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Ommega 2.4.4
热更新(同版本 2.4.4,A 模块 versionCode 360 → 361): 修复 KeyMint 降权到 keystore 后缺少
inet组,导致修改中继配置热加载后中继 DNS 解析失败(#107)。已安装 2.4.4 的 A 端可直接覆盖刷入。Hotfix (same version 2.4.4, A module versionCode 360 → 361): KeyMint now keeps the
inetgroup after dropping to keystore, so relay DNS keeps working after a relay config hot reload (#107). Flash over an existing 2.4.4 A install.
中文
本版涉及 A、B、Server 和 B-app,均为安全加固与稳定性修复;StrongBoxCapabilityMask 仅同步产品版本号,随包 AProbe 未更新。
- 中继 TLS 默认校验证书并支持公钥固定(#102)。 A 端
tls_insecure默认改为false,配置锁异常时报错而不是退回不校验;B 端 relay 不再一律接受任意证书。两端新增 SPKI SHA-256 固定:A 为remote.tls_pin_sha256,B 为OMMEGA_RELAY_TLS_PIN_SHA256;B 另有OMMEGA_RELAY_TLS_INSECURE(默认false)。设置了固定值时只接受持有该公钥的服务器;固定值格式错误直接报配置错误,不会降级为不校验。A WebUI 中继设置新增固定值输入框,「关闭 TLS 校验」在无配置时默认不勾选。 - B token 绑定设备,联系方式查询不再返回完整 token(#101)。
/api/card/query/只返回打码的订单号和 token,完整 token 只能凭随机订单号领取。数据库签发的 B token 只能服务管理员绑定的device_id(api_token.allowed_device_ids,首次使用时自动加列),否则b_poll、b_result、身份上传与撤销均返回 403;静态RELAY_TOKEN不受影响。b_poll要求非空machine_id,同一设备第二台机器返回 409;B relay 在未配置时使用内核boot_id,B-app 在服务启动时即使用ANDROID_ID。管理后台可在签发时或之后为 token 绑定设备。 - Server 限流与抽奖加固(#99、#100)。 抽奖每客户端每天 3 次,IPv6 按 /64 合并计数,全站每天最多 5 次中奖。五个滑动窗口限流表统一实现,每表最多 4096 个键,超长键以哈希保存;登录同时按 IP(每分钟 20 次)和 IP+用户名(每分钟 5 次)限流,匿名请求无法再无限撑大内存。
- 管理后台与 A WebUI 的注入修复(#97、#98)。 管理后台按钮改用
data-*属性和事件委托,不再把 DeviceID 拼进内联脚本;上传 keybox 时 DeviceID 只接受[A-Za-z0-9._-],长度 1–128。A WebUI 对应用名、keybox 文件选择器中的文件名、目录名和路径做转义,进入目录和读取文件的 root shell 命令改为单引号转义,共享存储中的恶意文件名不能再执行命令。 - KeyMint 中继请求移出 TA 互斥锁(#105)。 keyblob 版本检查只读缓存的中继 profile,缓存在加锁前单次预取,失败按 2 秒起、最长 30 秒退避;带 challenge 的远程 generateKey 在锁外完成中继证明后再加锁封装。中继不可达时,同一安全级别的其他 KeyMint 调用不再排队等待网络超时。路由、错误映射和 auth-bound 密钥存储不变。
- cpu-mask App 内日志跟随调试开关(#104、#106)。 目标 App 进程内的
MaskCPUlogcat 只在「诊断 → 启用调试日志」开启时写入,release 与 debug 构建一致;开关由 root companion 在每次目标 App 启动时读取,改动后需重启目标 App。关闭时被伪装的 App 读不到这些痕迹;root companion 的MaskCPU日志照常写,WebUI「设备属性视图」诊断依据 companion 日志判断。keymint 默认log_level改为info,新安装时调试日志默认关闭。 - 文档(#103)。 README 与 Server README 补充上述行为与数值。
升级:中继模式请成套更新 A、B、Server 和 B-app。使用自签名证书的 Server 必须在 A、B 两端配置公钥固定值(或明确开启不校验),否则请求会因证书校验失败;已显式保存 tls_insecure = true 的 A 配置保持原行为。数据库签发的 B token 升级后默认未绑定,需在管理后台绑定 device_id 后才能继续服务。上传 keybox 时 DeviceID 含其他字符会被拒绝。已有设备保存的 log_level = "debug" 不会被改写,调试日志仍保持开启,需要时请在 WebUI 手动关闭。A 端请使用整包更新,使同版 KeyMint 与注入器一同生效,再刷新 WebUI。
验证:各 PR 在主机上通过 A/B Android 目标的 fmt、clippy 与测试编译,Server 单元测试,WebUI 与 UI 测试;#97、#101 另在本地 Server 与数据库上做了端到端检查。本次发版未在设备上执行验收;中继 TLS、B 设备绑定和 KeyMint 锁外请求仍需实机验证。
English
This release changes A, B, Server and B-app with security hardening and stability fixes. StrongBoxCapabilityMask only receives the synchronized product version, and the bundled AProbe is unchanged.
