits and earn zero profits. If the no-renegotiation constraint binds, Zero-self's utility must be lower than optimal. Starting from this situation consider now one firm's strategic choice of whether to adopt non-profit status. One firm deviating into nonprofit status in this way can make positive profits while offering Zero-self a contract with a higher discounted utility because of the loosened no-renegotiation constraint (40). So, if the borrowers are sophisticated hyperbolics, in equilibrium all firms become nonprofit and earn zero profits.

6.2.2 Non-Exclusive Contracts

Now, assume that exclusivity and period 1 monopoly power disappears. Firms can compete to renegotiate each other's contracts in period 1.

If there were only nonprofits in equilibrium, any one firm could make positive profits by switching to for-profit status and undoing a rival bank's contract in period 1. The advantages of undercutting other firms' contracts outweigh the benefits of promising one's own clients

it will not renegotiate. As a result, equilibrium contracts will be determined by for-profit firms, and consumers will be offered lower commitment than from non-profit firms alone.³¹

The above discussion is summarized in the following proposition.

Proposition 6. *(a) Suppose $\kappa < \bar{\kappa}^m$. Under monopoly, there exist captured profit functions such that the firm will operate as a nonprofit.*

(b) Suppose $\kappa < \bar{\kappa}$. Under competition: (i) If contracts are exclusive, firms will operate as nonprofits for any captured profit discount function. (ii) If contracts are not exclusive, there is no captured profit discount function under which firms will operate as nonprofits.

7 Discussion

We discuss three areas of practical and policy concern that our above analysis aims to engage with.

7.1 Commitment as a form of Consumer Protection

Concerns about excessive refinancing and ‘over-indebtedness’ have been raised especially in the lead up and wake of financial crises. On the eve of the mortgage banking crisis in 2007, over 70 percent of all new subprime mortgage loans were refinances of existing mortgages and approximately 84 percent of these were ‘cash out’ refinances (Demyanyk & Van Hemert, 2011). In the market for payday loans in the United States economists and regulatory observers express concern not so much that fees are high (the typical cost is 15% of the amount borrowed on a 2 week loan) but rather that 4 out of 5 payday loans are ‘rolled over’ or renewed rather than paid off resulting in very high total loan costs and placing many people into very difficult debt management situations (DeYoung *et al.*, 2015).

Problems of consumer protection are typically analyzed through two channels: naive or uneducated consumers and their failure to correctly anticipate fees and punishments (see Gabaix & Laibson (2006), Armstrong & Vickers (2012), and Akerlof & Shiller (2015) for related arguments), and bank’s moral hazard (see Dewatripont & Tirole (1999) and Oak & Swamy (2010)). We have argued that, given the growing evidence of time-inconsistent preferences,³² a bank’s ability to provide credible commitment should also fall under this umbrella—sometimes consumers *want* punishments or fees to limit renegotiation.

In recent years, especially in light of crises in consumer credit markets, there has been renewed emphasis on consumer protection and better governance and regulation in bank-

³¹The same argument applies if banks can costlessly renegotiate other bank’s contracts.

³²See, for example, Laibson *et al.* (2003), Ashraf *et al.* (2006), Gugerty (2007), and Tanaka *et al.* (2010).

ing.³³ One particular outcome of concern has been borrower over-indebtedness, an issue that has been at the center of recent microfinance repayment crises in places as far-flung as Morocco, Bosnia, Nicaragua and India, as well as the 2008 mortgage lending crisis in the United States. In each of these cases the issue of refinancing or the taking of loans from multiple lenders emerges.

Journalistic and scholarly analyses of such situations, including the recent mortgage crisis in the United States, have often framed the issues as problems of consumer protection, suggesting that many lenders designed products to purposefully take advantage of borrowers who have limited financial literacy skills and are naive about their self-control problems. Informed by such interpretations, new regulations introduced in the wake of these crises have swung toward restricting the terms of allowable contracts, for example by setting maximum interest rates and limiting the use of coercive loan recovery methods.

We place consumers' struggles with intertemporal self-control issues at the center of the analysis, but argue that borrowers may be more sophisticated in their understanding of their own time-inconsistency than is often assumed. From this perspective, 'predatory lending' is not primarily about tricking naive borrowers into paying more than they signed up for with hidden penalties or misleading interest rates quotes, but about offering excessive flexibility and refinancing of financial contracts in ways that limit or undermine the commitments to long term consumption and debt management paths that borrowers themselves may be attempting to put in place.³⁴

Here, a bank that promises to be rigid and is then flexible could be seen as hurting, rather than helping, the consumer. We take seriously the bank's ex-post considerations and derive conditions under which it would renegotiate.

