v0.26.5

Security

• A symlink planted at <work_dir>/<workspace_id> no longer redirects the
  whole workspace. os.Root confines operations inside a root but resolves
  the root path itself normally, so if anything else with write access to your
  work directory (another tool, sandboxed code) left a link at the workspace's
  name, every read and write anchored on the link's target: images were written
  outside the directory you named and the call reported success. The workspace
  directory is now created through an os.Root on work_dir and then verified
  by real path; a workspace whose name resolves elsewhere is refused with
  path_not_allowed, naming the id and what it resolved to.
• A symlink planted at the engine's temp output path is no longer written
  through. generate and upscale hand the diffusion engine an absolute
  path (output/<name>.tmp.png), which the engine opens with plain
  os.Create — following any link left there and writing the render outside
  the workspace. The tool then failed while reading the result back, so the
  out-of-workspace write had already happened silently. That name is now
  unlinked through the containment root before the path is handed out, so the
  engine always creates the file fresh.