Determinants of Arab Public Opinion on Foreign Relations

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Using Zogby International polling data from seven different Arab nations (Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates) this paper offers a societal-level quantitative analysis ($N = 91$ dyads) of the determinants of Arab public opinion toward 13 different non-Arab countries (Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Iran, Israel, Japan, Pakistan, Russia, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States). We first explore whether Arab public opinion toward these countries is predicted by general "realist," "liberal," "Marxist," and/or "cultural" hypotheses suggested in the IR/ foreign policy literature. After finding few statistically significant relationships among these variables, we present evidence that Arab publics evaluate non-Arab countries on the basis of those countries' specific foreign policy behaviors throughout the wider Middle East (e.g., especially those behaviors affecting Palestine and Iraq). Noting that these evaluations occur in the context of competing identity frames, we provisionally link Arab publics' concerns with "regional" matters to the high salience of "Arabist" identity among respondents to the Zogby survey.

Particularly since September 11, 2001, American political commentators have speculated widely on the sources of apparent Arab resentment toward the United States (Kifner 2001; Friedman 2002a, 2002b, 2003; Khalidi 2002; Kristof 2002; Sardar & Davies 2002; Wright 2002; Telhami 2003a; Waterbury 2003). In so doing, these observers sometimes cite unique aspects of U.S. policy, including, first and foremost, the longstanding special relationship between the U.S. and Israel (Telhami 2001). At other times, however, the commentators echo a variety of more generalizable hypotheses about enmity and rivalry familiar to scholars of international relations, political psychology and foreign policy opinion (Mearsheimer 1990; Russett 1993; Huntington 1993, 1996; Holsti 1996; Sulfaro and Crislip 1997; Russett and Oneal 2001; Krauthammer 2002; Roger 2002; Wallerstein 2002; Joffe 2003; Kagan 2003). In this paper, we first offer a preliminary test of six of these sorts of hypotheses, examining Arab attitudes toward the United States in the

context of Arab attitudes toward foreign countries more generally. Some of these hypotheses pertain to characteristics of the Arab countries themselves, many others to characteristics of the countries that may be objects of Arab resentment, and the rest to dyadic relationships between the two. We conclude that *none* of these general theories of enmity and rivalry finds support in our data.

We argue instead that "middle-range" explanations of Arab opinion toward the outside world appear most persuasive and, specifically, that Arab publics evaluate non-Arab countries based in large part on their relatively recent foreign policy actions throughout the Middle East. Although this finding, that specific foreign policy actions drive opinion, is broadly in keeping with Hans Morgenthau's traditional view that the major determinants of foreign policy opinion are "national," the situation in Arab countries is complicated by competing visions of what the most relevant national community is. We explore how multiple identity frames compete within the Arab world, including Arab nationalism, more country-centered nationalisms, and Islamist identifications. As the Zogby poll finds a relatively strong leaning toward the "Arabist" identity frame among respondents, we link the prevalence of this type of identity to consensus among Arab publics regarding the behavior of non-Arab countries in the wider Middle East and, in particular, their policies regarding Palestine and Iraq. We do, however, find variation among different Arab societies in their evaluations of certain non-Arab countries asked about in the Zogby study, suggesting that Arab attitudes on foreign relations are by no means monolithic.

Method

We base our analysis on the Zogby International "Arab Values Survey" carried out in March and April of 2002 (Zogby 2002:61). The survey was conducted using face-to-face interviews in what we henceforth refer to as seven Arab "subject" countries. Specifically, 600 adults per country were surveyed in Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, and 400 adults per country were surveyed in Morocco, Lebanon, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates. After dividing each county into geographic regions, participants within each region were selected at random (Zogby 2002:99). Zogby does, however, concede that the regional sampling frames themselves tended to over-represent urban populations and, in turn, "those [individuals] more likely to be literate with more access to both satellite televisions and the Internet" (Zogby 2002:99). Although we thus caution that members of the "attentive" public are somewhat overrepresented in these data, this is of course often the case with survey data from the Global South (i.e., if not due to coverage errors induced by sampling frames, then due to high levels of non-response among uneducated rural respondents). All in all then, we are about equally confident in the quality of the data collected by Zogby as we are in that collected by other internationally respected organizations operating in the Global South (e.g., Gallup, Pew, and the World Values Study Group).[1]

The Zogby survey contains many questions pertaining to personal as well as political matters, but the primary item that we analyze concerns Arab attitudes toward 13 non-Arab "object" countries. Specifically, respondents in each of the "subject" countries were asked to answer the following question:

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[1] The margin of error for the country surveys ranges between ± 4–6%. Although Zogby only surveys seven of 18 Arab countries, the sample draws from over 50% of the population of the Arab world. Despite the authoritarian nature of Arab governments, we find no empirical evidence that respondents failed to state their true preferences on foreign relations. Rather, the high degree of in-country variation in attitudes on foreign relations, as well as the clear willingness of respondents to offer negative evaluations of countries with which their own governments possess security ties (see below), lead us to believe that respondents felt little or no state pressure to answer the questions here analyzed in a particular way.

> Interviewer: "I will read you a list of countries. Please tell me if your overall impression of each is either very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable, or if you are not familiar enough to form a judgment."

The object countries in the Zogby study were chosen on the basis of their regional and/or global political significance. They are Russia, China, the United States, France, India, Israel, Pakistan, Iran, Japan, Turkey, Canada, Germany, and the U.K. Although some might prefer a random selection of object countries, the countries do vary in significant ways, both in terms of the predictors of Arab opinion that we examine and in terms of that opinion itself (i.e., in the extent to which they are positively regarded by Arab publics).

Specifically, the dependent variable in our analysis, AFFECT, represents the percentage of respondents in a given subject country that express either "very" or "somewhat" favorable feelings toward a given object country. We compute this variable in regard to 91 different subject country/object country "dyads" (e.g., "Lebanese attitudes toward France") based on the fact that Zogby conducted surveys in seven Arab "subject" countries and asked about attitudes toward 13 foreign "object" countries in each of these surveys (i.e., $7 \times 13 = 91$). Subject country affect toward object countries varies from a low of 2 (representing chilly Kuwaiti and Emirati attitudes toward Israel) to a high of 79 (representing warm Kuwaiti attitudes toward Iran).[2] The mean affect score for all 13 object countries across the seven subject countries surveyed is 43.2 with a standard deviation of 19.4. We now evaluate six "general" theories of threat perception, enmity, and rivalry as predictors of Arab attitudes on foreign relations. Although these theories are often competing, all are grounded in either the "realist," "liberal," "Marxist," and/or "cultural" schools of IR scholarship.

General Hypotheses

Throughout the Cold War, most realist scholars of international politics assumed that analysts could ignore the extent to which publics participate in the enmities and rivalries of their political leaders.[3] Noting an apparent rise in "hyper-nationalism" and "mass hate" after the Cold War, however, many realists have subsequently changed their minds. Perhaps due to the relative infrequency of interstate war in the early post-Cold War era, proponents of the "neorealist" view that balances of power promote peace have seemed particularly eager to "bring public opinion back in." Beginning with John Mearsheimer, realists who see the current international distribution of power as unstable have argued that even if power preponderance promotes peace in the short term, imbalances of power between countries breed long-lasting hatreds and resentments that may ultimately lead to violent conflict (Mearsheimer 1990; Roger 2002; Joffe 2003; Kagan 2003). In other words, "weak countries will always resent and seek to topple the strong." In contrast, "power transition theorists," who see power preponderance as stability-enhancing, suggest that only when weaker countries begin to perceive strong countries as weakening is the door opened to military challenges (Blainey 1973; Organski and Kugler 1980; Gilpin 1981; Krauthammer 2002). Put another way, "the weak will always respect the strong." By examining how, if at all, a state's military capabilities impact perceptions of that country abroad, we can simultane-

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[2] Notably, these outliers are only partly suggestive of patterns in the sample as a whole.

