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TOWARDS EXPLAINABILITY IN KNOWLEDGE ENHANCED NEURAL NETWORKS

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Abstract

¹⁹ This is the abstract of the thesis.

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Listing of acronyms

101

102	ML	Machine Learning
103	XAI	Explainable Artificial Intelligence
104	NN	Neural Network
105	KENN	Knowledge Enhanced Neural Networks
106	TBF	<i>t</i> -conorm Boost Function
107	CE	Clause Enhancer
108	KE	Knowledge Enhancer
109	SBR	Semantic Based Regularization
110	LTN	Logic Tensor Networks
111	RNM	Relational Neural Machines
112	NSI	Neural Symbolic Integration

113

114

115 STILL WIP

1

Introduction

Explainability in Machine Learning

118 In recent years, research on Deep Learning (DL) has achieved remarkable results in a wide vari-
119 ety of domains, going from image recognition, speech recognition, machine translation, play-
120 ing games, and many others, even outperforming human capabilities. Although DL is not a
121 new research topic, its popularity and capabilities skyrocketed only in the last decade: this has
122 been possible mostly thanks to the always growing availability of new data, together with the
123 increase in computational power of modern machines. Despite the quick and huge success, re-
124 searchers in the field have already shown some perplexities and moved some critiques towards
125 this approach [2, 3]: is DL really the future of Artificial Intelligence (AI)? Will Neural Networks
126 (NN) be able to give a good approximation of the human brain? Leaving aside such overwhelm-
127 ing questions, we should still be interested in what DL is capable to do at the moment, and
128 what capabilities it still lacks. One particular aspect for which DL has been criticized is its lack
129 of transparency: in fact, deep models have millions or even billions of parameters, which are not
130 characterized in human interpretable ways, but only in terms of their position in the network
131 topology. This results in opaque models, since no human supervisor can, ultimately, interpret
132 what the model has learned by simply inspecting its internal structure. To refer to this undesir-
133 able property of deep NNs, the term “black box” is commonly used. DL models also present
134 other critical and perplexing issues: in [4] the authors made a neural network misclassify an
135 image by applying an hardly perceptible perturbation, found by maximizing the network’s pre-
136 diction error. Such adversarial examples have also been found to be somewhat universal and
137 not just the result of overfitting [5]. Similarly, authors in [6] show how deep neural networks

are easily fooled into misclassifying inputs with no resemblance to their true category. This kind of issues pose serious doubts about the ability of NN to learn general representations: indeed, if such networks can generalize well, how can they be confused by what we see as nearly indistinguishable images? Adversarial examples are not confined to the field of computer vision: natural language networks can also be fooled as shown in [7, 8]. Furthermore, it has been found that in several applications, DL models present strong biasedness. One example is reported in [9], where the authors show how word embeddings trained on Google News articles exhibit strong female/male gender stereotypes due to biases in the training data. Susceptibility to unintuitive errors remains therefore a pervasive problem in DL and no robust solution has been found for them so far. Such issues contribute to generate mistrust, and threaten to slow down or even hinder the prevalence of AI in some applications, due to the high potential of unexpected behavior and lack of verifiability of solutions. In light of such problems, Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI) has become an area of interest in the research community: it tackles the important problem that complex machines and algorithms often cannot provide insights into their behavior and thought processes. The need for XAI is now even more urgent: the renewed EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) could require AI providers to provide users with explanations of the results of ML systems based on their personal data. This clearly affects the industry in a huge way: indeed, the GDPR may hinder or even prohibit the use of “black box” models which don’t offer explanations for their decisions, when based on users’ personal data (think for example to recommender systems). This is also referred to as the “right to explanation” [10]. The need for XAI has been also expressed by the statement on algorithmic transparency and accountability released by the Association for Computing Machinery [11], and by the XAI program launched by DARPA in 2017 [12].

Even though the general aim for XAI is well understood as the achievement of *interpretability*, or *explainability*, for ML models, few articulate precisely what those terms mean or why they are important. In this chapter, we try to provide a more rigorous definition for such terms, by reviewing what has been done in the literature so far.

2.1 WHY DO WE NEED EXPLAINABILITY

Before determining a good definition for *explainability* or *interpretability*, we must have a good understanding of what the real world objectives of XAI research are. More specifically, what are the desiderata of XAI which are still not being satisfied by the current ML tools and practices. Consider a supervised learning scenario: a lot of evaluation metrics are used to assess

the quality of a model, accuracy probably being the most common one. The computation of such metrics require the presence of model predictions, together with ground truth labels, in order to produce a score which is computed in order to answer in a quantitative way to some questions, like “how good is Model A able to generalize with respect to Model B?”, or “what is the probability that Model A will misclassify an unseen sample?”. This evaluation framework provides satisfactory answers for some kinds of questions, but still fails to answer other ones, especially those demanding things qualitative information like “why did Model A predict sample x to belong to class k ?”, or “how did Model A understand that sample x belongs to class k ?”. This kind of questions are the ones sought by XAI research. However, we argue that a rigorous definition for the desiderata of XAI cannot consist in a list of potential questions: this approach is qualitative and already tackled by philosophical works [13]. We therefore need to express such needs in other forms other than simple questions.

Lipton [14] suggests that the need for explainability arises “when our real world objectives are difficult to encode as simple real-valued functions”: in this sense, *interpretations* are useful to achieve objectives which are important for us, but which we struggle to model in a formal way. Other mentioned motivating aspects are causality, transferability, informativeness and fair and ethical decision making. The authors in [15] refer to this same concept as *incompleteness* in the problem formalization: in such situations, explanations are one of ways to ensure human intervention on such questions, which machines are still struggling to understand. Some examples of such scenarios would be:

- **Scientific Understanding:** humans learn about the world around them in the form of knowledge, which is still difficult to formalize in the same way in which it works inside our brains. For this reason, we might look for explanations from ML models, which in turn we can interpret and transform into human interpretable knowledge.
- **Safety:** in complex tasks, rigorous and complete testing is almost never feasible and it is not possible to formally model all the wrong or dangerous decisions that a model could make. For this reason, when decisions from a ML system can pose a threat to others, explanations can help humans to evaluate safety conditions and to boost trust towards AI.
- **Ethics:** for us humans, evaluating the fairness of a decision is often easy, in the same way in which we have a clear idea of how we would want our model to be ethical (for example, we could desire a “fair” classifier for loan approval). However, this kind of properties are not easy to encode in ML systems and, at the same time, biases in the data can often lead to unethical decisions if not treated properly.

Some papers [16, 17] also motivate the need for explainability and interpretability in light of the need for trust by domain experts: indeed trust is fundamental if one plans to act based on a prediction, therefore ML systems must be able to communicate with highly skilled human experts to leverage their expertise and share useful information or patterns from the data.

2.2 WHEN DO WE NEED EXPLAINABILITY

Explainability is important in a lot of domains, but not in all of them. There are applications, e.g. aircraft collision avoidance, in which algorithms have been functioning from years without giving any explanations and without any human interaction. It is clear, then, that ML systems can be used without any need for interpretations in real world applications, at least in those cases where their raw performance in terms of accuracy suffices, or when the risk of error doesn't pose any serious threat to the end users. Therefore, domains that demand explainability are generally characterized by the critical nature of decisions which need to be made, where mistakes could have severe consequences. Authors in [18] provide a fairly exhaustive list of domains in need for explainability:

- **Medical Domain/Health-Care:** when the lives of humans are at stake, the need for explanations and knowledge are of paramount importance; take as an example a model used from researchers in order to associate to each patient a risk of suffering a certain disease. Such a model should not only be accurate, but intelligible from doctors: in this way they could understand the underlying causes for such disease, effectively advancing research in the medical domain;
- **Judicial System:** machine learning systems have also been explored for the automatic decision of judgement results [19]. Such systems should help judges and lawyers to take decisions, but in order to do so their decision must be well motivated;
- **Banking/Finance:** typical examples of automatic decision making in the banking domain are automatic credit approval systems. Since banks are legally obliged to provide customers with motivations when their credit request is denied, the usage of explainable models is required;
- **Automobile Industry:** autonomous driving systems are one of the most common and popular applications in DL research. Such autonomous agents are responsible for any accident that could take place on the road: for this reason explanations for each of the agent's decision must be provided, both for legal and security reasons, so that the system can be quickly fixed and improved;

- **Recommender Systems:** explainable recommendations boost the trustworthiness and effectiveness of recommender systems [20]. Furthermore, regulations like the aforementioned GDPR are currently requiring models that use users’ personal data to provide predictions, to also provide explanations.

Examples of other domains requiring explainability include bio-informatics, marketing, election campaigns, precision agriculture or expert systems for the military.

2.3 WHAT IS EXPLAINABILITY

Several research works attempt to describe rigorously the meaning of explainability in the context of XAI. In the literature, such word is often used interchangeably or substituted by “interpretability”, even though some try to make a distinction. In [21], for example, the authors claim that explainability is a property of a model that implies interpretability, but not viceversa. More specifically they provide definitions that, we argue, are the most agreed upon in the literature. For clarity, from now on we will interpret those two terms with the following meanings:

Definition 2.3.1 (Interpretability). We define *interpretability* in the context of supervised ML as the generic property of a model which makes its single components, as well as its functioning as a whole, understandable by a human being. Examples of interpretable models are simple linear regression or decision trees. Examples of not interpretable models are deep neural networks.

