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MADE IN GERMANY

# AutoDCA

# Audit

**Security Assessment  
08. March, 2023**

For



[SolidProof.io](https://SolidProof.io)



@solidproof\_io

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Version	Date	Description
1.0	4. March 2023	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Layout project</li><li>• Automated- /Manual-Security Testing</li><li>• Summary</li></ul>

## **Network**

Arbitrum

## **Website**

<https://autodca.io/>

## **Twitter**

[https://twitter.com/AutoDCA\\_io](https://twitter.com/AutoDCA_io)

## Description

We develop distinctive investment strategies that provide exposure to a variety of cryptocurrencies, market trends, and narratives.

## Project Engagement

During the Date of 4 March 2023, **AutoDCA Team** engaged Solidproof.io to audit smart contracts that they created. The engagement was technical in nature and focused on identifying security flaws in the design and implementation of the contracts. They provided Solidproof.io with access to their code repository and whitepaper.

## Logo



## Contract Link

### v1.0

- <https://github.com/autodca/dca-contracts/tree/master/contracts>
- Commit: 3853f60

# Vulnerability & Risk Level

Risk represents the probability that a certain source-threat will exploit vulnerability, and the impact of that event on the organization or system. Risk Level is computed based on CVSS version 3.0.

Level	Value	Vulnerability	Risk (Required Action)
<b>Critical</b>	9 - 10	A vulnerability that can disrupt the contract functioning in a number of scenarios, or creates a risk that the contract may be broken.	Immediate action to reduce risk level.
<b>High</b>	7 – 8.9	A vulnerability that affects the desired outcome when using a contract, or provides the opportunity to use a contract in an unintended way.	Implementation of corrective actions as soon as possible.
<b>Medium</b>	4 – 6.9	A vulnerability that could affect the desired outcome of executing the contract in a specific scenario.	Implementation of corrective actions in a certain period.
<b>Low</b>	2 – 3.9	A vulnerability that does not have a significant impact on possible scenarios for the use of the contract and is probably subjective.	Implementation of certain corrective actions or accepting the risk.
<b>Informational</b>	0 – 1.9	A vulnerability that have informational character but is not effecting any of the code.	An observation that does not determine a level of risk

# Auditing Strategy and Techniques Applied

Throughout the review process, care was taken to evaluate the repository for security-related issues, code quality, and adherence to specification and best practices. To do so, reviewed line-by-line by our team of expert pentesters and smart contract developers, documenting any issues as they were discovered.

## Methodology

The auditing process follows a routine series of steps:

1. Code review that includes the following:
  - i) Review of the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to SolidProof to make sure we understand the size, scope, and functionality of the smart contract.
  - ii) Manual review of code, which is the process of reading source code line-by-line in an attempt to identify potential vulnerabilities.
  - iii) Comparison to specification, which is the process of checking whether the code does what the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to SolidProof describe.
2. Testing and automated analysis that includes the following:
  - i) Test coverage analysis, which is the process of determining whether the test cases are actually covering the code and how much code is exercised when we run those test cases.
  - ii) Symbolic execution, which is analysing a program to determine what inputs causes each part of a program to execute.
3. Best practices review, which is a review of the smart contracts to improve efficiency, effectiveness, clarify, maintainability, security, and control based on the established industry and academic practices, recommendations, and research.
4. Specific, itemized, actionable recommendations to help you take steps to secure your smart contracts.

## Used Code from other Frameworks/Smart Contracts (direct imports)

Imported packages:

```
@openzeppelin/contracts/access/Ownable.sol  
@openzeppelin/contracts/access/AccessControl.sol  
@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/IERC20.sol  
@uniswap/v3-periphery/contracts/interfaces/ISwapRouter.sol  
hardhat/console.sol  
.IAccessManager.sol  
.IFeeManager.sol  
.DCATypes.sol  
.IFeeCollector.sol
```

```
@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/proxy/utils/Initializable.sol  
@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/proxy/utils/UUPSUpgradeable.sol  
@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/access/OwnableUpgradeable.sol  
.IFeeCollector.sol
```

## Tested Contract Files

This audit covered the following files listed below with a SHA-1 Hash.

