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Fix -Wredundant-decls warning #9

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I don't believe this no longer applies. The way hardware writes to memory invalidates tags has been since rewritten. See ab5220b

@staceyson staceyson closed this Jul 28, 2016
arichardson pushed a commit to arichardson/qemu that referenced this pull request Oct 20, 2017
"name" is freed after visiting options, instead use the first NetClientState
name. Adds a few assert() for clarifying and checking some impossible states.

READ of size 1 at 0x602000000990 thread T0
    #0 0x7f6b251c570c  (/lib64/libasan.so.2+0x4770c)
    CTSRD-CHERI#1 0x5566dc380600 in qemu_find_net_clients_except net/net.c:824
    CTSRD-CHERI#2 0x5566dc39bac7 in net_vhost_user_event net/vhost-user.c:193
    CTSRD-CHERI#3 0x5566dbee862a in qemu_chr_be_event /home/elmarco/src/qemu/qemu-char.c:201
    CTSRD-CHERI#4 0x5566dbef2890 in tcp_chr_disconnect /home/elmarco/src/qemu/qemu-char.c:2790
    CTSRD-CHERI#5 0x5566dbef2d0b in tcp_chr_sync_read /home/elmarco/src/qemu/qemu-char.c:2835
    CTSRD-CHERI#6 0x5566dbee8a99 in qemu_chr_fe_read_all /home/elmarco/src/qemu/qemu-char.c:295
    CTSRD-CHERI#7 0x5566dc39b964 in net_vhost_user_watch net/vhost-user.c:180
    CTSRD-CHERI#8 0x5566dc5a06c7 in qio_channel_fd_source_dispatch io/channel-watch.c:70
    CTSRD-CHERI#9 0x7f6b1aa2ab87 in g_main_dispatch /home/elmarco/src/gnome/glib/glib/gmain.c:3154
    CTSRD-CHERI#10 0x7f6b1aa2b9cb in g_main_context_dispatch /home/elmarco/src/gnome/glib/glib/gmain.c:3769
    CTSRD-CHERI#11 0x5566dc475ed4 in glib_pollfds_poll /home/elmarco/src/qemu/main-loop.c:212
    CTSRD-CHERI#12 0x5566dc476029 in os_host_main_loop_wait /home/elmarco/src/qemu/main-loop.c:257
    CTSRD-CHERI#13 0x5566dc476165 in main_loop_wait /home/elmarco/src/qemu/main-loop.c:505
    CTSRD-CHERI#14 0x5566dbf08d31 in main_loop /home/elmarco/src/qemu/vl.c:1932
    CTSRD-CHERI#15 0x5566dbf16783 in main /home/elmarco/src/qemu/vl.c:4646
    CTSRD-CHERI#16 0x7f6b180bb57f in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x2057f)
    CTSRD-CHERI#17 0x5566dbbf5348 in _start (/home/elmarco/src/qemu/x86_64-softmmu/qemu-system-x86_64+0x3f9348)

0x602000000990 is located 0 bytes inside of 5-byte region [0x602000000990,0x602000000995)
freed by thread T0 here:
    #0 0x7f6b2521666a in __interceptor_free (/lib64/libasan.so.2+0x9866a)
    CTSRD-CHERI#1 0x7f6b1aa332a4 in g_free /home/elmarco/src/gnome/glib/glib/gmem.c:189
    CTSRD-CHERI#2 0x5566dc5f416f in qapi_dealloc_type_str qapi/qapi-dealloc-visitor.c:134
    CTSRD-CHERI#3 0x5566dc5f3268 in visit_type_str qapi/qapi-visit-core.c:196
    CTSRD-CHERI#4 0x5566dc5ced58 in visit_type_Netdev_fields /home/elmarco/src/qemu/qapi-visit.c:5936
    CTSRD-CHERI#5 0x5566dc5cef71 in visit_type_Netdev /home/elmarco/src/qemu/qapi-visit.c:5960
    CTSRD-CHERI#6 0x5566dc381a8d in net_visit net/net.c:1049
    CTSRD-CHERI#7 0x5566dc381c37 in net_client_init net/net.c:1076
    CTSRD-CHERI#8 0x5566dc3839e2 in net_init_netdev net/net.c:1473
    CTSRD-CHERI#9 0x5566dc63cc0a in qemu_opts_foreach util/qemu-option.c:1112
    CTSRD-CHERI#10 0x5566dc383b36 in net_init_clients net/net.c:1499
    CTSRD-CHERI#11 0x5566dbf15d86 in main /home/elmarco/src/qemu/vl.c:4397
    CTSRD-CHERI#12 0x7f6b180bb57f in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x2057f)

Signed-off-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
arichardson pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 18, 2018
…nnect

When cancel migration during RDMA precopy, the source qemu main thread hangs sometime.