[3] As Kenneth Waltz argued in 1959, for example, the fact that popular "peace wishes" may have run strong among both the Soviet and American peoples during the Cold War seemed to do little to reduce Cold War–era security competition between the U.S. and USSR (Waltz 1959:3). Other Cold War–era realists such as Hans Morgenthau and E.H. Carr were of course more interested in public opinion, yet their views were seemingly less influential on scholarship of the period.

ously and systematically test both of these claims. We formalize this test via Hypothesis 1.

Hypothesis 1: *Positive attitudes expressed by citizens of State A toward State B are systematically related to the distribution of military capabilities between the two states.*

We operationalize Hypothesis 1 in multiple ways. Typically, IR scholars calculate a "capabilities ratio" for a dyad by taking the six-item "capabilities score" for the stronger of two countries in the Correlates of War (COW) data sets and dividing it by the capabilities score of the weaker country (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972).[4] We likewise calculate this conventional indicator of the "capabilities ratio" for each dyad in the traditional manner, using data on capabilities updated through 2001 by the authors of the EUGene statistical software package (Bennett and Stam 2000). Note, however, that Hypothesis 1 technically refers to a "directed-dyad" relationship in regard to public attitudes on the part of the weaker member of a dyad. Thus, although our Arab subject countries have lower capabilities scores than the object countries that their publics are asked about in 89 out of 91 cases (the only two exceptions being the Egypt–Israel dyad and the Saudi Arabia–Israel dyad), we also calculate a directed capabilities measure of "object-country preponderance," which consists of the ratio of the object-country's capabilities score to that of the subject country. Finally, we create a variable measuring "object-country capability" in *absolute* terms, in order to test for the possibility that strong countries will be respected or resented by subject countries irrespective of the ratio of power between them.

To note that realists are increasingly attentive to societal-level nationalism and resentment is not to deny that many realists see societal enmity as an "epiphenomenal" product of the strategic action of state elites. In this vein, a second broadly realist hypothesis posits that malleable publics can be made to express suitably favorable attitudes toward any and all foreign countries with which state leaders determine that their security interests compel them to ally. To cite only one particularly famous example, Henry Kissinger and other realists have celebrated FDR's adroitness in responding to shifting strategic needs by manipulating U.S. public opinion toward Germany and the U.S.S.R. in various directions over the course of his presidency (Kissinger 1994). On the other hand, the claim that the "Arab Street" has proven highly resistant to similar attempts on the part of Arab state elites is no less familiar. Indeed, some commentators go so far as to suggest that insofar as Arab publics view their own governments as oppressive, they will systematically *resent* precisely those countries with which their governments possess security ties (Wright 2002). We formalize both of these competing claims via Hypothesis 2.

Hypothesis 2: *Positive attitudes expressed by citizens of State A toward State B are systematically related to security ties between the two states.*

To operationalize Hypothesis 2, we again utilize the EUGene software package to create a dummy variable for the presence of any of the various types of alliances coded in the most recent update of the Correlates of War alliance data (Bennett and Stam 2000). Perhaps tellingly, however, none of the 91 dyads in our data set involves two states coded as having any sort of alliance by COW. (Without further analysis, we can thus reject the hypothesis that variation in AFFECT is explained by security ties so defined.) In order to test Hypothesis 2 a bit more generously, however, we also created a dummy variable "security ties" that we coded "1" for the

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[4] The six equally weighted components of a country's capabilities or CINC "Composite Index of Military Capabilities" score are total population, urban population, energy consumption, iron and steel production, military expenditures, and military personnel (Singer et al. 1972).

20 dyads for which we found government and/or press reports of informal agreements and/or joint security exercises in the three years before the survey.

"Liberal" scholars of international politics have proposed numerous hypotheses about the relationship of public opinion to foreign policy. For the purposes of this particular study, though, only one such hypothesis seems directly relevant.[5] Namely, many liberals suggest that through its tendency to promote amity or "fellow-feeling" among societies, economic interdependence between states promotes dyadic peace. Although some liberals view the profits from trade and investment accruing to capitalist elites as alone sufficient to pacify dyadic relations, the most prominent among them argue that trade exercises much of its pacifying effect because it leads to "mutual respect" among trading societies (see Doyle 1983; Russett and Oneal 2001). We formalize this liberal claim *via* Hypothesis 3.[6]

Hypothesis 3: *Positive attitudes expressed by citizens of State A toward State B constitute a mark-up on levels of economic interdependence between the two states.*

The most commonly utilized COW data set on dyadic trade likewise presents problems for the operationalization of Hypothesis 3, in that, thus far, it has only been updated through 1992.[7] Luckily, our relatively small sample of 91 dyads makes it possible for us to compute 2001 trade statistics for each of our pairs of countries. Specifically, we operationalize Hypothesis 3 by calculating two variables. The first variable, "gross dyadic trade," consists of the sum of exports and imports between the subject country and the object country as reported in the 2002 *IMF Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook* (IMF 2002). The second variable, "Gross Domestic Product (GDP)-adjusted dyadic trade," is calculated by dividing this figure by the relevant subject country's GDP.[8]

"Marxist" and "dependency school" scholars of international relations also suggest at least one hypothesis relevant to the present analysis.[9] Contrary to liberals, Marxists argue that *asymmetric* trade between countries may lead to resentment within a dyad insofar as one country within a dyad is disadvantaged by the terms of that trade. The claim that trade dependence fuels resentment of foreign exporters can, of course, be applied to northern publics (e.g., it is often adduced in explaining the American public's resentment of Japan in the 1980s and 1990s), but Marxists most frequently articulate this claim in regard to "neo-colonial" dependencies suffered by countries in the Global South (Sardar and Davies 2002; Wallerstein 2002). With Hypothesis 4, we test the claim that trade dependence on the part of Arab countries influences attitudes toward the foreign countries on which they depend.

Hypothesis 4: *Negative attitudes expressed by citizens of state A toward state B constitute a mark-up on A's level of import dependence on B.*

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[5] The relatively robust hypothesis that joint democracy promotes dyadic peace, for example, is not straight-forwardly related to our present study of attitudes in Arab subject countries (none of which was coded as democratic in either the "Polity" or "Freedom House" data sets as of 2002).

[6] Foreign direct investment between societies (FDI) may also have pacifying effects, but data on FDI are much less readily available than data on trade. See Russett and Oneal (2001) for an argument that due to the prominence of intra-industry trade, trade data are nonetheless a fair proxy for overall economic links between societies. A simultaneous relationship between economic links and positive affect is also possible (i.e., societies may trade more with foreign societies *because* they regard them favorably), but as we find no link between trade and positive affect below, the direction of this (non)-relationship is of limited concern.

[7] See Jones et al. (1996) as well as the "downloads" page of the Correlates of War project, http://cow2.la.psu.edu/.

[8] We also tested the effects of logged values of dyadic trade on AFFECT, but we found no statistically significant results here either (analyses included in an earlier version of the manuscript available from the authors).

[9] Other Marxists hypothesize that "poor" countries of the Global South may be systematically hostile to "rich" countries of the Global North. This hypothesis can also be tested empirically, but, as it turns out, neither an object-country's GDP nor its logged GDP nor its GNI per capita is significantly related to the attitudes toward that country held by Arab publics (analyses available from the authors).

