Support Certificate Revocation Checking (CRL/OCSP) for mTLS #4038
avhove
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Feature Requests
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Good idea! |
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Yes! Great detailed breakdown. In addition to all of this, expose as much of it as possible through the integration API, so we can automate via our own apps. I would also love to see a new option added to the resource authentication system, such that a valid mTLS cert bypasses Auth, but a missing cert has the option to redirect to the normal Auth rules, rather than flatly rejected. |
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Summary
Add support for Certificate Revocation List (CRL) and optionally Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) validation for mTLS client certificates.
This would allow Pangolin to automatically reject revoked client certificates while continuing to trust other valid certificates issued by the same Certificate Authority (CA).
Motivation
Pangolin's mTLS functionality allows access to protected resources based on client certificates issued by trusted CAs.
However, certificate chain validation and expiration checks alone do not establish whether a certificate is still authorized.
For example, when a device is lost, compromised, or decommissioned, its certificate can be revoked by the issuing CA. Without revocation checking, Pangolin may continue accepting that certificate until it expires.
For environments using a private PKI or an external certificate management solution, this creates a security gap: revoking a certificate at the CA level does not automatically prevent its use for accessing Pangolin-protected resources.
Administrators should be able to revoke individual certificates without removing the trusted CA or affecting other valid certificates.
Proposed Solution
1. Certificate Revocation List (CRL) support — Primary Request
thisUpdateandnextUpdate).2. OCSP support — Optional Enhancement
3. Configuration and security behavior
4. Integration with existing mTLS authentication
Revocation validation should occur as part of client certificate authentication, before access to a protected resource is granted.
Pangolin would not need to issue, manage, or revoke certificates itself. It would simply verify their revocation status using information published by the issuing CA.
Alternatives Considered
These alternatives do not provide the same seamless integration with an existing PKI as native CRL/OCSP validation.
Additional Context
This feature would be particularly useful for deployments where client certificates are issued and managed through an external PKI.
Many certificate authorities already publish revocation information through standard CRL Distribution Points or OCSP responders.
Supporting these mechanisms would allow Pangolin to automatically enforce certificate revocations performed in an existing PKI, without introducing additional certificate lifecycle management functionality.
CRL support alone would already provide significant value and could serve as an initial implementation, with OCSP support added separately if appropriate.
The intended outcome is straightforward: when an administrator revokes a client certificate at the issuing CA, Pangolin should stop accepting that certificate while continuing to accept other valid certificates from the same CA.
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