The backtrace is:
    (gdb) bt
    #0  0x00007f249eabd43d in write () from /lib64/libpthread.so.0
    #1  0x00007f24a1ce98e4 in rdma_get_cm_event (channel=0x4675d10, event=0x7ffe2f643dd0) at src/cma.c:2189
    #2  0x00000000007b6166 in qemu_rdma_cleanup (rdma=0x6784000) at migration/rdma.c:2296
    #3  0x00000000007b7cae in qio_channel_rdma_close (ioc=0x3bfcc30, errp=0x0) at migration/rdma.c:2999
    #4  0x00000000008db60e in qio_channel_close (ioc=0x3bfcc30, errp=0x0) at io/channel.c:273
    #5  0x00000000007a8765 in channel_close (opaque=0x3bfcc30) at migration/qemu-file-channel.c:98
    #6  0x00000000007a71f9 in qemu_fclose (f=0x527c000) at migration/qemu-file.c:334
    #7  0x0000000000795b96 in migrate_fd_cleanup (opaque=0x3b46280) at migration/migration.c:1162
    #8  0x000000000093a71b in aio_bh_call (bh=0x3db7a20) at util/async.c:90
    #9  0x000000000093a7b2 in aio_bh_poll (ctx=0x3b121c0) at util/async.c:118
    #10 0x000000000093f2ad in aio_dispatch (ctx=0x3b121c0) at util/aio-posix.c:436
    #11 0x000000000093ab41 in aio_ctx_dispatch (source=0x3b121c0, callback=0x0, user_data=0x0)
        at util/async.c:261
    #12 0x00007f249f73c7aa in g_main_context_dispatch () from /lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0
    #13 0x000000000093dc5e in glib_pollfds_poll () at util/main-loop.c:215
    #14 0x000000000093dd4e in os_host_main_loop_wait (timeout=28000000) at util/main-loop.c:263
    #15 0x000000000093de05 in main_loop_wait (nonblocking=0) at util/main-loop.c:522
    #16 0x00000000005bc6a5 in main_loop () at vl.c:1944
    #17 0x00000000005c39b5 in main (argc=56, argv=0x7ffe2f6443f8, envp=0x3ad0030) at vl.c:4752

It does not get the RDMA_CM_EVENT_DISCONNECTED event after rdma_disconnect sometime.

According to IB Spec once active side send DREQ message, it should wait for DREP message
and only once it arrived it should trigger a DISCONNECT event. DREP message can be dropped
due to network issues.
For that case the spec defines a DREP_timeout state in the CM state machine, if the DREP is
dropped we should get a timeout and a TIMEWAIT_EXIT event will be trigger.
Unfortunately the current kernel CM implementation doesn't include the DREP_timeout state
and in above scenario we will not get DISCONNECT or TIMEWAIT_EXIT events.

So it should not invoke rdma_get_cm_event which may hang forever, and the event channel
is also destroyed in qemu_rdma_cleanup.

Signed-off-by: Lidong Chen <lidongchen@tencent.com>
Reviewed-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
arichardson pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 29, 2020
ivqs/ovqs/c_ivq/c_ovq is forgot to cleanup in
virtio_serial_device_unrealize, the memory leak stack is as bellow:

Direct leak of 1290240 byte(s) in 180 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x7fc9bfc27560 in calloc (/usr/lib64/libasan.so.3+0xc7560)
    #1 0x7fc9bed6f015 in g_malloc0 (/usr/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x50015)
    #2 0x5650e02b83e7 in virtio_add_queue hw/virtio/virtio.c:2327
    #3 0x5650e02847b5 in virtio_serial_device_realize hw/char/virtio-serial-bus.c:1089
    #4 0x5650e02b56a7 in virtio_device_realize hw/virtio/virtio.c:3504
    #5 0x5650e03bf031 in device_set_realized hw/core/qdev.c:876
    #6 0x5650e0531efd in property_set_bool qom/object.c:2080
    #7 0x5650e053650e in object_property_set_qobject qom/qom-qobject.c:26
    #8 0x5650e0533e14 in object_property_set_bool qom/object.c:1338
    #9 0x5650e04c0e37 in virtio_pci_realize hw/virtio/virtio-pci.c:1801

Reported-by: Euler Robot <euler.robot@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Pan Nengyuan <pannengyuan@huawei.com>
Cc: Laurent Vivier <lvivier@redhat.com>
Cc: Amit Shah <amit@kernel.org>
Cc: "Marc-André Lureau" <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <1575444716-17632-3-git-send-email-pannengyuan@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
arichardson pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 29, 2020
Currently the SLOF firmware for pseries guests will disable/re-enable
a PCI device multiple times via IO/MEM/MASTER bits of PCI_COMMAND
register after the initial probe/feature negotiation, as it tends to
work with a single device at a time at various stages like probing
and running block/network bootloaders without doing a full reset
in-between.

