COMP251: Bipartite graphs

Jérôme Waldispühl

School of Computer Science

McGill University

Based on slides fom M. Langer (McGill) & P. Beame (UofW) & K. Wayne (Princeton)

Bipartite graphs



Vertices are partitioned into 2 sets.

All edges cross the sets.

Examples



Counter-examples



Easy to identify.

But not always...

Cycles

Claim: If a graph is bipartite if and only if does not contain an odd cycle.

Proof: Exercise.

Is it a bipartite graph?

Assuming G=(V,E) is an undirected connected graph.

1. Run DFS and use it to build a DFS tree.
2. Color vertices by layers (e.g. red & black)
3. If all non-tree edges join vertices of different color, then the graph is bipartite.





Non-tree edges in DFS tree cross 2 or more levels. Why?

Bipartite matching

Consider an undirected bipartite graph.



A matching is a subset of the edges $\{(\alpha, \beta)\}$ such that no two edges share a vertex.



Perfect matching



Suppose we have a bipartite graph with *n* vertices in each A and B. A **perfect matching** is a matching that has *n* edges.

Note: It is not always possible to find a perfect matching.

Complete bipartite graph



A complete bipartite graph is a bipartite graph that has an edge for every pair of vertices (α, β) such that α∈A, β∈B.

The algorithm of happiness

Resident matching program

- **Goal:** Given a set of preferences among hospitals and medical school students, design a self-reinforcing admissions process.

- **Unstable pair:** applicant **x** and hospital **y** are unstable if:
  - **x** prefers **y** to their assigned hospital.
  - **y** prefers **x** to one of its admitted students.

- **Stable assignment:** Assignment with no unstable pairs.
  - Natural and desirable condition.
  - Individual self-interest will prevent any applicant/hospital deal from being made.

Stable matching problem

Goal: Given **n** elements of **A** and **n** elements of **B**, find a "suitable" matching. Participants rate members of opposite set:

- Each element of A lists elements of B in order of preference from best to worst.
- Each element of B lists elements of A in order of preference from best to worst.

A's preferences

	1st	2nd	3rd
Xavier	Alphabet	Baidu	Campbell
Yulia	Baidu	Alphabet	Campbell
Zoran	Alphabet	Baidu	Campbell

B's preferences

	1st	2nd	3rd
Alphabet	Yulia	Xavier	Zoran
Baidu	Xavier	Yulia	Zoran
Campbell	Xavier	Yulia	Zoran

Stable matching problem

- **Context:** Candidates apply to companies.
- **Perfect matching:** everyone is matched with a single company.
  - Each candidate gets exactly one company.
  - Each company gets exactly one candidate.

- **Stability:** no incentive for some pair of participants to undermine assignment by joint action.
  - In matching **M**, an unmatched pair **α-β** is unstable if candidate **α** and company **β** prefer each other to current match.
  - Unstable pair **α-β** could each improve by "escaping".

- **Stable matching:** perfect matching with no unstable pairs.
- **Stable matching problem:** Given the preference lists of **n** candidates and **n** companies, find a stable matching (if one exists).

Example

Q: Is X-C, Y-B, Z-A a good assignment?



Candidates' preferences

	1st	2nd	3rd
Xavier	Alphabet	Baidu	Campbell
Yulia	Baidu	Alphabet	Campbell
Zoran	Alphabet	Baidu	Campbell

Companies' preferences

	1st	2nd	3rd
Alphabet	Yulia	Xavier	Zoran
Baidu	Xavier	Yulia	Zoran
Campbell	Xavier	Yulia	Zoran

Example

Q: Is X-C, Y-B, Z-A a good assignment?

A: No! Xavier and Baidu will hook up…



Candidates' preferences

	1st	2nd	3rd
Xavier	Alphabet	Baidu	Campbell
Yulia	Baidu	Alphabet	Campbell
Zoran	Alphabet	Baidu	Campbell

Companies' preferences

	1st	2nd	3rd
Alphabet	Yulia	Xavier	Zoran
Baidu	Xavier	Yulia	Zoran
Campbell	Xavier	Yulia	Zoran

Example

Q: Is X-A, Y-B, Z-C a good assignment?

A: Yes!



Candidates' preferences

	1st	2nd	3rd
Xavier	Alphabet	Baidu	Campbell
Yulia	Baidu	Alphabet	Campbell
Zoran	Alphabet	Baidu	Campbell

Companies' preferences

	1st	2nd	3rd
Alphabet	Yulia	Xavier	Zoran
Baidu	Xavier	Yulia	Zoran
Campbell	Xavier	Yulia	Zoran

Stable matching problem

Consider a complete bipartite graph such that |A|=|B|=n.

