## CPSC 320 Sample Solution, The Stable Marriage Problem

September 13, 2018

#### 1 Trivial and Small Instances

matched with anyone else.

1. Write down all the **trivial** instances of SMP. We think of an instance as "trivial" roughly if its solution requires no real reasoning about the problem.

**SOLUTION:** If you think of the smallest possible instances, it usually guides you towards trivial instances. In SMP, it's tempting to say that the smallest possible instance has one man and one woman, but we can go smaller! Degenerate cases like "zero men and zero women" are often helpful! So, is zero men and zero women trivial? Sure! There's exactly one solution, in which no one is

What about one man and one woman? To rardless of their preferences (which, in fact, must be simply for each other), the only solution is for the one man to marry the one woman.

So, zero men/women and one man/woman are the trivial instances.

FROM SOLUTION REPRESENTATION: The solution for a problem with n=0 is the empty set of pairings  $\{\}$ . The depth for a problem with n=0 is the empty  $\{\}$ .

What about two men and women? You might start that here, but you'll quickly realize it belongs in the next slot...

2. Write down two small instances of SMT. One should be based on your early/baked goods example above (but we'll just make one up for the sample solution):

**SOLUTION:** Here's what we might have come up with. This is just a sample of three men and women and their preferences for each other that could come from the baked goods example:

```
w1: m2 m1 m3 m1: w3 w1 w2 w2: m1 m2 m3 m2: w3 w2 w1 w3: m2 m1 m3 m3: w2 w1 w3
```

Each woman lists their preferences for men in order from most to least preferred.

Each man lists their preferences for women in the same order.

**FROM PROBLEM REPRESENTATION:** We can rephrase this with our new notation, but honestly, there's not much to do. n = 3, clearly.  $W = \{w_1, w_2, w_3\}$ , but all that changes there is subscripts vs. numbers on the side.  $P[w_1]$  is the first list on the left. Similarly, we can see the men and the other preference lists.

**FROM SOLUTION REPRESENTATION:** There happens to be only one stable solution to this instance:  $\{(m_2, w_3), (m_1, w_1), (m_3, w_2)\}.$ 

On to the next question...

The other can be even smaller, but not trivial:

**SOLUTION:** We can go smaller and still have a trivial example. So, let's do so. Two men and two women:

w1: m1 m2 m1: w1 w2 w2: m1 m2 m2: w2 w1

With two men/women, there are only two choices of preference list. So, I gave the women matching preference lists and the men opposite preference lists, just to illustrate both possibilities. That may be useful or may not!

FROM PROBLEM REPRESENTATION: I won't explicitly use our new names here, since little has changed, as noted above.

FROM SOLUTION REPRESENTATION: Again, there happens to be only one stable solution to this instance:  $\{(m_1, w_1), (m_2, w_2)\}$ . (Want one with more than one solution? Try tweaking  $w_1$ 's preference list.)

#### $\mathbf{2}$ Represent the Problem

In this part, we try to understand what an instance of the problem looks like. Imagine you were writing a function to solve this problem. We're asking what are the parameters to your function, what types are they, and what constraints/preconditions are there on them and their relationships?

1. What are the quantities that matter in this problem? Give them short, usable names.

 $\begin{array}{c} \textbf{SOLUTION:} \ \, \textbf{You} \ \, \textbf{may} \ \, \textbf{have} \ \, \textbf{come} \ \, \textbf{up} \ \, \textbf{with} \ \, \textbf{more}, \ \, \textbf{fewer}, \ \, \textbf{or} \ \, \textbf{different} \ \, \textbf{quantities} \ \, \textbf{than} \ \, \textbf{me}, \ \, \textbf{but} \ \, \textbf{here} \ \, \textbf{are} \\ \textbf{some} \ \, \textbf{useful NSSIGNMENT} \ \, \textbf{PTOJECT} \ \, \textbf{EXAM} \ \, \textbf{Help} \\ \end{array}$ 