In this sense, our paper complements some others that demonstrate how commitment can be undone in related settings. [Gottlieb \(2008\)](#) shows how competition leads to inefficient outcomes in immediate rewards goods. [Heidhues & Koszegi \(2010\)](#) study the mistakes of partially naive borrowers in competitive credit markets. [Mendez \(2012\)](#) analyzes predatory lending with naive consumers.

³³In the US, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau was set up in 2011 under the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. In India, the far-reaching Micro Finance Institutions Development and Regulation Bill of 2012 was designed to increase government oversight of MFIs in response to the credit crisis in the state of Andhra Pradesh, and the perception that lax consumer protection and aggressive lending practices had led to rising over-indebtedness and stress.

³⁴[Bond *et al.* \(2009\)](#) discuss evidence of predatory lending in the context of mortgages. In 2016 the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau put forth a proposal to protect payday loan consumers including limits on the number and frequency of re-borrowings ([CFPB, 2016](#)).

7.2 Commercial Non-profits in Finance

The idea that firm ownership might be strategically chosen to solve or ameliorate ‘contract failure’ problems dates back at least to [Arrow \(1963\)](#) and is one that has been articulated most clearly in the work of Henry [Hansmann \(1996\)](#). Hansmann argued that in markets where the quality of a product or service might be difficult to verify, clients may rationally fear that investor-led firms will be tempted to opportunistically skimp on the quality of a promised product or service, or reveal a hidden fee, and this can greatly reduce or even eliminate contracting. In such circumstances becoming a ‘commercial non-profit’ may be a costly but necessary way to commit the firm to not act opportunistically, hence enabling trade.

Hansmann gives as a primary historical example the development of consumer saving, lending and insurance products in the United States and Europe. Life insurance in the United States for example has until quite recently always been dominated by mutuals. Rate payers could not trust investor-led firms to not act opportunistically by, for example, increasing premiums or by skimping or reneging on death benefit payouts. Mutuals on the other hand had little incentive to cheat clients to increase shareholder dividends as the clients themselves are the only shareholders. Mutuals therefore enjoyed a distinct competitive advantage until sufficient state regulatory capacity developed.

In our analysis we began by following Hansmann in defining nonprofits by the legal restrictions faced by them, setting aside other ways (such as motivation) in which they might be different from for-profit firms.³⁵ In this view “[a] nonprofit organization is, in essence, an organization that is barred from distributing its net earnings, if any, to individuals who exercise control over it, such as members, officers, directors, or trustees.”³⁶ [Glaeser & Shleifer \(2001\)](#) have formalized Hansmann’s central argument to show that when a firm cannot commit to maintaining high quality, it might choose to operate as a commercial nonprofit rather than as an investor-led for-profit in order to credibly signal that it has weaker incentives to cheat the consumer on aspects of unobserved product quality. As Hansmann describes it, firm ownership form adapts endogenously as a “crude form of consumer protection” in unregulated emerging markets where asymmetric information problems are rife. [Bubb & Kaufman \(2013\)](#) modify this model so that the non-contractible quality issue is on hidden penalties, which are incurred with certainty by some borrowers. All of these models are built rely on some form of asymmetric information or contract verification problem.

³⁵Hence we abstract away from other considerations for nonprofits, as in [Besley & Ghatak \(2005\)](#), [McIntosh & Wydick \(2005\)](#), and [Guha & Roy Chowdhury \(2013\)](#). Nonetheless our modeling framework could be adapted to include these considerations.

³⁶In practice, nonprofit firms also enjoy certain benefits that are denied to for-profit firms (see, for example, [Cohen, 2015](#)). But for the purposes of Hansmann’s (and our) argument, it is the *restrictions*, not benefits, that generate improved outcomes.

A contribution of our paper is to argue that a theory of ownership form can be built on behavioral micro-foundations even in environments with no asymmetric information and with sophisticated forward-looking agents. We believe this is an important element for understanding the development of consumer finance in developed countries historically as well as the current shape of microfinance today where non-profit and ‘hybrid’ forms still dominate the sector in most developing countries (Cull *et al.* , 2009; Conning & Morduch, 2011). Hybrid ownership forms include the many microfinance firms that, though technically incorporated as for-profit financial service providers, are in fact dominated by boards where, by design, social investors or client representatives exert substantial governance control. Hybrid forms such as these would appear to confer many of the benefits of non-profit status (specifically, credible commitment to consumer protection) with fewer of the costs (in particular, unlike a pure non-profit they can and do issue stock to outside investors although usually in a manner that does not lead to challenge control).