- Each member of A has a preference ordering of members of B.
- Each member of B has a preference ordering of members of A.

Algorithm for finding a matching:

- Each A member offer to a B, in preference order.
- Each B member accepts the first offer from an A, but then rejects that offer if/when it receives a offer from a A that it prefers more.

In our example: Candidates applies to companies. Companies accept the first offer they receive, but companies will drop their applicant when/if a preferred candidate applies after.

Note the asymmetry between A and B.

Gale-Shapley algorithm

For each α∈A, let pref[α] be the ordering of its preferences in B

For each β∈B, let pref[β] be the ordering of its preferences in A

Let matching be a set of crossing edges between A and B


```
matching←∅
```


while there is α∈A not yet matched **do**

    β←pref[α].removeFirst()
    if β not yet matched **then**
        matching←matching∪{(α,β)}
    else
        γ←β's current match
        if β prefers α over γ **then**
            matching←matching-{(γ,β)}∪{(α,β)}

return matching

Example

Candidates' preferences

	1st	2nd	3rd
Xavier	Baidu	Alphabet	Campbell
Yulia	Baidu	Campbell	Alphabet
Zoran	Alphabet	Campbell	Baidu

Companies' preferences

	1st	2nd	3rd
Alphabet	Zoran	Xavier	Yulia
Baidu	Yulia	Zoran	Xavier
Campbell	Xavier	Yulia	Zoran

Note: In practice, we inverse the roles. Companies makes offers…

Example

Candidates' preferences

	1st	2nd	3rd
Xavier	Baidu	Alphabet	Campbell
Yulia	Baidu	Campbell	Alphabet
Zoran	Alphabet	Campbell	Baidu

Companies' preferences

	1st	2nd	3rd
Alphabet	Zoran	Xavier	Yulia
Baidu	Yulia	Zoran	Xavier
Campbell	Xavier	Yulia	Zoran

Example

Candidates' preferences

	1st	2nd	3rd
Xavier	Baidu	Alphabet	Campbell
Yulia	Baidu	Campbell	Alphabet
Zoran	Alphabet	Campbell	Baidu

Companies' preferences

	1st	2nd	3rd
Alphabet	Zoran	Xavier	Yulia
Baidu	Yulia	Zoran	Xavier
Campbell	Xavier	Yulia	Zoran

Example

Candidates' preferences

	1st	2nd	3rd
Xavier	Baidu	Alphabet	Campbell
Yulia	Baidu	Campbell	Alphabet
Zoran	Alphabet	Campbell	Baidu

Companies' preferences

	1st	2nd	3rd
Alphabet	Zoran	Xavier	Yulia
Baidu	Yulia	Zoran	Xavier
Campbell	Xavier	Yulia	Zoran

Example



Candidates' preferences

	1st	2nd	3rd
Xavier	Baidu	Alphabet	Campbell
Yulia	Baidu	Campbell	Alphabet
Zoran	Alphabet	Campbell	Baidu

Companies' preferences

	1st	2nd	3rd
Alphabet	Zoran	Xavier	Yulia
Baidu	Yulia	Zoran	Xavier
Campbell	Xavier	Yulia	Zoran

Example



Candidates' preferences

	1st	2nd	3rd
Xavier	Baidu	Alphabet	Campbell
Yulia	Baidu	Campbell	Alphabet
Zoran	Alphabet	Campbell	Baidu

Companies' preferences

	1st	2nd	3rd
Alphabet	Zoran	Xavier	Yulia
Baidu	Yulia	Zoran	Xavier
Campbell	Xavier	Yulia	Zoran

Example



Men's preferences

	1st	2nd	3rd
Xavier	Baidu	Alphabet	Campbell
Yulia	Baidu	Campbell	Alphabet
Zoran	Alphabet	Campbell	Baidu

Companies' preferences

	1st	2nd	3rd
Alphabet	Zoran	Xavier	Yulia
Baidu	Yulia	Zoran	Xavier
Campbell	Xavier	Yulia	Zoran

Example



Candidates' preferences

	1st	2nd	3rd
Xavier	Baidu	Alphabet	Campbell
Yulia	Baidu	Campbell	Alphabet
Zoran	Alphabet	Campbell	Baidu