- n, the number of men and the number of women.
- M, the set of menting  $x_2$ . //  $p_0$  we come  $w_1$  where  $w_1$  we will depend on  $w_1$  where  $w_2$  is  $w_2$  and  $w_3$  and  $w_4$  are  $w_1$  and  $w_2$  is  $w_2$  and  $w_3$  are  $w_4$  and  $w_4$  and  $w_4$  are  $w_4$  are  $w_4$  are  $w_4$  and  $w_4$  are  $w_4$  are  $w_4$  are  $w_4$  and  $w_4$  are  $w_4$  are  $w_4$  and  $w_4$  are  $w_4$  are  $w_4$  are  $w_4$  are  $w_4$  are  $w_4$  are  $w_4$  and  $w_4$  are  $w_4$  are  $w_4$  are  $w_4$  are  $w_4$  and  $w_4$  are  $w_4$  are  $w_4$  are  $w_4$  are  $w_4$  are  $w_4$  are  $w_4$  and  $w_4$  are  $w_4$  and  $w_4$  are  $w_4$  are  $w_4$  are  $w_4$  are  $w_4$  are  $w_4$  and  $w_4$  are  $w_4$  are  $w_4$  are  $w_4$  are  $w_4$  are  $w_4$  and  $w_4$  are  $w_4$  are  $w_4$  and  $w_4$  are  $w_4$  are  $w_4$  are  $w_4$  are  $w_4$  are  $w_4$  and  $w_4$  are  $w_4$  are  $w_4$  and  $w_4$  are  $w_4$  are  $w_4$  are  $w_4$  are  $w_4$  are  $w_4$  are  $w_4$  and  $w_4$  are  $w_4$  are  $w_4$  and  $w_4$  are  $w_4$  and  $w_4$  are  $w_4$  are  $w_4$  are  $w_4$  are  $w_4$  are  $w_4$  and  $w_4$  are  $w_4$  are  $w_4$  are  $w_4$  and  $w_4$  are  $w_4$  are  $w_4$  are  $w_4$  are  $w_4$  and  $w_4$  are  $w_4$  are  $w_4$  and  $w_4$  are  $w_4$  are  $w_4$  and  $w_4$  are  $w_4$  are  $w_4$  are  $w_4$  are  $w_4$  and  $w_4$  are  $w_4$  are
- Each man's preference list—which we might call  $P[m_i]$  for man i—is a permutation of W, the set of women. Note that I'm forcing the men to have complete preferences for all the women, no ties. That's the simplest wers on of the quoblent, soy probably the one to start with. I'll also assume that everyone prefers being married to not being married.
- Similarly, each woman's preference list,  $P[w_i]$ , is a permutation of M.
- It's good to have a notation to indicate whether a woman prefers one man to another (or similarly for a man). I'll use  $m_i >_{w_j} m_k$  to mean that  $w_j$  prefers  $m_i$  to  $m_k$ , i.e.,  $m_i$  occurs earlier in  $w_j$ 's preference list than  $m_k$ .
- 2. Go back up to your trivial and small instances and rewrite them using these names.

**SOLUTION:** See above.

3. Describe using your representational choices above what a valid instance looks like:

**SOLUTION:** What "shape" is an instance (in programming terms, what inputs of what type constitute an input) and what additional constraints are there on inputs of that "shape" for them to be valid?

The crucial piece of an instance is the preference lists for the men and women. We need to know how many of those there are.

So, we might describe an instance as a tuple:  $(n, P_W, P_M)$ , where n is the number of women (and also the number of men),  $P_W$  is a list of n preference lists for the women (where element i is  $w_i$ 's preferences), and  $P_M$  is a list of n preference lists for the men.

If you're more comfortable thinking in programming input/output terms, you might say that the input is: one line with a (non-negative) integer n, then n lines representing the women's preference lists each with n whitespace-separated numbers forming a permutation of  $1, \ldots, n$ , and finally n similar lines representing the men's preference lists.

### 3 Represent the Solution

In this part, we try to understand what a solution to an instance of the problem looks like. Imagine you were write a function to solve this problem. We're asking what will your function return, what type is it, and what postconditions does it satisfy?