7.3 Market Structure and Governance Choice

Commenting upon a major microfinance crisis in the state of Andhra Pradesh in India, veteran microfinance investor and market analyst Elizabeth Rhyne (2011) describes the build up of “rising debt stress among possibly tens of thousands of clients, brought on by explosive growth of microfinance organizations . . .” fueled by the rapid inflow of directed private lending and new equity investors who, because they “paid dearly for shares in [newly privatized] MFIs . . . needed fast growth to make their investments pay off .”

She goes on to lay the blame on “poor governance frameworks” for behaviors that included “loan officers [that] often sell loans to clients already indebted to other organizations.” In her view, Indian MFIs might have avoided their problems and followed the model of leading microfinance organizations in other countries like Mibanco (Peru) and Bancosol (Bolivia) which “were commercialized with a mix of owners including the original non-governmental organization (NGO), international social investors (including development banks), and some local shareholders. The NGOs kept the focus on the mission, while the international social investors contributed a commercial orientation, also tempered by social mission.” These are the types of hybrid ownership forms, along with nonprofit firms, that we argue can provide surplus building consumer protection through a reduced incentive to renegotiate. Rhyne’s argument is that a number of Indian state regulations made it difficult for such hybrid ownership forms to rise organically in India. As our model makes clear, these governance choices are highly dependent on market structure, and nonprofits may survive better under monopoly than under competition.

8 Conclusion

The starting point for this paper is the observation that the solution to any commitment problem must also address a renegotiation problem. We show how the renegotiation problem depends on costs of renegotiation and how it changes contract terms in sometimes unexpected ways. In this context, we also provide a rationalization of commercial nonprofits in the absence of asymmetric information.

We argue that the model sheds some light on trends in microfinance, payday lending, and mortgage lending. We hope this paper also offers a framework that can be built upon. The incorporation of additional ‘real-world’ factors could improve our understanding of particular institutions and generate empirically relevant comparative statics. Examples of these include nondeterministic incomes, private and heterogeneous types, collateral and strategic default, and longer time horizons.

Furthermore, the analysis could be expanded to heterogeneous populations. For instance, how might a monopoly’s governance choices be affected when it serves a market that comprises both naive and sophisticated hyperbolic discounters? With sophisticates, the firm would prefer high renegotiation costs while with sophisticates, it would prefer that the same costs be low.

In this paper, we make the simplifying assumption that new contracts can only be signed in period 0. This assumption is inconsequential under competition but matters for monopoly. As a result of the assumption, in the profit maximization problem the consumer’s outside option is the same as her autarky consumption. This streamlines the analysis but could easily be lifted without altering the intuition of the model. If fresh contracts could be signed in future periods, the consumer’s participation constraint would have to take these into account. Basu (2020) shows that the possibility of future contracts can affect current participation constraints in some subtle ways—the outside option is not monotonic in autarky utility and could be strictly better or strictly worse than autarky. However, for the purposes of this paper, given an outside option, even if its relationship to autarky is complex, the optimization problems remain as specified.

Finally, the differences between monopoly and competition open up some new, potentially interesting questions. How does market structure evolve and what are the implications for commitment? And through this evolution might there emerge third parties to contracts between consumers and banks that can more effectively enforce the commitment that is sought after on both sides of the market?

A Appendix: CRRA Derivations and Proofs

A.1 Full-commitment

A.1.1 Competition

Combining the first-order conditions (8) and the budget constraint (6) of the utility maximization problem, the competitive full-smoothing commitment contract C_0^F is:

$$C_0^F = \left(\frac{y}{1 + 2\beta^{\frac{1}{\rho}}} \right) \cdot \left(1, \beta^{\frac{1}{\rho}}, \beta^{\frac{1}{\rho}} \right) \quad (41)$$

A.1.2 Monopoly

For the monopolist bank that offers full-commitment, the solution is determined by the first-order condition and the consumer's participation constraint:

$$C_0^{mF} = \left(\frac{U_0^A (1 - \rho)}{1 + 2\beta^{\frac{1}{\rho}}} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\rho}} \cdot \left(1, \beta^{\frac{1}{\rho}}, \beta^{\frac{1}{\rho}} \right) \quad (42)$$

$$\Pi_0 (C_0^{mF}; Y_0) = y - (U_0^A (1 - \rho))^{\frac{1}{1-\rho}} \left(1 + 2\beta^{\frac{1}{\rho}} \right)^{\frac{-\rho}{1-\rho}} \quad (43)$$

It can easily be verified that $C_0^F > C_0^{mF}$.

