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Anti-REA Forge v1.2.0
Anti-REA Forge 1.2.0 — Expanded recovery controls
Release date: 2026-11-18. Python core and JavaScript SDK use 1.2.0.
This release expands the real REA experiments from single fixtures to different
programs and builds, and closes three demonstrated disclosure paths. It keeps
the previous controls and their failures. The measurements describe what the
specified readers recover from authored release artifacts; they are not a
general probability of preventing reverse engineering.
Measured changes
| Control | Original / previous release | Public / current release | Positive or compatibility control |
|---|---|---|---|
| Five Wasm programs, known private names | 26 recovered | 0 recovered | Private originals restored: 26 recovered |
| Wasm executable behavior | 43 numerical checks, 2 runtime traps, 1 host rejection | Same results; every standard section byte identical | Imports, memory, globals, table mutation and loops exercised |
| Four JavaScript builds, five bundles | 9 embedded originals recovered | 0 exact originals recovered | Private maps restored: all 9 recovered; JS bytes unchanged |
| Incomplete maps with escaped content keys | v1.1 permits 2; REA recovers exact source despite partial graphs | v1.2 rejects both | Complete graph required for absence in the normal three-sided controls |
| Residual Wasm linker symbols | Actual v1.1 split removes name, gate allows, REA recovers one helper |
v1.2 gate and splitter refuse the input | Producer-valid, executable relocatable module; nonexistent outputs are not scored |
| Consumer-compatible key representations | v1.1 permits all 19; recovered material actually decrypts or signs | v1.2 positively identifies and rejects all 19 | Two nonsecret controls pass on both versions |
| Known-key consumer decoding beyond its raw-text budget | v1.1 permits; Node still recovers the exact key | v1.2 explicitly rejects incomplete inspection | Separately reported; excluded from the 19 positive identifications |
Both Wasm and JavaScript corpora run against published rea-agents@6.9.0
and a separately compiled, tracked-clean source snapshot
675287517c98c702ee88ad036c5e3b8dd4bcc7a7.
There are 16 Wasm and 15 JavaScript REA invocations per distribution, including
the separately classified rejection/disclosure controls: 62 actual calls
across the two distributions. Repeated artifact sides and distributions do not
multiply the number of independent programs or behavioral cases.
The source tree and compiled runtime are verified before and after each run.
Official WABT 1.0.42 archive and executable hashes remain pinned. The previous
release comparison uses the official v1.1 wheel with SHA-256
5040a0f33c6b5a640302af4983556abdcab1918e845f4bac4010ec2fa2233086.
Wasm and key probes verify all 29 installed package files against that wheel
before and after execution. The source-map probe's optional baseline check is
version-only; required CI first runs the Wasm identity check on the same
interpreter. Each report states its actual provenance and limits.
1. Finish Wasm linking before release
name is not the only place a helper can be named. A real WABT
--relocatable --debug-names build retains linking and reloc.Code; removing
the debug-name section alone leaves an internal helper recoverable by REA.
The bounded envelope reader now records linker_sections and
evidence.linker_metadata_present. Default portable inspection reports
native_metadata_unverifiable with reason
linker_metadata_requires_final_link and an incomplete metadata flag.
split-wasm-debug rejects before creating either output. The rule recognizes
the section names; it does not pretend to parse linker symbol/relocation tables
or delete data that a linker might require. Some such modules are executable.
The five ordinary modules still separate successfully. Each private original is
byte-exact, all retained public sections keep their bytes and order, and the
public notice custom section survives. Runtime users of removed debug custom
sections can observe the change; test the actual embedding.
2. Treat readable source as a disclosure even in an incomplete map
The escaped JSON key sourcesCont\u0065nt decodes to sourcesContent. Source
text is still readable when mappings is missing, numeric or otherwise not a
valid mapping string. The old structural recognizer required a valid-looking
map and could miss this disclosure while the literal key was already blocked.
The bounded JSON traversal now applies the same conservative key rule after
decoding. It produces source_map_marker with
representation: "json-decoded-key" when existing literal/structural findings
have not already rejected the document. It works within the existing encoding,
XSSI, archive, node and depth bounds. It is a disclosure marker, not a claim
that the document is a valid v3 source map.