- 1. What are the quantities that matter in the solution to the problem? Give them short, usable names. **SOLUTION:** Central to our solution are marriages, which are pairs  $(m_i, w_j)$  indicating that man i and woman j are married. A solution, then is a set of pairings (with some constraints we describe next).
- 2. Describe using these quantities what makes a solution valid and good:

**SOLUTION:** There's no technical weight intended here for the words "valid" and "good". They're just ways to think about how you might judge solutions. A solution might be invalid if it violates a constraint. It might be bad if it's low-quality for some reason. (Later, we'll also solve optimization problems where we really are searching for the best among many valid solutions.)

In this case, let's focus on validity measuring whether we've successfully married everyone off just once. A valid Souten it and the marching last of pairing and that the woman appears in exactly one pairing and each man appears in exactly one as well.

Any such set of pairings is one we **could** propose to our women and men as a way to pair them off. A good one is "self-e norting" on the pass water our women and men as a way to pair them off. A good one is "self-e norting" on the pass water our women and men as a way to pair them off. A good one is "self-e norting" on the pass water our women and men as a way to pair them off. A good one is "self-e norting" on the pass water our women and men as a way to pair them off. A good one is "self-e norting" on the pass water our women and men as a way to pair them off. A good one is "self-e norting" on the pass water our women and men as a way to pair them off. A good one is "self-e norting" on the pass water our women and men as a way to pair them off.

Next, what's an instability? An instability can occur for a man  $m_i$  and woman  $w_j$  who are not matched in the solution  $(4m_i)$  which the set of pairings. Let  $w'_i$  be  $m'_i$ 's partner in the solution and m' be  $w_j$ 's partner. Then,  $m_i$  and  $w_j$  constitute an instability  $(2m_i)$   $(2m_i)$ 

3. Go back up to your trivial and small instances and write out one or more solutions to each using these names.

**SOLUTION:** See above.

4. Draw at least one solution. (We would normally ask you to **draw** an instance as well, but SMP isn't an especially graphical problem!)

**SOLUTION:** For this instance:

#### 4 Similar Problems

As the course goes on, we'll have more and more problems we can compare against, but you've already learned some. So...

Give at least one problem you've seen before that seems related in terms of its surface features ("story"), problem or solution structure, or representation to this one:

**SOLUTION:** You may not have enough background in problems to feel like you've seen a lot of similar problems, but you have at least seen problems where you organize a bunch of values by comparisons among them: sorting. If you've worked with bipartite graphs and matching problems, anything associated with them seems promising, especially maximum matching. (We often discuss "goodness" measures that give more points to a first preference than a second and so forth, like the Borda count. You could frame that problem as a maximum matching problem!) This also feels a bit like an election or auction, which takes us toward game theory. Maybe you'd even decide this feels a bit like hashing (mapping a value in one set to a different value in another set).

The point isn't to be "right" yet; it's to have a lot of potential tools on hand! As you collect more tools, you'll start to judge which are more promising and which less.

#### 5 Brute Force?

You should usually start on any algorithmic problem by using "brute force": generate all possible solutions and test each on Atssetig in infactifit spring the spring from the

1. A possible SMP solution takes the form of a perfect matching: a pairing of each woman with exactly one man. We'll call a perfect matching a "valid" (but not necessarily good) solution.

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**SOLUTION:** There are n-1 to line up next to the second. Then, n-2 next to the third, and so on. Overall, then, that's  $n \times n - 1 \times n - 2 \times \ldots \times 2 \times 1 = n!$ . There are n! perfect matchings, our "valid" solutions. That's already super-exponential, even if it takes only constant time per solution to produce them!

We asked in the challenge problems for an algorithm to produce these. It's unusually challenging to design for a brute force algorithm, but it's useful to think about; so, we'll work through it here.

