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Security
How this project is kept clean + what the hardening guarantees are.
Current state:
- npm audit: 0 vulnerabilities (production + dev)
- Transitive CVEs in
hono+@hono/node-server(pulled via@modelcontextprotocol/sdk) are pinned to patched versions viaoverridesinpackage.json.
Reproduce:
npm install
npm audit-
.env,.env.*,.gh-token,*.token,*.secret,.credentials,.secret*,*.pem,*.key,*.crt,*.p12,*.pfx— all in.gitignore. - The
setupcommand writes timestamped backups (*.bak-<ts>) next to every agent config before mutating it; those backups are also gitignored. - Maintenance scripts (
scripts/cleanup-old-releases.mjs,scripts/set-github-topics.mjs) take the token only from$GITHUB_TOKEN; it never appears on a CLI argument or in logs.
The server exposes a handful of tools that spawn external processes
(launch_re_backend, ida_run_script,
fakepdb_run, ghidra_run_script). On Windows, those spawns use
shell: true so Node resolves .cmd / .bat / PATH — which opens
a shell-injection sink for user-supplied string args.
Mitigation: a central safeShellArg(name, value) / safeShellArgs()
in src/retools.ts rejects any string containing shell
metacharacters ([\s;&|<>$\"'\!*?(){}[]\n\r\0]`) before it reaches
such a spawn. Every call site that takes user input has the guard
wired in.
run (the code harness) executes JavaScript with the server's authority,
like a shell — disable it with MCP_CODE_HARNESS=0 where that is not wanted.
Any tool that reads an arbitrary path (pe_parse, elf_parse,
pe_imports_json, go_build_info, …) calls
requirePathAllowed(path) from src/fs-sandbox.ts. Sandbox policy:
-
MCP_FS_ALLOW=root1,root2— allowlist; paths not inside one of these roots are refused. -
MCP_FS_DENY=root3,root4— denylist, wins over allow. - With neither set, policy is open (back-compat with pre-sandbox behavior). Explicit opt-in is strongly recommended when the server is reachable over HTTP.
HTTP mode has per-user token-bucket rate limiting. Enable via:
MCP_RATE_LIMIT_PER_USER=1
MCP_RATE_LIMIT_PER_USER_SEC=20
Identity resolution: X-User-Id header → Authorization bearer hash
→ remote IP. Over-limit requests get 429 + Retry-After.
- CodeQL runs on every push via
.github/workflows/codeql.yml. -
release-core.ymlbuilds the Rust binary with clang + lld on every target (core/.cargo/config.lld.toml). - Dependabot opens PRs for every dep bump; the maintainer merges weekly.
Read SECURITY.md for the responsible-disclosure contact.
decompile v0.0.1 · MIT · npm · install.sh · install.ps1
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