*A file with a different Hash has been modified, intentionally or otherwise, after the security review. A different Hash could be (but not necessarily) an indication of a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.*


### v1.0

File Name	SHA-1 Hash
contracts/ DefaultAccessManager.sol	3944c1fe75aad4d95ea6ee9500bb3081 6dc61883
contracts/IFeeManager.sol	ef206b9c1279fa5029518d8bef6bca8a3 f747fc0
contracts/ IAccessManager.sol	014fc111829324d6e6bc3858048ce845 8cca7544
contracts/IFeeCollector.sol	fb5333d9bad98cba017ca021a68bd41b 4be200fb
contracts/ DefaultFeeManager.sol	4172212cf5ca703811e29bb1af0eb83f 18004bd
contracts/FeeCollector.sol	b32f573ea4307a4790559a5976edb911 faf33a33
contracts/DCATypes.sol	ec1fdef35b855fbca63f51ee4ee88fa49a 3eebee
contracts/ DCAStrategyManager.sol	a6fb671a228b542875ef52cbb3d888fdc 84c27a9


# Metrics

## Source Lines v1.0

source comment single block mixed  
empty todo blockEmpty



## Risk Level v1.0



# Capabilities

## Components v1.0

🌐 Public	💰 Payable
31	3

External	Internal	Private	Pure	View
17	29	0	0	12

### StateVariables


Total	🌐 Public
18	10

### Capabilities

Solidity Versions observed	🧪 Experimental Features	💰 Can Receive Funds	💻 Uses Assembly	💣 Has Destroyable Contracts
^0.8.9		yes		
📝 Transfers ETH	⚡ Low-Level Calls	👥 DelegateCall	⛓️ Uses Hash Functions	🔥 ECRecover
yes			yes	
♻️ TryCatch	Σ Unchecked			
yes				


# Inheritance Graph

## v1.0



# CallGraph

## v1.0



## **Scope of Work/Verify Claims**

The above token Team provided us with the files that needs to be tested (Github, Bscscan, Etherscan, files, etc.). The scope of the audit is the main contract (usual the same name as team appended with .sol).

We will verify the following claims:

1. Is contract an upgradeable
2. Correct implementation of Token standard
3. Deployer cannot lock user funds
4. Deployer cannot pause the contract
5. Deployer cannot set fees
6. Deployer cannot blacklist/antisnipe addresses
7. Overall checkup (Smart Contract Security)

## Is contract an upgradeable

Name

Is contract an upgradeable?

Yes

Comments:

v1.0

- Owner can deploy a new version of the feeCollector contract which can change any limit and give owner new privileges
  - Be aware of this and do your own research for the contract which is the contract pointing to

## Correct implementation of Token standard

ERC20				
Function	Description	Exist	Tested	Verified
TotalSupply	Provides information about the total token supply	✓	✓	✓
BalanceOf	Provides account balance of the owner's account	✓	✓	✓
Transfer	Executes transfers of a specified number of tokens to a specified address	✓	✓	✓
TransferFrom	Executes transfers of a specified number of tokens from a specified address	✓	✓	✓
Approve	Allow a spender to withdraw a set number of tokens from a specified account	✓	✓	✓
Allowance	Returns a set number of tokens from a spender to the owner	✓	✓	✓

# Write functions of contract

## v1.0

- ◆ setFeeCollector
- ◆ setParticipateFee
- ◆ registerStrategy
- ◆ updateStrategy
- ◆ participate 💰
- ◆ resign
- ◆ removeFromStrategy
- ◆ executeDCA

- ◆ receiveNative 💰
- ◆ receiveToken
- ◆ claimNative
- ◆ claimToken
- ◆ emergencyNativeWithdraw
- ◆ emergencyTokenWithdraw
- ◆ setClaimingPaused

## Deployer cannot burn or lock user funds

Name	Exist	Tested	Status
Deployer can lock	✓	✓	✗

Comments:

v1.0

- Owner can lock claimable user funds by pausing the claim

## Deployer cannot pause the contract

Name	Exist	Tested	Status
Deployer can pause	✓	✓	✗

Comments:

v1.0

- Owner can pause claim in the feeCollector contract, and lock tokens.

