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Anti-REA Forge v1.0.0
Anti-REA Forge v1.0.0
2026-11-18 · English README · 中文 README
Release focus
Version 1.0 combines a broader release inspector, verified native metadata separation,
stronger build/admission boundaries and an installation-tested distribution pipeline.
Python and JavaScript package versions are aligned at 1.0.0. Existing v1 signed
formats, the releaseguard CLI/import name and SDK entry points are retained.
LLVM native function transformation remains experimental; this release is not an
independent security audit or a claim that general-purpose analysis tools cannot run.
Audit findings and reproductions
The audit began at 674f8b20cc0fae7bd2684b15dc74cc4db567db29. Each row represents
a concrete reproduced behavior with owned inputs, followed by a production change
and both rejection and compatibility controls.
| Area | Before | 1.0 behavior | Reproduction / regression |
|---|---|---|---|
| ELF CTF/BTF | GCC type metadata survived GNU strip; native and release checks reported no debug disclosure | Exact type/index sections detected; eligible non-allocated bytes retained privately and removed publicly | Real GCC/readelf/objcopy controls |
| Source-map encodings and wrappers | UTF-16/32 XSSI maps and root-array embedded maps could pass inspection | Encoded delimiters aligned by code unit; objects and arrays inspected under existing byte/node/depth budgets | Encoding and JSON controls |
| Opaque packages | Renamed canonical V7 TAR and expected Brotli sidecars were treated as ordinary bytes | V7 structure/checksum recognized and .br suffix rejected as unsupported | Independent TAR/Node Brotli round trips |
| CMake gate identity | cwd/PYTHONPATH shadows replaced native-init and made a compiled forbidden-literal program pass POST_BUILD | Selected installed interpreter uses isolated mode for both commands | Four actual CMake shadow controls |
| Final LLVM emission closure | Direct sealing input retained prefix/prologue constants and inline/module assembly outside inventoried storage | Actual syntax tokens rejected across the module while identifiers, strings and comments remain valid | 11 emission variants and real LLVM controls |
| Native static teardown | A late global destructor could reopen the generated loader after its owner had been destroyed | Automatic teardown retires the instance; normal explicit clear/reinitialize still works | Actual GCC/OpenSSL lifetime controls |
| Capability admission timing | A capability could expire during durable commit/close yet reach the handler | Trusted time sampled again after consumption; final denial leaves the nonce spent | Real Ed25519/SQLite completion controls |
| Replay-store identity | One live store object accepted a fresh or byte-identical replacement database | Instance pins device/inode and rejects ordinary replacement | Replacement and normal multi-instance controls |
| Bounded document input | Legacy reads could block on FIFO or read without a bound before rejecting a negative budget | Regular, stable files only; bounded reads and pre/post identity checks | FIFO, links, changes, budgets and ordinary documents |
The LLVM emission issue is post-transform/direct-API hardening: original-source
preflight already rejected those constructs, so this is not presented as a
proven ordinary CLI bypass. Replay identity checks do not provide rollback-proof
storage. TAR/MSF/ar/Brotli recognition is explicit incomplete-inspection handling,
not a new parser or proof that the contents are protected. Arbitrarily renamed
Brotli streams have no supported magic recognition.
Release acceptance and downloadable evidence
CI has 13 named required jobs across Linux,
Windows and macOS. The publisher requires an
entire successful main push run at the current main SHA, with the exact job
inventory in release-policy.json. PR/fork runs,
skipped jobs, changed commits and incomplete job lists cannot publish.
Three packaging jobs build and install the actual wheel and Python source archive
in separate fresh environments outside the checkout. They verify isolated imports,
CLI version, shipped native resources, clean/blocked releases, a 4 KiB authenticated
asset round trip and leaked-key rejection. The packed SDK is installed in a separate
Node project and exercised against the installed Python core.
Publication uses the exact Linux job archives. The other operating systems independently build and install the same source; they do not install identical Linux-produced archive bytes. Their names, byte sizes and SHA-256
are checked against the installation report. A new tag identifies the validated
commit; assets are uploaded into a draft, and server-reported asset digests are
checked before making the release public. Existing releases or tags are never
replaced. A failed upload/check remains unpublished for review.
