




BALL
security



Parallel Protocol
Fee Claim Update

FINAL REPORT

January '2026

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1. Project Details

Important:

Please ensure that the deployed contract matches the source-code of the last commit hash.

Project	Parallel Protocol - Fee Claim Update - Audit Report
Website	app.parallel.best/
Language	Solidity
Methods	Manual Analysis
Github repository	https://github.com/parallel-protocol/parallel-parallelizer/tree/3fd5aa8a5a335d54e72d4dc167f19541a769c79b
Resolution 1	

2. Detection Overview

Severity	Found	Resolved	Partially Resolved	Acknowledged [no changes made]	Failed resolution	Open
High	2					
Medium	1					
Low	4					
Informational	9					
Governance						
Total	16					

2.1 Detection Definitions

Severity	Description
High	The problem poses a significant threat to the confidentiality of a considerable number of users' sensitive data. It also has the potential to cause severe damage to the client's reputation or result in substantial financial losses for both the client and the affected users.
Medium	While medium level vulnerabilities may not be easy to exploit, they can still have a major impact on the execution of a smart contract. For instance, they may allow public access to critical functions, which could lead to serious consequences.
Low	Poses a very low-level risk to the project or users. Nevertheless the issue should be fixed immediately
Informational	Effects are small and do not post an immediate danger to the project or users
Governance	Governance privileges which can directly result in a loss of funds or other potential undesired behavior

3. Detection

Surplus Upgrade

This audit focuses on just an upgrade to the [Parallelizer](#) system involving the surplus mechanism. The previous audit on the [Parallel V3](#) system as a whole can be found here, which covers all the contracts in the system. All acknowledged issues from the previous report are still present in the current codebase and have not been re-reported here for brevity.

This upgrade adds a surplus module that lets the protocol identify when it is holding “excess” collateral value, swap that excess into the stable asset under a configurable slippage limit, and then distribute the resulting income to a set of recipients according to predefined shares. The [Parallelizer](#) protocol accrues fees in terms of the collateral token during mints and burns, and this surplus module implements a way to collect and distribute these fees in terms of the stable token while still maintaining the collateralization of the protocol as a whole.

Surplus

The [Surplus](#) contract is a restricted “fee capture” module for the [Parallelizer](#) system. It allows an authorized operator to periodically skim excess collateral value that accumulates in the diamond (i.e., collateral held beyond what is required to back the outstanding stable supply) and convert that excess into the protocol’s stablecoin. To do this, [processSurplus](#) computes the protocol’s surplus for a given collateral using the system’s oracle pricing and accounting, then swaps the surplus amount into the stable asset while enforcing a minimum-outbound derived from a configurable slippage tolerance; this turns unrealized surplus into realized stablecoin revenue held by the protocol.

Once surplus has been converted into stablecoins, the [release](#) function distributes the accumulated stablecoin balance to a predefined set of payees according to share weights. This provides an on-chain mechanism for routing protocol revenue to recipients (or burning, if configured) under access control, and emits events for monitoring when surplus is processed and when income is released.

Privileged Functions

- [processSurplus](#)
- [release](#)

Core Invariants:

INV 1: Surplus amount must be swapped into the [tokenP](#) stablecoin before being credited.

Issue_01	Surplus processing can depeg a healthy protocol
Severity	High
Description	<p><code>processSurplus</code> lets an authorized actor “skim” surplus from a single collateral and swap it into the stablecoin, effectively minting new stable liabilities backed by that collateral’s perceived excess value.</p> <p>The problem is that “surplus” is computed per-collateral, with no protocol-wide safety buffer. If one collateral depegs or drops in price, the system can still be barely healthy overall, but other collaterals may still show local surplus. Harvesting that local surplus increases total stable supply and can push the whole system into undercollateralization.</p> <p>Assume tokens C1, C2, and C3 are all stablecoin collaterals in the system.</p> <p>Say <code>Parallelizer</code> holds 100 tokens of each and has minted out 291 <code>tokenP</code> stablecoins. Each collateral token backs 97 <code>tokenP</code> mint.</p> <p>$\text{Collateralization Ratio} = \\$300/\\$291 = 1.03 \rightarrow \text{healthy}$</p> <p>Say C1 depegs to 0.95.</p> <p>$\text{CR} = \\$[95+100+100]/\\$291 = 1.013 \rightarrow \text{still healthy}$</p> <p>Now, say the admin calls <code>processSurplus</code> on tokens C2 and C3. There are 100 collateral tokens each, which back 97 <code>tokenP</code> each. So there's \$3 extra each. So 3 <code>tokenP</code> is minted from each of C2 and C3.</p> <p>Now, $\text{CR} = \\$[95+100+100]/[(291+3)+3] = 0.993 \rightarrow \text{unhealthy.}$</p> <p>So this allows the admin to undercollateralize a healthy system. This is a severe violation of the safeguards of the system, and can even get triggered by mistake, depending on market conditions.</p>
Recommendations	Consider preventing surplus minting if the overall CR is below a specified value.