A.2 The no-renegotiation constraint

Consider any existing continuation contract C_1^0 . The competitively renegotiated contract (most beneficial to the consumer) will be:

$$C_1^1 (C_1^0) = \left(\frac{c_1^0 + c_2^0 - \kappa}{1 + \beta^{\frac{1}{\rho}}} \right) \cdot \left(1, \beta^{\frac{1}{\rho}} \right) \quad (44)$$

The condition to make sure the consumer will neither propose nor accept this most favorable renegotiated is

$$U(C_1^1 (C_1^0)) \leq U(C_1^0) \quad (45)$$

Substituting 44 into this and re-arranging allows us to write the no-renegotiation constraint as the condition:

$$u(c_1^0) + \beta u(c_2^0) \geq (1 + \beta^{\frac{1}{\rho}}) u \left(\frac{c_1^0 + c_2^0 - \kappa}{1 + \beta^{\frac{1}{\rho}}} \right) \quad (46)$$

The same no-renegotiation constraint can be derived starting from the assumption of period 1 monopoly. The most favorable renegotiation for the monopolist is:

$$C_1^{m1}(C_1^0) = \left(\frac{(c_1^0)^{1-\rho} + \beta(c_2^0)^{1-\rho}}{1 + \beta^{\frac{1}{\rho}}} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\rho}} \cdot (1, \beta^{\frac{1}{\rho}}) \quad (47)$$

The contract will not be renegotiated so long as the profits gains to this most favorable renegotiation fall short of renegotiation costs:

$$\Pi_1(C_1^{m1}(C_1^0); C_1^0) = (c_1^0 + c_2^0 - \kappa) - ((c_1^0)^{1-\rho} + \beta(c_2^0)^{1-\rho})^{\frac{1}{1-\rho}} (1 + \beta^{\frac{1}{\rho}})^{\frac{-\rho}{1-\rho}} \leq \kappa \quad (48)$$

This can be rearranged to yield the same condition as (46).

A.2.1 No-renegotiation condition

Substituting from 48 in the no-renegotiation condition (17), we get the following explicit no-renegotiation condition:

$$u(c_1^0) + \beta u(c_2^0) \leq u \left(\frac{c_1^0 + c_2^0 - \kappa}{1 + \beta^{\frac{1}{\rho}}} \right) (1 + \beta^{\frac{1}{\rho}}) \quad (49)$$

This condition applies identically whether contract renegotiation happens under competition or monopoly.

A.2.2 No-renegotiation condition for full-smoothing contracts

Setting $c_1^0 = c_2^0$ in the no-renegotiation constraint (49) above we can re-arrange the constraint as:

$$\kappa \geq c_1^0 \cdot \Upsilon \quad (50)$$

where

$$\Upsilon = \left[2 - \left[\frac{(1 + \beta)}{\left(1 + \beta^{\frac{1}{\rho}}\right)^\rho} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\rho}} \right] \quad (51)$$

A.3 Imperfect-Smoothing Commitment Contracts

Redefine any consumption stream in the following manner:

$$C_0 = (c_0, c_1, c_2) \equiv (c_0, \alpha s, (1 - \alpha) s) \quad (52)$$

so that c_1 and c_2 are expressed as shares of total future consumption s . Since the no-renegotiation constraint places restrictions on the relative values of c_1 and c_2 , we can rewrite the constraint (49) using the new notation to get a continuous function $\alpha(s)$, which determines the minimum fraction of any s that must be offered to One-self to prevent renegotiation:

$$(s) \left(1 - \left(\alpha^{1-\rho} + \beta (1-\alpha)^{1-\rho} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\rho}} \left(1 + \beta^{\frac{1}{\rho}} \right)^{\frac{-\rho}{1-\rho}} \right) \leq \kappa \quad (53)$$

Observe that at One-self's optimal division of s , $\left(c_2 = \beta^{\frac{1}{\rho}} c_1 \iff \alpha = \frac{1}{1+\beta^{\frac{1}{\rho}}} \right)$, there cannot be profit gains from renegotiation so the constraint will be slack. For any s , there may be two values of α that satisfy the constraint with equality—one with α smaller than One-self would like (lower boundary), and another with α larger than One-self would like (upper boundary). Assuming the full-smoothing contract does not satisfy the constraint, the second-best contract must lie on the lower boundary. This defines a continuous function $\alpha(s)$, which determines the minimum fraction of any s that must be offered to One-self to prevent renegotiation.

$$\alpha(s) = \min \left\{ \alpha : (s) \left(1 - \left(\alpha^{1-\rho} + \beta (1-\alpha)^{1-\rho} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\rho}} \left(1 + \beta^{\frac{1}{\rho}} \right)^{\frac{-\rho}{1-\rho}} \right) = \kappa \right\} \quad (54)$$