Using the same IMF data as we do to operationalize Hypothesis 3, we measure a subject-country's level of "import dependence" on an object country in two ways. First, we calculate a variable "GDP-adjusted imports" in a manner directly parallel to that which we use in calculating "GDP-adjusted dyadic trade" above. This variable allows us to distinguish economically significant export dependencies from insignificant ones, but it fails to distinguish between dyads in which exports flow both ways and dyads in which exports are one sided. Thus, we likewise calculate a "dependency ratio" for each dyad, consisting of a subject country's absolute level of imports from a given object country divided by its absolute level of exports to that same country.

Although realism, liberalism, and Marxism together remain the dominant sources of globally testable hypotheses on international relations, their inability to explain Arab attitudes on foreign relations might not strike scholars such as Samuel Huntington as much of a surprise (Huntington 1993, 1996). By contrast, what we here term the "cultural" school of IR scholarship has proposed numerous general hypotheses that are often thought particularly pertinent to Arab and/or Muslim countries. Last but not least, we examine two closely related hypotheses about Arab opinion on foreign relations suggested in the work of Huntington and his followers, both broadly associated with what he refers to as a "clash of civilizations."

In his initial 1993 article, Huntington was widely understood as arguing that "civilizational" identity would expand worldwide, perhaps soon eclipsing allegiance to nation states (Huntington 1993). Although few regions of the world (including, emphatically, Europe) have exhibited this trend to date, Mark Tessler and Jodi Nachtwey (1998) have, intriguingly, found relatively high levels of allegiance to the Islamic *umma* in Arab countries. In subsequent writings, however, Huntington has made clear that he does not think that nation states and patriotic allegiances are weakening, but only that "kin-countries" from a given civilization will identify more strongly with each other than with other sovereign countries. We formalize this claim via Hypothesis 5.

Hypothesis 5: *Positive attitudes expressed by citizens of State A toward State B constitute a mark-up on the existence of a shared "civilization" between the two states.*

In addition, Huntington's work suggests a hypothesis about Arab (or, more properly, Muslim) attitudes on foreign relations that is somewhat less "general" than the other hypotheses that we have mentioned thus far. Namely, he argues that beyond the fact that Muslim and Western countries feel no special affinity for each other, there is an especially pronounced tendency for countries from these two civilizations to "clash." Although this hypothesis has proved extremely controversial, it is worth pointing out that it does find some support in *Western* public opinion data.[10] At present, however, we are interested in determining whether a parallel pattern obtains among the Arab publics surveyed by Zogby, as suggested by Hypothesis 6.

Hypothesis 6: *Citizens of "Muslim" countries will express systematically negative attitudes toward "Western" countries.*

In order to operationalize these two "civilizational" hypotheses, we initially follow Huntington's own guidelines for assigning countries membership in a civilization based on cultural and, in particular, religious attributes of the majority of the country's population (Huntington 1993, 1996). Specifically, in order to operation-

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[10] For example, U.S. public attitudes in the 1994–2002 Chicago Council on Foreign Relations "American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy" surveys (CCFR 1995, 1999, 2003) suggest a highly statistically significant tendency to give less warm "thermometer ratings" to foreign countries with a majority Muslim population. The strength of this bivariate tendency ranges from $r = -.579$ ($p < .002$) in 1998, to $r = -.624$ ($p < .001$) in the post-9/11 survey of 2002.

alize Hypothesis 5, which holds that the publics of our majority-Muslim subject countries will feel a special affinity for majority-Muslim object countries, we create a dichotomous variable "Muslim–Muslim dyad" and code it "1" for dyads involving the three out of 13 object countries (Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey) that Huntington himself categorizes as "Muslim" on the basis of Islam's being the most widely practiced faith therein. Similarly, in order to operationalize Hypothesis 6, which holds that the publics of our "Muslim" subject countries will feel a special hostility toward "Western" object countries, we create a dichotomous variable "Muslim–Western dyad," which we code "1" for dyads involving the five out of thirteen object countries (Canada, France, Germany, the U.K., and the U.S.) that Huntington himself categorizes as Western (i.e., majority "Western-Christian"). Notably, although Huntington himself categorizes Israel as a "non-Western" country (Huntington 1996:91), Israel's unpopularity in Arab countries makes our coding decision in its regard far from trivial. Thus, although we adopt Huntington's coding for our bivariate analysis, our multivariate models examine the effects of operationalizing dyads involving Israel in multiple ways.

Results

Table 1 summarizes bivariate relationships between AFFECT and the multiple independent variables discussed in accordance with each of our six hypotheses. These bivariate relationships suggest that, no matter how the relationships predicted by realism, liberalism, Marxism, and "cultural IR" are operationalized, statistically significant predictors of AFFECT are nowhere apparent. In turning to a more rigorous multivariate analysis, therefore, we choose to model those six indicators that nonetheless cast their respective hypotheses in the most favorable possible light (with the exception of one variable whose introduction into our multivariate models would also introduce a problem with missing data).[11]

Specifically, as shown in Table 2 below, Models I–IV operationalize Hypothesis 1 in terms of the *absolute* military capability of an object country; Hypothesis 2 in terms of the *informal* security ties between countries; Hypothesis 3 in terms of the *GDP-adjusted* measure of trade within a dyad; Hypothesis 4 in terms of the *GDP-adjusted* level of object-country imports into a given subject country; Hypothesis 5 in terms of a dummy variable coded "1" if the majority religious persuasion in both subject country and object country is Islam; and Hypothesis 6 in terms of a dummy variable coded "1" if it involves a "Western" object country. (Models I–IV vary only in terms of dyads that are coded as "Muslim–Western" and/or are excluded from the analysis.)

Model I shows the results of a multivariate ordinary least squares (OLS) analysis of our six predictors of AFFECT across all dyads when, following Huntington, dyads involving Israel are *not* coded as "Muslim–Western" dyads. As we might expect given the negative bivariate findings in Table 1, none of the six predictors of AFFECT shows up in this model as even borderline statistically significant. Joint R^2 for the model is a low .041, so we now have somewhat more robust evidence that realism, liberalism, Marxism, and "cultural IR" rank as roughly equal failures when it comes to predicting Arab attitudes on foreign relations. Model II diverges from Model I only in that we recode the seven subject–object dyads involving Israel to positive values on the "Muslim–Western" variable. Ironically, it is only by violating

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[11] In regard to Hypothesis 4, we include the "GDP-adjusted imports from object country" instead of the only slightly more robust "imports/exports from object country" variable because including the latter would reduce our sample size from 91 to 81. Although our bivariate results find no systematic support for Marxist suspicions about the resentment-inducing properties of asymmetric trade, therefore, it is worth noting that our multivariate models are a bit less generous in their operationalization of Marxist hypotheses than of hypotheses drawn from other IR paradigms. Note, moreover, that the negative relationship between "gross dyadic trade" and AFFECT is actually more consistent with Marxism than it is with liberalism.

TABLE 1. Bivariate Associations of AFFECT and Multiple Independent Variables Corresponding to Hypotheses 1–6

Independent Variables	N	Pearson r	p-Value	Included in OLS Models?
Capabilities variables (H1)				
Capabilities ratio (non-directed)	91	.002	.998	No
Capabilities ratio (directed)	91	.005	.965	No
Absolute capability of object	91	− .047	.655	Yes
Alliance variables (H2)				
COW alliance (all values = 0)	91	NA	NA	No
Security tie	91	− .053	.618	Yes
Liberal trade variable (H3)				
Absolute dyadic trade	91	− .106	.315	No
GDP-adjusted dyadic trade	91	.012	.909	Yes
Import dependence variables (H4)				
Imports/exports from object country	81	.095	.398	No
GDP-adjusted imports from object country	91	.010	.923	Yes
"Kin countries" variable (H5)				
Muslim–Muslim dyad	91	.122	.247	Yes
Civilization "clash" variable (H6)				
Muslim–Western dyad	91	.047	.660	Yes

Note: *p-values* calculated using two-tailed tests of significance.