## Deployer cannot set fees

Name	Exist	Tested	Status
Deployer cannot set fees over 25%	✓	✓	✓
Deployer cannot set fees to nearly 100% or to 100%	✓	✓	✓

Comments:

**v1.0**

- Fees cannot be set without any limitations

## Deployer can blacklist/antisnipe addresses

Name	Exist	Tested	Status
Deployer cannot blacklist/antisnipe addresses	-	-	-

## Overall checkup (Smart Contract Security)

Tested	Verified
✓	✓

### Legend

Attribute	Symbol
Verified / Checked	✓
Partly Verified	🚩
Unverified / Not checked	✗
Not available	-

# Modifiers and public functions

## v1.0

DCAStrategyManager

FeeCollector

- ◆ `setFeeCollector`
- Ⓜ `onlyOwner`
- ◆ `setParticipateFee`
- Ⓜ `onlyOwner`
- ◆ `registerStrategy`
- Ⓜ `onlyOwner`
- ◆ `updateStrategy`
- Ⓜ `onlyOwner`
- Ⓜ `strategyExists`
- ◆ `participate $`
- Ⓜ `strategyExists`
- ◆ `resign`
- ◆ `removeFromStrategy`
- Ⓜ `onlyOwner`
- ◆ `executeDCA`
- Ⓜ `onlyRole`

- ◆ `initialize`
- Ⓜ `initializer`
- ◆ `receiveNative $`
- ◆ `receiveToken`
- ◆ `claimNative`
- ◆ `claimToken`
- ◆ `emergencyNativeWithdraw`
- Ⓜ `onlyOwner`
- ◆ `emergencyTokenWithdraw`
- Ⓜ `onlyOwner`
- ◆ `setClaimingPaused`
- Ⓜ `onlyOwner`

## Comments

- [AutoDCA:](#)
  - Set fee collector address
  - Set participate fees to any arbitrary value
  - Register Strategy
  - Update the strategy, and change uniswapFeeTier value, maxParticipants number, access manager, and fee manager addresses to any arbitrary value.
  - Remove accounts from strategy at any given time, and the participation fees paid by the user will not be refunded. It cannot be done while executing the DCA.
  - The account with the OPERATOR\_ROLE can execute the DCA
- [feeCollector.sol:](#)
  - Withdraw any type of token from the contract including the native ones

- There are several authorities which are authorized to call some functions, that means, if the owner is renounced, another address is still authorized to call functions
  - Be aware of this

**Please check if an OnlyOwner or similar restrictive modifier has been forgotten.**



# Source Units in Scope

## v1.0

File	Logic Contracts	Interfaces	Lines	nLines	nSLOC	Comment Lines	Complex. Score
contracts/DefaultAccessManager.sol	1	———	70	59	48	2	20
contracts/IFeeManager.sol	———	1	17	7	3	3	5
contracts/IAccessManager.sol	———	1	16	6	3	2	5
contracts/IFeeCollector.sol	———	1	9	6	3	2	8
contracts/DefaultFeeManager.sol	1	———	36	29	21	3	12
contracts/FeeCollector.sol	1	———	121	115	86	7	76
contracts/DCATypes.sol	1	———	65	65	57	14	1
contracts/DCAStrategyManager.sol	1	———	538	494	437	10	151
<b>Totals</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>872</b>	<b>781</b>	<b>658</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>278</b>

### Legend

Attribute	Description
Lines	total lines of the source unit
nLines	normalised lines of the source unit (e.g. normalises functions spanning multiple lines)
nSLOC	normalised source lines of code (only source-code lines; no comments, no blank lines)
Comment Lines	lines containing single or block comments
Complexity Score	a custom complexity score derived from code statements that are known to introduce code complexity (branches, loops, calls, external interfaces, ...)