Definition 2.3.2 (Explainability). We define *explainability* in the context of supervised ML as the generic property of a model which makes it able to explain, to a certain extent, its own reasons behind a certain decision.

Explanations, according to the authors, can be evaluated in two ways: according to their intelligibility (that is, its understandability by a human being) and their completeness (that is, the accuracy of the description). Under this definitions, the challenge of XAI is in creating explanations that are both interpretable and complete, even though such characteristics are often opposed to one another. These two features of explanations resemble two important properties of ML models and suggest a similitude: on one hand, the user would desire a simple model with few parameters and at the same time a model able to capture really well the structure of the training data. While both the properties are desirable, they are almost never achievable

at the same time. Indeed, as we train simple models, we will probably underfit the data: in the same way, really easy explanations often fail to capture the complexities behind the internal workings of our algorithms. On the other hand, as we add parameters to our model and make it more complex, it will begin to better fit the data: in the same way a really complete explanation will describe accurately the operations of the systems, but will probably result more difficult to understand to a human being. This comparison suggests that, even for explanations, one should allow for a *tradeoff* between interpretability and completeness. The author also suggests that the explanation methods should be evaluated according to how such explanations behave on the curve from maximum interpretability to maximum completeness. This approach is followed in depth in [17], where the authors devise an explanation technique able to work for any classifier, by optimizing the intelligibility-completeness tradeoff. More information about this work is provided in Section 2.3.2.

In [15] interpretability is defined as the ability to explain or to present in understandable terms to a human. According to [18], instead, *interpretability* is most often used in terms of comprehending how the prediction model works as a whole, while *explainability*, in contrast, is used to indicate the capability of models to give explanations about their decision, but keeping their black box nature. In the particular context of generating explanations for DL models, the authors of [22] define an explanation as the collection of features of an interpretable domain (i.e. pixel values on images), that have contributed for a given example to produce a decision (e.g. classification or regression). We can see that none of the aforementioned definitions are specific enough to enable one universal formalization: indeed they implicitly depend on the context or the aim of the research work.

Going back to our definitions, in general, it is true that an explainable model is almost always interpretable, but the viceversa might not always be true. A notable exception to this rule, however, is the human brain itself: while we are able to give really detailed and motivated reasons behind our decision processes, our brain is not an interpretable model. Indeed, we don't know every single aspect of how our brains works, and yet we (often) trust the explanations that other human beings provide when asked why they took a certain decision. This offers an interesting point of view to the discussion: we should be careful not to trust certain explanations only by the fact that they look plausible and convincing. To this regard, Herman [23] warns its readers, making a clear distinction between descriptive and persuasive explanations: indeed implicit cognitive biases of the human brain could mislead us to trust wrong explanations (for example, humans naturally tend to prefer simpler descriptions). To avoid falling in this problem, one should always keep in mind the intelligibility-completeness tradeoff mentioned above.




Figure 2.1: Intuitive representation of explanations coming from transparent models (left) vs. explanations coming from post-hoc interpretability techniques (right). Transparent models are inherently interpretable by their design; they can be inspected and explanations can be deduced from them. Post-hoc interpretability, on the other hand, refers to a wide range of techniques with which explanations are extracted by any already trained model.

It is clear that, even after providing some sort of definitions, the meanings of interpretability and explainability are still very generic and slippery. Nevertheless, the volume of research in XAI is quickly expanding, making the number of available methodologies continuously grow. One fundamental problem in XAI is the definition of specific properties, which make models explainable or interpretable. In the literature, two paradigms are often distinguished [24, 14]:

- **Transparency**, or integrated interpretability: it is mostly a feature of *interpretable* models. A transparent model can be interpreted by a human thanks to its own easy to understand design.
- **Post-hoc** interpretability: refers to that approach with which explanations are extracted from already trained models. Such models can be transparent, or retain their black box structure.

An intuitive illustration of those two concepts are illustrated in Figure 2.1.

2.3.1 TRANSPARENCY

Transparency is one of the properties that can enable interpretability and it implies some sort of understanding of the mechanism by which the model works. It can also be seen as the direct opposite to the concept of *black box*. Lipton [14] goes into even more details, by subdividing transparency in different levels:

1. **Simulatability**: it's the highest level of abstraction of the concept of transparency. Lipton refers to simulatability as the property of the model that makes it understandable by a person "at once". Specifically, this means that a human could, given the input data and all the necessary parameters, produce a prediction by making all the computations in a reasonable time. This notion of transparency is not very applicable to modern machine learning techniques and is often disregarded.

323 2. **Decomposability**: it's the transparency considered at the level of the single components
324 of the model. Specifically, one model can be considered decomposable if each part of the
325 model (weights, modules, computations...) admits an intuitive explanation.

326 3. **Algorithmic Transparency**: this notion of transparency refers to the learning algo-
327 rithm itself. For example, we know that in the case of linear regression the shape of
328 the loss function is known, as well as an analytical form for the solution for the prob-
329 lem. This means a maximum degree of algorithmic transparency. On the other hand,
330 modern deep learning lacks this notion of transparency: in fact, even if a lot of power-
331 ful optimization algorithms give empirically excellent results, there is no guarantee that
332 those will work on any new problem. The same holds for the shape of the error function,
333 which is almost never known.

334 It's interesting to notice that the human brain, as noted previously, doesn't exhibit any of
335 those features. In fact, human thinking is not transparent to us and justifications in the form
336 of explanations may differ from the actual decision mechanism. Transparent models are fasci-
337 nating, but recent research in DL has proven that predictive performances rise when building
338 deeper models, and not vice-versa. For this reason, we argue that the most promising techniques
339 in XAI come from the research of post-hoc explainability methods.

340 2.3.2 POST-HOC INTERPRETATIONS

341 With post-hoc interpretability we refer to those methods with which we generate explanations
342 from already trained models, without caring about their internal mechanisms. The advantage
343 of this approach is that it does not impact on the performances of the model, which is treated
344 as a black box. Unlike transparency, this kind of interpretability is the one that applies to hu-
345 mans. Lipton [14] summarizes post-hoc explainability methods into four main categories: text
346 explanations, visualizations, local explanations and explanations by example.

347 TEXT EXPLANATIONS

348 This approach aims to mimic the way humans provide explanations to one another, that is,
349 in text form. Example of such approaches: in reinforcement learning [25], in recommender
350 systems: [26]

351 (Non ho ancora trovato molti esempi di metodi di questo tipo, forse la tolgo come categoria)

353 Another popular approach for post-hoc interpretations is to provide visualizations in order to
 354 have a qualitative idea of what the model has learned. For example, when models learn em-
 355 beddings in high dimensional vector spaces, one popular technique to visualize them is t-SNE
 356 [27], which provides 2D or 3D visualization of high dimensional data points, in such a way
 357 that nearby samples are likely to appear closer together. In the field of computer vision, several
 358 papers have investigated the internal representations of visual concepts in CNNs. In [1], the
 359 authors try to build “prototypes” of certain objects starting from already trained image classi-
 360 fication models. Specifically, starting from a white noise image, they tweak it in such a way
 361 that the activation of a certain neuron (in this case, the output neuron corresponding to the se-
 362 lected object) is maximized. This process can be replicated also starting from an existing image,
 363 a process which produces really peculiar visual effects (see Figure 2.2).



Figure 2.2: Process of image manipulation shown in [1]. From an intuitive point of view, starting from existing real images, the network is asked to enhance the features of the image that resemble the desired object (in this case, starting from an image of a tree, start looking for features that resemble buildings). This process is then repeated, creating a positive feedback loop. As a result, the features of the desired objects appear seemingly out of nowhere.

364 This process is also known as *Activation Maximization*: consider a deep NN classifier which
 365 maps an input tensor (in this case an image) x to a set of classes $\{\omega_i\}_{i=1}^m$. In a classification
 366 scenario, we know that the i -th output neuron encodes the modeled class probability $p(\omega_i|x)$.
 367 The basic idea is that the *prototype* x_i^* , representative of class ω_i can be found as follows:

$$x_i^* = \max_x \log p(\omega_i|x) - \lambda \|x\|^2.$$

368 The proposed definition doesn't yield good results in practice: although producing strong
 369 class response, they often look unnatural. This problem is solved in several ways, for exam-
 370 ple by adding regularization via a data density model, or imposing prior constraints which are
 371 common in real images, such as high correlation among neighboring pixels. Again, a similar
 372 approach is found in [28], where the authors investigate the amount of information retained
 373 in the hidden representations of CNNs. They manage to reconstruct the original images with
 374 good accuracy even from high level representations by performing gradient descent on white
 375 noise inputs.

