

Reference

Thursday, April 18, 2024 11:47 AM

1. "An Introduction to Mathematical Cryptography" by Hoffstein, Pipher and Silverman
2. Dan Boneh Cryptography course on Coursera

Some math background

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$\boxed{\mathbb{Z}/m\mathbb{Z}} = \{0, 1, \dots, m-1\}$ ring of integers modulo m .

Binary operations : + and \cdot $\rightarrow (\mathbb{Z}/m\mathbb{Z}, +), (\mathbb{Z}/m\mathbb{Z}, \cdot)$

notation: $\mathbb{Z}_m \leftrightarrow \mathbb{Z}/m\mathbb{Z}$ quotient ring of \mathbb{Z} by principal ideal $m\mathbb{Z}$

Example: $\mathbb{Z}/5\mathbb{Z}$ is just \mathbb{Z}_5 .

$$\{0, 1, 2, 3, 4\} \quad \text{you can do} \quad 2+3 = 5 = 0 \pmod{5}$$

or $2 \cdot 3 = 6 = 1 \pmod{5}$

$$\boxed{(\mathbb{Z}/m\mathbb{Z})^*} = \{a \in \mathbb{Z}/m\mathbb{Z} : \gcd(a, m) = 1\}$$

$$= \{a \in \mathbb{Z}/m\mathbb{Z} : a \text{ has an inverse modulo } m\}$$

Numbers that have inverses are called units.

$(\mathbb{Z}/m\mathbb{Z})^*$ is just the set of all units, called group of units modulo m .

Example: $\mathbb{Z}/24\mathbb{Z} = \{0, 1, 2, \dots, 23\}$

$$(\mathbb{Z}/24\mathbb{Z})^* = \{1, 5, 7, 13, 17, 19, 23\}$$

$$\mathbb{Z}/7\mathbb{Z} = \{0, 1, 2, \dots, 6\}$$

$$(\mathbb{Z}/7\mathbb{Z})^* = \{1, 2, \dots, 6\}$$

When m is prime ($\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}$ case), all elements other than 0 are units.

If p is prime, then the set $\boxed{\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}}$ is a finite field, also denoted as $\boxed{\mathbb{F}_p}$.

Also, $\boxed{(\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z})^*} = \{1, 2, \dots, p-1\}$ is often denoted as $\boxed{\mathbb{F}_p^*}$ it is just called non-zero

Also, $(\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z})^*$ is often denoted as \mathbb{F}_p^* . It is just all the non-zero elements in the finite field.

Fermat's Little Theorem

Let p be a prime, then $\forall x \in (\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z})^*$:

$$x^{p-1} = 1 \pmod{p}$$

Example: $p=5$, $3^4 = 81 = 1 \pmod{5}$

Fermat's Little Theorem can help with modular inverse computation in $\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Pick } x \in (\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z})^* &\Rightarrow x^{p-1} = 1 \pmod{p} \\ &\Rightarrow x \cdot x^{p-2} = 1 \pmod{p} \\ &\Rightarrow x^{-1} = x^{p-2} \pmod{p} \quad (\text{less efficient than Euclid}) \end{aligned}$$

Fermat's Little Theorem can help with random prime generation

Want to generate a large random prime p with length 1024 bits

Step 1: choose random integer $p \in [2^{1024}, 2^{1025}-1]$

Step 2: test if $2^{p-1} = 1 \pmod{p}$

If Yes, return p ; otherwise, repeat.

Probability of getting false positive is negligible.

The structure of $(\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z})^*$

Theorem (Euler) : $(\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z})^*$ is a cyclic group, that is

$$\exists g \in (\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z})^* \text{ st. } \{1, g, g^2, \dots, g^{p-2}\} = (\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z})^*$$

\uparrow
 $g^{p-1} \text{ by Fermat}$

g is called a generator of $(\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z})^*$.

Example: $(p=7)$. $\{1, 3^1, 3^2, 3^3, 3^4, 3^5\} = (\mathbb{Z}/7\mathbb{Z})^*$, $g=3$

$1 \quad 3 \quad 2 \quad 6 \quad 4 \quad 5 \pmod{7}$

Not every element is a generator: $\{1, 2^1, 2^2, 2^3, 2^4, 2^5\} = \{1, 2, 4\}$

$1 \quad 2 \quad 4 \quad 1 \quad 2 \quad 4 \pmod{7}$

Euler's phi function (totient function)

$$\phi(m) = \# (\mathbb{Z}/m\mathbb{Z})^* = \# \{0 \leq a < m : \gcd(a, m) = 1\}$$

\uparrow
size of $(\mathbb{Z}/m\mathbb{Z})^*$,

"#" is "number of"

Example: $\phi(24) = 8 \quad \phi(7) = 6 = 7 - 1$

$$\phi(p) = p-1 \text{ in general}$$

Computation:

1. p prime, a positive integer,

$$\text{then } \phi(p^a) = p^a - p^{a-1} = p^a(p-1)$$

2. If a, b coprime, then $\phi(ab) = \phi(a)\phi(b)$

fundamental theorem
of arithmetic

3. n positive integer, prime factorization $p_1^{e_1} \cdots p_k^{e_k}$
then $\phi(n) = (p_1^{e_1} - 1)(p_1^{e_1-1}) \cdots (p_k^{e_k} - 1)(p_k^{e_k-1})$

3. n positive integer, prime factorization $p_1^{e_1} \cdots p_k^{e_k}$
then $\phi(n) = (p_1^{e_1} - p_1^{e_1-1}) \cdots (p_k^{e_k} - p_k^{e_k-1})$

$$\begin{aligned}
&= p_1^{e_1} \left(1 - \frac{1}{p_1}\right) \cdots p_k^{e_k} \left(1 - \frac{1}{p_k}\right) \\
&= (p_1^{e_1} \cdots p_k^{e_k}) \left(1 - \frac{1}{p_1}\right) \cdots \left(1 - \frac{1}{p_k}\right) \\
&= n \cdot \left(1 - \frac{1}{p_1}\right) \cdots \left(1 - \frac{1}{p_k}\right)
\end{aligned}$$

Theorem (Euler): $\forall x \in (\mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z})^*$: $x^{\phi(N)} \equiv 1 \pmod{N}$

Example: $5^{\phi(12)} = 5^4 = 625 \equiv 1 \pmod{12}$

Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange

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Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange protocol was designed to exchange secret key over insecure channel. After that Alice and Bob do traditional symmetric crypto -> "hybrid encryption"

Keygen A trusted 3rd party publishes a large prime p and an integer g having prime order in \mathbb{F}_p^* .
 \mathbb{F}_p^* ↑ non-zero elements in \mathbb{F}_p

Private computation

Alice

Pick secret a


Compute $A = g^a \text{ mod } p$

Bob

Pick secret b

Compute $B = g^b \text{ mod } p$

Public exchange



Private computation

Compute $B^a \text{ mod } p$

Compute $A^b \text{ mod } p$

Correctness: $B^a = (g^b)^a = g^{ba} = g^{ab} = (g^a)^b = A^b \text{ mod } p$

Diffie-Hellman Problem (DHP)

Let p be a prime number and g an integer. The Diffie-Hellman Problem is the problem of computing the value of $g^{ab} \text{ mod } p$ from the known values of $g^a \text{ mod } p$ and $g^b \text{ mod } p$.



Eve knows A and B ,

Eve knows A and B,
but not the shared secret

The difficulty relies on the hardness of discrete log problem.

Eve: solve $g^a \bmod p$ or $g^b \bmod p$ to get a or b
then compute $B^a \bmod p$ or $A^b \bmod p$.

Fermat's Little Theorem:

$$a^{p-1} \equiv 1 \pmod{p} \text{ if } p \nmid a \quad (\text{if } p \mid a \text{ then } a \equiv 0 \pmod{p} \Rightarrow a^{p-1} \equiv 0 \pmod{p})$$

Is this theorem for non-prime m in general? No

But, we can generalize it to $m = pq$ where p, q are distinct primes.

Observation: $m = 15 = 3 \cdot 5$

$$\begin{aligned} a^4 &\equiv 1 \pmod{15} \quad \text{for } a = 1, 2, 4, 7, 8, 11, 13 \text{ and } 14 \quad \leftarrow \gcd(a, 15) = 1 \\ a^4 &\not\equiv 1 \pmod{15} \quad \text{for } a = 3, 5, 6, 9, 10, \text{ and } 12 \quad \leftarrow \gcd(a, 15) \neq 1 \end{aligned}$$

equivalent

$$\begin{aligned} a^4 \equiv 1 \pmod{15} &\rightarrow a^4 \equiv 1 \pmod{3} \quad \text{and} \quad a^4 \equiv 1 \pmod{5} \\ \Rightarrow 15 \mid a^4 - 1 &\Rightarrow 3 \mid a^4 - 1 \quad \Rightarrow 5 \mid a^4 - 1 \end{aligned}$$

$$\downarrow \quad \quad \quad \downarrow$$

$$15 \mid a^4 - 1$$

Verify if $\stackrel{\textcircled{1}}{a^4 \equiv 1 \pmod{3}}$ and $\stackrel{\textcircled{2}}{a^4 \equiv 1 \pmod{5}}$ hold:

$$\textcircled{1} \quad a^4 = (a^2)^2 = (a^{3-1})^2 = 1^2 \equiv 1 \pmod{3}$$

by Fermat

$$\textcircled{2} \quad a^4 = a^{5-1} \equiv 1 \pmod{5}$$

By Fermat

You can see 4 is special in this case:

- ① it is multiple of $p-1$ for $p=3$
- ② it is multiple of $p-1$ for $p=5$

In general:

..... \sim .. \sim ..