Comments / Resolution	
Issue_02	No surplus buffer can lead to easy depegs due to oracle deviations
Severity	Low
Description	<p><code>processSurplus</code> treats any positive “surplus” as immediately extractable and converts it into newly issued stablecoins. There is no minimum global collateral ratio, safety margin, or “buffer” requirement before surplus can be harvested. Furthermore, the admins cannot even specify the amount of surplus to extract; they can only specify the collateral.</p> <p>This leads to a system that can very easily become undercollateralized due to small oracle price changes. The system mints <code>tokenP</code> until there's 0 excess collateral (ignoring mint fees). Thus, any slight price drop immediately after a mint will temporarily undercollateralize the protocol since there is exactly 0 room for any price movement.</p>
Recommendations	Consider ensuring that the overall collateral ratio of the protocol is above a defined minimum after processing the surplus, and allowing the admins to specify how much surplus collateral to mint against.
Comments / Resolution	

Issue_03	Stored USDp balance can be accidentally sold as rewards
Severity	Low
Description	<p>The <code>RewardHandler</code> facet allows the trusted seller to swap any token not recognized as a PSM collateral, enabling conversion of protocol rewards into collateral tokens.</p> <p>With the new surplus mechanism, some USDp may remain in the PSM contract until released. This creates a risk where the trusted seller could unintentionally sell stored USDp, converting it back into collateral.</p> <p>While this action is reversible by processing the surplus again, it may result in minor value loss due to swap fees.</p>
Recommendations	If governance is fully aware of this risk and the trusted seller is instructed to avoid selling USDp, the current behavior may be acknowledged. Otherwise, update <code>sellRewards</code> to explicitly prevent selling USDp.
Comments / Resolution	

Issue_04	The surplus mechanism might be blocked due to collateral caps or pausability.
Severity	Informational
Description	<p>Processing surplus relies on the ability to swap collateral tokens for USDp:</p> <pre><i>issuedAmount = ISwapper[address[this]].swapExactInput(collateralSurplus, minExpectedAmount, collateral, address[ts.tokenP], address[this], block.timestamp);</i></pre> <p>If minting is paused or the collateral cap has been reached, the swap cannot proceed, preventing surplus processing entirely. This may interfere with the intended operation of the surplus mechanism.</p>
Recommendations	Consider acknowledging this issue.
Comments / Resolution	

Issue_05	Improper approval handling
Severity	Informational
Description	<p>The <code>processSurplus</code> function grants approval to itself on the collateral tokens for minting tokenP.</p> <pre><code>IERC20[collateral].approve(address[this], collateralSurplus);</code></pre> <p>Even though <code>SafeERC20</code> is available, <code>forceApprove</code> is not used. This can cause issues with non-standard tokens, which handle approvals differently.</p>
Recommendations	Use <code>forceApprove</code> to handle approvals.
Comments / Resolution	

Issue_06	DoS on <code>processSurplus</code> if the collateral token reverts on self-transfers.
Severity	Informational
Description	<p>The <code>processSurplus</code> function calls <code>swapExactInput</code> to convert surplus collateral into USDp. During execution, the <code>_swap</code> function performs a token transfer:</p> <pre><code>IERC20[token].safeTransferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), amount);</code></pre> <p>In this context, the caller is the contract itself, resulting in a self-transfer. While most tokens allow this, some revert when the sender and receiver are the same. For example, Compound V3 tokens like cUSDCv3 exhibit this behavior.</p> <p>If such tokens are accepted as collateral in the PSM in the future, this would break the surplus mechanism for those assets.</p>
Recommendations	Either acknowledge this behavior as an accepted limitation or update the swapper facet to skip the transfer when the caller is the PSM.
Comments / Resolution	

LibSurplus

LibSurplus is the accounting and payout library backing the **Surplus** module. It computes a collateral's "excess" by valuing the protocol's on-contract collateral balance via the configured oracle and comparing it to the protocol's recorded stable liabilities, then converts that value surplus into a collateral amount to be swapped. After surplus has been realized as stablecoin revenue, release splits the income across a configured set of payees using share weights (optionally burning the portion assigned to the zero address) and emits events for distribution tracking. It also provides a helper to derive a minimum acceptable swap output from a slippage tolerance, allowing surplus conversions to be bounded against adverse execution.