376 LOCAL EXPLANATIONS

377 With visualization techniques, one aims to understand what the model learned from a global
 378 point of view: for example, the activation maximization technique described earlier will reflect
 379 the “internal representation” that the model has of a particular class. With local explanations,
 380 instead, one aims at giving explanations in the context of a specific example. One popular ap-
 381 proach is the computation of saliency maps, or relevance scores [29, 22, 30]. Specifically, given
 382 a data point $x \in \mathbb{R}^k$, and given the learned function f , the predicted class for point x will
 383 be $f(x)$; this approach aims to assign to each feature a score $R(x)_i$, representing a measure of
 384 how relevant the feature x_i is for explaining $f(x)$. One simple approach to obtain the rele-
 385 vance scores is *sensitivity analysis*: it consists on finding the input features for which the output
 386 is more sensitive, meaning the ones that best contribute to increase the value of the output. In
 387 mathematical terms, it is defined as:

$$R(x)_i = \left(\frac{\partial f}{\partial x_i} \right)^2,$$

388 where the gradient is then evaluated on x . Such relevance scores can then be visualized: for
 389 example, in images they can be represented as a mask. We should note a subtle detail: this
 390 method gives us an explanation of the *variation* of $f(x)$, not of the value of $f(x)$ itself. In
 391 other terms, this method does not answer the question “*what parts of x make it belong to class*
 392 *y ?*”, but instead it answers “*what parts of x make it belong more/less to class y ?*”.

393 While the relevance scores can be seen as a way of extracting explanations, those can also be
 394 used in different ways. An interesting approach can be found in [31], where the authors explic-

itly train the relevance scores in a supervised manner, in such a way to make them conform to some manually curated notion of where the attention should be put. Following this approach, the authors aim to train a model which is “right for the right reason”. The motivation is that, if the assumption that relevance score faithfully describes the model’s underlying behavior, then constraining such relevance scores in order to match domain knowledge would result in a model that, in some way, will use that domain knowledge to take decisions.

Another interesting approach for generating local explanations is from Ribeiro et al. [17]: they propose an explanation technique called LIME (Local Interpretable Model-agnostic Explanations), which purpose is to locally approximate complex models with simpler, interpretable models, following the completeness-interpretability tradeoff mentioned by Gilpin in [21]. More specifically, they define an explanation as an interpretable model $g \in G$, where G is a set of models which, with the right conditions, can be considered interpretable (e.g. decision trees). In fact, the authors note that even those that are considered transparent models, will not be considered interpretable by a human supervisor if the model relies on thousands of features to make the prediction. This means that there should be a measure of complexity that determines how much a “potentially interpretable” model g is actually interpretable. They define such measure of complexity as $\Omega(g)$ (e.g. for decision trees, this could represent the depth of the tree). Then, they denote with $f : \mathbb{R}^k \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ the model to be approximated, and with $\pi_x(z)$ a proximity measure between a feature vector x and z . Finally, $\mathcal{L}(f, g, \pi_x)$ is defined as a measure of how badly the model g approximates f near the input sample x . With this setup, one can find a model g which is maximally interpretable, and which best explains the original model, near a specific input. Specifically, this model is the output of LIME, which is defined as follow:

$$\xi(x) = \underset{g \in G}{\operatorname{argmin}} \mathcal{L}(f, g, \pi_x) + \Omega(g).$$

Another recent technique which provides local explanations is the attention mechanism [32], which, in recent years, has proven to be very successful mostly in machine translation [33] and computer vision [34]. Despite not being explicitly designed to provide explanations, they can do so by visualizing their internal attention scores, which highlight sections of the input data which were most influential for the classification. It is interesting to note that this kind of explanation is almost identical to the one provided by saliency maps, discussed above. The core difference is that, for the attention mechanism, the attention scores are directly computed by the model at inference time, while the saliency maps are obtained after inference via backpropagation. It is interesting to know that datasets depicting how humans distribute attention have

426 been created [35, 36]: this can allow us to evaluate attention-based models according to how
427 much their attention patterns conform with the human ones.

428 EXPLANATION BY EXAMPLE

429 A common way in which humans justify their decisions is by offering analogies between the
430 current object in study, and similar objects. For example, to decide the best treatment for a
431 medical condition, doctors often refer to previous similar case studies. This kind of explanation
432 is referred to explanation by example. The first approach with this method was proposed in
433 [37]: the authors aim to generate explanations in the form of a collection of elements from
434 the training set, returned by the model (in this case, a neural network) together with the actual
435 prediction. To do this, they generate a distance metric directly from the model: in this way it
436 is possible, at inference time, to scan the entire training set and look for the data points which,
437 by the model's point of view, are the most similar to the current one being classified. Given x
438 the current sample being predicted and given y any element of the training set, this metric is
439 defined as the euclidean distance between the hidden representations of y , and x .

440 2.4 NEURAL SYMBOLIC INTEGRATION

441 Despite the attempts in the literature to give rigorous definitions of explainability and inter-
442 pretability, those remain slippery concepts: interpretations may vary depending on the appli-
443 cation domain and type of task to be performed. The need for explainability is mostly due to
444 the black box nature of ML models, which is universally agreed upon. Indeed, differently from
445 humans, ML models employ only sub-symbolic representations of concepts, meaning that ev-
446 erything inside the model is encoded as tensors of real values, which are inherently opaque to
447 humans. Furthermore, classic ML systems learn everything from data, which is a radically dif-
448 ferent paradigm from the one humans use for learning. This has been identified as one of their
449 major flaws [2]: NNs can offer outstanding performances when the problem is confined inside
450 a specific domain (e.g. recognize spoken words in a short audio clip), but have nothing to offer
451 when it comes to trivial tasks like commonsense reasoning. One possible way to extend the
452 range of applications of NNs, could be to equip them with the ability to reason with abstract
453 symbolic terms. Indeed, the introduction of symbolic language inside neural networks could
454 also help in the process of encoding general knowledge inside them, a problem for which the
455 formulation is still considered incomplete (cfr. Section 2.1).

456 The area of research that tackles the problem of integrating symbolical knowledge with neu-
457 ral architectures is known as Neural Symbolic Integration. The intuition that motivates NSI
458 as field of research goes beyond explainability: while neural networks give good evidence to be
459 a good modeling framework for the human mind (e.g. parallelization and adaptive learning
460 from the environment) they completely lack the ability to reason in symbolic terms [38]. In-
461 deed, works in NSI argue that logic is the best tool to represent general knowledge, and their
462 first aim is to build systems capable of dealing with both symbolic and sub-symbolic represen-
463 tations. This is a well known, crucial task, and not an easy one: the problem of integrating the
464 statistical nature of learning with the logical nature of reasoning has been already identified as
465 one of the most important research challenges in computer science [39].

466 In the next chapter, we delve in the details of Knowledge Enhanced Neural Networks (KENN)
467 [40], a neural network layer designed to integrate logical knowledge in NNs. We will also pro-
468 vide a short summary of other notable methods in NSI and provide a comparison of experi-
469 mental results.

Knowledge Enhanced Neural Networks

Knowledge Enhanced Neural Networks (KENN) [40] is a special type of Neural Network (NN) layer, designed for injecting logical knowledge into a pre-existing base NN. More specifically, it is a residual layer designed to be stacked after the last layer of a standard NN, in order to boost its predictive performances via the addition of a Prior Knowledge in the form of first order logic clauses. In this chapter we will describe the theory behind KENN, its architecture, and experimental results.

3.1 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

We present here the theoretical framework behind KENN. The first step will be to rigorously define the symbolic language and how to link it with the theoretical framework of NNs, which consists in defining a semantic for the language. Next, we will describe the process with which the truth value of a clause can be increased, and how to integrate this method inside NNs.

3.1.1 PRIOR KNOWLEDGE AND LANGUAGE SEMANTIC

Definition 3.1.1 (Prior Knowledge). The Prior Knowledge is defined as a collection of formulas of a function-free FO language \mathcal{L} whose signature is defined with a set of constants $\mathcal{C} = \{a_1, \dots, a_l\}$ and a set of predicates $\mathcal{P} = \{p_1, \dots, p_q\}$. A predicate is a symbol, which can take in input a number of constants $k \geq 1$. If $k = 1$, the predicate represents a property

of the input constant; if $k > 1$, it represents a relation between the input constants. k is called the *arity* of the predicate.

Definition 3.1.2 (Clause). A clause is defined to be of the following form:

$$c := \bigvee_{i=1}^k l_i, \quad l_i \neq l_j \quad \forall i \neq j. \quad (3.1)$$

In this equation, l_i is a literal, i.e. a formula constituted only by a n -ary predicate, or its negation. Specifically, when writing $l_i \neq l_j$, we mean that those two literals never share their constituting predicate. For example, the clause $A(x) \vee \neg B(x)$ is considered an acceptable clause, while $A(x) \vee B(x) \vee \neg A(x)$ is not. Also clauses have an arity, which is by definition the number of variables given in input to the clause.

One example of a clause could be the following:

$$c(x, y) = \neg \text{Smoker}(x) \vee \neg \text{Friends}(x, y) \vee \text{Smoker}(y), \quad (3.2)$$

which, in classical logic, is equivalent to the clause $\text{Smoker}(x) \wedge \text{Friends}(x, y) \Rightarrow \text{Smoker}(y)$, but expressed as a disjunction of literals. Such a clause is constituted by two predicates: $\text{Smoker}(x)$, a unary predicate expressing the statement “ x is a smoker”, and $\text{Friends}(x, y)$, a binary predicate which expresses the statement “ x and y are friends”. Therefore, this clause expresses the rule “if x is a smoker and x and y are friends, then also y is a smoker”. Note that the variables x and y are supposed to be universally quantified, since our aim is to express general knowledge. We now give another definition:

Definition 3.1.3 (Grounding of a clause). The grounding of an n -ary clause c , denoted as $c[x_1/k_1, \dots, x_n/k_n]$, is the clause obtained by substituting k_i to $x_i, \forall i = 1, \dots, n$.

