

You are making whitelisting difficult

Casey Smith





Two Ways to Engage the Enemy

Off Horizon - Collect and Analyze Telemetry

Hand To Hand Combat - Mitigations (User/
Kernel/Hypervisor)

Whitelisting is a street fight



Disrupt/Degrade Adversary Capabilities

Classes Of Adversary

These attackers are aware of your defense and are **actively** working to bypass those controls.

Enlightened

Naïve

These attackers are not equipped to handle all security measures they may encounter.

Three Problem Statements

1.

admins often do not know where or
how to begin to deploy whitelisting

Defenders need to hear the positive results

Secure | https://www.asd.gov.au/publications/protect/application_whitelisting.htm



[ASD > Publications > Implementing Application Whitelisting](#)

IMPLEMENTING APPLICATION WHITELISTING

Download [ACSC Protect Notice, *Implementing Application Whitelisting* \(PDF\)](#), April 2016
First published 2012; updated April 2016

INTRODUCTION

1. [Application whitelisting is the most effective strategy](#) in the Australian Signals Directorate [Incidents](#).

I actually want whitelisting to work.

I worry defenders are not talking about its efficacy.

...for fear attackers will switch tactics?

2.

trust by default
instead of
trust by exception

More of this please...Ignite 2017 Talk (Aaron & Chris)

Trust by Default

All software is good until
proven bad

APPS

Trust by Exception

All software is bad
until proven good

Trust Decisions made on... publisher...?

- Was this the intent of code signing?
- Verifies Identity and Integrity
 - Not Intent



S P E C T E R O P S

Subverting Trust in Windows

Matt Graeber

3.

trusted signed tools can lead to compromise

My experience with bypasses

IEExec - Jan 16, 2014 (Proved my theory Trusted Things Can Execute Things)

InstallUtil - October 31, 2014

RegAsm/RegSvcs - November 6, 2015

Regsvr32 - April 19, 2016

MSBuild - May 27, 2016 - Device Guard Bypass.

dbgghost.exe

Discovered accidentally by ...

Reading MSDN & :)



Honestly need all need a better methodology to find these...



Using Custom Analysis Scripts

The analysis module in DebugDiag is extensible. You can also use existing analysis scripts to extract more data or using the objects exposed by Dbgghost.exe. Additionally, you can create new analysis scripts to address specific areas.

Does keeping a blacklist for whitelisting even make sense?

Current Published Device Guard Bypass Tools

- bash.exe
- bginfo.exe^[1]
- cdb.exe
- csi.exe
- dbgghost.exe
- dbgsvc.exe
- dnx.exe
- fsi.exe
- fsiAnyCpu.exe
- kd.exe
- ntkd.exe
- lxssmanager.dll
- msbuild.exe^[2]
- mshta.exe
- ntsd.exe
- rcsi.exe
- system.management.automation.dll
- windbg.exe

How are new bypasses...

Discovered?

Serviced?

Announced?

Call To Action

Three Things We Need

1.

Acknowledge whitelisting is a boundary. ;-)

2.

“sign everything same way”, needs to be
evaluated

`notepad.exe == windbg.exe ?`

3.

more .NET visibility

Closing Thoughts

Questions? Feedback?

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