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Bootloaders edk2
TianoCore's reference implementation of UEFI.
| Type | Firmware bootloader (type1) |
| Upstream | https://github.com/tianocore/edk2 |
| CVEs attributed | 34 |
| Vulnerability-fixing commits | 85 naming a CVE, 342 keyword-matched |
| CVEs with a linked fix | 25 |
Runs SEC, PEI, DXE and BDS phases, brings up the platform, publishes Boot Services and Runtime Services, then selects a boot application via BootOrder.
Type 1: it presents the hardware-agnostic UEFI interface that later stages consume, and remains OS-agnostic -- it loads a Type 2 loader, not a kernel.
The SoK paper gives a full case study of this bootloader in section 3.1. See Boot-Stages for the eight-stage model these phases map onto.
- SEC (Security) -- Runs from the reset vector. Sets up temporary memory, establishes the root of trust by verifying what it loads, and finds the PEI core.
- PEI (Pre-EFI Initialisation) -- Completes CPU init and brings up permanent memory. Work is done by PEIMs, dispatched in dependency order, which record their results as HOBs.
- DXE (Driver Execution Environment) -- The core of the boot. Dispatches drivers, enumerates devices and binds drivers to them, publishes Boot Services and Runtime Services, and sets up SMM.
- BDS (Boot Device Selection) -- Walks the BootOrder NVRAM variable, loads the selected boot application, and gives the user a way to interact with the firmware.
Phases communicate through structures rather than calls. PEI passes its findings to DXE as a HOB list -- memory ranges, firmware volumes, platform data -- consumed once at DXE entry. From DXE onward the EFI System Table is the interface: it points at the Boot Services table, the Runtime Services table, the handle database of installed protocols, and a configuration table carrying ACPI, SMBIOS and the DXE Services table. Configuration that has to survive power-off lives in NVRAM variables (BootOrder, Boot####, SecureBoot, PK/KEK/db), reachable through Runtime Services. SMIs provide a channel into SMM that persists after the OS is running.
BDS resolves each BootOrder entry to a device path -- a partition on a GPT disk, a network device, a USB stick -- loads the image found there, and calls it with an image handle and a pointer to the EFI System Table. That image is typically a Type 2 loader such as GRUB, shim or the Windows boot manager. When the loader is ready to start a kernel it calls ExitBootServices(), which frees all boot-services memory, stops the firmware's timers and drivers, and leaves only Runtime Services mapped for the OS.
| Surface | CVEs | |
|---|---|---|
SAS1 |
Remote access (software) | 6 |
SAS4 |
Boot-time features (software) | 3 |
SAS3 |
Post-boot features (software) | 1 |
| CWE | CVEs |
|---|---|
| CWE-122 | 3 |
| CWE-125 | 3 |
| CWE-119 | 3 |
| CWE-835 | 2 |
| CWE-200 | 2 |
| CWE-190 | 2 |
| CWE-680 | 1 |
| CWE-338 | 1 |
Detected in its build configuration and source:
- cfi
- encryption
- fortify
- measured boot
- rollback protection
- secure boot
- signature verification
- stack protector
See Security-Mechanisms for how these are detected and what a detection does and does not prove.
Each of these resolves to a fixing commit and to the parent revision that still contains the bug:
| CVE | Fix | Vulnerable revision |
|---|---|---|
| CVE-2018-12182 | cf574f0a18 |
83f997e58d |
| CVE-2019-14558 | f1d78c489a |
764e8ba138 |
| CVE-2019-14558 | 764e8ba138 |
c32be82e99 |
| CVE-2019-14584 | 26442d11e6 |
f82b827c92 |
| CVE-2022-36765 | 9a75b030cf |
aeaee8944f |
| CVE-2022-36765 | aeaee8944f |
049695a0b1 |
| CVE-2022-36765 | 59f024c76e |
9971b99461 |
| CVE-2023-45229 | 5fd3078a2e |
75deaf5c3c |
| CVE-2023-45229 | 1c440a5ece |
a1c426e844 |
| CVE-2023-45229 | 07362769ab |
1dbb10cc52 |
| CVE-2023-45229 | 1dbb10cc52 |
5f3658197b |
| CVE-2023-45230 | 5f3658197b |
8014ac2d7b |
| CVE-2023-45230 | f31453e8d6 |
959f71c801 |
| CVE-2023-45231 | 6f77463d72 |
bbfee34f41 |
| CVE-2023-45231 | bbfee34f41 |
07362769ab |
| … and 10 more |
git -C oss-bootloaders/type1/edk2 checkout <vulnerable revision>git -C oss-bootloaders submodule update --init type1/edk2
./scripts/analysis/run-tool.sh codeql edk2See Tools for what each tool applies to.