Going back to the example of before, assume that a and b are two specific persons. Then, the grounding of clause (3.2) will be

$$c(x/a, y/b) = c(a, b) = \neg \text{Smoker}(a) \vee \neg \text{Friends}(a, b) \vee \text{Smoker}(b).$$

The next step is to build a semantic for the formal language \mathcal{L} , that is, how to interpret the symbols that we are working with. In practice, this will consist on defining a way to map constants towards a domain, and predicates to functions that go from such domain to a truth

value. To clarify, consider the following example: let a be a constant and let P be a predicate, such that $P(x)$ expresses the statement “ x is a prime number”. In this case, there is a natural way to define an interpretation for our symbols, that is to map constants to the domain of natural numbers and to map P to the function $f : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$, where $f(n) = 1$ if n is prime, and 0 otherwise. Now, we define the semantic of \mathcal{L} .

Definition 3.1.4 (Semantic of \mathcal{L}). The semantic of \mathcal{L} is defined by means of a pair of functions $(\mathcal{I}_C, \mathcal{I}_P)$, that, together, define an *interpretation* for the symbols of our language and are defined as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{I}_C : \mathcal{C} &\rightarrow \mathbb{R}^l & \mathcal{I}_P : \mathcal{P} &\rightarrow (\mathbb{R}^{n_l} \rightarrow [0, 1]) \\ c &\mapsto x, & P &\mapsto f \end{aligned} \tag{3.3}$$

Where n is the arity of the predicate P and f is a function that takes in input the concatenation of the interpretations of n constant symbols, $\mathcal{I}_C(c_1), \dots, \mathcal{I}_C(c_n)$ and returns the truth value of $P(c_1, \dots, c_n)$. Note that, to make the notation lighter, we will omit the subscript when it's clear whether the argument of the interpretation is a literal or a constant term.

With those definitions, we can already see how this theoretical framework is suitable to describe a NN. In fact, each constant symbol c is mapped to a l -dimensional real vector, which can be seen as the feature vector characterizing the real world object identified by c . Another important detail is that the truth value of each literal, in our setup, is not determined by a hard assignment of 0 or 1, but is represented by a real number in the interval $[0, 1]$. This is a crucial point: indeed, the truth value in our semantic is trying to represent predictions by a NN, which, for classification tasks, are always expressed in terms of values in the interval $[0, 1]$. The natural consequence of this choice is that, from this point on, we will have to rely on the rules of Fuzzy Logic [41], which is a generalization of the standard Boolean logic where the truth value of variables can take the value of any real number between 0 and 1.

3.1.2 t -CONORM FUNCTIONS

With our definition of a semantic for \mathcal{L} , we can now give an interpretation for constants and predicates. The next step is to find a way to interpret clauses, or, more specifically, a way to determine the truth value of a grounded clause. We saw that, by definition, a clause is a disjunction of literals: this means that we only need a way to define the interpretation of a negated predicate and of the disjunction of two predicates. As stated above, since we are allowing truth

537 values in the range $[0, 1]$, we will need to use the rules of Fuzzy Logic. For computing the truth
 538 value of a negated predicate, the standard way in Fuzzy Logic is to use the Lukasiewicz Nega-
 539 tion.

540 **Definition 3.1.5** (Lukasiewicz Negation). If $P \in \mathcal{P}$ is a predicate, then:

$$\mathcal{I}(\neg P) = 1 - \mathcal{I}(P)^* \quad (3.4)$$

541 So for example if the truth value of a predicate is $\mathcal{I}(P)(x) = 0.8$, the truth value of its
 542 negated copy would be $\mathcal{I}(\neg P)(x) = 0.2$. It is worth noting that this definition is equivalent
 543 to the Boolean negation when $\mathcal{I}(P) = 0$ or $\mathcal{I}(P) = 1$.

544 With this tool we are now able to compute the truth value of any literal. There remains to
 545 see how to define the interpretation of a disjunction of literals. To do this, we introduce the
 546 concept of t -conorm functions.

547 **Definition 3.1.6** (t -conorm). A t -conorm is a function $\perp: [0, 1]^2 \rightarrow [0, 1]$ that satisfies the
 548 following properties:

- 549 1. $\perp(a, b) = \perp(b, a)$
- 550 2. $\perp(a, b) \leq \perp(c, d)$ if $a \leq c$ and $b \leq d$
- 551 3. $\perp(a, \perp(b, c)) = \perp(\perp(a, b), c)$
- 552 4. $\perp(a, 0) = a$

By definition, \perp takes values in $[0, 1]^2$, but can be easily extended to $[0, 1]^n$ for any n , by
 defining:

$$\perp(a_1, \dots, a_n) := \perp(a_1, \perp(a_2, \dots, \perp(a_{n-1}, a_n))).$$

553 In Fuzzy Logic, t -conorm functions are used to represent the concept of logical disjunction, and
 554 will be the tool employed to represent the interpretation of a disjunction of literals. Specifically:

$$\mathcal{I}(l_1 \vee \dots \vee l_n) = \perp(\mathcal{I}(l_1), \dots, \mathcal{I}(l_n)). \quad (3.5)$$

*Writing $1 - \mathcal{I}(P)$ is a slight abuse of notation since $\mathcal{I}(P)$ is a function. To be more precise one should write $\mathcal{I}(\neg P)(\mathcal{I}(c)) = 1 - \mathcal{I}(P)(\mathcal{I}(c)), \forall c$.

555 With the given definitions, we have all that is needed to compute the truth value of any grounded
 556 clause. From a practical point of view, the only remaining step would be to choose a specific
 557 t -conorm function. KENN uses the Gödel t -conorm function, which is also known as the
 558 Maximum t -conorm and is defined as

$$\perp_{max}(a, b) = \max\{a, b\},$$

which, as above, can be extended like follows:

$$\perp_{max}(t) = \max_{i=1, \dots, l} t_i, \quad \forall t \in \mathbb{R}^l.$$

559 We are now finally ready to fully understand how this theoretical framework is able to de-
 560 scribe the predictions of a NN. Suppose that we have a dataset $\mathcal{X} = \{x_1, \dots, x_n\}$, $x_i \in \mathbb{R}^l$,
 561 where each x_i belongs to one or more classes (P_1, \dots, P_m) . The task in which the NN must
 562 learn to classify each input into one or more output classes is known in Machine Learning as a
 563 multilabel classification problem. To tackle this kind of task, a NN architecture will present, in
 564 the last layer, m output units, each of which will be finally subject to a sigmoidal activation func-
 565 tion. After training, the NN will have learned to approximate a function $h(x_i) = y_i \in \mathbb{R}^m$,
 566 where $(y_i)_j = \mathbb{P}(x_i \text{ belongs to class } j)$. Now, if we consider:

- 567 1. $\mathcal{P} = \{P_1, \dots, P_m\}$ to be predicates defined as $P_i(x) = "x \text{ belongs to class } P_i"$;
- 568 2. $\{x_1, \dots, x_n\}$ to be the interpretations of the constants $\mathcal{C} = \{c_1, \dots, c_n\}$, which repre-
 569 sent the real-world objects of our dataset,

570 it is clear that the entries of y_i can be seen as truth values of the predicates $\{P_1, \dots, P_m\}$.
 571 More formally:

$$(y_i)_j = \mathcal{I}_{NN}(P_j)(x_i), \quad \forall i = 1, \dots, n, \forall j = 1, \dots, m. \quad (3.6)$$

572 Hence, the whole NN defines an interpretation for each predicate P_i , which we denoted as \mathcal{I}_{NN} .
 573 Therefore, given a clause $c := \bigvee_{i=1}^k l_i$ and given a collection of feature vectors $\{x_1, \dots, x_d\}$
 574 (where d is the arity of c), then the truth value of the grounded clause predicted by the NN will
 575 be $\perp((y_c)_1, \dots, (y_c)_k)$, where:

$$y_c \in \mathbb{R}^k, \quad (y_c)_i = \begin{cases} \mathcal{I}_{NN}(l_i) & \text{if } l_i \text{ is not a negated predicate} \\ 1 - \mathcal{I}_{NN}(l_i) & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases} \quad (3.7)$$

576 The intuition behind KENN is very simple: given the vector y of predictions of the NN, a
 577 new layer is added at its end with the aim to modify y and obtain a new vector of predictions
 578 y' , of the form $y' = y + \delta$, such that y' improves the truth value of each clause present in
 579 the base knowledge and, at the same time, keeps the quantity $\|y' - y\|_2$ minimal. It is worth
 580 noticing that this new layer introduced by KENN, called Knowledge Enhancer (KE), is a kind
 581 of residual layer, since it learns to represent the quantity $\delta = y' - y$.

582 3.1.3 t -CONORM BOOST FUNCTIONS

583 The next problem is to understand how to improve the truth value of a single clause. Since this
 584 truth value is represented by a t -conorm function, this involves finding a way to let the value
 585 of \perp (y) rise by manipulating the value of y . To do this, we define a new class of functions.