The expanded corpus includes three-source builds, two linked bundles, Unicode
sources/keys and a null original. The unavailable original is excluded from
recovery counts. A nested indexed map exposes two originals but remains outside
the flat-map splitter profile and is explicitly rejected. A partial REA graph
can demonstrate positive recovery; it cannot establish absence.
3. Inspect the representations real key consumers accept
The new key control executes Node key imports and byte-array decoding, plus
cryptography signing and authenticated decryption. The 19 inputs are specific
representations, not 19 independent vulnerability classes. They cover:
- JWK Base64 alphabet, folding, ignored characters, padding, unused bits and
Node's UTF-16 consumer aliases, including non-BMP and surrogate inputs. - Leading-zero RSA integer representations that preserve the actual key.
- Configured asset keys in integer-valued JSON numbers, contiguous windows in
longer byte arrays, folded Base64 and mixed-case hex. - Whole JSON strings containing supported unencrypted private DER in hex or
Base64, including ignored separators accepted by the decoding consumer.
Consumer recognition is distinct from canonical JWK validation. Supported JWK
families with nonempty declared private fields that cannot be completely
inspected now produce an explicit incomplete-inspection finding. They are not
counted as positively identified keys. Normal public keys remain allowed.
A separate 38,744-character ignored-byte representation still decodes to the
configured 32-byte key in Node. The known-key reader now checks a bounded raw
prefix: enough significant characters exclude an exact 32-byte whole-string
key, while an undecidable over-budget prefix explicitly blocks release. A
complete key followed by padding and a long ignored tail is still detected.
This regression is recorded as one budget rejection, outside the 19 positive
identifications.
JSON keeps its 8 MiB file, node and depth limits. Raw JWK fields are bounded
before allocating consumer normalization; whole-string known-key Base64 has a
32,768-character raw prefix budget. Encoded DER has a raw text inspection
bound, a 64 KiB per-candidate decoded limit, at most 64 candidates and a shared
256 KiB decoded-candidate budget per JSON document. Only private ASN.1 candidates
reach the cryptographic reader. Unsupported or over-budget recognized material
must not silently become a complete, successful scan. No secret values or JSON
property names are copied into findings.
Upgrade notes
The CLI/import names, SDK methods and signed-document v1 formats are unchanged.
Default release decisions become stricter in these cases:
- Finish final linking for Wasm files containing
linkingorreloc.*, then
separate debug information and test the application. Renamed files and
inspected ZIP/ASAR members receive the same metadata decision. - Remove private source content even from malformed or nonstandard JSON maps.
Merely naming the reserved content key may trigger the conservative rule. - Keep private key material and known external asset keys outside releases in
every accepted consumer representation. Resolve incomplete inspection; do not
treat it as a successfully checked public key. - Install matching 1.2.0 core/SDK archives and regenerate exported build assets
when upgrading. Sign and package only after all applicable checks succeed.
Required validation and downloadable evidence
The final local candidate ran 913 Python tests: 900 passed, 13 skipped, zero
failures. All 65 SDK tests and 10 real CLI integration tests passed, as did
fresh wheel, source and SDK installations. Local tool-dependent skips are
explicit; these results do not replace required CI. The local record
binds tested source hashes and identifies its uncommitted candidate state.
The required recovery CI job now runs both expanded corpora against npm/source,
the v1.1 key-representation control, and the existing v1.0 key, single-fixture
REA and Craft controls. Portable tests run on all three operating systems.
Every fresh wheel and source installation must also reject a consumer-compatible
key array, an escaped incomplete map and relocatable Wasm. The publisher requires
all three new installation booleans to be true.
Publication still requires all 13 named CI jobs at the exact main commit,
clean installed-artifact evidence, matching versions and verified uploaded
archive bytes. A skipped, missing, duplicate or unsuccessful required job blocks
publication. The release attaches installation-report.json,
release-evidence.json and SHA256SUMS alongside wheel, source and SDK archives.
Reproducible records
- Wasm corpus: npm and
pinned source. - JavaScript corpus: npm and
pinned source. - Nineteen key recoveries and nonsecret controls.
- Chinese assessment and per-program results.
- Wasm integration, source-map integration
and security boundaries.
Public Wasm/JS logic remains analyzable; authorized process memory can contain
plaintext; Python bytecode, CIL and Go-specific metadata have not gained new
confidentiality transformations. These tests do not evaluate an unrestricted
REA agent session or establish that all general-purpose software is protected.