Before we dive into an algorithm, let's just try creating all solutions for an example. We might start by just marrying the first person (say,  $w_1$ ) off to **someone**. After all, we know she needs to be married to somebody!

$$w_1 = m_1$$
 $w_2 = m_2$ 
 $w_3 = m_3$ 

We can now set  $w_1$  and  $w_1$  aside, which gives us... another SMP instance that's smaller. As soon as you hear words like "and that leaves us with [something that looks like our original problem] but smaller", you should be thinking of recursion. Let's just assume we can recursively construct all possible solutions. That will give us back a bunch of sets of pairings, in this case two:

$$w_1 \longrightarrow m_1 \qquad w_1 \longrightarrow m_1$$
 $w_2 \longrightarrow m_2 \qquad w_2 \longrightarrow m_2$ 
 $w_3 \longrightarrow m_3 \text{ and } w_3 \longrightarrow m_3$ 

We can add our set-aside pairing  $(m_1, w_1)$  onto each of these:

That's all the solutions in which  $w_1$  weds  $m_1$ . Who else can  $w_1$  marry? Each of the other men. We can use the same procedure for each other possible pairing. Must  $w_1$  marry someone? Yes, because we need a perfect matching. So, that covers all the possibilities for  $w_1$  and, recursively, for everyone else.

Now we're ready for an algorithm. Let's call it AllSolns. It's recursive; so, what's the base case? Our trivial cases are where n=0 or n=1. Let's try n=0 as a base case. Looking back at the trivial cases, I see the solution for n=0 is the empty set of pairings  $\{\}$ . With that, let's build the algorithm. I'll use **return** when I'm producing the whole set at once and **yield** to produce one at a time. (You could just initialize a variable to the empty set and add in each **yielded** solution, returning the whole set at the end.)

```
procedure AllSolns(W, M)

if |W| = 0 then

return \{\{\}\}

be The set of sol'ns, containing only the empty sol'n. else

choose a w \in W

For all m \in M do m \in M

yield \{(m, w)\} \cup S

end for end for end for end of procedure

procedure

The base case we chose.

Any one, e.g., the first.

Any one, e.g., the first.

Add the set-aside pairing.

Add the set-aside pairing.
```

If we use our analysis techniques to count the number of solutions this creates, the analysis will parallel the recursive function itself. In the base case when n=0, ALLSOLNS produces one solution. Otherwise, for each of the n men, it makes a recursive call with n'=n-1 (one fewer man and one fewer woman in the subproblem). For each solution produced by that recursive call, it also generates one solution. If we give the number of solutions a name, we can express this as a recurrence:

$$N(n) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{when } n = 0\\ n * N(n-1) & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

So, for example, N(4) = 4\*N(3) = 4\*3\*N(2) = 4\*3\*2\*N(1) = 4\*3\*2\*1\*N(0) = 4\*3\*2\*1\*1 = 4!. And, indeed, this is exactly the definition of factorial. So, N(n) = n!. There are n! solutions to a problem of size n.

2. Once we have a possible solution, we must test whether it's the solution we're looking for. Informally, we'll refer to this as asking whether it's a "good" solution.

A perfect matching is a good solution if it has no instabilities. Design a (brute force!) algorithm that—given an instance of SMP and a perfect matching—determines whether that perfect matching contains an instability. (As always, it helps to **give a name** to your algorithm and its parameters, especially if your algorithm is recursive. Remember, for brute force: generate each possible solution (possible instability, in this case) and then test whether it really is a solution.)

**SOLUTION:** The form of a potential instability is a pair (man and woman). We therefore want to go through each pair of one man and one woman and check that (1) they are **not** already married (or they cannot cause an instability) and (2) they'd rather be with each other that their partners. (I'll

assume we have a quick way to find a partner, which shouldn't be hard to create.) That should look like the following, where  $(n, P_W, P_M)$  is an instance of SMP and S is a solution to that instance (a perfect match and therefore a set of pairings  $(m_i, w_i)$ ):

```
procedure IsStable ((n, P_W, P_M), S) for all w \in \{w_1, \ldots, w_n\} do for all m \in \{m_1, \ldots, m_n\} do if (m, w) \notin S then find m' such that (m', w) \in S find w' such that (m, w') \in S if m >_w m' and w >_m w' then return false end if end for return true end procedure
```

3. Exactly or asymptotically, how long does your algorithm take? (Again, you should explicitly name the size of an instance and perform your analysis in terms of that name!)

