How to Trust your Peephole Rewrites: Automatically Prove Them For Arbitrary Width!

Siddharth Bhat



Extremely Collaborative Work!

- bv_decide was developed by the Lean Focused Research Organization (Henrik Böving implemented bv_decide, supervised by Kim Morrison, Leonardo De Moura)
- Josh Clune implemented the LRAT checker.
- Many folks contributed to the Bitvector Library: Abdalrhman Mohamed, Alex Keizer, Harun Khan, Henrik Böving, Joe Hendrix, Kim Morrison, Leonardo de Moura, Luisa Cicolini, Siddharth Bhat, Tobias Grosser, Wojciech Nawrocki, Joe Hendrix, ...
- Collaboration with Léo Stefanesco to implement arbitrary-width decision procedures.
- Chris Hughes wrote the first version of the decision procedure in Lean.

```
define i32 @src(i32) {
   %r = udiv i32 %0, 8192
   ret i32 %r
}

define i32 @tgt(i32) {
   %r = lshr i32 %0, 13
   ret i32 %r
}
```

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define i32 @src(i32) {
    %r = udiv i32 %0, 8192
    ret i32 %r
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define i32 @tgt(i32) {
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```

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define i32 @src(i32) {
    %r = udiv i32 %0, 8192
    ret i32 %r
}

define i32 @tgt(i32) {
    %r = lshr i32 %0, 13
    ret i32 %r
}
```

Transformation seems to be correct!

```
define i32 @src(i32) {
   %r = udiv i32 %0, 1
   ret i32 %r
}

define i32 @tgt(i32) {
   %r = lshr i32 %0, 13
   ret i32 %r
}
```

```
define i32 @src(i32) {
   %r = udiv i32 %0, 1
   ret i32 %r
}

define i32 @tgt(i32) {
   %r = lshr i32 %0, 13
   ret i32 %r
}
```

```
Transformation doesn't verify!
ERROR: Value mismatch
Example:
i32 \%#0 = #x00000001 (1)
Source:
i32 %r = #x00000001 (1)
Target:
i32 %r = #x00000000 (0)
Source value: #x00000001 (1)
Target value: #x00000000 (0)
```

```
define i32 @src(i32) {
    %r = udiv i32 %0, 1
    ret i32 %r
}


define i32 @tgt(i32) {
    %r = lshr i32 %0, 13
    ret i32 %r
}
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Source value: #x00000001 (1)
Target value: #x00000000 (0)
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define i32 @src(i32) {
   %r = udiv i32 %0, 1
   ret i32 %r
}

define i32 @tgt(i32) {
   %r = lshr i32 %0, 13
   ret i32 %r
}
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```
define i32 @src(i32) {
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   %r = lshr i32 %0, 13
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define i32 @src(i32) {
   %r = udiv i32 %0, 1
   ret i32 %r
}

define i32 @tgt(i32) {
   %r = lshr i32 %0, 13
   ret i32 %r
}
```

```
(set-logic QF_UFBV)

(define-fun src
    ((x (_ BitVec 32)))
    (_ BitVec 32)
    (bvudiv x (_ bv32 1)))

(define-fun tgt
    ((x (_ BitVec 32)))
    (_ BitVec 32)
    (bvlshr x (_ bv32 32)))
```

```
define i32 @src(i32) {
   %r = udiv i32 %0, 1
   ret i32 %r
}
define i32 @tgt(i32) {
   %r = lshr i32 %0, 13
   ret i32 %r
}
```

```
(set-logic QF_UFBV)

(define-fun src
    ((x (_ BitVec 32)))
    (_ BitVec 32)
    (bvudiv x (_ bv32 1)))

