

“Our ability to know is a
function of our tools for
knowing” -Carmen Medina


Hackers Teaching Hackers - 2022
Casey Smith
@subTee

3 Big Ideas

1. Hackers get their edge knowing how things work behind the scenes
2. Defense and Offense taking the same perspectives (Tools)
3. Combining Things and Learning From Other Domains

Examples / Case Studies / References






Opening Car Chase Scene



4wd Race Cannon Beach



“Hackers get their edge from knowing how all the pieces interact within this bigger picture.”

Hackers Gain Advantage By Their Tools



“Our Ability To Know, Is a Function of our Tools for knowing”

The world we understand today, is largely the results of TOOLS and Observation.

See :

<https://www.thecipherbrief.com/thinking-in-the-time-of-coronavirus-part-two>

1. Individuals, Even Trained Scientists, Are REALLY Bad At Drawing Appropriate Conclusions From Available Evidence.
2. Our Ability To Know Is A Function Of Our Tools For Knowing.
3. The Streetlight Effect.


Maps as a Tool - Abstraction of Terrain



What can you tell me about this area?



How about now?





Ecola State Park, Oregon - Fratelli's Hideout



The Map Is Not The Territory

Context Is Key =)





The Sheet Music is Not The Song

ThunderStruck

2/10/2019 2017 150/the-sound-of-getting-hacked-thunderstruck-ac-dc

The sound of getting hacked is apparently Thunderstruck by AC/DC

By Dieter Bohn | @backlon | Aug 25, 2015, 3:02pm EDT

If you buy something from a Verge link, Vox Media may earn a commission. See our [ethics statement](#).

[!\[\]\(115eff7009a76771e6b7adb966005e4c_img.jpg\) F](#) [!\[\]\(c24dcf59bed0461b9c1f1624db18f81e_img.jpg\) T](#) [!\[\]\(314356a72dc4630a4a0fb9bfa09689a1_img.jpg\) SHARE](#)



Karl Walter/Getty Images

Write
sket
edit
more

[LEARN](#)

[Gala](#)

Sub
app

Email (r)


The Threat Report Is Not The Attack




“Thank you for that fine forensic analysis Mr. Bodine.”

“Of course, the experience was... somewhat different.”





It is never that clean, never that easy




Tools Help Us More Accurately Understand Reality

Hypothesis:

Defense and Offense Need Same View

CyberBall - Defender's Can Take an Attacker View

Defender
Map and
Rules



Attacker
Map and
Rules

What Do Analysts See? What Tools Do They Use?

Before


During

After

Can we replay? Pause, Rewind , Train ?

As a defender, I want the same TOOLS as an attacker!

Cobalt Strike Beacon - Lateral Mvmt View




Credentials X					
user	password	realm	note	source	host
Guest	31d6cf0d16ae...	FILESERVER		hashdump	10.10.10.4
SUPPORT_3889...	5ace382672979...	FILESERVER		hashdump	10.10.10.4
Administrator	4d714387627d0...	FILESERVER		hashdump	10.10.10.4


Buttons at the bottom: Add, Edit, Copy, Remove, Help

How we think & Visualize Attacks and Incident Response

How do we model these?



<https://neo4j.com/blog/bloodhound-how-graphs-changed-the-way-hackers-attack/>



Red Team's
BloodHound Map


Blue Team's
BloodHound Map

Corporate needs you to find the difference
between this picture and this picture



They're the same picture

PARINACOTA attack chain



MITRE ATT&CK

T1190 | Exploit Public-Facing Application

T1089 - Disabling Security Tools

T1003 - Credential Dumping

T1046 - Network Service Scanning

T1047 - Windows Management Instrumentation

T1110 - Brute Force


T1076 - Remote Desktop Protocol

T1047 - Windows Management Instrumentation

T1089 - Disabling Security Tools

T1076 - Remote Desktop Protocol

T1471 - Data Encrypted for Impact



What kind of tools/visualizations do we have?