Core Invariants:

INV 1: Surplus must only report the excess collateral, the part that does not back any of the minted stablecoins yet.

INV 2: During release, each target must receive tokens proportional to their share amount.

Issue_07	Incorrect surplus calculation
Severity	High
Description	<p>LibSurplus subtracts a normalized debt value as if it were the actual stable supply.</p> $\text{stableSurplus} = \text{totalCollateralValue} - \text{collatInfo.normalizedStables};$ <p>But collatInfo.normalizedStables is the normalized value, which remains unchanged during redemptions. For the actual amount of stablecoins minted against it, the value needs to be denormalized using ts.normalizer.</p> <p>Thus, this calculation is only correct when ts.normalizer=1e27, the unit value. At all other values, this is incorrect.</p>
Recommendations	De-normalize the value and then use it.
Comments / Resolution	

Issue_08	Surplus calculation doesn't work for managed collaterals
Severity	Medium
Description	<p><code>_computeCollateralSurplus</code> uses <code>balanceOf</code> to calculate the collateral amount and ignores the existence of managed collaterals.</p> <p><code>Parallelizer</code> supports managed collaterals, where the collateral tokens are sent off to a different contract to be invested to generate yield. For such managed collaterals, <code>balanceOf</code> will give the wrong value since the collateral tokens do not exist in the <code>Parallelizer</code> contract itself.</p>
Recommendations	For managed collaterals, use <code>LibManager.totalAssets</code> to get the collateral amount present in the system. These funds also need to be released first before they can be minted against.
Comments / Resolution	
Issue_09	Revert message for code clarity
Severity	Informational
Description	<p>The <code>stableSurplus</code> value is calculated using a raw subtraction.</p> $\text{stableSurplus} = \text{totalCollateralValue} - \text{collatInfo.normalizedStables};$ <p>If there isn't any surplus, this just reverts with an underflow. Consider adding a check and reverting with an appropriate custom error/message.</p>
Recommendations	Consider adding a custom error/message when the <code>stableSurplus</code> calculation underflows.
Comments / Resolution	

Getters

The [Getters](#) contract introduced a few new functions in this protocol upgrade. The [getPayees](#), [getTotalShares](#), [getShares](#), [getSlippageTolerance](#), [getLastReleasedAt](#), [getCollateralSurplus](#) functions are simple view functions that fetch the new storage variables introduced in the upgrade.

No issues were identified in this contract.

Setters

The [Setters](#) contract and the [LibSetters](#) library introduce the [updatePayees](#) and [updateSlippageTolerance](#) functions, which enable the [Governor](#) to specify the address to which the surplus mints are to be directed and the tolerance for mints.

Issue_10	Payee updates can be blocked by a failing income release
Severity	Low
Description	<p>updatePayees attempts to distribute any accumulated protocol income to the current payees before applying the new payee configuration. If that distribution fails (for example, because the “burn” route is configured via the zero address but burning is disabled, or because the stable token transfer/burn path reverts for any reason), the whole updatePayees call reverts.</p> <p>This creates a governance footgun: the protocol can get stuck in a state where it cannot change payees precisely because the old payee configuration is broken, turning a recoverable configuration error into a persistent inability to update revenue routing.</p>
Recommendations	Consider adding logic to allow payee updates without a surplus release, or documenting and acknowledging this issue.
Comments / Resolution	

Issue_11	Duplicate payees can lead to incorrect share accounting
Severity	Low
Description	<p><code>updatePayees</code> does not prevent duplicate addresses in the payee list, but it stores shares in a mapping keyed by address while also iterating over the payees array during release.</p> <p>If a payee appears twice, the mapping only retains the last share value, yet release will pay that same address multiple times using the same [last] share each time.</p> <p>Example: set payees to [Alice, Alice] with shares [1, 100]; <code>totalShares</code> becomes 101, <code>shares[Alice]</code> becomes 100, and release will attempt to pay Alice about \$99.01 twice from a \$100 income, which can overdraw the balance and revert, effectively bricking income distribution.</p>
Recommendations	Consider adding a duplicate check in the <code>updatePayees</code> function.
Comments / Resolution	