Huntington's own coding rule in regard to Israel that we uncover any evidence of a Muslim–Western "clash." Whereas, in Model I, Arab publics actually appeared slightly *positively* disposed toward the West (albeit not significantly so), Model II's recoding of a mere seven out of 91 dyads now produces a highly statistically significant tendency for Arabs to be *negatively* disposed toward Western countries. As in Model I, the coefficients on the five predictors corresponding to Hypotheses I–V

TABLE 2. Multivariate OLS Models Testing Realist, Liberal, Marxist, and Cultural Variables as Predictors of AFFECT

Predictor	Model I Israel ≠ Western	Model II Israel = Western	Model III Israel Dyads Deleted	Model IV US & Israel Dyads Deleted
(Intercept)	37.378***	51.493***	57.130***	45.993***
	(4.652)	(5.561)	(4.853)	(8.414)
Object's capability score	13.234	− 80.524	− 119.392**	20.717
	(53.470)	(56.184)	(48.556)	(99.814)
Informal security tie	− 5.841	1.999	− 3.272	− 1.675
	(5.801)	(5.543)	(4.826)	(5.189)
GDP-adjusted dyadic trade	36.247	− 66.080	− 26.558	13.767
	(95.597)	(92.871)	(79.834)	(89.802)
GDP-adjusted imports	− 37.089	335.597	− 2.938	− 78.855
(from object country to subject)	(265.160)	(248.467)	(220.195)	(240.219)
Muslim–Muslim dyad	9.723	− 4.905	− 7.751	.790
	(6.011)	(6.543)	(5.624)	(7.795)
Muslim–Western dyad	7.777	− 16.110***	− 5.725	3.337
	(5.951)	(5.986)	(5.330)	(8.061)
N	91	91	84	77
R^2	.041	.101	.111	.005

Main entries in table are OLS regression coefficients; standard errors in parentheses below.
p-values calculated using two-tailed tests of significance; * = $p < .10$; ** = $p < .05$; *** = $p < .01$.
GDP, Gross National Product; OLS, ordinary least squares..

remain non-significant, and, indeed, the *sign* on all five of these insignificant predictors has changed.

The considerable differences between Models I and II suggest that a third approach to the dyads involving Israel is in order. Although we have thus far been hesitant to delete any dyads from our analysis, removing the Israel dyads seems a logical compromise between coding them as either a "0" (Model I) or a "1" (Model II) on our variable testing for "Muslim–Western" enmity. The results of removing these seven dyads are presented in Model III, which shows a negative but not statistically significant coefficient for the variable corresponding to Hypothesis 6. In other words, Hypothesis 6 again fails to be confirmed even given a more generous operationalization of Huntington's "clash" thesis than seems strictly warranted.

Intriguingly, however, removing the Israel dyads from the data set initially seems to paint the "neorealist" variant of Hypothesis 1 in a much more favorable light. Setting aside Arab publics' deep resentment of Israel (a country not coded as particularly powerful by COW) Model III suggests that Arab publics are otherwise quite systematically resentful of "strong" countries, with object-country capability showing up as a statistically significant predictor that alone explains over 6% of the variation in AFFECT. Upon further analysis, however, even this apparently "general" finding seems entirely attributable to negative attitudes about a single foreign country: in this case, the United States. For, as is shown in Model IV, if we remove not only the seven dyads involving Israel but also the seven dyads involving the U.S. from the analysis, the relationship between AFFECT and object-country capability turns insignificant and changes its sign.

What is perhaps most remarkable about Model IV is that once the U.S. and Israel are both removed from the analysis, our six independent predictors of Arab opinion jointly explain only *one-half-of-one percent* of the variance in AFFECT (R^2 = .005)! To be sure, Arab attitudes toward countries other than the U.S. and Israel vary enormously, and we should not thus conclude that they are in any sense "random."[12] Rather, the findings of Model IV tend to bolster the conclusion already suggested by the evidence of Models I–III; namely, Arab attitudes toward *all* countries—the U.S. and Israel included—are determined by factors other than those thus far specified by "general" IR theories.

In the next section of the paper, therefore, we take a closer look at the Zogby data in order to develop new hypotheses about what these undertheorized determinants of Arab opinion might be. We find substantial empirical support for the familiar if hardly scientific assertion that Arab attitudes toward foreign countries are driven less by what those countries "are" than by what those countries "do." We examine the theoretical status of this popular claim, considering how and whether it can be quantitatively operationalized in the Middle East and beyond. In particular, we highlight two major difficulties that any quantitative analysis of "behavioral" determinants of Arab opinion must confront. A first is that the myriad foreign policy "deeds" that appear to be linked to Arab opinion are rarely accounted for in existing IR data sets. A second, and more theoretically significant, difficulty is that we often find that Arab citizens of a given subject country evaluate a given object country less on the basis of its behavior toward that subject country than on the basis of its treatment of Arabs *throughout* the Middle East. Although remaining open to the possibility that this tendency will prove generalizable to other regions, we ultimately suggest that Arab opinion is influenced by numerous contextual factors that would help to explain a possibility we think more likely: namely, that other publics fail to share Arabs' high levels of concern with "regional" matters.

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[12] AFFECT scores for the 77 dyads not removed from Model IV via listwise deletion of missing data vary *almost* as much as those analyzed in the models including the U.S. and Israel (ranging from a low score of 11 for Emirati attitudes toward Turkey to the aforementioned high score of 79 for Kuwaiti attitudes toward Iran).

TABLE 3. Mean Arab Country AFFECT in Regard to Particular Object Countries

Object Country	Mean AFFECT Score Across Subject Countries	Standard Deviation
France	60.57	9.64
Iran	59.00	12.42
Japan	57.29	14.43
China	51.57	16.68
Germany	49.43	16.25
Canada	49.14	16.44
Pakistan	46.43	10.36
India	41.14	10.40
Russia	38.29	15.98
Turkey	34.43	13.14
UK	32.86	11.65
USA	25.29	12.72
Israel	4.71	2.56
Overall	42.32	19.34

Computed from Zogby, 2002a: 61 (Table XXXVI "How Arabs View Other Countries").

Foreign Policy Behavior as a Determinant of Arab Opinion

The analysis above suggests the failure of "realist," "liberal," "Marxist," and "cultural" IR theories to explain why Arab publics possess extremely positive feelings toward certain foreign countries and extremely negative feelings toward others. We would by no means rule out the possibility that these IR theories may perform better in other contexts, but in this paper, a comprehensive global test of such theories is not our aim.[13] Rather, our present purpose is to explore the determinants of foreign policy opinion in *Arab* countries (countries in which such opinion is widely regarded as being of particularly high substantive interest). Having systematically demonstrated that existing theory offers no compelling explanation for the patterns observed in our data, we now examine these data more closely.

Table 3 presents both the average AFFECT score received by each object country (i.e., across *all* subject countries) and the standard deviation from this average (reflecting the extent to which the seven Arab publics surveyed diverge in their opinions of the object country in question). It is not surprising that Israel and the U.S.—the two countries whose inclusion or exclusion from the OLS analysis so affected its results—have the two lowest mean affect scores among the 13 object countries. Perhaps more surprising is that attitudes toward France not only are more favorable than attitudes toward any other object country, but also that they show less variation across subject countries than do attitudes toward any other country except Israel. We now consider the possibility that it is particular foreign policy behaviors of individual object countries that are in fact driving perceptions of these countries throughout the Arab world.