(define-fun tgt
    ((x (_ BitVec 32)))
    (_ BitVec 32)
    (bvlshr x (_ bv32 32)))
```

"does src equal tgt for all inputs?"



"does src equal tat for all inputs?"



Provably Correct Peephole Optimizations with Alive

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University of Utah, U regehr@cs.utah.ed

Abstract

Compilers should not miscompile. Our work addresses problems in developing peephole optimizations that perform local rewriting to improve the efficiency of LLVM code. These optimizations are individually difficult to get right, particularly in the presence of undefined behavior; taken together they represent a persistent source of bugs. This paper presents Alive, a domain-specific language for writing optimizations and for automatically either proving them correct or else generating counterexamples. Furthermore, Alive can be automatically translated into C++ code that is suitable for inclusion in an LLVM optimization pass. Alive is based on an attempt to balance usability and formal methods; for example, it capturesbut largely hides-the detailed semantics of three different kinds of undefined behavior in LLVM. We have translated more than 300 LLVM optimizations into Alive and, in the process, found that eight of them were wrong.

Categories and Subject Descriptors D.2.4 [Programming Lan-

(compiler verification) or a proof that a particular comcorrect (translation validation). For example, CompCe a hybrid of the two approaches. Unfortunately, creating required several person-years of proof engineering and tool does not provide a good value proposition for man use cases: it implements a subset of C, optimizes only does not yet support x86-64 or the increasingly impo extensions to x86 and ARM. In contrast, production are constantly improved to support new language sta

to obtain the best possible performance on emerging a This paper presents Alive: a new language and to oping correct LLVM optimizations. Alive aims for a that is both practical and formal; it allows compiler wri ify peephole optimizations for LLVM's intermediate re (IR), it automatically proves them correct with the hel bility modulo theory (SMT) solvers (or provides a coun and it automatically generates C++ code that is simi written peephole optimizations such as those found in struction combiner (InstCombine) pass InstCombine

Alive2: Bounded Translation Validation for LLVM

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John Regehr regehr@cs.utah.edu University of Utah USA

Abstract

We designed, implemented, and deployed Alive2: a bounded translation validation tool for the LLVM compiler's intermediate representation (IR). It limits resource consumption by, for example, unrolling loops up to some bound, which means there are circumstances in which it misses bugs. Alive2 is designed to avoid false alarms, is fully automatic through the use of an SMT solver, and requires no changes to LLVM. By running Alive2 over LLVM's unit test suite, we discovered and reported 47 new bugs, 28 of which have been fixed already. Moreover, our work has led to eight patches to the LLVM Language Reference-the definitive description of the semantics of its IR-and we have participated in numerous discussions with the goal of clarifying ambiguities and fixing errors in these semantics. Alive2 is open source and we also made it available on the web, where it has active users from the LLVM community.

1 Introduction

LLVM is a popular open-source compiler that is used by numerous frontends (e.g., C, C++, Fortran, Rust, Swift), and that generates high-quality code for a variety of target architectures. We want LLVM to be correct but, like any large code base, it contains bugs. Proving functional correctness of about 2.6 million lines of C++ is still impractical, but a weaker formal technique-translation validation-can be used to certify that individual executions of the compiler respected its specification.

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A key feature of LLVM that makes it a suitable platform for translation validation is its intermediate representation (IR), which provides a common point of interaction between frontends, backends, and middle-end transformation passes. LLVM IR has a specification document.1 making it more amenable to formal methods than are most other compiler IRs. Even so, there have been numerous instances of ambiguity in the specification, and there have also been (and still

SMT Solver

Transformation doesn't verify!

ERROR: Value mismatch

Example:

i32 %#0 = #x00000001 (1)

Source:

i32 %r = #x00000001 (1)


Target:


i32 %r = #x000000000 (0)


Source value: #x00000001 (1)


Target value: #x00000000 (0)














Bitwuzla

An SMT solver for bit-vectors, floating-points, arrays and uninterpreted functions.

News

- >> Our paper Scalable Bit-Blasting with Abstractions at CAV 2024
- >> Bitwuzla won 26 out of 56 (participated) division awards at SMT-COMP 2023
- >> Our system description of Bitwuzla won a CAV distinguished paper award at CAV 2023
- >> Bitwuzla won 32 out of 48 (participated) division awards at SMT-COMP 2022
- >> Bitwuzla won 17 out of 28 (participated) division awards at SMT-COMP 2021
- >>> Bitwuzla is now available on GitHub
- >> Bitwuzla won 43 out of 71 (participated) division awards at SMT-COMP 2020
- >>> Bitwuzla participating at SMT-COMP 2020 (submitted binary)



News

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fwangdo opened on Nov 8, 2024

Greetings,

For this instance, a refutational soundness bug occurred.

We tried to reduce the size of this instance, however ddSMT failed to do it.

(we checked that the instance had a solution through z3.)



Commit 9b56a69





rewriter: Fix another case in BV_AND_CONCAT rule.


Fixes #134.


🎖 main · 🟷 0.7.0 0.6.1

123










SMT Solver Proofs Need Arbitrary Width Theorems