It can easily be verified that $\alpha'(s) > 0$ (profits from renegotiation rise in s , so if s rises there must be an increase in the share allocated to One-self to compensate). Implicitly differentiating the binding no-renegotiation constraint by s , we have:

$$\frac{d\alpha}{ds} = \left(\frac{k}{s^2} \right) \left(\frac{1 + \beta^{\frac{1}{\rho}}}{\alpha^{1-\rho} + \beta (1-\alpha)^{1-\rho}} \right)^{\frac{\rho}{1-\rho}} \left(\frac{1}{\alpha^{-\rho} - \beta (1-\alpha)^{-\rho}} \right) \quad (55)$$

The terms in the first two sets of parentheses are always positive. The last term is positive when the no-renegotiation constraint is binding (One-self would ideally like $\alpha^{-\rho} = \beta (1-\alpha)^{-\rho}$ but if $\kappa > 0$ she has to settle for $\alpha^{-\rho} > \beta (1-\alpha)^{-\rho}$).

Finally, for any s and α , let

$$V(s, \alpha) \equiv \beta [u(\alpha s) + u((1-\alpha)s)] \quad (56)$$

This is the discounted utility over periods 1 and 2, from period 0's perspective. It will be useful to note that the first-order conditions of the full-smoothing contract problems (competition and monopoly) can be written as:

$$\frac{du(c_0)}{dc_0} = \frac{dV(s, \frac{1}{2})}{ds} \quad (57)$$

A.3.1 Sophisticated Hyperbolic Discounters

Proof of Proposition 2: (i) Since the full-commitment profit-maximizing contract was uniquely determined, and since it does not satisfy the renegotiation-proofness constraint, the renegotiation-proof contract must yield lower profits than the full-commitment contract does.

(ii) Using the modified notation, the full-smoothing contract terms are c_0^{mF} and s^{mF} , with $\alpha^{mF} = \frac{1}{2}$. The imperfect-smoothing contract terms are c_0^{mP} and s^{mP} , with $\alpha^{mP} = \alpha(s^{mP})$. Suppose $c_0^{mP} \leq c_0^{mF}$. Then, to satisfy Zero-self's participation constraint,

$$V(s^{mP}, \alpha(s^{mP})) \geq V\left(s^{mF}, \frac{1}{2}\right) \quad (58)$$

$$\Rightarrow s^{mP} \geq s^{mF} \left[\frac{\left(\frac{1}{2}\right)^{1-\rho} + \left(\frac{1}{2}\right)^{1-\rho}}{(\alpha^{mP})^{1-\rho} + (1 - \alpha^{mP})^{1-\rho}} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\rho}} \quad (59)$$

Differentiating $V(s^{mP}, \alpha^{mP})$, we get the following inequalities:³⁷

$$\frac{dV(s^{mP}, \alpha^{mP})}{ds} = \frac{\partial V(s^{mP}, \alpha^{mP})}{\partial s} + \frac{\partial V(s^{mP}, \alpha^{mP})}{\partial \alpha} \frac{d\alpha^{mP}}{ds} \quad (60)$$

$$< \frac{\partial V(s^{mP}, \alpha^{mP})}{\partial s} \quad (61)$$

$$= \beta(s^{mP})^{-\rho} [(\alpha^{mP})^{1-\rho} + (1 - \alpha^{mP})^{1-\rho}] \quad (62)$$

$$\leq \beta(s^{mF})^{-\rho} \left[\frac{(\frac{1}{2})^{1-\rho} + (\frac{1}{2})^{1-\rho}}{(\alpha^{mP})^{1-\rho} + (1 - \alpha^{mP})^{1-\rho}} \right]^{\frac{-\rho}{1-\rho}} [(\alpha^{mP})^{1-\rho} + (1 - \alpha^{mP})^{1-\rho}] \quad (63)$$

$$= \beta(s^{mF})^{-\rho} \left[\left(\frac{1}{2} \right)^{1-\rho} + \left(\frac{1}{2} \right)^{1-\rho} \right] \left[\frac{(\alpha^{mP})^{1-\rho} + (1 - \alpha^{mP})^{1-\rho}}{(\frac{1}{2})^{1-\rho} + (\frac{1}{2})^{1-\rho}} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\rho}} \quad (64)$$

$$< \beta(s^{mF})^{-\rho} \left[\left(\frac{1}{2} \right)^{1-\rho} + \left(\frac{1}{2} \right)^{1-\rho} \right] \quad (65)$$

$$= \frac{dV(s^{mF}, \alpha^{mF})}{ds} \quad (66)$$

$$= \frac{du(c_0^{mF})}{dc_0^{mF}} \quad (67)$$

$$\leq \frac{du(c_0^{mP})}{dc_0^{mP}} \quad (68)$$

Since $\frac{dV(s^{mP}, \alpha^{mP})}{ds} < \frac{du(c_0^{mP})}{dc_0^{mP}}$, this contract cannot be profit maximizing for the monopolist (it could do better by reallocating consumption away towards Zero-self). This contradiction implies that our assumption is incorrect. It must be true that at the profit-maximizing imperfect-smoothing contract, $c_0^{mP} > c_0^{mF}$. \square