**SOLUTION** Sletisgsamp vedgan efficient (constant-lime) job of practical like comparing w's preferences for the two men and checking if (m,w) is in S. (It's not immediately obvious how to do this, but with some careful data structures and  $O(n^2)$  preprocessing, it's doable!) The number of iterations in the inner loop is independent of which iteration we're on in the outer one. The body takes constant time. Solution worst  $O(n^2)$  in the first blift this takes  $|M|*|W|*O(1) = n*n*O(1) = O(n^2)$  time.

4. Brute force would generate each valid solution and then test whether it's good. Will brute force be sufficient for this probably for the what is were interest to the condition of the whole is were interest.

**SOLUTION:** Looks like brute force will take  $O(n^2n!)$  time. That's horrendous. It won't do for even quite modest values of n. (But, it is good enough to solve the n=3 example we demonstrated in the classroom.)

## 6 Promising Approach

Unless brute force is good enough, describe—in as much detail as you can—an approach that looks promising.

**SOLUTION:** You may have thought of lots of ideas. For example, you might have noticed that if a man and a woman both most-prefer each other, we must pair them; that might form the kernel of some kind of algorithm. We won't go into ideas here. Rather, we refer you to the textbook's description of the Gale-Shapley algorithm.

## 7 Challenge Your Approach

1. Carefully run your algorithm on your instances above. (Don't skip steps or make assumptions; you're debugging!) Analyse its correctness and performance on these instances:

**SOLUTION:** For fun, we'll use G-S with **women** proposing.

G-S correctly terminates immediately on any n=0 example with an empty set of marriages. With n=1, the one woman proposes to the one man, who must accept, and the algorithm correctly terminates with them married.

Going back to our other two examples:

(a) Example #1:

```
w1: m2 m1 m3 m1: w3 w1 w2 w2: m1 m2 m3 m2: w3 w2 w1 w3: m2 m1 m3 m3: w2 w1 w3
```

G-S doesn't specify what order the women propose. We'll work from top to bottom:

```
i. w_1 proposes to m_2, who accepts. E = \{(m_2, w_1)\}
```

```
ii. w_2 proposes to m_1, who accepts. E = \{(m_2, w_1), (m_1, w_2)\}
```

- iii.  $w_3$  proposes to  $m_2$ , who prefers  $w_3$  to  $w_1$ .  $m_2$  breaks his engagement with  $w_1$  and accepts  $w_3$ 's proposal.  $E = \{(m_2, w_3), (m_1, w_2)\}$
- iv.  $w_1$  proposes to  $m_1$  (2nd on her list), who prefers  $w_1$  to  $w_2$ .  $m_1$  breaks his engagement with  $w_2$  and accepts  $w_{1's}$  proposal.  $E = \{(m_2, w_3), (m_1, w_1)\}$
- v.  $w_2$  proposes to  $m_2$ , who prefers  $w_3$  to  $w_2$  and so declines the proposal.  $E = \{(m_2, w_3), (m_1, w_1)\}$
- vi.  $w_2$  proposes to  $m_3$  (last on her list!), who accepts.  $E = \{(m_2, w_3), (m_1, w_1), (m_3, w_2)\}$
- vii. The algorithm terminates with the correct solution  $S = \{(m_2, w_3), (m_1, w_1), (m_3, w_2)\}.$
- (b) Example Signment Project Exam Help

```
w1: m1 m2 m1: w1 w2
w2: m1 m2 m2: w2 w1
We'll again use the proposing, working top Content.
```

- i.  $w_1$  proposes to  $m_1$ , who accepts.  $E = \{(m_1, w_1)\}$
- ii.  $w_2$  proposes to  $m_1$ , who declines (prefers  $w_1$  to  $w_2$ ).  $E = \{(m_1, w_1)\}$
- iii. w<sub>2</sub> propose Add Owh West Math 100 W. Coder
- iv. The algorithm terminates with the correct solution  $S = \{(m_1, w_1), (m_2, w_2)\}.$
- 2. Design an instance that specifically challenges the correctness (or performance) of your algorithm. This time, we suggest designing an instance with n=3 to be solved by G-S with men proposing where either the maximum number of proposals is made or men get as bad an outcome as possible.

