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Bootloaders mu_basecore

Connor Glosner edited this page Sep 11, 2026 · 3 revisions

mu_basecore

Microsoft's Project Mu fork of EDK-II.

Type Firmware bootloader (type1)
Upstream https://github.com/microsoft/mu_basecore
CVEs attributed 0
Vulnerability-fixing commits 94 naming a CVE, 383 keyword-matched
CVEs with a linked fix 29

What it does at boot

Supplies the core UEFI packages that Mu platform repositories build against; ships on Surface devices and Hyper-V.

Why it is Type 1

Type 1: a UEFI implementation. Note it is a library repository, not a standalone buildable platform.

How it boots

See Boot-Stages for the eight-stage model these phases map onto.

  1. SEC -- As in EDK II: reset-vector code, temporary memory, root of trust.
  2. PEI -- Permanent memory bring-up through PEIMs, results recorded as HOBs.
  3. DXE -- Driver dispatch, device enumeration, Boot and Runtime Services.
  4. BDS -- Boot device selection from NVRAM variables.

Passing data between stages

Project Mu is a fork of EDK II, so the communication mechanisms are EDK II's: HOB list from PEI to DXE, the EFI System Table and protocol database from DXE onward, and NVRAM variables for persistent configuration. What Mu adds is policy and structure around them -- a policy service for cross-module settings, and package boundaries maintained so platforms consume Mu as a versioned dependency instead of forking the tree.

Handoff

Identical to EDK II: BDS loads a boot application from the EFI system partition with a pointer to the system table, and ExitBootServices() marks the transition to the OS. In practice mu_basecore is not built alone -- a platform repository supplies the silicon and board packages that complete the image.

Security mechanisms

Detected in its build configuration and source:

  • cfi
  • measured boot
  • rollback protection
  • secure boot
  • signature verification

See Security-Mechanisms for how these are detected and what a detection does and does not prove.

Reproducible vulnerabilities

Each of these resolves to a fixing commit and to the parent revision that still contains the bug:

CVE Fix Vulnerable revision
CVE-2018-12182 cf574f0a18 83f997e58d
CVE-2019-14558 f1d78c489a 764e8ba138
CVE-2019-14558 764e8ba138 c32be82e99
CVE-2019-14584 26442d11e6 f82b827c92
CVE-2022-36765 9a75b030cf aeaee8944f
CVE-2022-36765 aeaee8944f 049695a0b1
CVE-2022-36765 59f024c76e 9971b99461
CVE-2023-45229 5fd3078a2e 75deaf5c3c
CVE-2023-45229 1c440a5ece a1c426e844
CVE-2023-45229 07362769ab 1dbb10cc52
CVE-2023-45229 1dbb10cc52 5f3658197b
CVE-2023-45230 5f3658197b 8014ac2d7b
CVE-2023-45230 f31453e8d6 959f71c801
CVE-2023-45231 6f77463d72 bbfee34f41
CVE-2023-45231 bbfee34f41 07362769ab
… and 14 more
git -C oss-bootloaders/type1/mu_basecore checkout <vulnerable revision>

Analysing it

git -C oss-bootloaders submodule update --init type1/mu_basecore
./scripts/analysis/run-tool.sh codeql mu_basecore

See Tools for what each tool applies to.


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