```
theorem unsat_of_verifyBVExpr_eq_true (bv : BVLogicalExpr) (c : String)
  (h : verifyBVExpr bv c = true) : ∀ (f : Assignment), eval f bv = false
```


RAT Proof Certificates: Pure Literal Elimination

Resolution Asymmetric Tautology (RAT) [IJCAR 2012]

Given a clause $C = (I_1 \vee \cdots \vee I_k)$ and a CNF formula F:

- $ightharpoonup \overline{C}$ denotes the conjunction of its negated literals $(\bar{l}_1) \wedge \cdots \wedge (\bar{l}_k)$
- $ightharpoonup F \vdash_1 \epsilon$ denotes that unit propagation on F derives a conflict
- ▶ C is an asymmetric tautology w.r.t. F if and only if $F \wedge \overline{C} \vdash_1 \epsilon$
- ▶ C is a resolution asymmetric tautology on $I \in C$ w.r.t. F iff for all resolvents $C \diamond D$ with $D \in F$ and $\overline{I} \in D$ holds that $F \land \overline{C \diamond D} \vdash_1 \epsilon$





Bitvector Formula

How To Verify?

→ SAT Problem


```
011b + 100b
= 3 + 4
= 7
= 111b
```

How To Verify? <a>♥
Bitvector Formula
SAT Problem


```
011b + 100b (bits / booleans ✓)
= 3 + 4
= 7 (natural numbers X)
= 111b
```


How To Verify? <a>♥
SAT Problem


011b + 100b (bits / booleans ✓)
= 3 + 4
= 7 (natural numbers X)
= 111b



3-BIT FULL ADDER







In General, We Must Prove This Correct For Arbitrary Width!

Gigantic Bitvectors Are Becoming Common!

Arm SVE: 2048 Bit Width Vectors Fully Homomorphic Encryption: Wide Registers

Gigantic Bitvectors Are Becoming Common!

Arm SVE: 2048 Bit Width Vectors Fully Homomorphic Encryption: Wide Registers I Sleep Better At Night With an Arbitrary Width Proof

Just Prove The Arbitrary Width Theorems 🔥



Algorithms for Arbitrary Bitwidth Proofs

bv_automata: Automata Theory

bv_mba: 1bit to Nbit generalization

LLVM

Alive IR





Just Prove The Arbitrary Width Theorems 🔥

```
theorem and_idem: \forall (w : Nat) (x : BitVec w), x & x = x := by bv_automata
```

x0&x0:


x&x

1 : x&x=x

Does **x**&**x**=**x** produce an infinite sequence of 1s?



Automata for a&b:




) : a

1 : I

0 : a&b

Automata for a&b:




1 0 : a

<mark>1</mark> 1 : b

1 0 : a&b

Automata for a&b:




1 1 0 : a

0 1 1 : b

0 1 0 : a&b


Automata for a&b:




1 1 0 : a

0 1 1 : b


0 1 0 : a&b




Automata for a&b:




Automata for x:




Automata for a&b:




Automata for x&x:




Automata for x:





Automata for **a=b**:




: a

1 : b

1 : a=b


Automata for **a=b**:




1: 6


0 1 : b

1 1 : a=b




- 0 1 : a
- 101: b
- 0 1 1 : a=b







