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Security

decompile-release-bot edited this page Nov 21, 2026 · 2 revisions

Security

How this project is kept clean + what the hardening guarantees are.

Dependency audits

Current state:

  • npm audit: 0 vulnerabilities (production + dev)
  • Transitive CVEs in hono + @hono/node-server (pulled via @modelcontextprotocol/sdk) are pinned to patched versions via overrides in package.json.

Reproduce:

npm install
npm audit

Secret handling

  • .env, .env.*, .gh-token, *.token, *.secret, .credentials, .secret*, *.pem, *.key, *.crt, *.p12, *.pfx — all in .gitignore.
  • The setup command writes timestamped backups (*.bak-<ts>) next to every agent config before mutating it; those backups are also gitignored.
  • Maintenance scripts (scripts/cleanup-old-releases.mjs, scripts/set-github-topics.mjs) take the token only from $GITHUB_TOKEN; it never appears on a CLI argument or in logs.

Shell-injection guard

The server exposes a handful of tools that spawn external processes (launch_re_backend, ida_run_script, fakepdb_run, ghidra_run_script). On Windows, those spawns use shell: true so Node resolves .cmd / .bat / PATH — which opens a shell-injection sink for user-supplied string args.

Mitigation: a central safeShellArg(name, value) / safeShellArgs() in src/retools.ts rejects any string containing shell metacharacters ([\s;&|<>$\"'\!*?(){}[]\n\r\0]`) before it reaches such a spawn. Every call site that takes user input has the guard wired in.

run (the code harness) executes JavaScript with the server's authority, like a shell — disable it with MCP_CODE_HARNESS=0 where that is not wanted.

Filesystem sandbox

Any tool that reads an arbitrary path (pe_parse, elf_parse, pe_imports_json, go_build_info, …) calls requirePathAllowed(path) from src/fs-sandbox.ts. Sandbox policy:

  • MCP_FS_ALLOW=root1,root2 — allowlist; paths not inside one of these roots are refused.
  • MCP_FS_DENY=root3,root4 — denylist, wins over allow.
  • With neither set, policy is open (back-compat with pre-sandbox behavior). Explicit opt-in is strongly recommended when the server is reachable over HTTP.

Rate limiting

HTTP mode has per-user token-bucket rate limiting. Enable via:

MCP_RATE_LIMIT_PER_USER=1
MCP_RATE_LIMIT_PER_USER_SEC=20

Identity resolution: X-User-Id header → Authorization bearer hash → remote IP. Over-limit requests get 429 + Retry-After.

CI code scanning

  • CodeQL runs on every push via .github/workflows/codeql.yml.
  • release-core.yml builds the Rust binary with clang + lld on every target (core/.cargo/config.lld.toml).
  • Dependabot opens PRs for every dep bump; the maintainer merges weekly.

Reporting a vulnerability

Read SECURITY.md for the responsible-disclosure contact.

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