Definition 3.1.7 (t -conorm Boost Function (TBF)). A function $\delta : [0, 1]^n \rightarrow [0, 1]^n$ is a t -conorm Boost Function (TBF) if:

$$0 \leq t_i + \delta(t)_i \leq 1 \quad \forall n \in \mathbb{N} \quad \forall t \in [0, 1]^n.$$

586 Let Δ denote the set of all TBFs.

587 From the definition follows a simple but essential result.

Lemma 3.1.1. Given any t -conorm \perp and $\delta \in \Delta$, it holds that:

$$\perp(t) \leq \perp(t + \delta(t)).$$

Proof. By definition of TBF, $\delta(t)_i \geq 0$. This implies that

$$t_i \leq t_i + \delta(t)_i, \quad \forall i = 1, \dots, n.$$

588 By the monotonicity of t -conorms, it follows that $\perp(t) \leq \perp(t + \delta(t))$. □

589 The purpose of such TBF δ is to update the NN predictions $y \in \mathbb{R}^m$ to a new vector in
 590 such a way that the truth value of the clause increases. The problem is now how to choose such
 591 a TBF. It is clear that not all the $\delta \in \Delta$ would be useful: for example, one could choose the
 592 function $\delta(y)_i = 1 - y_i, \quad \forall i = 1, \dots, n$. In this way, we would obtain an updated truth
 593 value of 1 for any literal, independently of y . This of course would be pointless, and would

render the predictions of the base NN useless. For this reason another requirement for y' is needed. Specifically, as we already mentioned, KENN is built in such a way that the learnt δ improves the t -conorm value in a minimal way. To be more rigorous, we will now formally define the concept of a minimal TBF.

Definition 3.1.8 (Minimal TBF). A function $\delta \in \Delta$ is minimal with respect to a norm $\|\cdot\|$ and a t -conorm \perp if and only if:

$$\|\delta'(t)\| < \|\delta(t)\| \Rightarrow \perp(t + \delta'(t)) < \perp(t + \delta(t)), \quad \forall \delta' \in \Delta, \quad \forall n \in \mathbb{N}, \quad \forall t \in [0, 1]^n.$$

As mentioned above, KENN works with the Gödel t -conorm function and the L_p norm $\|x\|_p = (\sum_{i=1}^n |x_i|^p)^{\frac{1}{p}}$. The next step at this point is to find such a minimal TBF. In the following result, we present a possible form that a minimal TBF can assume.

Theorem 3.1.2. For any function $f : \mathbb{R}^n \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ we define $\delta^f : \mathbb{R}^n \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^n$ as

$$\delta^f(t)_i = \begin{cases} f(t) & \text{if } i = \arg \max_{j=1}^n t_j \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

Let $f : [0, 1]^n \rightarrow [0, 1]$ satisfying $0 \leq f(t) \leq 1 - \max_{j=1}^n t_j$. Then, δ^f is a minimal TBF for the Gödel t -conorm function and the L_p norm.

Proof. δ^f is a TBF. Indeed $\delta^f(t) \geq 0$ and $0 \leq t_i + \delta^f(t)_i \leq 1$ because $f(t) \leq 1 - \max_j t_j$. Therefore we only need to prove that δ^f is minimal. Take $\delta \in \Delta$, with $\|\delta(t)\|_p < \|\delta^f(t)\|_p$. We have to show that

$$\perp(t + \delta(t)) < \perp(t + \delta^f(t)).$$

Now define $j = \arg \max_k (t_k + \delta(t)_k)$. By definition of the Gödel t -conorm we can immediately derive that:

$$\perp(t + \delta(t)) = t_j + \delta(t)_j. \quad (3.8)$$

Now, defining $i = \arg \max_k t_k$, using the same reasoning and exploiting the definition of δ^f it follows that:

$$\perp(t + \delta^f(t)) = t_i + f(t). \quad (3.9)$$

By combining (3.8) and (3.9) and noting that by definition $t_i \geq t_j$, the last step is to prove that $f(t) > \delta(t)_j$. To do this we exploit the definition of L_p norm as follows:

$$\delta(t)_j = (|\delta(t)_j|^p)^{\frac{1}{p}} \leq \left(\sum_{k=1}^n |\delta(t)_k|^p \right)^{\frac{1}{p}} = \|\delta(t)\|_p < \|\delta^f(t)\|_p = f(t).$$

Where the last inequality follows from the definition of $\delta^f(t)$.

□

3.1.4 APPLYING TBFs TO PREACTIVATIONS

There is a problem with the definition of δ^f : there is a specific constraint $f(t) \leq 1 - \max_i t_i$ that limits the number of candidates for f . Indeed, this is imposed to ensure that the final output $y' = y + \delta^f(y)$ will be in $[0, 1]$. There is a natural way to solve this impracticality: since we are assuming a multilabel classification scenario, the final m output units of the NN will pass through a sigmoidal activation function. More specifically, y_i will be of the form:

$$y_i = \sigma(z_i) = \frac{1}{1 + e^{-z_i}}, \forall i = 1, \dots, m.$$

For this reason, KENN exploits the fact that σ takes only values in $[0, 1]$ by applying the TBF directly on the preactivations $z \in \mathbb{R}^m$. In fact, it is clear from an intuitive point of view that one can apply any delta to the preactivations vector, and at the same time always be sure that the final output y will be in $[0, 1]$. In this way, the constraint on f is no longer needed. The next theorem proves formally that applying a minimal TBF on the preactivations z is equivalent to applying a minimal TBF on the output of the NN y .

Theorem 3.1.3. For all $f : \mathbb{R}^n \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$, the function:

$$\delta^g(y) = \sigma(z + \delta^f(z)) - \sigma(z) \tag{3.10}$$

is a minimal TBF under the Gödel t -conorm and the L_p norm.

Proof. By definition we know that $z = \sigma^{-1}(y)$, hence we can rewrite equation (3.10) as:

$$y + \delta^g(y) = \sigma(z + \delta^f(z)).$$

From the definition of sigmoid activation function it easily follows that $0 \leq y + \delta^g(y) \leq 1$. To prove that δ^g is a TBF we have to show that $\delta^g(y) \geq 0$. We note a few details: σ is monotonic

increasing, which means that:

$$\operatorname{argmax}_{j=1}^n \sigma(z_j) = \operatorname{argmax}_{j=1} z_j.$$

Another implication of the monotonicity of σ is that:

$$f(z) \geq 0 \Rightarrow \sigma(z_i + f(z)) \geq \sigma(z_i)$$

This implies that $\delta^g(y) = \sigma(z + \delta^f(z)) - \sigma(z) \geq 0$. We now define the function $g(y) = \sigma(z_i + f(z)) - \sigma(z_i)$, where $i = \operatorname{argmax}_i z_i$. It's easy to see that this g is the function associated to our δ^g . In fact:

$$\begin{aligned} \delta^g(y)_i &= \sigma(z + \delta^f(z))_i - \sigma(z)_i \\ &= \begin{cases} g(y) & \text{if } i = \operatorname{argmax}_j y_j \\ 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases} \end{aligned}$$

Therefore, Theorem 3.1.2 guarantees that $\delta^g(y)$ is a minimal TBF under the Gödel t -conorm and the L_p norm.

□

Note that $\delta^g(y)$ is not directly used in KENN but it's indirectly induced by using $\delta^f(z)$ on the preactivations.

Applying the TBF directly on the preactivations has also another remarkable advantage. Indeed, it is known that it is possible to interpret the value of the preactivation of the i -th output neuron as the “confidence” of the NN that the current feature vector is to be classified in the i -th class. This “confidence” is not yet a probability, but a generic scalar value $z \in \mathbb{R}$; it will become a probability when transformed with the sigmoid activation function: $\sigma(z) \in [0, 1]$. More specifically we know that:

- $z \gg 0$ means high confidence of being classified in the i -th class. This follows from the fact that $\lim_{z \rightarrow +\infty} \sigma(z) = 1$;
- $z \ll 0$ means high confidence of *not* being classified in the i -th class. This follows from the fact that $\lim_{z \rightarrow -\infty} \sigma(z) = 0$;
- $z \approx 0$ corresponds to a highly uncertain decision. This follows from the fact that $\sigma(z) \approx 0.5$ if $z \approx 0$.

By observing the shape of the sigmoid activation function we can notice that when $|z| \gg 0$ (high confidence in the NN predictions), even large deltas on the preactivations produce very small changes. More rigorously, $\lim_{|z| \rightarrow \infty} |\sigma(z + \delta^f(z)) - \sigma(z)| = 0$. On the contrary, when $z \approx 0$, even small deltas on the preactivations produce high modification at the activation level. This will result in the following behavior: if the NN is highly confident of its decision, then logical rules will not modify too much the result of the NN predictions. On the contrary, in the cases where the NN is uncertain of its decision, our base knowledge will intervene and give higher modifications on the final predictions. This conforms to the intuition that KENN should produce minimal changes in the original predictions. These key concepts are further illustrated in Figure 3.1.