The v1.0.0 Release
contains:
open_release_guard-1.0.0-py3-none-any.whlopen_release_guard-1.0.0.tar.gzanti-rea-forge-releaseguard-1.0.0.tgzinstallation-report.json— exact package checks and archive hashesrelease-evidence.json— final commit, all required CI job URLs and installation reportSHA256SUMS— checksums for all five files above
The Python and SDK archives are GitHub Release assets. This publication does not
claim a PyPI or npm registry release. CI success is operational evidence, not a
cryptographic signature or independent security certification. The release record
is generated from actual final-main results, rather than copied from an earlier PR.
Upgrade from 0.10 / SDK 0.6
- Install the core into the selected interpreter. CMake now uses
python -I;
PYTHONPATH and user-site-only installations are excluded. Use a virtual
environment, install the package there and setPython3_EXECUTABLEfor CMake.
Regenerate previously exported CMake assets so builds use the new gate. - Update the dependency baseline. The core requires
cryptography>=50.0.2,<51.
Upstream fixed security issues and updated bundled OpenSSL after the former
allowed floor. This is dependency hygiene; no reachable PKCS7/X509 exploit in
ReleaseGuard was demonstrated. Python 3.10+ remains supported. Intel macOS and
32-bit Windows no longer receive wheels from recent cryptography releases;
our macOS/Windows runner matrix does not establish support for those targets. - Use regular files for documents, policies and PEM keys. Unsafe leaf links,
reparse points, FIFOs and other special files are rejected. Parent directories
must remain trusted. The internal bounded reader accepts a plain integer in
0..8 MiB; individual callers retain their smaller limits. - Handle additional release findings. CTF/BTF sections now fail the default
native metadata check. Usesplit-elf-debugon eligible original linked ELF
input, retaining its private sidecar..br, recognized V7 TAR and previously
unsupported formats must be removed, inspected in an appropriate separate
workflow or covered by an explicit reviewed policy decision. An opt-out is
not equivalent to having inspected their contents. - Keep authorization retries explicit. A token rejected by the final time
check remains spent. Obtain a new token rather than resetting replay storage.
The database schema and existing signed capability format are unchanged. - Respect native lifetime order. Initialize before workers, clear after
joining them. Automatic module destruction is final; late destructors cannot
reopen it. Public runtime/helper code and authorized plaintext remain observable.
Sources for the dependency change: cryptography 50.0.2 changelog
and published package metadata.
What the data does and does not show
The README links the historical paired Ghidra/IDA asset experiment, with plaintext,
external-key and deliberately leaked-key controls, candidate counts and patch results.
Its 1 MiB latency number is a dated single-host observation, not a universal benchmark.
Current CI also runs pinned REA CLI/source-map recovery, genuine Ghidra extraction,
actual LLVM/native compilers and official ASAR controls. Missing local toolchains
are recorded as skips and never counted as execution.
There is no new claim of modern IDA/Hex-Rays, Hopper, Frida, GDB, JADX, JEB, firmware
or complete REA-agent/model resistance. The controls reduce shipped disclosures and
close specific admission/build/format errors. They cannot revoke an independent
reader's access to already distributed code or prevent authorized runtime observation.
中文升级摘要
本轮修复 9 类已复现的行为缺口,保留正常使用的正对照;Python 与 SDK 统一为 1.0.0。
新的发布门禁要求 13 个指定 CI 作业成功,并核对实际安装包及上传文件的 SHA-256。
中英文 README 的原理图由仓库内 SVG 生成脚本
维护,私有密钥、公开产物和授权执行的边界在图中分别标明。
升级时需要将内核安装进 CMake 选定的解释器,重新生成旧版 CMake 资产;普通文档、策略、
PEM 必须为可信普通文件。CTF/BTF、.br、V7 TAR 等新增检查可能使旧发布流程失败,需处理
真实泄露或明确评审策略。授权提交后过期会拒绝进入处理函数,令牌保持已消费;重放数据库
仍依赖可信持久化存储。原生 LLVM 转换继续标为实验功能,不宣称所有通用逆向工具都无法突破。