Starting at the bottom of Table 3, it is clear that the seven Arab publics in our study hardly diverge at all in their attitudes toward *Israel*. Indeed, there is no Arab subject country in which more than 8% of the public views Israel favorably. To most

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[13] There is as yet no trans-regional survey that asks respondents in multiple subject countries their opinions about multiple object countries. One can create a pooled data set based on single-country and single-region surveys (e.g., the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations studies and certain Eurobarometer and Latinobarometer studies), but the significant differences between these surveys create numerous analytical problems. Having made a preliminary attempt to do so, Furia (1999) comes to a similar conclusion about the predictive power of most theories of enmity, as do Bennett and Stam (2003) about most theories of interstate conflict. Namely, of all of the determinants of dyadic amity and enmity proposed by IR theory, only *joint democracy* seems to have a statistically significant effect on the attitudes expressed by members of a given "subject" country toward members of a given "object" country.

TABLE 4. The Importance of Palestine as a Political Issue

Subject Country	% Ranking Important or Very Important	
	Palestine	Rights of Palestinians
Egypt	89	86
Jordan	83	86
Kuwait	90	85
Lebanon	69	67
Morocco	92	90
Saudi Arabia	97	96
UAE	90	92
Mean	87	86

Zogby (2002a:34); Table XIII "Importance of Political Issues."

experts on the region, the fact that these exceptionally low ratings of Israel stem directly from the ongoing Israeli–Palestinian conflict goes without saying. Israel's continued military occupation of the West Bank, and, at the time of the survey, Gaza, as well as the perception that Israel refuses to recognize its role in creating the Palestinian refugee problem both help to create deeply unfavorable attitudes toward Israel among Arabs. As one Saudi columnist sums it up, "It's the occupation, stupid" (Khashoggi 2002). Yet if it is unsurprising that Israel's occupation of Palestine would predict hostility to Israel *in Palestine*, the fact that Israel is resented *throughout* the Arab world presents IR scholars accustomed to analyzing interstate dyads with more of a puzzle. Were we, for example, to create a dummy variable for an object country's recent military occupation of a subject country, our entire data set would include only one positive value for the Israel–Lebanon dyad.

In point of fact, however, Israel's foreign policy actions have rarely been perceived as directed against Palestinians alone. Rather, the 1948, 1956, 1967, and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars and the two Palestinian uprisings are all events that have been felt throughout the Arab world. Palestine's central place as a political issue for Arabs has been long established, and many suggest that as an issue, it has helped create the Arab "public sphere" (Kerr 1971; Korany 1993). As early as the 1930s, "residents of the region were now defining themselves as Arabs, supporting Arabs in Palestine and expecting their governments to do the same" (Barnett 1998:72). Today as well, according to Telhami, "No other issue resonates with the public in the Arab World, and many other parts of the Muslim world, more deeply than Palestine" (Telhami 2002:96).

Returning to contemporary empirics, Zogby's "Arab Values Survey" itself presents compelling evidence of Palestine's place as a central issue for Arabs in all countries surveyed. Table 4 shows that, in absolute terms, the vast majority of Arabs in all seven subject countries rank "Palestine" and the "Rights of Palestinians" as important or very important political issues. In relative terms, the (mostly non-Palestinian) Arabs surveyed ranked Palestine as the third most important international *or* domestic political issue, surpassed only by civil/political rights and health care in the respondents' own states (Zogby 2002:33–34).

To be sure, events which occurred as the Zogby survey was being conducted in late March and April 2002 may have increased the salience of the Palestinian issue in Arab opinion.[14] At the time of the survey, Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah had recently presented a plan to the Arab Summit to restart Palestinian–Israeli peace

[14] In order to supplement the Zogby survey, we also surveyed the Arab press for the first 5 months of 2002 for news and opinion stories regarding the 13 object countries. We cite from these media sources to further support our argument about Arab perceptions of particular object countries.

negotiations, which had stalled in October 2000 with the beginning of the second Palestinian intifada. The plan called for the recognition of Israel by the Arab states in return for a full Israeli withdrawal to its 1967 borders. However, after a wave of Palestinian suicide bombings in Israeli cities, Israel reoccupied a number of Palestinian cities in the West Bank in "Operation Defensive Shield." In the ensuing battles, Yasir Arafat was almost killed, and large portions of the Jenin refugee camp were destroyed. Yet while this series of events certainly thrust the Palestinian–Israeli conflict to the forefront of Arab and international attention, other surveys confirm that the high levels of sympathy for the Palestinians recorded by Zogby are not atypical (see, e.g., Center for Strategic Studies, University of Jordan 2005: 79–80).

Beyond its importance in shaping Arab public attitudes toward Israel, the findings of Table 4 suggest that the issue of Palestine is *so* important to Arabs that it may serve as a "litmus test" for their evaluations of other countries as well. If this is indeed the case, then it would seem reasonable to expect that, besides Israel itself, the object country most widely perceived as failing this litmus test would be the *United States* (i.e., due to its exceptional levels of military, economic and diplomatic support for Israel). As Table 3 suggests, only a quarter of Arabs surveyed by Zogby view the United States favorably, easily rendering the U.S. the second-least popular of the thirteen object countries asked about in the study. Yet while it is tempting to suggest that negative affect for the U.S. stems solely from its support for Israel, evidence from other Zogby surveys suggests a more complicated picture.

In particular, evidence from a separate April 2002 Zogby International "Impressions of America" poll suggests that even before the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, "extra-military" U.S. actions in regard to that country—above all the U.S.-dominated sanctions regime—were exercising a large negative effect on America's image in the Arab world.[15] Specifically, as indicated in Table 5, favorable views of the U.S. increased by nearly 50% in all countries except Kuwait when respondents were asked about their *potential* attitudes toward the U.S. if it were to end sanctions on Iraq. This is especially direct evidence that Arab publics in a given subject country respond to (a) an object country's specific foreign policy actions and (b) foreign policy actions affecting Arab countries other than their own. Unfortunately, existing IR data sets on the dyadic interactions of states are inadequate to test the generalizability of this proposition: that is, that majorities of respondents in a given subject country would alter their view of a given object country were that country to alter its non-military behavior toward *another* international actor.

Even in early 2002, of course, numerous Arabic and international media sources correctly predicted that the Bush administration would take actions in Iraq that would instead exert a *downward* effect on Arab opinion. In particular, America's early labeling of Iraq as a member of the "axis of evil" in preparing for a pre-emptive war not contingent on UN support elicited a negative reaction from Arabs far more severe than that which accompanied the 1991 Gulf War. A not atypical Saudi commentator, Fawaz Turki, suggested that

> Pre-emptive war, such as the one contemplated by the U.S. today, however, is of a different order [than the 1991 Gulf War], bringing with it no rhyme and no reason, and fraught as it is with dangerous uncertainties. Moreover, it poses a clear and present danger to all Arabs, in the sense that, collaterally if not directly, an attack on Iraq will be an attack against them all (Turki 2002).

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[15] The perceived *inconsistency* of U.S. policies toward Palestine and Iraq probably intensifies animosity toward the U.S. In 2002, the perception that the U.S. supported Israel at the expense of the rights of the Palestinians was compounded by a feeling that a double standard existed in its application of international law and justice toward Iraq. Arabs pointed out that while Israel occupied the Palestinian West Bank and Gaza for over 30 years, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait was quickly condemned and reversed militarily. Similarly, the post-War Iraqi regime was held under U.S.-directed UN sanctions, whereas Israel has routinely been sheltered from UNSC actions by U.S. veto.