As we already mentioned, the minimal TBF directly modeled by KENN is the one we called $\delta^f(z)$. From its definition, we know that the magnitude of the produced delta is determined by the definition of f . One of the most important features of KENN is that, by design, it learns to give the proper *importance* to each clause in the base knowledge: this precise feature of the model gives also a way to find such function f . Specifically, for each clause c a learnable parameter w_c is defined so that the produced delta for c is:

$$\delta^{w_c}(z)_i = \begin{cases} w_c & \text{if } i = \arg \max_{j=1}^n z_j \\ 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

From this definition it's now clear that the function f we were looking for is not actually the same for all the clauses in the base knowledge, but it is defined for each different clause and it's equal to the constant function $f_c(z) = w_c$, $w_c \in [0, \infty]$. There is one last problem: while it's true that the function δ^{w_c} is a minimal TBF, the implementation of this kind of functions inside a NN is unfeasible since they are not differentiable. For this reason KENN uses a soft approximation of δ^{w_c} , defined as:

$$\delta_s^{w_c}(z)_i = w_c \cdot \text{softmax}(z)_i = w_c \cdot \frac{e^{z_i}}{\sum_{j=1}^n e^{z_j}}. \quad (3.11)$$

There are still, however, some steps to describe in order to fully understand how KENN produces a vector of deltas. Recall our notation: we defined with $y \in \mathbb{R}^m$ the vector of predictions from the NN. Specifically, we now define with y_A the truth value relative to A , where A is a generic grounded predicate of our language. We also define $z_A = \sigma^{-1}(y_A)$. Now, we note that equation (3.11), tells us that the produced δ is always m -dimensional, where m is the number of output classes. This however is not desirable: in fact, in general, not all the clauses in our base




Figure 3.1: This image illustrates the actual deltas produced by KENN, which are the δ^f , opposed to the actual delta produced on the activations, which is δ^g . As we said, δ^g is not produced directly by the model but it is indirectly *induced* by the application of δ^f on the preactivations. This also illustrates how, thanks to the shape of the sigmoid activation function, the same delta on the preactivation produces a different delta at the activations level: the closer the preactivations to zero, the highest the modification on the final predictions.

knowledge contain all the predicates of our language. For example, given $\mathcal{P} = \{A, B, C\}$, the clause $c = A \vee \neg B$ contains only two of the three predicates in the language. Therefore, we would like this specific clause to not modify in any way z_C . Another problem is that we don't know how to express the preactivation of a negated literal, i.e. we don't know how to derive

669 $z_{\neg A}$ from z_A . In fact, recall that in equation (3.4) we defined the interpretation of a negated
 670 predicate, where we knew that the truth values were well defined in the interval $[0, 1]$. Now
 671 we are dealing with preactivations, which cannot be considered truth values in the Fuzzy Logic
 672 theoretical framework. However, this problem can be easily solved by exploiting the following
 673 property of the sigmoid activation function:

$$1 - \sigma(x) = \sigma(-x).$$

674 Now it's easy to see that, since $y_{\neg A} = 1 - y_A$, we can define:

$$z_{\neg A} = -z_A.$$

675 Notice that we are not introducing any new concepts: instead we are just redefining quan-
 676 tities that were already mentioned at the activation level, to the preactivation level. We finally
 677 define $z_c = (z_{l_1}, \dots, z_{l_k})$ for every clause $c := \bigvee_{i=1}^k l_i$ of the knowledge. We refer to the
 678 process of transforming from z to z_c as the *selection* step. This new vector contains only the
 679 preactivations of literals present in c , and is the one that we actually want to use to produce
 680 the delta relative to clause c . Now, let \mathcal{K} be the set of clauses in our knowledge, and $\{w_c\}_{c \in \mathcal{K}}$
 681 their corresponding weights. For every clause $c \in \mathcal{K}$ we want to obtain a new delta, namely
 682 $\delta^c \in \mathbb{R}^m$, which contains one value for each predicate in the clause and is defined as follows:

$$\delta_A^c = \begin{cases} \delta_s^{w_c}(z_c)_A & \text{if } A \in c \\ -\delta_s^{w_c}(z_c)_{\neg A} & \text{if } \neg A \in c, \quad \forall A \in c \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \quad (3.12)$$

683 This newly defined delta, δ^c , will be the delta obtained from clause c and will be summed to
 684 z to obtain the updated prediction. More specifically:

$$y' = \sigma(z + \delta^c)$$

685 In Figure 3.2, an example of computation of the δ^c vector is provided.

686 3.1.5 INCREASING THE SATISFACTION OF THE KNOWLEDGE

687 In the previous section we found out how KENN produces a vector of changes δ to be applied
 688 to the original NN predictions, but only considering a single clause. That would suffice in




Figure 3.2: Example with all the steps needed to compute δ^c for the clause $A \vee \neg B$ starting from the vector of preactivations z ; for this example $w_c = 2$. We refer to this process as *clause enhancement*.

the cases where the knowledge is constituted only by a single clause, but in real applications a higher number of logical rules will be desirable. Therefore, the next and final problem is to understand how KENN takes all the deltas from all the clauses and produces a single vector of changes. This particular step of aggregation is critical, as it constitutes one of the best features of KENN, but at the same time one of its bigger inaccuracies. This is because, to aggregate the contributions from all the clauses $c \in \mathcal{K}$, KENN just sums the contributions. Specifically, the final prediction is defined as follows:

$$y' = \sigma\left(z + \sum_{c \in \mathcal{K}} \delta^c\right). \quad (3.13)$$

This particular choice makes KENN really fast at inference and learning time, increasing scalability. At the same time, though, this makes the risk of inconsistencies higher. For example, the same predicate can appear negated in one clause, and not negated in another clause: in this way the delta for the first one will be negative while it will be positive for the second one. In this way, the two deltas may cancel out rendering the contributions of the two clauses less effective.

3.2 KENN ARCHITECTURE

In this section we present the architecture of the KENN layer in details. To be more precise, the architecture we are about to describe is valid only for unary predicates, meaning that only unary clauses will work as base knowledge. In general, KENN is capable of dealing also with binary clauses, but that will require a modification of the architecture, as we'll see later.

As described above, the core functionality of KENN is the *clause enhancement*, i.e. the creation of a vector δ which, summed to the vector of predictions y , produces a modified vector of predictions y' which increases the truth value of the relative clause. The architecture that takes care of this task is the Clause Enhancer (CE): this submodule takes in input the full vector

of preactivations from the original NN and computes the vector of deltas δ^c described in equation (3.12). For each clause in the base knowledge, a CE will be instantiated. The details of the architecture of the CE are described in Figure 3.3a.

The CE performs the following operations:

1. Takes in input the vector of preactivations z coming from the base NN;
2. Performs the *selection* step;
3. Computes the vector of deltas according to equation (3.11);
4. Transforms the delta vector according to equation (3.12)


Note that, in practice, the CE does not take in input a single vector of preactivations at a time, but works in parallel taking in input mini-batches of data. Once every CE has produced a vector of deltas, the next step is to aggregate them by summing them up. The module that performs this operation is called the *Knowledge Enhancer* (KE), which is shown in Figure 3.3b. More specifically, the KE performs the following operations:

1. Takes as inputs all the δ^c for each clause c in the Base Knowledge and sums them;
2. It sums the obtained delta with the original preactivations vector;
3. Applies the sigmoid activation function.


These steps produce the final vector of modified predictions y' . Notice that the KE is just the implementation of equation (3.13).

3.3 KENN FOR RELATIONAL DATA

As we said, KENN can also handle relational data; specifically, thanks to its general approach, KENN can handle clauses with any arity. Nevertheless, for simplicity, we will just describe the binary case. In order to integrate binary clauses, the first step is to split the base knowledge into two complementary subsets of clauses \mathcal{K}_U and \mathcal{K}_B , containing the unary and binary clauses respectively. In this way, the set of all the clauses constituting the Prior Knowledge is denoted as $\mathcal{K} = \mathcal{K}_U \cup \mathcal{K}_B$. The intuition at the base of KENN remains the same: starting from initial predictions z , we will need to produce a vector of deltas δ . The only difference, is that δ will be the sum of two different deltas, one produced just by unary clauses and the other just by binary clauses. More simply, this consists in modifying equation (3.13) as follows:



(a) The Clause Enhancer (CE) module.



(b) The Knowledge Enhancer (KE) module.

Figure 3.3: Illustration of the KENN architecture. Images are replications of the illustrations provided in [40].

$$y' = \sigma(z + \sum_{c \in \mathcal{K}_U} \delta^c + \sum_{c \in \mathcal{K}_B} \delta^c). \quad (3.14)$$

738 Note that the procedure to compute the quantity $\sum_{c \in \mathcal{K}_U} \delta^c$ is the one we described before,
 739 since all is limited to unary clauses. The only thing left to define is how to compute a delta
 740 vector starting from a binary clause.

741 TABLE REPRESENTATION OF BINARY DATA

742 In order to deal with binary clauses, KENN represents truth values of every grounded predicate
 743 inside two different matrices: U and B . Matrix U has one row for each constant object, one col-
 744 umn for each unary predicate and an additional column containing an identifier for each object.
 745 Matrix B , instead, has one row for each couple of objects: specifically, for each pair of objects
 746 such that there is a binary relation between them. The first two columns of B contain the iden-
 747 tifier indices of the pair of objects, while the remaining columns contain the preactivations for
 748 each binary predicate, grounded on that pair of objects. So, in the case of n unary predicates,
 749 m binary predicates, p total objects and q couples of objects, U and B will have dimensions
 750 $p \times (n + 1)$ and $q \times (m + 2)$ respectively. Figure 3.4 shows an example with a visualization of
 751 U and B . With those newly defined matrices, equation (3.14) can be implemented as follows:

$$\begin{cases} y_u = \sigma(U + \delta U) \\ y_b = \sigma(B + \delta B) \end{cases} \quad (3.15)$$

752 where y_u and y_b are the final predictions for the unary and binary predicates respectively, and
 753 δU and δB are the delta matrices that need to be computed.