Proof of Proposition 3: (i) We know that $U_0(C_0^F) = U_0^F$. By assumption, since the renegotiation-proofness constraint is binding, the renegotiation-proof contract cannot offer the optimal consumption path. Therefore $U_0(C_0^P) < U_0(C_0^F)$.

(ii) At the full-commitment contract:

$$\frac{du(c_0^F)}{dc_0} = \frac{dV(s^F, \frac{1}{2})}{ds} = (s^F)^{-\rho} \left(2 \left(\frac{1}{2} \right)^{1-\rho} \right) \quad (69)$$

³⁷An explanation of the steps: Line 61 follows from the fact that $\alpha(s)$ rises in s (derived from Equation 54) and V falls as α rises, making the allocation worse from Zero-self's perspective. Line 63 follows from Inequality 59. Line 67 follows from the FOC of the monopolist's profit-maximization problem with full-smoothing contracts.

Consider a renegotiation-proof contract with $c_0 = c_0^F$. To keep bank profits zero, this contract would also have $s = s^F$. But in the renegotiation-proof contract, s must be divided according to $\alpha(s^F)$. So:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{dV(s^F, \alpha(s^F))}{ds} &= (s^F)^{-\rho} \left(\alpha(s^F)^{1-\rho} + (1 - \alpha(s^F))^{1-\rho} \right) \\ &\quad + \frac{d\alpha(s^F)}{ds} (s^F)^{1-\rho} \left(\alpha(s^F)^{-\rho} - (1 - \alpha(s^F))^{-\rho} \right) \end{aligned} \quad (70)$$

The first term—the direct effect of a change in s —is weakly less than $\frac{dV(s^F, \frac{1}{2})}{ds}$ if $\rho \leq 1$ and strictly greater if $\rho > 1$. The second term—the component of $\frac{dV}{ds}$ that is driven by the change in α —is strictly negative. Therefore, if $\rho < 1$, $\frac{dV(s^F, \alpha(s^F))}{ds} < \frac{dV(s^F, \frac{1}{2})}{ds} = \frac{du(c_0^F)}{dc}$, so the renegotiation-proof contract must satisfy $c_0^P > c_0^F$.

Next, we consider the case when $\rho > 1$. We can make the following observations about $\alpha(s)$. First, $\lim_{\kappa \rightarrow 0} \alpha(s) = \frac{\beta^{-\frac{1}{\rho}}}{1 + \beta^{-\frac{1}{\rho}}}$. Second, implicitly differentiating equation 53 with respect to s , and combining it with the previous limit result, we get $\lim_{\kappa \rightarrow 0} \frac{d\alpha(s)}{ds} = 0$. Therefore, if $\rho > 1$ and κ is small enough, the second term in Equation 70 will be sufficiently small in magnitude that $\frac{dV(s^F, \alpha(s^F))}{ds} > \frac{dV(s^F, \frac{1}{2})}{ds} = \frac{du(c_0^F)}{dc}$. In this case, the renegotiation-proof contract must satisfy $c_0^P < c_0^F$. \square

If $\kappa = 0$, the renegotiation-proof contracts can be explicitly derived since in any contract it must be true that $c_2 = \beta^{\frac{1}{\rho}} c_1$. Solving the respective maximization problems, we get the following equilibrium contracts for monopoly and competition, respectively:

$$C_0^{mP} = \left(\left(\frac{U_0^A (1 - \rho)}{1 + \beta^{\frac{1}{\rho}} \left(\frac{\left(1 + \beta^{\frac{1-\rho}{\rho}}\right)^{\frac{1}{\rho}}}{\left(1 + \beta^{\frac{1}{\rho}}\right)^{\frac{1-\rho}{\rho}}}\right)} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\rho}}, \left(\frac{\beta + \beta^{\frac{1}{\rho}}}{1 + \beta^{\frac{1}{\rho}}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\rho}} c_0^{mP}, \beta^{\frac{1}{\rho}} \left(\frac{\beta + \beta^{\frac{1}{\rho}}}{1 + \beta^{\frac{1}{\rho}}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\rho}} c_0^{mP} \right) \quad (71)$$

$$C_0^P = \left(\frac{y}{1 + \beta + \beta^{\frac{1}{\rho}}}, \left(\frac{\beta + \beta^{\frac{1}{\rho}}}{1 + \beta^{\frac{1}{\rho}}} \right) c_0^P, \beta^{\frac{1}{\rho}} \left(\frac{\beta + \beta^{\frac{1}{\rho}}}{1 + \beta^{\frac{1}{\rho}}} \right) c_0^P \right) \quad (72)$$

