

This is a formalization of SCP 's abstract balloting protocol described in Section 3.5 of the IETF draft at:

<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-mazieres-dinrg-scp-05#section-3.5>

The goal is to then refine this specification to one that closely matches the concrete SCP protocol.

We provide an inductive invariant showing that agreement is guaranteed.

Note that a node may vote to commit a ballot and later vote to abort the same ballot if it knows that commit cannot possibly reach quorum threshold. This can happen when a validator votes to commit a ballot, but then accepts to abort it. Moreover, it is necessary for liveness to allow this.

Also note that we do not model *Byzantine* behavior explicitly. Instead, whenever a node checks that a set (a quorum or a blocking set) voted or accepted a statement, it only checks that the non-Byzantine members of the set did so. This soundly models what could happen under *Byzantine* behavior because *Byzantine* nodes, being unconstrained, could have voted or accepted whatever is needed to make the check pass.

EXTENDS *DomainModel*

VARIABLES

*voteToAbort*  
 , *acceptedAborted*  
 , *voteToCommit*  
 , *acceptedCommitted*  
 , *externalized*  
 , *byz*

*TypeOK*  $\triangleq$

$\wedge$  *voteToAbort*  $\in [N \rightarrow \text{SUBSET } \textit{Ballot}]$   
 $\wedge$  *acceptedAborted*  $\in [N \rightarrow \text{SUBSET } \textit{Ballot}]$   
 $\wedge$  *voteToCommit*  $\in [N \rightarrow \text{SUBSET } \textit{Ballot}]$   
 $\wedge$  *acceptedCommitted*  $\in [N \rightarrow \text{SUBSET } \textit{Ballot}]$   
 $\wedge$  *externalized*  $\in [N \rightarrow \text{SUBSET } \textit{Ballot}]$   
 $\wedge$  *byz*  $\in \text{SUBSET } N$

*Init*  $\triangleq$

$\wedge$  *voteToAbort*  $= [n \in N \mapsto \{\}]$   
 $\wedge$  *acceptedAborted*  $= [n \in N \mapsto \{\}]$   
 $\wedge$  *voteToCommit*  $= [n \in N \mapsto \{\}]$   
 $\wedge$  *acceptedCommitted*  $= [n \in N \mapsto \{\}]$   
 $\wedge$  *externalized*  $= [n \in N \mapsto \{\}]$   
 $\wedge$  *byz*  $\in \textit{FailProneSet}$

The second disjunct allows voting to commit all higher ballot numbers once a ballot is accepted committed (see meaning of COMMIT message in the IETF draft):

*IsPrepared*(*n*, *b1*)  $\triangleq$

$\vee \forall b2 \in \textit{Ballot} : \textit{LessThanAndIncompatible}(b2, b1) \Rightarrow$