```
1 0 0 1 : a
```

Automata for x&x:




Automata for x:







Automata for x&x:




Automata for x:




Automata for **a=b**:






x:0/1


Automata for x&x:




Automata for x:



Automata for **a=b**:




Automata for x&x=x:




Does Automata for x&x=x Always Produce 1s?


Automata for x&x:




Automata for x:




Automata for **a=b**:




Automata for x&x=x:



```
theorem and_idem: \forall (w : Nat)(x : BitVec w),
    x \& x = x := by bv_automata
                 ...x1 x0 : x
                 ...x1 x0 : x
              ... \times 18 \times 1 \times 08 \times 0 : \times 8 \times 1
                  ...1 1 : x&x=x
```



```
theorem and_idem: \forall (w : Nat)(x : BitVec w),
    x \& x = x := by bv_automata
                   ...x1 x0 : x
                   \dots x1 \qquad x0 : \qquad x
               ... \times 18 \times 1 \times 08 \times 0 : \times 8 \times 1
                    ...1 1 : x&x=x
```







YES: Automata for x&x=x Always Produce 1s!



Reachable by path p:

Model Checking / k-induction

Reachable by path
$$p$$
:
$$(s:S) \xrightarrow{p} (u:S) \equiv \begin{cases} s = u & p = \langle \rangle \\ \delta(s, p_0) = t \land t \xrightarrow{q} u & p = \langle p_0; q \rangle \end{cases}$$



Reachable by path p, all intermediate states output true:

$$(s:S) \xrightarrow{p}_{\mathsf{true}}^*(u:S) \equiv \begin{cases} s = u & p = \langle \rangle \\ \pi(s, p_0) = \mathsf{true} \land \delta(s, p_0) = t \land t \xrightarrow{q}_{\mathsf{true}}^* u & p = \langle p_0; q \rangle \end{cases}$$

States reachable in k steps from s_0 are safe:


InitPrecond_k $\equiv \forall (t:S) \ (i:\mathbb{B}) \ (p:\text{BitVec } k), s_0 \xrightarrow{p} t \implies \pi(t,i) = \text{true}$

Safe reachability in k steps can be extended to k + 1 steps:


$$\operatorname{Ind}_k \equiv \bigvee_{i=1}^k \forall (s \ t : S) \ (i : \mathbb{B}) \ (p : \operatorname{BitVec} k), s \xrightarrow{p}_{\operatorname{true}}^* t \implies \pi(t, i) = \operatorname{true}$$

Safety = Preconditions + Inductive Invariant:

 $Safe_k \equiv InitPrecond_k \wedge Ind_k$



Automata for **a+b**:




1: a

0: b

1: a+b

Automata for **a+b**:




1 1: a

1 0: b

0 1: a+k

Automata for **a+b**:




. . .

0 1: **a+b**

Automata for a+b:

Automata for **a+b**:



1 1

0 1 1 1: 8

0 0 1 0: b

1 0 0 1: **a+b**

Recall Automata for equality: Told us if equality was true up to the index

```
1 0 0 1 : a
1 1 0 1 : b
0 0 1 1 : a=b
```

```
1: P
```

Recall Automata for equality: Told us if equality was true up to the index

```
1 0 0 1 : a
1 1 0 1 : b
0 0 1 1 : a=b
```

```
    1 1: P
    1 1: Q
    1 1: P∧Q
```

Recall Automata for equality: Told us if equality was true up to the index

```
1 0 0 1 : a
1 1 0 1 : b
0 0 1 1 : a=b
```

```
1 1 1: P

0 1 1: Q

0 1 1: P∧Q
```

Recall Automata for equality: Told us if equality was true up to the index

```
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1 1 0 1 : b
0 0 1 1 : a=b
```