It can easily be established that $c_0^{mP} > c_0^{mF}$, $c_0^P > c_0^{mF}$ if $\rho > 1$, and $c_0^P < c_0^{mF}$ if $\rho < 1$.

A.3.2 Naive Hyperbolic Discounters

Suppose the monopolist intends to renegotiate the contract. The maximization problem, combined with the expression for $C_1^{m1}(C_1)$ (47), simplifies to:

$$\max_{c_0, c_1, c_2} y - c_0 - \frac{\left(c_1^{1-\rho} + \beta c_2^{1-\rho}\right)^{\frac{1}{1-\rho}}}{\left(1 + \beta^{\frac{1}{\rho}}\right)^{\frac{\rho}{1-\rho}}} - \kappa \quad (73)$$

$$s.t. \frac{c_0^{1-\rho}}{1-\rho} + \beta \frac{c_1^{1-\rho}}{1-\rho} + \beta \frac{c_2^{1-\rho}}{1-\rho} \geq U_0^A \quad (74)$$

The partial derivatives of the resulting Lagrangian are:

$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial c_0} = -1 - \lambda c_0^{-\rho} \quad (75)$$

$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial c_1} = c_1^{-\rho} \left[- \left(\frac{c_1^{1-\rho} + \beta c_2^{1-\rho}}{1 + \beta^{\frac{1}{\rho}}} \right)^{\frac{\rho}{1-\rho}} - \lambda \beta \right] \quad (76)$$

$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial c_2} = c_2^{-\rho} \left[-\beta \left(\frac{c_1^{1-\rho} + \beta c_2^{1-\rho}}{1 + \beta^{\frac{1}{\rho}}} \right)^{\frac{\rho}{1-\rho}} - \lambda \beta \right] \quad (77)$$

An interior solution, with $\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial c_1} = 0$ and $\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial c_2} = 0$ does not exist (on a $c_1 - c_2$ plot, the two first-order conditions do not intersect). If $\rho < 1$, the Lagrangian is maximized at a corner solution with $c_1 = 0$. If $\rho > 1$, the Lagrangian is maximized at the limit as c_2 approaches infinity. Using this, the maximization problem can be re-solved. If $\rho < 1$:

$$C_0^{mN} = \left(\left(\frac{U_0^A (1-\rho)}{2 + \beta^{\frac{1}{\rho}}} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\rho}}, 0, \left(\frac{1 + \beta^{\frac{1}{\rho}}}{\beta} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\rho}} \left(\frac{U_0^A (1-\rho)}{2 + \beta^{\frac{1}{\rho}}} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\rho}} \right) \quad (78)$$

If $\rho > 1$, the solution is undefined, but in the limit is given by:

$$C_0^{mN} = \left(\left(\frac{U_0^A (1-\rho)}{1 + \left(1 + \beta^{\frac{1}{\rho}}\right) \beta^{\frac{1}{\rho}}} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\rho}}, \beta^{\frac{1}{\rho}} \left(1 + \beta^{\frac{1}{\rho}}\right)^{\frac{1}{1-\rho}} \left(\frac{U_0^A (1-\rho)}{1 + \left(1 + \beta^{\frac{1}{\rho}}\right) \beta^{\frac{1}{\rho}}} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\rho}}, \infty \right) \quad (79)$$

Let us define profits from such a contract as:

$$\Pi_0^{mN} \equiv \Pi(C_0^{mN}; Y_0) + \Pi_1(C_1^{m1}(C_1^{mN}); C_1^{mN}) - \kappa$$

Proof of Proposition 4: (i) and (ii) are simultaneously established through the following observations. First, Π_0^{mN} is strictly falling in κ while $\Pi_0(C_0^{mF}; Y_0)$ is invariant in κ . Second,

at $\kappa = \bar{\kappa}^m$,

$$\Pi_0(C_0^{mF}; Y_0) = \Pi_0(C_0^{mF}; Y_0) + \Pi_1(C_1^{m1}(C_1^{mF}); C_1^{mF}) - \kappa < \Pi_0^{mN} \quad (80)$$