In general:

Theorem (Euler's formula for p^q)

Let p, q be distinct primes and $g = \gcd(p-1, q-1)$

then

$$a^{\frac{(p-1)(q-1)}{g}} \equiv 1 \pmod{pq} \quad \text{for all } a \text{ s.t. } \gcd(a, pq) = 1$$

If p and q are odd primes (not 2), then:

$$a^{\frac{(p-1)(q-1)}{2}} \equiv 1 \pmod{pq} \quad \text{for all } a \text{ s.t. } \gcd(a, pq) = 1$$

This theorem is a generalization of Fermat's little theorem, and it will be used in the proofs of the next two propositions.

Security of RSA relies on solving $x^e \equiv c \pmod{N}$

In other words, it is hard to take e th root modulo N .

If N is prime, it is easy to compute e th root modulo N .

Proposition: Let p be prime, $e \geq 1$ integer s.t. $\gcd(e, p-1) = 1$.

(e has inverse mod $p-1$: $de \equiv 1 \pmod{p-1}$)

Then the congruence $x^e \equiv c \pmod{p}$ has unique solution $x \equiv c^d \pmod{p}$

If $N = pq$ but attacker can factor N , then RSA is broken.

Because attacker knows p and q , can compute $\phi(N) = (p-1)(q-1)$, then compute d s.t. $de \equiv 1 \pmod{(p-1)(q-1)}$. Then learns $x \equiv c^d \pmod{pq}$.

Proposition: Let p, q be distinct primes, $e \geq 1$ s.t. $\gcd(e, (p-1)(q-1)) = 1$.

(e has inverse mod $(p-1)(q-1)$: $de \equiv 1 \pmod{(p-1)(q-1)}$)

Then the congruence $x^e \equiv c \pmod{pq}$ has unique solution $x \equiv c^d \pmod{pq}$



Correctness of RSA decryption

RSA

Alice

key gen

Bob

choose secret primes p and q
choose encryption exponent e
with $\text{gcd}(e, (p-1)(q-1)) = 1$.

Publish $N = pq$ and e . ($p, q \approx \sqrt{N}$)
 (N, e) is Bob's public key pair.

Encryption

Choose plaintext m .

Use Bob's public key (N, e)
to compute $c = m^e \pmod{N}$

Send ciphertext c to Bob.

use his (p, q)

Decryption

Compute d s.t. $ed \equiv 1 \pmod{(p-1)(q-1)}$
Compute $m' = c^d \pmod{N} = m$.

Security analysis

Setup: p, q prime, $N = pq$, e, c integers

Problem: solve congruence $x^e \equiv c \pmod{N}$ for variable in x .

(In PHP, it was solving a in $g^a \pmod{p}$)

Easy Bob knows p and q , can easily solve for x

trapdoor info

Hard Eve, who does not know p and q , can't solve for x

\Rightarrow RSA encryption is a trapdoor function

Some further discussions

Some further discussions

$N \rightarrow$ modulus

$e \rightarrow$ encryption exponent

$d \rightarrow$ decryption exponent

1. choice of e

$e=1 \Rightarrow c=m$, RSA broken

$e=2 \Rightarrow \gcd(e, (p-1)(q-1)) \neq 1$, does not work

$e=3 \Rightarrow$ fine, but some people worry about security

$$e = 2^{16} + 1 = 65537$$

fast and secure

2. Eve can break RSA if she knows $p+q$

Why? $de \equiv 1 \pmod{(p-1)(q-1)}$

$$(p-1)(q-1) = pq - p - q + 1$$

$$= pq - (p+q) + 1$$

$$= N - (p+q) + 1$$

↑

public

And in fact, knowing $p+q$ is equivalent to knowing p and q in RSA. Consider the polynomial:

$$x^2 - (p+q)x + pq$$

$$\text{roots are: } x = \frac{(p+q) \pm \sqrt{(p+q)^2 - 4pq}}{2}$$

$$x = \frac{(p+q) \pm \sqrt{(p+q)^2 - 4N}}{2}$$

$$\left(x = \frac{-b \pm \sqrt{b^2 - 4ac}}{2a} \right)$$

Since the polynomial can be factored into $(x-p)(x-q)$:

$$p = \frac{(p+q) + \sqrt{(p+q)^2 - 4N}}{2}$$

$$p = \frac{(p+q) + \sqrt{(p+q)^2 - 4N}}{2}$$

$$q = \frac{(p+q) - \sqrt{(p+q)^2 - 4N}}{2}, \text{ or swap}$$

3. Eve's job is to solve $x^e \equiv c \pmod{N}$, not factor N . Factoring N is just one way of breaking RSA. If Eve knows how to compute ℓ th root modulo N , she can decrypt messages without knowing $\phi(pq) = (p-1)(q-1)$. No algorithm can do this efficiently at this moment.

Further research

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Number Theory notes by Ben Lynn:

<https://crypto.stanford.edu/pbc/notes/numbertheory/>

A paper on RSA attacks by Dan Boneh: <https://crypto.stanford.edu/~dabo/papers/RSA-survey.pdf>

Solve challenges on <https://cryptohack.org/challenges/>, specifically, challenges in "RSA" and "Diffie-Hellman" categories. You probably want to research "lattice-based cryptography" for more sophisticated attacks on RSA.