```
1 1 1 1: P
1 0 1 1: Q
0 0 1 1: PAQ
```

Recall Automata for equality: Told us if equality was true up to the index

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```

Recall Automata for equality: Told us if equality was true up to the index

```
1 0 0 1 : a
1 1 0 1 : b
0 0 1 1 : a=b
```

Automata for $P \land Q$:

Automata for PVQ:

0 1 1 1 1: P 0 1 0 1 1: Q 0 0 0 1 1: P∧Q

- 0 1 1 1 1: P
- 0 1 0 1 1: Q
- 0 0 0 1 1: PVQ

What Is Automata Representable?

- Bitwise Operations, Equality
- Addition (Build Add-Carry Circuit)
- Negation (-x = !x + 1)
- Multiplication by Constants: 3 * x = x + x + x
- Boolean Combinations of Conditions: and, or, not.
- Left Shift: a <<< 2 = a * 4 = a + a + a + a
- Right Shift: a >>> 1 = b if and only if the bits b[i] equals a[i+1]: \forall aShift, aShift & (..1110) = $a \rightarrow a$ Shift = b

What Is Automata Representable? (WIP Extensions)

- Sign Extend, Zero Extend
- Multiple Widths, Append
- IsPowerOf2?

```
theorem add_eq_xor_and (x y : BitVec w) :
 x + y - (x ^^ y) - 2 * (x && y) = 0
```

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```

```
theorem add_eq_xor_and (x y : BitVec w) : A \equiv A \text{tom} \mid B \oplus B \mid \neg B \pmod{\{ \|, \&, \text{shl} \}}

X + y - (x ^ ^ y) - 2 + (x & & y) = 0
A \equiv B \mid A \otimes A \pmod{\{ \} \in \{ \|, \&, \text{shl} \}}
P \equiv (A = 0).
theorem add_eq_xor_and_w1 (x y : BitVec 1) : x + y - (x ^ \wedge ^ y) - 2 + (x & & y) = 0
x1x0 + y1y0 - (x1x0 ^ y1y0) - 2 + (x1x0 & y1y0)
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```

```
B \equiv Atom \mid B \oplus B \mid \neg B \quad (\oplus \in \{\parallel, \&, shl\})
theorem add_eq_xor_and (x y : BitVec w) :
                                                                   A \equiv B \mid A \otimes A \quad (\otimes \in \{+, -\})
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     x + y - (x ^ ^ y) - 2 * (x && y) = 0
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(2x1+x0)
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(2x1+x0) + (2y1+y0)
```

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2(x1
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(2x1+x0) + (2y1+y0) - (2(x1^y1)+(x0^y0)) - 2 * (2(x1&y1)+(x0&y0))
2(x1 + y1)
```

```
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```

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```

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
```
Atom 


■ Const | Var
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2(x0 + y0 - (x0^{y0}) - 2 * (x0^{y0}) = 0
```

```
Atom 


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```

Problems Solved v/s walltime on MBA-Blast






- Rewrites With Constants For Fixed Width: ~500 problems $(7 \rightarrow 2^{-4})$



- Rewrites With Constants For Fixed Width: ~500 problems $(7 \rightarrow 2^{-4})$
- Rewrites With Multiple Widths: ~2000 problems (v, w, ...)



- Rewrites With Constants For Fixed Width: ~500 problems $(7 \rightarrow 2^{-4})$
- Rewrites With Multiple Widths: ~2000 problems (v, w, ...)
- Rewrites With Mul / Div / ...: ~500 problems

Trust Your Rewrites With Arbitrary Width Solvers!

```
x1x0 + y1y0 - (x1x0 ^ y1y0) - 2 * (x1x0 & y1y0)

(2x1+x0) + (2y1+y0) - (2(x^y1)+(x0^y0))

- 2 * (2(x1&y1)+(x0&y0))

2(x1 + y1 - (x1^y1) - 2 * (x1&y1) = 0

2(x0 + y0 - (x0^y0) - 2 * (x0&y0) = 0
```