- Relay TLS is verified by default, with public-key pinning (#102). A now defaults
tls_insecuretofalseand reports an error on a config-lock failure instead of falling back to no verification. The B relay no longer accepts every certificate. Both sides gain SPKI SHA-256 pinning:remote.tls_pin_sha256on A andOMMEGA_RELAY_TLS_PIN_SHA256on B, plusOMMEGA_RELAY_TLS_INSECUREon B (defaultfalse). With a pin set, only a server holding that key is accepted; a malformed pin is a configuration error and never downgrades to no check. The A WebUI relay dialog gains a pin field, and "Disable TLS verification" is unchecked when no config exists. - B tokens are bound to devices, and contact lookups no longer return full tokens (#101).
/api/card/query/returns only masked order ids and tokens; a full token is redeemed only with the random order id. A DB-issued B token serves only thedevice_ids an admin bound to it (api_token.allowed_device_ids, added automatically on first use); otherwiseb_poll,b_result, identity upload and revoke return 403. The staticRELAY_TOKENis unaffected.b_pollrequires a non-emptymachine_id, and a second machine for the same device gets 409; the B relay falls back to the kernelboot_id, and B-app usesANDROID_IDfrom service start. The admin console can bind devices when issuing a token or later. - Server rate limits and lottery hardening (#99, #100). The lottery allows 3 draws per client per day, counts an IPv6 /64 as one client, and caps wins at 5 per day across the site. The five sliding-window limiters share one implementation, hold at most 4096 keys per map and store over-long keys as hashes. Login is limited per IP (20 per minute) and per IP and username (5 per minute), so anonymous requests can no longer grow memory without bound.
- Injection fixes in the admin console and the A WebUI (#97, #98). Admin console buttons use
data-*attributes and delegated listeners instead of inline scripts built from the DeviceID, and keybox upload accepts only DeviceIDs matching[A-Za-z0-9._-]of 1–128 bytes. The A WebUI escapes app names and the keybox picker's file names, folder names and paths, and single-quotes the paths in its root shell commands, so a crafted file name in shared storage can no longer run commands. - KeyMint relay requests leave the TA mutex (#105). Keyblob version checks read only the cached relay profile, which is prefetched once before the lock is taken and backs off from 2 s up to 30 s after failures. A challenged remote generateKey finishes relay attestation outside the lock and then re-locks to seal the keyblob. When the relay is unreachable, other KeyMint calls at the same security level no longer queue behind network timeouts. Routing, error mapping and auth-bound key storage are unchanged.
- cpu-mask in-app logs follow the debug switch (#104, #106).
MaskCPUlogcat lines inside the target app are written only while Diagnostics → Enable debug logging is on, in release and debug builds alike. The root companion reads the switch at each target-app launch, so restart the target app after changing it. With the switch off a masked app cannot read these traces; the root companion'sMaskCPUlines are always written, and the WebUI "Device property view" diagnostic relies on them. KeyMint's defaultlog_levelis nowinfo, so debug logging starts off on new installs. - Documentation (#103). The READMEs and the Server README describe the behavior and limits above.
Upgrade: for relay mode, update A, B, Server and B-app together. A Server with a self-signed certificate needs its public-key pin on both A and B (or an explicit opt-in to no verification); otherwise requests fail certificate verification. An A config that already saved tls_insecure = true keeps its behavior. Existing DB-issued B tokens start unbound after the upgrade and serve nothing until an admin binds their device_ids. Keybox uploads with other characters in the DeviceID are rejected. A saved log_level = "debug" on existing devices is not rewritten, so debug logging stays on until you turn it off in WebUI. Update A as a complete module so KeyMint and the injector stay in sync, then refresh WebUI.
Validation: each PR passed host-side fmt, clippy and test compilation for the A/B Android targets, Server unit tests, and the WebUI and UI tests; #97 and #101 were also checked end to end against a local Server and database. This release was not tested on a device; relay TLS, B device binding and the out-of-lock KeyMint requests still need on-device acceptance.