**SOLUTION:** We'll focus on men getting as bad an outcome as possible. We'll work through this by ignoring irrelevant choices and trying to make (and backtrack to) relevant choices carefully. For example, who proposes first is an irrelevant question. It might as well be  $m_1$ . If it were  $m_2$  instead, we could just swap the second and first man and **make** it  $m_1$ .

So,  $m_1$  proposes first and may as well propose to  $w_1$ :

```
m1: w1 w1: w2: w2: m3: w3:
```

 $w_1$  has to accept, but we want her to eventually break off the engagement with  $m_1$  for someone else (to make the outcome bad for  $m_1$ ). Let's have  $m_2$  propose to her and  $w_1$  accept. Notice that we don't specify all of the preferences for  $w_1$ , just enough to know she prefers  $m_2$  to  $m_1$ :

```
m1: w1 w1: m2 > m1
m2: w1 w2:
m3: w3:
```

Note that that was a choice, however. We could have had both  $m_2$  and  $m_3$  prefer  $w_2$  to  $w_1$ . We may have to come back to that. (Why not  $w_3$ ? Well, if they both prefer  $w_3$ , we'll just swap  $w_2$  and  $w_3$ . If the prefer **different** people, then G-S will stop after three iterations with all men getting their top choice, which isn't what we want! Can you see why?)

Then, we'll have  $m_3$  propose to  $w_1$  and be accepted. Again, this is a choice we may have to revisit!

```
m1: w1 w1: m3 > m2 > m1
m2: w1 w2:
m3: w1 w3:
```

Oh, wait. If we do that,  $m_3$  will **definitely** end up with  $w_1$ , getting his top choice. Can we force him to do worse? Let's try a different approach and have  $m_3$  propose to  $w_2$ .

```
m1: w1 w1: m2 > m1 m2: w3 m3: w2 w3:
```

Then,  $m_1$  can break in on that engagement:

 $m_2$  is still engaged to  $w_1$ . So, maybe  $m_3$  can break in on that engagement now? That doesn't give  $m_3$  his worst outcome though. Maybe we'll need to some back to this?

```
m1: w1 w2 w1: m3 > m2 > m1 w2: w1 w2: m1 > m3
```

```
<sup>m3: w2 w1</sup> w3Add WeChat powcoder
```

Now,  $m_2$  can break in on  $m_1$ :

```
m1: w1 w2 w1: m3 > m2 > m1 m2: w1 w2 w2: m2 > m1 > m3 m3: w2 w1 w3:
```

And, finally,  $m_1$  can propose to  $w_3$ :

```
m1: w1 w2 w3 w1: m3 > m2 > m1
m2: w1 w2 w2: m2 > m1 > m3
m3: w2 w1 w3: m1
```

Is that the best we can do? Could we get another man to his worst choice? It turns out we actually **cannot**. See if you can prove it. Specifically: *if a man proposes to the last woman on his preference list, G-S must terminate on that iteration*. (Hint: how many couples must already be engaged for a man to propose to the last woman on his preference list? And... can that last woman herself already be engaged?)

Let's turn that into an actual instance:

```
m1: w1 w2 w3 w1: m3 m2 m1 m2: w1 w2 w3 w2: m2 m1 m3 m3: w2 w1 w3 w3: m1 m2 m3
```

## 8 Repeat!

Hopefully, we've already bounced back and forth between these steps in today's worksheet! You usually will have to. Especially repeat the steps where you generate instances and challenge your approach(es).

**SOLUTION:** We bounced back and forth quite a bit, even in this carefully crafted solution.

P.S. No solutions to challenge problems, but feel free to talk to us about them!

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