Third, if κ gets indefinitely large, $\Pi_0(C_0^{mF}; Y_0) > \Pi_0^{mN}$. Finally, it can be verified from the explicit derivations that $c_0^{mN} < c_0^{mF}$. \square

We now derive equilibrium contracts for naive consumers under perfect competition. Suppose contracts are exclusive. Then, a contract that is renegotiated satisfies:

$$\max_{c_0, c_1, c_2} \frac{c_0^{1-\rho}}{1-\rho} + \beta \frac{c_1^{1-\rho}}{1-\rho} + \beta \frac{c_2^{1-\rho}}{1-\rho} \quad (81)$$

$$s.t. y - c_0 - \frac{\left(c_1^{1-\rho} + \beta c_2^{1-\rho}\right)^{\frac{1}{1-\rho}}}{\left(1 + \beta^{\frac{1}{\rho}}\right)^{\frac{\rho}{1-\rho}}} - \kappa \geq 0 \quad (82)$$

The first-order conditions are the same as under monopoly (75, 76, 77). Combining these with the zero-profit constraint, we get the following solution. If $\rho < 1$:

$$C_0^N = \left(\frac{y - \kappa}{2 + \beta^{\frac{1}{\rho}}}, 0, \left(\frac{1 + \beta^{\frac{1}{\rho}}}{\beta} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\rho}} \left(\frac{y - \kappa}{2 + \beta^{\frac{1}{\rho}}} \right) \right) \quad (83)$$

If $\rho > 1$, the solution is undefined, but in the limit is given by:

$$C_0^N = \left(\frac{y - \kappa}{1 + \beta^{\frac{1}{\rho}} \left(1 + \beta^{\frac{1}{\rho}}\right)}, \beta^{\frac{1}{\rho}} \left(1 + \beta^{\frac{1}{\rho}}\right)^{\frac{1}{1-\rho}} \left(\frac{y - \kappa}{1 + \beta^{\frac{1}{\rho}} \left(1 + \beta^{\frac{1}{\rho}}\right)} \right), \infty \right) \quad (84)$$

Proof of Proposition 5:

(a) Under non-exclusive contracts, firms offering period 0 contracts do not benefit from renegotiation (profits from renegotiation will equal κ). So the equilibrium contract is the one that is arrived at without taking renegotiation into account—i.e. the full-commitment contract. If $\kappa < \bar{\kappa}$, the gains from renegotiation exceed the transaction costs, so the contract will be renegotiated.

(b) The following observations establish part (b). First, $U_0(C_0^N)$ is strictly falling in κ while $U_0(C_0^F)$ is invariant in κ . Second, at $\kappa = \bar{\kappa}$, $U_0(C_0^N) > U_0(C_0^F)$ (this must be true by construction of C_0^N). Third, if κ gets indefinitely large, $U_0(C_0^N) < U_0(C_0^F)$, so Zero-self will prefer the full-smoothing commitment contract over the renegotiable contract.

Suppose $\rho < 1$. Comparing C_0^F (41) to C_0^N (83), it is clear that $c_0^N < c_0^F$. Suppose $\rho > 1$. If κ is small enough, $c_0^N > c_0^F$. \square

A.4 Nonprofits

Proof of Proposition 6: (a) A non-profit will earn higher raw profits Π than a for-profit. If $f(\Pi(C_0^{mNP}; Y_0)) \geq \Pi(C_0^{mP}; Y_0)$ (i.e. if the captured profit function has a slope sufficiently close to 1 up to $\Pi(C_0^{mNP}; Y_0)$), the firm will choose to operate as a nonprofit.

(b) (i) Suppose all firms are for-profit and offer the renegotiation-proof contract C_0^P . There is some ε_1 and ε_2 satisfying $0 < \varepsilon_2 < \varepsilon_1$ and a corresponding $\hat{C}_0 = (c_0^P, c_1^P - \varepsilon_1, c_2^P + \varepsilon_2)$ such that $U_0(\hat{C}_0) = U_0(C_0^P)$ and

$$f(\Pi_0(\hat{C}_0; Y_0) + \Pi_1(C_1^{m1}(\hat{C}_1); \hat{C}_1)) < \kappa$$

So, any firm can make positive profits by operating as a non-profit. Therefore, in equilibrium, consumers will borrow only from non-profit firms.

(ii) If all firms are nonprofit, an individual firm has a strict incentive to switch to for-profit status, and make profits in period 1. Therefore, there must be for-profits in equilibrium, and equilibrium contracts will be constrained by their presence. \square

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