Companies' preferences

	1st	2nd	3rd
Alphabet	Zoran	Xavier	Yulia
Baidu	Yulia	Zoran	Xavier
Campbell	Xavier	Yulia	Zoran

Example



Candidates' preferences

	1st	2nd	3rd
Xavier	Baidu	Alphabet	Campbell
Yulia	Baidu	Campbell	Alphabet
Zoran	Alphabet	Campbell	Baidu

Companies' preferences

	1st	2nd	3rd
Alphabet	Zoran	Xavier	Yulia
Baidu	Yulia	Zoran	Xavier
Campbell	Xavier	Yulia	Zoran

Correctness (termination)

Observations:

1. Candidates apply to companies in decreasing order of preference.
2. Once a company is matched, it never becomes unmatched; it only "trades up."

Claim: Algorithm terminates after at most n^2 iterations of while loop (i.e. $O(n^2)$ running time).

Proof: Each time through the while loop a candidate applies to a new company. There are only n^2 possible matches. ■

Correctness (perfection)

Claim: All candidates and companies get matched.

Proof: (by contradiction)

- Suppose, for sake of contradiction, that Zoran is not matched upon termination of algorithm.

- Then some company, say Alphabet, is not matched upon termination.
- By Observation 2 (only trading up, never becoming unmatched), Alphabet never received any application.
- But, Zoran applies everywhere. Contradiction. ■

Correctness (stability)

Claim: No unstable pairs.

Proof: (by contradiction)

- Suppose **Z-A** is an unstable pair: they prefer each other to the association made in Gale-Shapley `matching`.
- Case 1: **Z** never applied to **A**.
  ⇒ **Z** prefers his GS match to **A**.
  ⇒ **Z-A** is stable.
- Case 2: **Z** applied to **A**.
  ⇒ **A** rejected **Z** (right away or later)
  ⇒ **A** prefers its GS match to **Z**.
  ⇒ **Z-A** is stable.
- In either case **Z-A** is stable. Contradiction. ■

Optimality

Definition: Candidate **α** is a valid partner of company **β** if there exists some stable matching in which they are matched.

Applicant-optimal assignment: Each candidate receives **best** valid match (according to his preferences).

Claim: All executions of GS yield an **applicant-optimal** assignment, which is a stable matching!

Note: the notation “Applicant-optimal” refers to α-optimality

Example

	1st	2nd	3rd
X	B	A	C
Y	A	B	C
Z	A	B	C

	1st	2nd	3rd
A	X	Y	Z
B	Y	X	Z
C	X	Y	Z

Two stable matchings: S = { X-A, Y-B, Z-C } and S' = { Y-A, X-B, Z-C }

Then:

- Both X and Y are valid partners for A.
- Both X and Y are valid partners for B.
- Z is the only valid partner for C.
- In S', X Y Z match their best valid partner.

Applicant-Optimality

Claim: GS matching **S*** is applicant-optimal.

Proof: (by contradiction)

- Suppose some candidate is paired with a company other than his/her best option. Candidates apply in decreasing order of preference ⇒ some candidate is rejected by a valid match.
- Let **Y** be first such candidate, and let **A** be the first valid company that rejects him (i.e. **Y-A** is optimal).
- Let **S** be a stable matching (not from GS) where **Y** and **A** are matched.
- **[In GS]** when **Y** is rejected, **A** forms (or reaffirms) engagement with a candidate, say **Z**, whom it prefers to **Y** ⟹ **A** prefers **Z** to **Y**.
- Let **B** be **Z**'s match in **S**.
- **[In GS]** **Z** is not rejected by any valid match (including B) at the point when **Y** is rejected by **A** (because Y is the first valid rejection). Thus, Z has not proposed to B when Z proposed to A ⟹ **Z** prefers **A** to **B**.
- Thus **A**-**Z** would be preferred in **GS** (i.e. **Y-A** and **Z-B** are unstable) and **S** is not a stable matching. Contradiction. ■

Why does Z prefer A to B?

In Gale-Shapley



- Y is the first rejection of a valid pair.
- Y-A rejected because of Z

$\Longrightarrow$ if Z had proposed to B before it would need to break the **valid pair** Z-B first

$\Longrightarrow$ impossible (Y first reject)

$\Longrightarrow$ Z did not proposed to B

S



S is a stable matching

$\Longrightarrow$ Y-A and Z-B are **valid pairs**

Company(β)-pessimality

Each element of (β) receive the worst valid partner

Claim: GS finds a student-pessimal stable matching.

Proof: Exercise… (by contradiction)