Table 5. Actual and Potentially Favorable Views of the U.S. in Percentages

Subject Country	Favorable toward U.S.	If U.S. Were to End Sanctions on Iraq
Egypt	15	80
Kuwait	41	56
Lebanon	26	75
Saudi Arabia	12	77
UAE	11	62

Table 3; Zogby (2002b).

Predictably then, more recent surveys have found that in the wake of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, negative perceptions of the U.S. have only intensified. For example, the Pew Research Center found that in March 2004, only 5% of Jordanians surveyed held a favorable view of the U.S., down from 34% in Zogby's April 2002 survey (Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2004:6; see also Telhami 2003b).

If a bit less extensively written about than the salience of *Palestine* for Arab opinion, the salience of *Iraq* is nonetheless frequently noted by regional experts. According to Marc Lynch, for example, "by virtue of the ongoing debates in the Arabist public sphere, Iraq stands as one of the few issues about which it can legitimately be said that an Arab public opinion exists" (Lynch 2003). Table 5 certainly suggests that, like the well-being of Palestinians, the well-being of Iraqis may be sufficiently important to Arabs throughout the region to influence their attitudes toward foreign countries that they see as only secondarily responsible for affecting that well-being.

It may thus be that Britain's considerable support for U.S. policies in regard to both Palestine and Iraq does much to explain Zogby's respondents ranking of the *United Kingdom* as the third least well-regarded object country in the sample. British policies in the region are widely discussed in the Arab public sphere, and to an even greater extent than does Britain's own press, the Arab press often portrays Britain as a "lapdog" of the United States (see, e.g., Allain 2002). In regard to Iraq in particular, various 2002 media accounts portrayed Britain as beholden to the U.S. in terms of the maintenance of the Iraq sanctions regime, that is, even before British support for U.S. policies was reinforced with its role in the 2003 invasion (Hammoud 2002). In regard to Israel, while it is important to remember that ordinary Arabs regard Britain much more favorably than they do Israel itself, it may also be that Britain's former imperial role in the region (and in Israel's creation) continues to resonate for some:

> For politicians and intellectuals throughout the Arab world, Israel (or as they usually called it, "The Zionist entity") was only the reflection of larger and more sinister forces. In their minds, the whole Zionist enterprise was from the beginning no more than a façade for British imperialism and then (after Britain's retreat from the Middle East in the mid-fifties) its American successor (Humphries 1999:51).

In short, we suspect that many Arabs perceive Britain as continuing to play a mostly negative military and political role in the Middle East, albeit a secondary one since ending its formal colonial role in the region.

Extremely favorable Arab attitudes toward *France*, in contrast, lead us to reject any notion that ordinary Arabs are systematically resentful of former imperial powers. Beyond the fact that, as Table 3 indicates, France is *the* most favorably regarded object-country out of all 13, France is nowhere better regarded than in

Lebanon and Morocco (i.e., its two former colonies in the sample).[16] This again suggests to us that Arab attitudes toward particular object countries are strongly influenced by those countries' *relatively recent* foreign policy actions in regard to *regionally salient* issues. In regard to Iraq, for example, French diplomatic pressure to reform the UN sanctions regime had been ongoing for at least 3 years at the time of the Zogby survey. Similarly, in regard to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, France has, in recent years, taken various diplomatic actions that have led partisans on both sides of the conflict to view it as the Western country most friendly to Palestine and least friendly to Israel. Beginning in 2001, for example, France began to (unsuccessfully) lobby other EU members to suspend Israel's EU trade preferences (Black 2001).[17] In theory, of course, France might have gone beyond merely "diplomatic" actions to protest events in the Middle East, but in practice, both Zogby's findings and various media accounts suggest to us that many Arabs are appreciative that France has done what it has. French pressure on Israel has, moreover, continued since 2002, and positive Arab attitudes toward France continue to be reflected in more recent surveys (see, e.g., Center for Strategic Studies, University of Jordan 2005:19–44).

The second most favorably regarded object country in the Zogby study is *Iran*, which receives an overall AFFECT rating only one-half a percentage point lower than that of France. Viewed in terms of the military, political, economic, and cultural characteristics measured in our "general" hypotheses, France and Iran could hardly be less alike. Yet viewed in terms of their specific foreign policy behavior in the region—especially in regard to Palestine and Iraq—both are, with some justification, perceived as having an active foreign policy in the region distinct from (and sometimes directly in opposition to) the policies of the U.S. and Israel. We would thus posit that Iran scored high on AFFECT in large part due to its particularly strident rejection of American and Israeli policies in the region. We stress, however, that we are not arguing that an object country's foreign policy behavior is the *only* contextual factor that influences AFFECT. For example, we suspect that Iran differs from other object countries in that many Arabs may be just as interested in this neighboring state's domestic political system as in its foreign policy behavior.[18] That said, one need hardly posit that object-country foreign policies explain *all* of the variation in AFFECT in order to improve on existing theory.

With mean AFFECT ratings just above the midpoint at 50, *Japan* and *China* seem comparable as two major powers that are not deeply involved in the geopolitics of the Middle East. Although both are consumers of Middle Eastern oil, we found no Arab media depictions of either country as projecting military power or interfering politically in the region. Although in the Arab public sphere there is some recognition of the potential hegemony of Japan and the rising military power of China, neither country's military power is often addressed. Rather, most media coverage of the two countries centers on issues of economics and trade, with the successful economic development of the two states sometimes cited as a model for Arab development (Eisa 2002; Elewa 2002; Nafie 2002). To many of the Arabs surveyed, moreover, we suspect that the two countries are simply unfamiliar, a possibility that

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[16] Surveys were not conducted in other former French colonies like Algeria, Syria, and Tunisia, which may or may not share Lebanon and Morocco's enthusiasm for France.

[17] This suggests to us that an object country's diplomatic behavior may be a generalizable, if not easily operationalizable, predictor of attitudes toward that country abroad.

[18] Although Iran is the only Muslim object country that Arab publics view favorably, we suspect that some Arabs view it as a successful experiment in the blending of Islamic values and popular participation in government. The Zogby data give no indication of how the predominantly Sunni Arabs polled feel about Persian Shi'ism, but they do suggest that the vast majority of respondents endorse political participation (Zogby, 2002a:34). Iran's fairly recent conflicts with Arabs during the Iran–Iraq War are also potentially relevant (and may help to explain why Iran's *more* strident opposition to U.S. and Israeli policies has not rendered Iran even *more* popular than France). Again, however, we do not claim that an object country's foreign policy behavior is the *only* influence on AFFECT.

seems consistent with the high degree of variation in attitudes toward both (SD for Japan = 14.4; SD for China = 16.7).

Moving now to countries with mean AFFECT ratings just below the midpoint at 50, it may be that *Germany* and *Canada* are seen as U.S. allies that nonetheless promote development and human rights in the region and limit their military presence to peacekeeping operations (Canada) and training exercises (Germany). Outside of the UAE, the majority of respondents to the Zogby survey view Germany and Canada favorably. As with China and Japan, however, the high degree of variability in AFFECT ratings for these two countries (SD for Germany = 16.2; SD for Canada = 16.4), suggests that they are influenced not only by considered respondent neutrality but also by low levels of respondent information.

