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@github-actions github-actions released this 17 Nov 13:53
· 1 commit to develop since this release
v3.0
08b9af1

⚠️ Breaking Changes

Upgrading from 2.4 needs action in several areas, see Upgrading to 3.0 for migration steps.

  • The library runs on .NET 11 only and requires newer minimum versions of the Protocol Buffers, Redis and Azure libraries it depends on.
  • Multi-tenancy is the only mode: a deployment serving one issuer declares one tenant, which owns its clients, scopes, resources, keys and pages.
  • Many types, members and constructors take the tenant they work for, so a host that implements, decorates or constructs them meets the change at compile time.
  • 3.0 reads nothing a 2.x server stored: end users sign in again, flows in progress and refresh tokens issued by 2.x end, and minted signing keys carry over only when they are copied into the tenant before the first start.
  • Several settings are renamed or removed, and a key under its 2.x name is ignored without an error.
  • The server starts only with a consent provider registered, and serves only the logout channels the host registers.
  • Offline access is set per client, and a refresh token is issued only after a consent prompt or to a client allowed it.
  • Refresh tokens rotate by default for every client whose access tokens are not bound to a key it proves.
  • A client authenticating with a JWT it signs names the tenant's issuer as the audience, as RFC 10070 requires.
  • FAPI 2.0 clients are held to RSA-PSS or ECDSA P-256 signatures and to the profile's rules, and a client configured against them stops the server.
  • An MVC host maps the OIDC endpoints with the library's mapping call, as a Minimal API host does.
  • A Shared Signals transmitter starts only with a key for signing security events and an issuer in its options.
  • Log event ids are unique across packages, and the Vault, Azure, security events and Shared Signals packages use new ranges.

⚙️ Platform Support

  • .NET 11 (latest)

🚀 Features

  • Multi-tenancy (#221)
  • Tenants created, changed and removed at run time without a restart
  • Shared Signals transmitter per tenant
  • FAPI 1.0 Advanced security profile (#889)
  • FAPI-CIBA under FAPI 1.0 Advanced (#940, #942)
  • FAPI 2.0 Message Signing security profiles (#896)
  • OpenTelemetry tracing and metrics (#207, #208)
  • Explicit typing of every JWT validation (RFC 8725) (#644)
  • Signing and encryption algorithms held to each client's security profile, with discovery advertising only those and a client registered without an algorithm assigned one the tenant's keys support (#889)
  • Revoking one user's tokens at one client (#753)
  • A host interaction step, such as accepting new terms, before anything is issued (#650)
  • "Keep me signed in" sessions that survive a browser restart (#684)
  • Per-client budgets on introspection and revocation (#326)
  • A default scope per client (#815)
  • One resource per access token, for a client held to it (#816)
  • A per-client list of the resources it may get an access token for (#814)
  • Resource inferred from the requested scopes
  • Protocol vocabulary package usable by a client without the server (#645)
  • Response modes in dynamic client registration (#896)
  • Extra client assertion audiences a host can grant one client: the backchannel authentication endpoint, and the pushed authorization request endpoint for clients built before RFC 10070 (#890, #938)
  • State hash in the ID token returned from the authorization endpoint (#888)
  • FAPI interaction identifier returned and logged at UserInfo under FAPI 1.0 Advanced (#943)

✏️ Improvements

  • JWT introspection responses chosen through the Accept header, signed by default without a client registration, and answered 406 when no offered form is acceptable (RFC 9701) (#896)
  • A release is published only after it passes the OpenID Foundation conformance plans for OpenID Connect, FAPI 2.0, FAPI 2.0 Message Signing, FAPI 1.0 Advanced and FAPI-CIBA, on both web adapters (#946, #952)
  • Every single-use decision goes through one entity store, so it holds across nodes once the host registers a store that adds a value only when absent in one command; the built-in store over the distributed cache decides within one instance (#929)
  • Refresh token reuse policy of three choices (#640)
  • A key custodian outage answered with a status the caller can act on, with the last key set still published (#531)
  • A rotated signing key of a client or trusted issuer read again at once
  • Three limits on guessing a user code
  • A granted authorization detail held to what the client requested
  • A consent that grants nothing answered as access denied
  • Any port on a loopback redirect address (RFC 8252) (#678)
  • Addresses, durations and dates parsed once into their own types where they arrive (#655)
  • Device codes kept in the entity storage
  • A device verification page relative to the issuer
  • Offline access together with an access token returned through the browser, where the host allows it
  • A minted key ring without a store refused at startup
  • A key chosen for an algorithm only where the registered algorithm accepts its material: an ECDSA key on its own curve, an AES key wrap key of its exact size (#954)

🛠 Fixes

  • Every client of a session told when it ends, even when two of them signed in at once (#307)
  • A missing essential claim answered with the claims the host holds
  • An essential authentication level honored in session selection and CIBA
  • A claims request that agrees on no end user answered as an invalid request
  • A CIBA authentication that ends without tokens reported to its push or ping client
  • Several prompt values in one authorization request (#622)
  • The MVC and Minimal API hosts read a request the same way (#632)
  • A request passed by reference comes back from the login page
  • An ID token returned together with a code and an access token carries the hash of each
  • A client using client secret JWT authentication registers without a key set (#951)
  • A key management algorithm the host registers under its own name works end to end (#951)
  • An unsecured request object naming no client served for the client named alongside it (#933)
  • A client required to sign its requests served under strict request object processing (#884)
  • A FAPI 2.0 client that registers no response type passes startup, registration and authentication (#920)
  • A token read back by another instance whose clock lags the issuing one
  • A logout request with a post-logout redirect address and no client ends the session after confirmation and redirects nowhere (#685)
  • Two overlapping logout requests for one session receive the same confirmation question (#910)
  • A back-channel logout the application did not complete accepted again (#565)
  • An approval that arrives during a device poll kept (#194)
  • An expired device code reported as expired
  • Device requests carry the scopes of their resources
  • Stored requests keep every address as the client wrote it
  • Configuration the registries cannot hold stops the server at startup
  • A request object member that cannot be read is an invalid request object (#657)
  • Absent optional members left out of the token response and of tokens pushed to a CIBA client (#873)
  • The authentication scheme of the authorization header accepted in any case (#876)
  • Basic credentials that are not base64 answered as an invalid client (#880)
  • Authentication challenge values kept within the characters RFC 6750 allows, and errors without a challenge keep their own status (#894, #911)
  • A UserInfo request whose parameter is refused answered with the endpoint's authentication challenges (#930)
  • An encrypted signed token carries the JWT content type, and a malformed pushed security event is answered 400 (#899)
  • The Shared Signals configuration document advertises only what is served (#534)
  • A queued Shared Signals event carries the time it was sent
  • A Shared Signals receiver that asks to wait is left alone until then

Detailed Description

The features, improvements and fixes of this release are described in What's new in 3.0.

✅ Why It Matters

  • Multi-tenancy lets one deployment serve many issuers, each with its own clients, keys and pages, and add, change or remove them without a restart
  • Explicit token typing defends against a token issued for one purpose being accepted where another is expected
  • A refresh token caught being reused revokes its grant, and its access tokens are refused wherever this server checks them
  • With per-client budgets, one client's broken retry loop leaves every other client's introspection working
  • A published key set that survives a custodian outage keeps the failure inside the issuer instead of spreading it to every relying party
  • Every client that signed in to a session is told when it ends, even when two of them signed in at once
  • Tracing and metrics show each request's path and cost without naming a client's credentials or an end user
  • The test suite of this release covers over 90% of the lines and branches of the hand-written code its packages ship

What's Changed

Full Changelog: v2.4...v3.0