What kind of tools are helpful?

What kinds of tools do other industries have?

What Kind of tools do we lack?

What if we could model / see across TIME

See drift

Anticipate area of new service deployments and features

Look back at the state when the incident occurred?



Time Travel - Images Over Time Weather





Time Travel Debugging




```
this.yVelocity = -25;  
}  
  
this.yVelocity += 100 * dt;  
this.y -= this.yVelocity * dt;  
  
var hitInfo = this.hitTest();  
  
this.jumping = (hitInfo.bumpedY >= this.y);  
if (hitInfo.bumpedY <= this.y) {  
    this.yVelocity = 0;  
}  
  
this.x = hitInfo.bumpedX;  
this.y = hitInfo.bumpedY;  
  
this.running = (this.x != oldX) && !this.jumping;  
this.facingLeft = (this.x < oldX) || (this.x == oldX &&  
    if (hitInfo.enemyObject) {  
        this.yVelocity = -35;  
        hitInfo.hitObject.stomp();  
    }  
  
if (this.y > 45 || this.y < -40) {  
    this.initialize();  
}  
});  
  
=====  
//  
// GameEnemy  
var GameEnemy = new Class({  
    Extends: GameObject,
```

Windbg - Ghidra - Ida

Developer ⇔ Reverse Engineer

Exploit & Developers

Same View





Tweet



Rob Napier

@cocoaphony

...

Periodic Reminder: When debugging, you must first accept that something you believe is true is not true. If everything you believed about this system were true, it would work. It doesn't, so you're wrong about something.

This is a surprisingly common stumbling block for devs.

8:10 AM · Feb 3, 2020 · Twitter Web App

RWX Detection

Detecting In-Memory Attacks: these are type ‘Private’ and do not map to a file on disk. They are therefore referred to as unbacked executable sections or floating code.

Can we find any RWX memory on disk backed by image?
Yes Yes we can

Image: Commit	7,016 kB RX	C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_64\System.Core\9d4a21...
Image: Commit	7,384 kB RX	C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_64\System.Xml\4ad732c...
Image: Commit	3,284 kB RX	C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_64\Microsoft.Baa2ca56b...
Image: Commit	8 kB RWX	C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\clr.dll

<https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/hunting-memory>

The **tools** we use helps us make **predictive** and
analytical and **strategic** decisions

Burp Suite - Web Application Testing

Burp Intruder Repeater Window Help

Target Proxy Spider Scanner Intruder Repeater Sequencer Decoder Comparer Extender Options Alerts

Site map Scope

Filter: Showing all items

http://www.google.com

- /
- advanced_search
- client_204
- history
- images
- imghp
- intl
- language_tools
- preferences
- search
 - hl=en&gbv=1&ie=UTF-8&q=bipolar+test&
 - hl=en&gbv=1&ie=UTF-8&q=burp+suite&s
 - hl=en&gbv=1&ie=UTF-8&q=depression+t
 - hl=en&gbv=1&ie=UTF-8&q=fun+test&s=
 - hl=en&gbv=1&ie=UTF-8&q=internet+spec
 - hl=en&gbv=1&ie=UTF-8&q=kali+linux+tu
 - hl=en&gbv=1&ie=UTF-8&q=learn+pentes
 - hl=en&gbv=1&ie=UTF-8&q=metasploit&s
 - hl=en&gbv=1&ie=UTF-8&q=pen+testing&
 - hl=en&gbv=1&ie=UTF-8&q=personality+t
 - hl=en&gbv=1&ie=UTF-8&q=phishing+fre
 - hl=en&gbv=1&ie=UTF-8&q=related:https:
 - hl=en&gbv=1&ie=UTF-8&q=related:https:

Contents Issues

Host	Method	URL	Params	Status
http://www.google.c...	GET	/search?ie=ISO-8859-1&hl=en&source=hp&biw=&bih=...	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	200
http://www.google.c...	GET	/search?q=pentestgeek&hl=en&gbv=1&oq=pentestgee...	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	200
http://www.google.c...	GET	/xjs/_/js/k=xjs.hp.en_US.JrX4RoZaeBk.O/m=sb_he,d/r...	<input type="checkbox"/>	200
http://www.google.c...	GET	/client_204?&atyp=i&biw=1649&bih=742&ei=nzvhV9iy...	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	204
http://www.google.c...	GET	/advanced_search	<input type="checkbox"/>	
http://www.google.c...	GET	/advanced_search?hl=en&authuser=0	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
http://www.google.c...	GET	/advanced_search?q=pentestgeek&hl=en&gbv=1&ie=U...	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	

Request Response

Raw Params Headers Hex

GET
/search?q=pentestgeek&hl=en&gbv=1&oq=pentestgeek&gs_l=heirloom-serp.3..0j0i30.56132.572
heirloom-serp.1.10.373.Z8pXafQweKk HTTP/1.1
Host: www.google.com
User-Agent: SNCAppSec2016
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
DNT: 1
Referer:
http://www.google.com/search?ie=ISO-8859-1&hl=en&source=hp&biw=&bih=&q=test&gbv=1&oq=t
.26166.0.26302.4.4.0.0.0.127.253.2j1.3.0....0...1ac.1.34.heirloom-hp..2.2.126.3rCfcq

All 500 code errors

All unexpected outbound requests initiated inside


METHOD	RESPONSE	COUNT
--------	----------	-------


GET	500	5000
-----	-----	------

GET	200	450
-----	-----	-----


Cantor Dust - Binary Visualizations

<https://inside.battelle.org/blog-details/battelle-publishes-open-source-binary-visualization-tool>





Think about what the defender SEES



What Might An Astronomer Teach us about Cyber Security?

Think about that for a moment, before you answer :) ?






Cecilia Payne-Gaposchkin

6-8 NOV 2019
Carmen Medina

Diversity of Thought - The Key to Innovation

Diverse
thinking
outperforms
even the
smartest
expert



Scandinavian Developer Conference
Malmö, Sweden

oredev.org
ØREDEV


Hackers Challenge Authority and Seek Reality

Like any great scientist

Driven by curiosity of how things really work, and
to dispel myths.



Let there be light - Michelson & Morley



<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7qJoRNseyLQ>



People ignored / dismissed the evidence



Combine 2 or More Different Ideas

Telescopes and Photography

Couple Cyber with ???? Cooking, Recipes, Drones, Zillow,
I don't know :)

What takes time today?

What is Expensive Today?

Tedious?

Reduce that .

Applied To Cyber - Example

Problem - Malicious Domain Detected in Log?

Find:

1. Which Host Performed the lookup (DNS from domain controller, host or proxy?)
2. Which process on the host performed the lookup? (Browser, svchost? User-agent spoofed?)
3. Which OTHER hosts and processes performed the same lookup
4. Repeat

What do you need to answer that?

The speed with which you ask and answer questions may affect outcomes

Asking and answering faster than an adversary might be a goal.

Closing Thoughts


Our Tools, Our Maps, Our Models Matter

“How do you know that? How could anyone know that?

YOU GET WHAT YOU MEASURE

—RICHARD HAMMING


WE'VE CHECKED ALL OUR
NETS AND CONCLUDED
THERE ARE NO FISH
SMALLER THAN THIS



THE INSTRUMENT YOU USE AFFECTS WHAT YOU SEE

sketchplanations

The Instrument You Use Affects What You See”
- Richard Hamming



This gives hackers their edge, allowing them to solve problems in ways unimaginable for those confined to conventional thinking and methodologies

“Our Ability to know is a function of our tools for knowing” -
Carmen Medina



3 Big Ideas

1. Hackers get their edge knowing how things work behind the scenes
2. Defense and Offense taking the same perspectives (Tools)
3. Combining Things and Learning From Other Domains

Examples / Case Studies / References



Go Build :) Have fun! Thank you