# Audit Results

## Critical issues

No critical issues

## High issues

No high issues

## Medium issues

No medium issues

## Low issues

Issue	File	Type	Line	Description
#1	All	A floating pragma is set	—	The current pragma Solidity directive is „^0.8.9”.
#2	DCAStrategymanager	Missing Zero Address Validation (missing-zero-check)	104, 112, 164	Check that the address is not zero
#3	FeeCollector.sol	Missing Events Arithmetic	All	Emit an event for critical parameter changes

## Informational issues

Issue	File	Type	Line	Description
#1	All	NatSpec documentation missing	—	If you started to comment your code, also comment all other functions, variables etc.
#2	DCAStrategymanager	Uninitialised Local Variable	485	Make sure to initialise all local variables to avoid default values in calculations.

## Audit Comments

We recommend you to use the special form of comments (NatSpec Format, Follow link for more information <https://docs.soliditylang.org/en/latest/natspec-format.html>) for your contracts to provide rich documentation for functions, return variables and more. This helps investors to make clear what that variables, functions etc. do.

## **08. March 2023:**

- There is still an owner (Owner still has not renounced ownership)
- Owner can deploy a new version of the fee collector contract which can change any limit and give owner new privileges
- We recommend to put a hardcap on the participation fees
- The IFeeManager interface used in the contracts was not provided to us in the audit scope. Hence, we cannot comment on its security.
- Read whole report and modifiers section for more information

## SWC Attacks

ID	Title	Relationships	Status
<a href="#">SW C-1 36</a>	Unencrypted Private Data On-Chain	<a href="#">CWE-767: Access to Critical Private Variable via Public Method</a>	PASSED
<a href="#">SW C-1 35</a>	Code With No Effects	<a href="#">CWE-1164: Irrelevant Code</a>	PASSED
<a href="#">SW C-1 34</a>	Message call with hardcoded gas amount	<a href="#">CWE-655: Improper Initialization</a>	PASSED
<a href="#">SW C-1 33</a>	Hash Collisions With Multiple Variable Length Arguments	<a href="#">CWE-294: Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay</a>	PASSED
<a href="#">SW C-1 32</a>	Unexpected Ether balance	<a href="#">CWE-667: Improper Locking</a>	PASSED
<a href="#">SW C-1 31</a>	Presence of unused variables	<a href="#">CWE-1164: Irrelevant Code</a>	PASSED
<a href="#">SW C-1 30</a>	Right-To-Left-Override control character (U+202E)	<a href="#">CWE-451: User Interface (UI) Misrepresentation of Critical Information</a>	PASSED
<a href="#">SW C-1 29</a>	Typographical Error	<a href="#">CWE-480: Use of Incorrect Operator</a>	PASSED
<a href="#">SW C-1 28</a>	DoS With Block Gas Limit	<a href="#">CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption</a>	PASSED