754 THE JOIN OPERATION

755 At this stage, we have two matrices, U and B , containing preactivations of unary and binary
 756 predicates respectively. However, recall that the CE module takes in input a single matrix con-
 757 taining all the preactivations, in order to compute the deltas. The fact is that, given any binary
 758 clause, we must be able to access the preactivation value of any of its atoms, from a single matrix.
 759 Take as an example the grounded clause $A(c_1) \vee B(c_1, c_2) \vee \neg A(c_2)$. The preactivations of
 760 $A(c_1)$ and $A(c_2)$ can be accessed from matrix U , but the one for $B(c_1, c_2)$ can be accessed only
 761 from B . For this reason, we need a way to merge both the binary and unary preactivations into




Figure 3.4: Representation of relational data inside KENN. Specifically, objects and relations can be seen as nodes and edges of a directed graph. The preactivations of each grounded predicate are represented in tables U and B . In this example, two unary predicates and one binary predicate are present. Note that in matrix B only the object pairs such that there is a relation between them are reported.

762 a single matrix. KENN does this with the JOIN operation.

763 **Definition 3.3.1 (JOIN).** Given n unary predicates, m binary predicates and their respective
 764 matrices U and B , the JOIN operation is defined as follows:

$$\text{JOIN}(U, B) = M \quad (3.16)$$

765 where the i -th row of the matrix M is:

$$M_i = (sx, sy, U_{sx,2}, \dots, U_{sx,n+1}, U_{sy,2}, \dots, U_{sy,n+1}, B_{i3}, \dots, B_{i(m+2)}), \quad (3.17)$$

where $sx = B_{i1}, sy = B_{i2}$.

766 More simply, M has the same number of rows as matrix B and shares its two first columns;
 767 additionally, it also contains the preactivations of all the unary predicates for both the first and
 768 second index of each row, together with all the preactivations for the binary predicates.

769 From this new matrix, the CE can access the preactivations for any atom of any grounded
 770 binary clause and can compute a delta matrix, which we will call δM .

771 THE GROUP BY AND SELECT OPERATIONS

772 As we saw with our previous example, binary clauses can also contain unary predicates. This
 773 implies that the delta vectors generated from binary clauses can actually modify the preactiva-
 774 tions of both unary and binary predicates. More specifically, this means that the matrix δM
 775 contains some information that is supposed to go both inside matrices δU and δB . KENN
 776 extracts the unary deltas from δM with the GROUP BY operation, and does the same for the
 777 binary deltas with the SELECT operation.

778 **Definition 3.3.2** (GROUP BY). The GROUP BY (GB) operation takes in input the matrix
 779 of deltas δM and an index (x or y), and is defined as follows:

$$\begin{cases} \text{GB}(\delta M, x) = \delta U_x \\ \text{GB}(\delta M, y) = \delta U_y \end{cases}$$

780 where

$$\begin{cases} (\delta U_x)_i = \left(i, \sum_{j \in J_x} \delta M_{j3}, \dots, \sum_{j \in J_x} \delta M_{j(2+n)} \right) \\ (\delta U_y)_i = \left(i, \sum_{j \in J_y} \delta M_{j(n+3)}, \dots, \sum_{j \in J_y} \delta M_{j(2n+2)} \right) \\ J_x := \{j : \delta M_{j1} = i\} \\ J_y := \{j : \delta M_{j2} = i\} \end{cases} \quad (3.18)$$

781 In simple terms, the GROUP BY operation extracts the deltas for the unary predicates from
 782 the delta matrix δM , by aggregating the results for each object identifier. This is exactly equiv-
 783 alent to a GROUP BY query in relational databases.

Definition 3.3.3 (SELECT). The SELECT operation simply extracts the preactivations of
 the binary atoms from the δM matrix. Specifically:

$$\text{SELECT}(\delta M) = \delta B$$

where:

$$\delta B_i = (\delta M_{i1}, \delta M_{i2}, \delta M_{i(2n+3)}, \dots, \delta M_{i(2n+m+2)}) .$$

784 PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER

785 Now that all the necessary tools have been defined, we are ready to describe the process to com-
 786 pute the matrices δU and δB . KENN uses two different KE to generate delta matrices: one

787 (KE_u) takes in input the matrix U , and returns a delta matrix δU_u , using the standard proce-
 788 dure for unary predicates described in the previous section. The other (KE_b) takes in input a
 789 matrix $M = \text{JOIN}(U, B)$, and returns a delta matrix δM . Afterwards, the following opera-
 790 tions are performed:

- 791 1. The final delta matrix for binary predicates is obtained as follows: $\delta B = \text{SELECT}(\delta M)$;
- 792 2. Two matrices $\delta U_x = \text{GB}(\delta M, x)$ and $\delta U_y = \text{GB}(\delta M, y)$ are computed;
- 793 3. δU_x and δU_y are summed together, obtaining matrix δU_b ;
- 794 4. The final delta matrix for unary predicates is obtained as follows: $\delta U = \delta U_u + \delta U_b$.

795 In Figure 3.5, we report an example with the whole process.

796 3.4 RELATED WORK

797 As already introduced at the end of Chapter 2, the integration of statistical learning with logical
 798 symbolic knowledge is one of the key challenges in the research on artificial intelligence, specif-
 799 ically for the field of NSI. Authors of [40, 42] subdivide NSI systems into three main groups,
 800 based on their different objectives:

- 801 1. **Differentiable Reasoning**: research on this subfield aims at developing models capable
 802 of logical reasoning, meaning capable to derive logical knowledge, given a base of ground
 803 truth logical facts (axioms). (non sono sicurissimo sia questa la definizione...)
- 804 2. **Inductive Logic Programming**: here the goal is to extract logical knowledge from
 805 data, or to refine an existing one;
- 806 3. **Knowledge Guided Learning**: here the goal is learning in classical ML sense, where the
 807 knowledge has the role of a supervisor, meaning that the machine should learn according
 808 to the base knowledge.

809 We are interested in Knowledge Guided Learning (KGL), the class of models where KENN
 810 belongs. The objective is to improve the performance of a NN model, by providing a Prior
 811 Knowledge which is expressed in terms of logical formulas and which acts as a supervisor for
 812 the learning process. At present, two main ways of injecting knowledge inside NN have been
 813 employed. The first one involves the usage of a regularization term in the loss function. Indeed,
 814 logical rules can be interpreted as constraints for the weights in the learning process; in ML, the




Figure 3.5: This figure shows an example with all the necessary computations to compute the final delta matrices δU and δB (in the bottom), starting from matrices U and B (top left).

815 natural way to introduce constraints in learning is to add a penalization term in the loss func-
 816 tion, which represents in some way the satisfaction of the logical rules. The second approach,
 817 adopted by KENN, is to directly modify the network architecture: in this way, logical rules are
 818 enforced at the level of the network topology.

819 3.4.1 REGULARIZATION APPROACHES

820 In KGL, regularization approaches enforce the satisfaction of the knowledge by defining a spe-
 821 cial penalization term to be applied to the loss function. Here we briefly mention two impor-
 822 tant examples of regularization based approaches: Logic Tensor Networks and Semantic Based
 823 Regularization.

824 LOGIC TENSOR NETWORKS

825 Logic Tensor Networks (LTN) [42] is a notable example of a method capable of integrating
 826 logical knowledge inside a NN by directly modifying the loss function. To do this, the authors
 827 define a differentiable first-order logic language called Real Logic, with which they manage to
 828 represent common deep learning tasks, such as clustering, multi-label classification, relational
 829 learning, regression, embedding learning and many others. In simple terms, the role of Real
 830 Logic is to act as a bridge between the purely symbolic world of logic, and the sub-symbolic
 831 world of neural systems. We give a brief summary of the core definitions in Real Logic, in order
 832 to understand how learning is possible.

833 Real Logic is defined over a first order language \mathcal{L} with a signature containing a set of con-
 834 stant symbols (or objects) \mathcal{C} , a set of variable symbols \mathcal{X} , a set of functional symbols \mathcal{F} and a
 835 set of relational symbols (or predicates) \mathcal{P} . We refer to the set $\mathcal{S} = \mathcal{C} \cup \mathcal{X} \cup \mathcal{F} \cup \mathcal{P}$ as the
 836 set of symbols of \mathcal{L} . Each symbol of the language can belong to different domains (i.e. can be
 837 of different types): for example the constant $c_1 \in \mathcal{C}$ can represent a specific person, while the
 838 constant $c_2 \in \mathcal{C}$ can represent a specific city. The same concept applies to functions and pred-
 839 icates. To represent the domain of each symbol, it is assumed that there exists a non-empty
 840 set \mathcal{D} , containing all the domains, which are in turn symbols. Then, to properly assign each
 841 symbol to its corresponding domain, the functions \mathbf{D} , \mathbf{D}_{in} and \mathbf{D}_{out} are defined:

$$\mathbf{D} : \mathcal{X} \cup \mathcal{C} \rightarrow \mathcal{D} \qquad \mathbf{D}_{\text{in}} : \mathcal{F} \cup \mathcal{P} \rightarrow \mathcal{D}^* \qquad \mathbf{D}_{\text{out}} : \mathcal{F} \rightarrow \mathcal{D},$$

842 where \mathcal{D}^* is the set of all finite sequences of symbols in \mathcal{D} . The point where the symbolic
 843 language meets the subsymbolic world of neural networks is in the definition of grounding,

which is the process in which each symbol is given its numeric representation. Indeed, in Real Logic, each domain is interpreted as sets of tensors in the real field. In the same way, each constant, variable and term of the language is interpreted as a tensor of real values, and function symbols are interpreted as functions between tensors. Predicates, are interpreted as functions that map tensors into the interval $[0, 1]$. So, given s any symbol of \mathcal{L} , its grounding is denoted as $\mathcal{G}(s)$. The authors then define how to compute the grounding of formulas, by using the semantics of first-order fuzzy logic. The way in which learning becomes possible is by defining parametric definition of grounding for symbols: given a symbol s , the parametric grounding of s is a grounding which is not known in advance, and can be computed exclusively by knowing a set of parameters. It is denoted as $\mathcal{G}(s|\theta_s)$, where θ_s is the set of parameter values that uniquely determines the value of the grounding. It's interesting to note that, based on what kind of symbol we are learning the grounding for, one can identify a corresponding task in machine learning:

- If $s \in \mathcal{C}$, corresponds to learning an embedding;
- If $s \in \mathcal{F}$, it corresponds to learning regression tasks;
- If $s \in \mathcal{P}$, it corresponds to learning a classification task.