That Arab attitudes toward *Pakistan* (AFFECT = 46) and *India* (AFFECT = 41) are roughly comparable is consistent with our failure to find support for Huntington's hypotheses about the civilizational determinants of amity and enmity. Can the similarly "cool" ratings that these two South Asian rivals receive thus be partly explained in terms of their foreign policy behaviors in the region? Although neither Pakistan nor India is deeply involved in the Middle East, the foreign policies of both have been criticized in the Arab press. In particular, Pakistan's frequent military cooperation with the U.S. has not gone unnoticed (Alam 2002; Haqqani 2002). India, for its part, is perceived by some commentators as increasing its military ties to Israel, though others also note its uneven treatment of Indian Muslims (Tash 2001; Masrawah 2002).[19]

The object country immediately below India in terms of favorable attitudes is *Russia* (AFFECT = 38). Russia's role in the Middle East is written about fairly extensively, with various commentators discussing it as a potential international rival of Arab states (Nafaa 2001), as a victim of Russian pro-Israeli lobbies (Naguib 2002), and as a co-conspirator with American foreign policy (Seale 2001). Although not all of these arguments seem plausible, the merely cool feelings toward Russia found among Arab respondents do seem consistent with its mixed foreign policy record in the region. Russia is likely resented for its membership in the unpopular "Quartet" of powers—seen by many Arabs as dictating a pro-Israel resolution of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict—but we also suspect that many Arabs are aware that Russian cooperation with U.S. policies in regard to Iraq has been less enthusiastic than that of countries such as the United Kingdom.

Finally, respondent attitudes toward Turkey (AFFECT = 34) are almost as cool as those toward the U.K. The fact that Turkey has significant military ties to Israel is widely criticized in the Arab media, and in early 2002, some commentators linked Turkey's cooperation with Israel to its initial cooperation with the U.S. in preparation for a war against Iraq (Nassar 2002). Press coverage of the Turkish parliament's later rejection of U.S. proposals to base troops for the Iraq War in Turkey was more positive, but we lack more recent survey data with which to explore the possibility that this rejection has led to a softening of Arab attitudes about Turkey.

A Middle-Range Theory of Arab Opinion

The idea that publics evaluate foreign countries largely on the basis of relatively recent and specific foreign policy behaviors is not entirely unanticipated by previous IR theorists. Hans Morgenthau, for example, was perhaps the first to argue that foreign policy opinion is ultimately driven by "concrete" concerns: Like Waltz, Morgenthau assumed that the "abstract" foreign policy attitudes of publics were pacific. Unlike Waltz, however (who concluded that public pacifism was little affected by international events and, in turn, analytically unimportant), Morgenthau

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[19] To our knowledge, neither Zogby nor other survey researchers have asked Arabs about their sympathies with foreign Muslims other than the Palestinians (e.g., those in Kashmir and Chechnya).

suggested that this pacifism quickly turns to popular nationalism and militarism when an enemy threatens a country's interests.

> When actual war threatens in our time. . . humanity remains united in its horror of war as such, and in its opposition to it. But men are incapable of translating this abstract opposition to war as such into concrete opposition to this particular war. While most members of the human race, *qua* members of the human race, consider war under the conditions of the mid-twentieth century an evil. . . most members of the human race, *qua* Americans, Chinese, Englishmen and Russians, look at war as they have always done, from the point of view of their particular nations (Morgenthau 1954:242).

For Morgenthau, in other words, public attitudes toward particular foreign countries are mostly determined by the question, "what has this country done for (or to) my own country lately?" If a bit difficult to operationalize, moreover, it is certainly possible to state another "general" hypothesis broadly consistent with Morgenthau's arguments: that is, "citizens of Country A will evaluate Country B on the basis of Country B's specific foreign policy actions (and especially their military actions) in regard to Country A."

Whatever the promise of such a hypothesis in other contexts, however, we think it requires considerable modification if it is to be predictive of Arab opinion on foreign relations. Specifically, the hypothesis that we now propose suggests that Arabs in a given subject country will be concerned not only with object-country military behavior toward their own country, but also with a wider range of object country behavior affecting Arabs throughout the region.

Hypothesis 7: *Arab publics evaluate object countries based on the military and non-military policy behaviors of those countries in regard to regionally salient issues.*

A systematic evaluation of this hypothesis will, among other things, require the collection of new data other than that upon which it has been formulated. The hypothesis will certainly appear more promising, however, insofar as ordinary Arabs' identifications and allegiances can be shown to extend beyond the individual countries in which they reside. Although there is no single Arab public opinion about foreign relations, we have seen that all seven Arab publics surveyed express strong concerns about certain issues—for example, Palestine and Iraq—that do not affect their own country's "national" interests narrowly defined.[20] In our view, this high level of concern with "regional" matters is best understood within the particular historical context of the twentieth and early twenty-first century Middle East.

Arab Opinion in the Context of Competing Identities

Since the decline and fall of the Ottoman Empire, the Arab public sphere has famously been the site of multiple attempts to define the scope of the nation and its relationship to state boundaries. Widely shared historical legacies (of colonialism, independence, the Cold War, and oil economics) have left public opinion in many countries in the region in a domestic context characterized by a competition between multiple frames of identity. Today, three major identity frames compete to define the proper scope of the "nation" in the Arab world: Arabism ("*qawmiyya*"), Islamic (or more properly Islamist) identity, and "country" specific nationalism

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[20] As we discuss below, however, there is also considerable subject-country variation in evaluations of particular countries. In any case, the argument that Arab publics tend to share perceptions about key foreign policy issues is entirely distinct from any vulgar "Arab Street" thesis, suggesting that Arab public opinion is monolithically anti-Western or hostile to outsiders (Lewis 2002; Pipes and Schanzer 2002). Rather, in rejecting Hypothesis 6, we have already rejected the claim that Arab opinion is monolithically anti-Western. (A quick glance at Table 3 suffices to demonstrate that Arabs are not systematically hostile to foreign countries in general.)

("*wattaniyya*"). Each of the three seeks to reconcile the effects of the colonial division of the Arab world, the lingering divisions in the Muslim community, and the contemporary norms of Westphalian sovereignty. Arabism and Islamism seek to subsume the colonially drawn boundaries in a larger community, while country-specific nationalism takes the current map as a given and seeks to build a community within existing states.[21]

Competition between these three logics of organizing the "national" community in Arab societies often seems to lie just below the surface of public debate on foreign relations. In turn, how individual respondents surveyed by Zogby define their identity may be important in explaining their evaluations of particular object countries. Given space constraints and the present unavailability of Zogby's individual-level data, we cannot yet test this inference in a rigorous way.[22] What we can do is note that Zogby's societal-level data on identity is broadly consistent with the fact that respondents seem to care a great deal about foreign policy behaviors affecting Arabs outside their own countries. Specifically, Zogby finds that respondents generally ranked "Arab" as their most important category of personal identification (mean: 41%) over "religion" (mean: 24%), citizen of a particular country (mean: 18%), and various sub-national forms of identification (combined mean 17%) (Zogby 2002:49–52). The weakness of "nation-state" identity relative to "Arabist" identity strikes us as particularly remarkable.[23]

Of course, to argue that allegiance to the nation state is not the primary mode of allegiance among Zogby's respondents is not to suggest that the publics of different Arab countries fail to vary in their attitudes toward particular international actors. On the contrary, we now conclude our empirical analysis of object-country foreign policy behavior as a determinant of Arab opinion by examining opinion in three individual subject countries (Morocco, Lebanon, and Kuwait) in which relatively unique historical legacies and international experiences seem particularly important determinants of amity and enmity.