<a href="#"><u>SW C-1 27</u></a>	Arbitrary Jump with Function Type Variable	<a href="#">CWE-695: Use of Low-Level Functionality</a>	PASSED
<a href="#"><u>SW C-1 25</u></a>	Incorrect Inheritance Order	<a href="#">CWE-696: Incorrect Behavior Order</a>	PASSED
<a href="#"><u>SW C-1 24</u></a>	Write to Arbitrary Storage Location	<a href="#">CWE-123: Write-what-where Condition</a>	PASSED
<a href="#"><u>SW C-1 23</u></a>	Requirement Violation	<a href="#">CWE-573: Improper Following of Specification by Caller</a>	PASSED
<a href="#"><u>SW C-1 22</u></a>	Lack of Proper Signature Verification	<a href="#">CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity</a>	PASSED
<a href="#"><u>SW C-1 21</u></a>	Missing Protection against Signature Replay Attacks	<a href="#">CWE-347: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature</a>	PASSED
<a href="#"><u>SW C-1 20</u></a>	Weak Sources of Randomness from Chain Attributes	<a href="#">CWE-330: Use of Insufficiently Random Values</a>	PASSED
<a href="#"><u>SW C-11 9</u></a>	Shadowing State Variables	<a href="#">CWE-710: Improper Adherence to Coding Standards</a>	PASSED
<a href="#"><u>SW C-11 8</u></a>	Incorrect Constructor Name	<a href="#">CWE-665: Improper Initialization</a>	PASSED
<a href="#"><u>SW C-11 7</u></a>	Signature Malleability	<a href="#">CWE-347: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature</a>	PASSED

<a href="#"><u>SW C-11 6</u></a>	Timestamp Dependence	<a href="#">CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere</a>	PASSED
<a href="#"><u>SW C-11 5</u></a>	Authorization through tx.origin	<a href="#">CWE-477: Use of Obsolete Function</a>	PASSED
<a href="#"><u>SW C-11 4</u></a>	Transaction Order Dependence	<a href="#">CWE-362: Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition')</a>	PASSED
<a href="#"><u>SW C-11 3</u></a>	DoS with Failed Call	<a href="#">CWE-703: Improper Check or Handling of Exceptional Conditions</a>	PASSED
<a href="#"><u>SW C-11 2</u></a>	Delegatecall to Untrusted Callee	<a href="#">CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere</a>	PASSED
<a href="#"><u>SW C-11 1</u></a>	Use of Deprecated Solidity Functions	<a href="#">CWE-477: Use of Obsolete Function</a>	PASSED
<a href="#"><u>SW C-11 0</u></a>	Assert Violation	<a href="#">CWE-670: Always-Incorrect Control Flow Implementation</a>	PASSED
<a href="#"><u>SW C-1 09</u></a>	Uninitialized Storage Pointer	<a href="#">CWE-824: Access of Uninitialized Pointer</a>	PASSED
<a href="#"><u>SW C-1 08</u></a>	State Variable Default Visibility	<a href="#">CWE-710: Improper Adherence to Coding Standards</a>	PASSED
<a href="#"><u>SW C-1 07</u></a>	Reentrancy	<a href="#">CWE-841: Improper Enforcement of Behavioral Workflow</a>	PASSED
<a href="#"><u>SW C-1 06</u></a>	Unprotected SELFDESTRUCT Instruction	<a href="#">CWE-284: Improper Access Control</a>	PASSED

<a href="#"><u>SW C-1 05</u></a>	Unprotected Ether Withdrawal	<a href="#"><u>CWE-284: Improper Access Control</u></a>	PASSED
<a href="#"><u>SW C-1 04</u></a>	Unchecked Call Return Value	<a href="#"><u>CWE-252: Unchecked Return Value</u></a>	PASSED
<a href="#"><u>SW C-1 03</u></a>	Floating Pragma	<a href="#"><u>CWE-664: Improper Control of a Resource Through its Lifetime</u></a>	NOT PASSED
<a href="#"><u>SW C-1 02</u></a>	Outdated Compiler Version	<a href="#"><u>CWE-937: Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities</u></a>	PASSED
<a href="#"><u>SW C-1 01</u></a>	Integer Overflow and Underflow	<a href="#"><u>CWE-682: Incorrect Calculation</u></a>	PASSED
<a href="#"><u>SW C-1 00</u></a>	Function Default Visibility	<a href="#"><u>CWE-710: Improper Adherence to Coding Standards</u></a>	PASSED

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