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Hi @ka1hatsu, thanks for the detailed report and the thorough reproduction. You’re right that download_and_extract_code() calls shutil.unpack_archive() without an extraction filter, and that a crafted tar can write outside the extraction directory. After review, though, we don’t consider this a security vulnerability in ZenML’s threat model. The archive in question is the pipeline code that the step container executes. Anyone able to write that archive to the artifact store, or to set a snapshot’s code_path, can already run arbitrary code in the container by including it in the archive. Path traversal doesn’t grant anything beyond that, and no privilege boundary is crossed. We’ll still harden the extraction with filter="data" (with a fallback for older Python versions) as a defense-in-depth change. We’ll close this advisory without a CVE and make the fix through a regular PR. We’re happy to credit you in the PR or release notes if you’d like. Thanks again for taking the time to dig into this. |
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Hello maintainers,
I reported a potential security vulnerability in your project approximately three weeks ago, but I have not received a response yet.
I understand that security reports may take time to review. Could you please confirm whether my report was received and provide an update on its current status?
I can provide any additional information needed to help validate the issue.
Thank you for your time.
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