$$\begin{aligned}
& \exists Q \in \text{Quorum} : \forall n2 \in Q \setminus \text{byz} : b2 \in \text{acceptedAborted}[n2] \\
& \vee \exists \text{cnt} \in \text{BallotNumber} : \\
& \quad \wedge [\text{counter} \mapsto \text{cnt}, \text{value} \mapsto b1.\text{value}] \in \text{acceptedCommitted}[n] \\
& \quad \wedge \text{cnt} < b1.\text{counter} \quad \text{really necessary? yes} \\
\text{Step}(n) & \triangleq \\
& \wedge \text{UNCHANGED } \langle \text{byz} \rangle \\
& \quad \text{NOTE for TLC, we must update } \text{acceptedAborted} \text{ before } \text{voteToAbort}, \\
& \quad \text{because updating } \text{voteToAbort} \text{ depends on } \text{acceptedAborted}': \\
& \wedge \exists B \in \text{SUBSET } \text{Ballot} : \\
& \quad \wedge \forall b \in B : \\
& \quad \quad \wedge \vee \exists Q \in \text{Quorum} : \forall n2 \in Q \setminus \text{byz} : b \in \text{voteToAbort}[n2] \cup \text{acceptedAborted}[n2] \\
& \quad \quad \vee \exists Bl \in \text{BlockingSet} : \forall n2 \in Bl \setminus \text{byz} : b \in \text{acceptedAborted}[n2] \\
& \quad \quad \wedge \text{acceptedAborted}' = [\text{acceptedAborted} \text{ EXCEPT } ![n] = @ \cup B] \\
& \wedge \exists B \in \text{SUBSET } \text{Ballot} : \\
& \quad \wedge \forall b \in B : b \notin \text{voteToCommit}[n] \vee b \in \text{acceptedAborted}'[n] \\
& \quad \wedge \text{voteToAbort}' = [\text{voteToAbort} \text{ EXCEPT } ![n] = @ \cup B] \\
& \quad \text{NOTE for TLC, we must update } \text{acceptedCommitted} \text{ before } \text{voteToCommit}, \\
& \quad \text{because updating } \text{voteToCommit} \text{ depends on } \text{acceptedCommitted}': \\
& \wedge \exists B \in \text{SUBSET } \text{Ballot} : \\
& \quad \wedge \forall b \in B : \\
& \quad \quad \wedge \vee \exists Q \in \text{Quorum} : \forall n2 \in Q \setminus \text{byz} : b \in \text{voteToCommit}[n2] \cup \text{acceptedCommitted}[n2] \\
& \quad \quad \vee \exists Bl \in \text{BlockingSet} : \forall n2 \in Bl \setminus \text{byz} : b \in \text{acceptedCommitted}[n2] \\
& \quad \quad \wedge \text{acceptedCommitted}' = [\text{acceptedCommitted} \text{ EXCEPT } ![n] = @ \cup B] \\
& \wedge \exists B \in \text{SUBSET } \text{Ballot} : \\
& \quad \wedge \forall b \in B : \\
& \quad \quad \wedge b.\text{counter} > 0 \quad \text{we start at ballot 1} \\
& \quad \quad \text{if the ballot is already aborted, don't vote to commit} \\
& \quad \quad \text{(using the primed version ensures we don't vote to commit and abort at the same time):} \\
& \quad \quad \wedge b \notin \text{voteToAbort}'[n] \cup \text{acceptedAborted}'[n] \\
& \quad \quad \text{the prime allows us to consider prepared something we accepted committed in this very step:} \\
& \quad \quad \wedge \text{IsPrepared}(n, b)' \\
& \quad \quad \wedge \text{voteToCommit}' = [\text{voteToCommit} \text{ EXCEPT } ![n] = @ \cup B] \\
& \quad \quad \text{we vote to commit at most one value per ballot number:} \\
& \quad \quad \wedge \forall b1, b2 \in \text{voteToCommit}'[n] : b1.\text{counter} = b2.\text{counter} \Rightarrow b1.\text{value} = b2.\text{value} \\
& \wedge \exists B \in \text{SUBSET } \text{Ballot} : \\
& \quad \wedge \forall b \in B : \exists Q \in \text{Quorum} : \\
& \quad \quad \wedge \forall n2 \in Q \setminus \text{byz} : b \in \text{acceptedCommitted}[n2] \\
& \quad \wedge \text{externalized}' = [\text{externalized} \text{ EXCEPT } ![n] = @ \cup B] \\
\text{Next} & \triangleq \\
& \vee \exists n \in N \setminus \text{byz} : \text{Step}(n) \\
\text{vars} & \triangleq \langle \text{voteToAbort}, \text{acceptedAborted}, \text{voteToCommit}, \text{acceptedCommitted}, \text{externalized}, \text{byz} \rangle \\
\text{Spec} & \triangleq \text{Init} \wedge \Box[\text{Next}]_{\text{vars}}
\end{aligned}$$

$Agreement \triangleq$

$$\begin{aligned} & \forall n1, n2 \in N \setminus byz : \forall b1, b2 \in Ballot : \\ & \quad b1 \in externalized[n1] \wedge b2 \in externalized[n2] \Rightarrow b1.value = b2.value \end{aligned}$$

Inductive invariant proving safety:

$InductiveInvariant \triangleq$

$$\begin{aligned} & \wedge TypeOK \\ & \wedge byz \in FailProneSet \\ & \wedge \forall n \in N \setminus byz : \\ & \quad \wedge \forall b \in Ballot : \\ & \quad \quad \wedge b \in voteToCommit[n] \Rightarrow b \notin voteToAbort[n] \vee b \in acceptedAborted[n] \\ & \quad \quad \wedge b \in voteToCommit[n] \cup acceptedCommitted[n] \cup externalized[n] \Rightarrow b.counter > 0 \\ & \quad \quad \wedge \forall b2 \in Ballot : \\ & \quad \quad \quad b \in voteToCommit[n] \wedge b2 \in voteToCommit[n] \wedge b \neq b2 \Rightarrow b.counter \neq b2.counter \\ & \quad \quad \wedge b \in acceptedAborted[n] \Rightarrow \exists Q \in Quorum : \\ & \quad \quad \quad \forall n2 \in Q \setminus byz : b \in voteToAbort[n2] \\ & \quad \quad \wedge b \in acceptedCommitted[n] \Rightarrow \exists Q \in Quorum : \\ & \quad \quad \quad \forall n2 \in Q \setminus byz : b \in voteToCommit[n2] \\ & \quad \quad \wedge b \in externalized[n] \Rightarrow \exists Q \in Quorum : \\ & \quad \quad \quad \forall n2 \in Q \setminus byz : b \in acceptedCommitted[n2] \\ & \quad \quad \wedge b \in voteToCommit[n] \Rightarrow \\ & \quad \quad \quad \vee b.counter = 1 \\ & \quad \quad \quad \vee \forall b2 \in Ballot : LessThanAndIncompatible(b2, b) \Rightarrow \\ & \quad \quad \quad \quad \exists Q \in Quorum : \forall n2 \in Q \setminus byz : b2 \in acceptedAborted[n2] \\ & \quad \quad \vee \exists cnt \in BallotNumber : \\ & \quad \quad \quad \wedge cnt < b.counter \\ & \quad \quad \quad \wedge [counter \mapsto cnt, value \mapsto b.value] \in acceptedCommitted[n] \\ & \quad \quad \wedge b \in acceptedAborted[n] \Rightarrow \forall Q \in Quorum : \exists n2 \in Q \setminus byz : b \notin voteToCommit[n2] \\ & \wedge Agreement \end{aligned}$$