Issue_12	Wrong interface referenced
Severity	Informational
Description	<p>The functions <code>updatePayees</code> and <code>updateSlippageTolerance</code> reference a non-existent interface in their NatSpec comments:</p> <pre>/// @inheritDoc ISettersGovernor</pre> <p>However, the correct interface containing the relevant documentation is <code>ISetters</code>.</p>
Recommendations	Update the comments to reference <code>ISetters</code> instead of <code>ISettersGovernor</code> .
Comments / Resolution	

Issue_13	No event emission on <code>updateSlippageTolerance</code>
Severity	Informational
Description	<p>Currently, the function <code>updateSlippageTolerance</code> does not emit an event when slippage tolerance is changed for a collateral.</p> <pre>function updateSlippageTolerance(address collateral, uint256 slippageTolerance) internal { if (slippageTolerance > BASE_9) revert InvalidRate(); ParallelizerStorage storage ts = s.transmuterStorage(); ts.slippageTolerance[collateral] = slippageTolerance;</pre> <p>It is considered a best practice to emit events when state variables are updated.</p>
Recommendations	Consider emitting events when slippage is updated.
Comments / Resolution	

Issue_14	<p><code>updatePayees</code> can accidentally transfer USDp to a compromised address.</p>
Severity	Informational
Description	<p>The <code>updatePayees</code> function calls <code>LibSurplus.release</code> when there is a non-zero USDp balance and the list of previous payees is not empty:</p> <pre><code>if [income > 0 && ts.payees.length > 0] { LibSurplus.release[income, ts.payees]; }</code></pre> <p>This behavior can lead to unintended asset loss if any of the previous payees have been compromised. In such cases, executing <code>updatePayees</code> would transfer USDp to addresses that may no longer be trusted.</p>
Recommendations	Consider adding a boolean flag to <code>updatePayees</code> to allow the caller to skip the release call when needed, or acknowledge this issue.
Comments / Resolution	

Issue_15	Stale shares mapping after payee removal
Severity	Informational
Description	<p>When <code>updatePayees</code> is called, the payees array is deleted, but individual entries in the shares mapping are not cleared. Old payees retain non-zero share values even though they are no longer active.</p> <p>This delete statement removes the payees array but does not clear the shares mapping for the removed addresses. As a result, the <code>getShares</code> getter will return stale non-zero values for addresses that were previously payees but have since been removed.</p>
Recommendations	Consider zeroing out old payee values.
Comments / Resolution	



Storage

The [Storage](#) contract introduces a few extra slots in the [Parallelizer](#) storage to hold data related to the surplus system.

No issues were identified in this contract.

Swapper

This contract contains a small modification in this upgrade, which rearranges the order of operations in the `_swap` function.

Issue_16	Hard cap check uses different rounding in quotes vs. execution
Severity	Informational
Description	<p>In the <code>_swap</code> function, the mint path enforces the per-collateral stablecoin cap via <code>_checkHardCaps</code>, but the cap check is performed on different values in the quoting functions versus the actual swap execution.</p> <p><code>quoteln / quoteOut</code> check caps using the user-facing <code>amountOut</code> directly, while <code>_swap</code> first converts <code>amountOut</code> into a “normalized” amount using rounding (round up), updates storage, and then checks caps using the normalized accounting (effectively re-rounded when converted back). This rounding mismatch can create a 1-wei discrepancy.</p> <p>Swap:</p> <pre>uint128 changeAmount = [amountOut.mulDiv(BASE_27, ts.normalizer, Math.Rounding.Ceil)].toUint128(); collatInfo.normalizedStables = collatInfo.normalizedStables + uint216[changeAmount]; _checkHardCaps(collatInfo, 0, ts.normalizer);</pre> <p>Quote:</p> <pre>amountOut = _quoteMintExactInput(collatInfo, amountIn); _checkHardCaps(collatInfo, amountOut, ts.normalizer);</pre> <p><code>Swap</code> first normalizes the amount, rounding up, and then checks the cap, rounding down, while the quote function does the exact amount. This discrepancy can lead to different results from the 2 functions.</p>
Recommendations	Consider using the same sequence of rounding/checking in the

	quote and swap functions.
Comments / Resolution	