Farcaster
FIP: Opportunity For Another Consensus (Imported) #6
Replies: 4 comments
|
vrypan The protocol generated ~$1.5m (please someone share the exact number) of revenue from Pro subscriptions. This amount can be used to fund validator operations. (We need a cost estimate by Merkle and Neynar who are already doing it). Additionally, Pro subscribers can point to the validators that they want to fund: The UI will show a list of validators and the user can pick the addresses where they want their Pro subscription to be distributed. |
|
androidsixteen That said, I think migrating to PoS would be a mistake -- it adds a lot of complexity on top of the obvious questions around what the staking asset would be. A better solution IMO would be PoA with a larger validator set + more governance (ie. https://x.com/sunnya97/status/1673686815155396608) This offers a middle ground with more capture resistance than the current system, while also avoiding opening the can of worms that comes with PoS @derekbrown I personally think that PoA is fine ("sufficiently decentralized") with a larger validator set. Considering that USDC is available on all of the major chains and doesn't carry a ton of chain-bias with it, I suspect that would be the most logical staking asset. Agreed with your comments, though. You get counterparty risk with the asset issuer if it's a fiat collateralized stable -- ie. Circle can influence and outright break conensus If so, I'm for step 1, but against step 2 (or option b, whatever) For me, expanding the validator set is not only about censorship resistance, but also expanding the entities that have a saying on how Snapchain evolves. |
|
jobiteth This would be the most robust and least risky alternative, combining the best of several proposals: Base Treasury Fund: A fixed percentage (e.g., 30%) of all "Pro" subscriptions is automatically allocated to a common fund (Treasury) for validators. Distribution Based on Demonstrated Activity: The Treasury is distributed monthly among all active validators in proportion to: The read/write traffic they served (an objective metric of useful work). A cryptographic verification that they store all the data (simplified Proof of Useful Storage). Optional Cost-Cover Fee: Validators can additionally set a minimal technical fee (micro-payment) for processing complex or high-volume write operations. This would primarily be paid by commercial applications or bots, not regular human users. Advantages of this hybrid model: Sustainable: Recurring revenue from the treasury + variable revenue from service. Fair: Validators are rewarded for the actual work they do. Open: Anyone can become a validator. If they serve useful data to the network, they receive funds. No friction for the common user: Normal actions (writing casts, reading) have no cost. Anti-capture: It is difficult for a single entity to control many validators, as each one's performance is measured individually. |
|
jqmwa Tendermint-style PoS can work if validator entry is genuinely open and not economically or socially gated. Cassie’s ideas around open validator calls and reducing affiliation concentration seem like good first steps. From my perspective, focusing on low barriers to entry, transparent selection, and gradual decentralization over time may matter more than picking the “perfect” consensus model upfront. i think i got triggered from seeing sufficiently decentralized so i may have been excessive detailing it We have a similar issue here where our board has 20 members, and only 2 are fully integrated in the system. users would call it sufficient, but sufficient for a social graph like farcaster likely needs less bias and more chaotic randomness (like G-d) i propose an optional plain-language framing alongside the technical discussion, to possibly help attract contributors who don't know they care yet. it's less about lowering rigor, and more about widening the funnel for future decentralization That said, an associated PR with further details has now been created: farcasterxyz/snapchain#730 |
Uh oh!
There was an error while loading. Please reload this page.
Problem
A sufficiently decentralized protocol needs members of a consensus set that is sufficiently decentralized. Proof of Authority does not achieve this, especially with five consensus set members owned by one company (or a second company with strong financial ties to the first).
High Level Solution
There are two paths, one simpler, one more complicated, both mutually pursuable for the greater good.
Notes
This is an incomplete draft proposal, a full LOE will be added soon.
All reactions