Country-Specific Variation in Arab Foreign Policy Opinion

Morocco's geographic and, to some extent, historical isolation from the other Arab countries surveyed deserves attention. It is important to note that Morocco was the only country surveyed that was not historically part of the Ottoman Empire. Thus, while Moroccans still see Palestine as an important issue (92%), this perception can stand alongside relatively favorable views toward Israel, the U.S. and Turkey; Moroccans hold the most favorable views toward France, Israel, Turkey, and Germany, with greater than a standard deviation above the mean of all subject country evaluations. Evaluations of the U.S. were also nearly a standard deviation above the mean and second only to favorable Kuwaiti evaluations. We presume that many historical conflicts in the central Middle East are not as salient for the Moroccan public as for those publics that were more involved in them. In short, the substantial, though not overwhelming, impact of varied historical experiences of different Arab states is well exemplified in Moroccan attitudes toward numerous non-Arab countries.

The legacies of country-specific histories are likewise apparent in attitudes on foreign relations among the Lebanese public—attitudes which appear affected by

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[21] We discuss the salience of various sub-state identities with family, tribe, and region of country below, but these modes of identification are less pertinent to our present examination of attitudes on foreign relations.

[22] We intend to analyze Zogby's still-embargoed individual-level data in the future.

[23] While the strength of Arabist identity in the general population may be somewhat exaggerated by Zogby's oversampling of "attentive" publics, evidence from the World Values Surveys (Inglehart 2001) suggests that such oversampling would also exaggerate "nation-state" identification (i.e., due to the fact that the Third World rural poor are systematically likely to express "sub-national" allegiances). In turn, vagaries of the Zogby sample would appear to have little influence on the *relative* strength of "Arabism" and "nation-state" identification.

the bitter and quite recent experience of that country's civil war. Table 4 indicates that Lebanon is the only country in which fewer than 80% of respondents to the Zogby survey rate the issues of "Palestine" (69%) and the "rights of Palestinians" (67%) as "important" or "very important." This lesser concern with Palestine is almost surely related to the involvement of Palestinians in the 15-year civil war and, more specifically, to negative perceptions of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon (Fisk 1992; Collings 1994). Logically enough, however, diminished sympathy for Palestinians by no means translates into favorable Lebanese evaluations of Israel (AFFECT = 5%), which occupied parts of Lebanon from 1978 until 2000.

A third notable case of country-specific variation concerns the considerably more favorable views of the U.S. and U.K. held by respondents in Kuwait. Favorable and very favorable perceptions of the U.S. and Britain among Kuwaitis are roughly 16% higher and more than one standard deviation above the overall means. Here again, it seems uncontroversial to assert that American and British leadership in the 1991 Gulf War, the subsequent enforcement of sanctions against Iraq, and looming plans for a second invasion had a different meaning in Kuwait than in much of the rest of the Arab world. Kuwaiti exceptionalism should not, however, be overstated. As Lynch points out, "while the memory of 1990–1991 was doubtless sufficient to insure Kuwaiti hostility toward Iraq, Kuwaitis nonetheless recognized the shifting terrain of the Arab consensus [on Iraq]" (Lynch 2003:80). Indeed, even 15% of Kuwaiti respondents saw the sanctions on Iraq as a decisive factor in their negative evaluation of the U.S. (see Table 5).

In sum, particular national contexts and histories of dyadic relationships, do, as many traditional IR realists might predict, impact patterns of amity and enmity in particular dyads.[24] What no IR theorist—and certainly no IR realist—seems yet to have anticipated, however, is that survey respondents in multiple Arab countries would express such deep concern with object-country behaviors affecting persons who are not their compatriots. In the conclusion of our paper, we explore the implications of such concern for theory development on the one hand and for policy on the other.

Conclusion

General theories of international relations would seemingly offer great help in placing rhetorically charged debates about Arab public opinion in a rigorous social-scientific context. As it turns out, however, this help is entirely negative: empirical tests of existing Realist, Liberal, Marxist, and Cultural hypotheses fail to significantly explain the roots of Arab public opinion toward the 13 object countries in the study. On the contrary, we have presented inductive evidence suggesting that Arab publics evaluate non-Arab object countries on the basis of those countries' specific foreign policy behaviors throughout the wider Middle East. Otherwise dissimilar countries seen as playing a positive role in the region—for example, France and Iran—are regarded favorably, whereas dissimilar countries seen as playing a negative role—for example, Israel, the U.S., and Turkey—are not. At present, an object country's policy actions in regard to Palestine and Iraq seem to have particular importance in determining how that country is regarded. Treatment of Palestinians and Iraqis by various members of the international community is widely covered in the Arab media, and we have presented evidence that Arabs treat these two issues as "litmus tests" in forming either favorable or unfavorable opinions of foreign countries.

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[24] Even many of these strictly "dyadic" determinants of AFFECT would require considerable development of IR data sets before they could be tested quantitatively. For example, it may well be that—as appears to be the case with the Kuwait-U.S. dyad—a subject country's "gratitude" toward an object country for "aiding in restoration of its territorial integrity" declines predictably over time. Before testing the generalizability of this hypothesis, however, one would need to quantify "third-party aid in restoration of subject-country territorial integrity."

We have further argued that the widespread concern of Arabs outside Iraq and Palestine with the well-being of Iraqis and Palestinians is consistent with the primacy of "Arabist" frames of identity among respondents to the Zogby survey. Although our own analysis has been provisional in this regard, we hope that future analysts of Arab attitudes on foreign relations will pay careful attention to the competing frames of identity and, in particular, the various "supra-state" frames of identity through which such attitudes may be filtered. (The extent to which analysts of amity and enmity in other regions should be similarly attentive to supra-state identifications would logically depend on their empirical prevalence in those regions.)[25] A second and perhaps more generalizable implication of our research is that all scholars of amity and enmity should pay close attention to a variety of "non-military" state behaviors that have yet to be operationalized quantitatively. Although analyzing such behaviors as predictors of subject country attitudes toward particular object countries is further limited by the paucity of cross-national survey data on such attitudes, trans-regional analyses of these predictors seem as likely as any to uncover robust "general" determinants of amity and enmity.[26]

In any case, the fact that we have here found existing theories of amity and enmity unhelpful in predicting Arab attitudes on foreign relations should actually be cause for optimism on the part of *policy makers*. First, and most obviously, our findings suggest that countries wishing to improve their image among ordinary Arabs *can* do so. Expressed in the language of the pundits, we find no evidence that ordinary Arabs resent countries for what they "are," and considerable evidence that they resent them for what they "do." Second, and perhaps more subtly, we find that countries wishing to improve their image can do so with great *efficiency*. Specifically, it appears that a state wishing to "win the hearts and minds" of the publics of, for example, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Kuwait, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates can vastly improve its standing in *all* of these societies simply by altering its policies in regard to Palestine and Iraq.

Needless to say, the most salient issues of the present may not be salient in the future. Although the issues of Palestine and Iraq have been salient for some time, new historical contingencies may alter the attitudes of ordinary Arabs about the appropriate role in the region of particular countries. Whatever political changes may occur in the Middle East, however, it seems highly likely that policy makers will continue to be able to consult reasonably reliable surveys on how ordinary Arabs perceive them. At present, theory and evidence alike indicate that the way to improve one's country's image in Arab opinion is not to run roughshod over that opinion but to heed it.

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[25] Global data on the salience of "regional" identities suggest that the high levels of "pan-Arabism" observed by Zogby fail to be paralleled by high levels of either "pan-Americanism," "pan-Asianism," or "pan-Europeanism." See among others, Inglehart (2001).

[26] Although policy-oriented work on the determinants of "soft power" (primarily the soft power of the United States) has not yet led to global quantitative studies that attempt to operationalize soft power in a comparative context, we infer from Joseph Nye's work that such an operationalization might well resemble our own operationalization of each object country's "mean score" for AFFECT (see Nye 2004:35–44).

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