For the simple case of binary classification, for example, the parametric grounding can be defined as $\mathcal{G}(A|\theta) : x \rightarrow \sigma(\text{MLP}_\theta(x))$

SEMANTIC BASED REGULARIZATION

Semantic Based Regularization (SBR) is a general learning framework designed to integrate domain specific background knowledge in the form of first-order logic (FOL) clauses. To enforce the satisfaction of all the clauses, SBR introduces special regularization terms in the loss function, which represent the satisfaction of the knowledge. Specifically, given a background knowledge represented by set of H clauses, the satisfaction of the h -th clause can be represented by the quantity denoted by $0 \leq \phi_h(f) \leq 1$, where f is the vector function learned by the model. From here, the regularization term to be added to the loss function is defined as

$$\sum_{h=1}^H \lambda_h (1 - \phi_h(f)),$$

where λ_h is the weight associated to the h -th constraint. A higher value of λ_h will increase the cost of not satisfying the constraint, meaning that the importance of the corresponding

rule will increase. The conversion of FOL clauses into differentiable functions is made possible by considering fuzzy generalizations of FOL logic, similarly to how it is done in KENN. This is a natural approach for machine learning tasks, but a major disadvantage over KENN is that, since the clause weights are introduced at the level of the loss function, those cannot be learned and are required to be known in advance. This, of course, is unlikely to happen in real scenarios and it is much more desirable to learn the weights together with the other learnable parameters of the model.

3.4.2 MODEL BASED APPROACHES

An example of model based approach for the integration of logic in NNs is represented by Relational Neural Machines (RNM) [44]. An RNM models a probability distribution over a set of m output variables, given the predictions provided by one (or more) base NN, and a set of model parameters. Specifically, differently from a standard NN, each forward pass in RNM is performed in two separate stages: in the first one, the predictions from the NN are obtained from the input data; the second is a *semantic* stage, where the logical constraints are enforced over the output. More precisely, this second stage is performed by an undirected graphical model. RNM defines a conditional probability distribution of the exponential family over the output variables, which is defined as follows:

$$p(y|f, \lambda) = \frac{1}{Z} \exp \left(\sum_{x \in S} \Phi_0(f(x), y(x)) + \sum_c \lambda_c \Phi_c(y) \right),$$

where Z is the partition function, f is the prediction from the NN, λ is the set of parameters driving the semantic stage, Φ_0 is a potential function which enforces the supervised learning paradigm, S is the subset of supervised input vectors and Φ_c is a potential associated to c , a FOL formula part of the base knowledge. Specifically, Φ_c enforces the satisfaction of the clause c , while λ_c determines the weight of such clause.

The approach used by RNM is similar to the one used in KENN: a base NN (or any learner) is used as a foundation which provides initial predictions: on those, the model performs a post elaboration step, enforcing logical rules and improving the predictions. Also, like in KENN, the clause weights are trained together with the whole model, which is a desirable thing in real use cases. However, one significant drawback of RNM is that, for each training step, and also at inference time, an optimization problem must be solved. In comparison, KENN is much more efficient since it is implemented as an actual layer of the NN architecture, which is then

trainable end-to-end, together with the clause weights.

3.5 EXPERIMENTS

In this section we describe in detail the experiments performed with KENN. We tested the ability of KENN of working with relational data, in the context of Collective Classification [43], both with the inductive and transductive learning paradigm.

Definition 3.5.1 (Collective Classification). Consider a directed graph, consisting in a set of nodes V and a set of edges E . Each $v \in V$ is described with a vector of features $x \in \mathbb{R}^n$ and belongs to one of k classes $\{\omega_i\}_{i=1}^k$. The set of nodes V is further divided in two subsets of nodes: X , the set of nodes for which the correct label is known (Training Set), and Y , the set of nodes for which it is unknown (Test Set). The task of Collective Classification is to correctly predict the labels of nodes in Y , given the feature vectors of X and the topology structure determined by E .

Based on how the edges from E are split between Training and Test set, a different learning paradigm is defined:

- **Inductive Learning:** two separate graphs are used, $G_x = (X, E_x)$ for training and $G_y = (Y, E_y)$ for testing, where $E_x = \{(u, v) | u, v \in X\}$ and $E_y = \{(u, v) | u, v \in Y\}$. In other words, the edges of nodes between train and test set are not considered.
- **Transductive Learning:** in the training graph, also edges connecting training and test data are retained. This means that the model can use additional information, in the form of connections between test and training data, even during training.

We also provide a comparison of our results with the ones from SBR and RNM, reported on [44], on the same dataset and tasks.

3.5.1 CITESEER DATASET

The experiments were conducted on the Citeseer Dataset [45]: it consists in a citation network with 4732 citations (directed links) between 3312 scientific publications (nodes), belonging to 6 different classes which represent the topic of the paper. Each node in the dataset is represented by a 0/1 valued feature vector, where each entry indicates the absence or presence of the corresponding word in the dictionary, which is constituted by 3703 unique words.

929 3.5.2 THE PRIOR KNOWLEDGE

930 The knowledge that we want to use in order to improve the predictions from the NN is the
 931 intuitive fact that, if a paper cites another paper, it is probably true that they are of the same
 932 topic. If we denote with $T_i(x)$ the truth value that node x belongs to the i -th output class, this
 933 fact can be encoded in terms of a logical clause as follows:

$$\forall x \forall y \quad T_i(x) \wedge \text{Cite}(x, y) \rightarrow T_i(y), \quad i = 1, \dots, 6$$

934 meaning that the this clause is repeated one time for each different output class. Inside
 935 KENN, this clause is represented as a disjunction of literals as follows:

$$\forall x \forall y \quad \neg T_i(x) \vee \neg \text{Cite}(x, y) \vee T_i(y), \quad i = 1, \dots, 6$$

936 3.5.3 RESULTS

937 In Table 3.1 we report the results of the experiments for the inductive case. The accuracies for
 938 KENN are the mean of 500 different runs on different randomly extracted splits. In Table 3.2
 the results for the transductive case are reported.

Table 3.1: Results of kenn experiments for the inductive case....

% training	NN	SBR	RNM	NN	KENN
10	0.645	0.650 (+0.005)	0.685 (+0.040)	0.544	0.601 (+ 0.048)
25	0.674	0.682 (+0.008)	0.709 (+0.035)	0.629	0.671 (+ 0.041)
50	0.707	0.712 (+0.005)	0.726 (+0.019)	0.680	0.714 (+ 0.034)
75	0.717	0.719 (+0.002)	0.726 (+0.009)	0.733	0.754 (+ 0.021)
90	0.723	0.726 (+0.003)	0.732 (+0.009)	0.759	0.768 (+ 0.010)




Figure 3.6: Deltas for the inductive learning task. 95% confidence intervals.




Figure 3.7: Deltas for the transductive learning task. 95% confidence intervals.




Figure 3.8: Histograms showing the distribution of the accuracies for all the different 500 runs, for the inductive case. On the left, the accuracies of the base NN vs accuracies of KENN. On the right the distribution of the difference between the NN accuracy vs KENN accuracy.




Figure 3.9: Histograms showing the distribution of the accuracies for all the different 500 runs, for the transductive case. On the left, the accuracies of the base NN vs accuracies of KENN. On the right the distribution of the difference between the NN accuracy vs KENN accuracy.

Table 3.2: Results of kenn experiments for the transductive case....

% training	NN	SBR	RNM	NN	KENN
10	0.640	0.703 (+0.063)	0.708 (+0.068)	0.544	0.652 (+ 0.108)
25	0.667	0.729 (+0.062)	0.735 (+0.068)	0.629	0.702 (+ 0.073)
50	0.695	0.747 (+0.052)	0.753 +0.058)	0.680	0.744 (+ 0.065)
75	0.708	0.764 (+0.056)	0.766 (+ 0.058)	0.733	0.788 (+0.055)
90	0.726	0.780 (+ 0.054)	0.780 (+ 0.054)	0.759	0.808 (+0.049)

940 3.5.4 CLAUSE WEIGHTS AND SATISFACTION OF THE RULES

941 3.6 EXPLAINABILITY IN KENN

4

Conclusion

942

943

944 The conclusion goes here.

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