In QEMU, when PCI_COMMAND_MASTER is disabled we disable the
corresponding IOMMU memory region, so DMA accesses (including to vring
fields like idx/flags) will no longer undergo the necessary
translation. Normally we wouldn't expect this to happen since it would
be misbehavior on the driver side to continue driving DMA requests.

However, in the case of pseries, with iommu_platform=on, we trigger the
following sequence when tearing down the virtio-blk dataplane ioeventfd
in response to the guest unsetting PCI_COMMAND_MASTER:

  #2  0x0000555555922651 in virtqueue_map_desc (vdev=vdev@entry=0x555556dbcfb0, p_num_sg=p_num_sg@entry=0x7fffe657e1a8, addr=addr@entry=0x7fffe657e240, iov=iov@entry=0x7fffe6580240, max_num_sg=max_num_sg@entry=1024, is_write=is_write@entry=false, pa=0, sz=0)
      at /home/mdroth/w/qemu.git/hw/virtio/virtio.c:757
  #3  0x0000555555922a89 in virtqueue_pop (vq=vq@entry=0x555556dc8660, sz=sz@entry=184)
      at /home/mdroth/w/qemu.git/hw/virtio/virtio.c:950
  #4  0x00005555558d3eca in virtio_blk_get_request (vq=0x555556dc8660, s=0x555556dbcfb0)
      at /home/mdroth/w/qemu.git/hw/block/virtio-blk.c:255
  #5  0x00005555558d3eca in virtio_blk_handle_vq (s=0x555556dbcfb0, vq=0x555556dc8660)
      at /home/mdroth/w/qemu.git/hw/block/virtio-blk.c:776
  #6  0x000055555591dd66 in virtio_queue_notify_aio_vq (vq=vq@entry=0x555556dc8660)
      at /home/mdroth/w/qemu.git/hw/virtio/virtio.c:1550
  #7  0x000055555591ecef in virtio_queue_notify_aio_vq (vq=0x555556dc8660)
      at /home/mdroth/w/qemu.git/hw/virtio/virtio.c:1546
  #8  0x000055555591ecef in virtio_queue_host_notifier_aio_poll (opaque=0x555556dc86c8)
      at /home/mdroth/w/qemu.git/hw/virtio/virtio.c:2527
  #9  0x0000555555d02164 in run_poll_handlers_once (ctx=ctx@entry=0x55555688bfc0, timeout=timeout@entry=0x7fffe65844a8)
      at /home/mdroth/w/qemu.git/util/aio-posix.c:520
  #10 0x0000555555d02d1b in try_poll_mode (timeout=0x7fffe65844a8, ctx=0x55555688bfc0)
      at /home/mdroth/w/qemu.git/util/aio-posix.c:607
  #11 0x0000555555d02d1b in aio_poll (ctx=ctx@entry=0x55555688bfc0, blocking=blocking@entry=true)
      at /home/mdroth/w/qemu.git/util/aio-posix.c:639
  #12 0x0000555555d0004d in aio_wait_bh_oneshot (ctx=0x55555688bfc0, cb=cb@entry=0x5555558d5130 <virtio_blk_data_plane_stop_bh>, opaque=opaque@entry=0x555556de86f0)
      at /home/mdroth/w/qemu.git/util/aio-wait.c:71
  #13 0x00005555558d59bf in virtio_blk_data_plane_stop (vdev=<optimized out>)
      at /home/mdroth/w/qemu.git/hw/block/dataplane/virtio-blk.c:288
  #14 0x0000555555b906a1 in virtio_bus_stop_ioeventfd (bus=bus@entry=0x555556dbcf38)
      at /home/mdroth/w/qemu.git/hw/virtio/virtio-bus.c:245
  #15 0x0000555555b90dbb in virtio_bus_stop_ioeventfd (bus=bus@entry=0x555556dbcf38)
      at /home/mdroth/w/qemu.git/hw/virtio/virtio-bus.c:237
  #16 0x0000555555b92a8e in virtio_pci_stop_ioeventfd (proxy=0x555556db4e40)
      at /home/mdroth/w/qemu.git/hw/virtio/virtio-pci.c:292
  #17 0x0000555555b92a8e in virtio_write_config (pci_dev=0x555556db4e40, address=<optimized out>, val=1048832, len=<optimized out>)
      at /home/mdroth/w/qemu.git/hw/virtio/virtio-pci.c:613

I.e. the calling code is only scheduling a one-shot BH for
virtio_blk_data_plane_stop_bh, but somehow we end up trying to process
an additional virtqueue entry before we get there. This is likely due
to the following check in virtio_queue_host_notifier_aio_poll:

  static bool virtio_queue_host_notifier_aio_poll(void *opaque)
  {
      EventNotifier *n = opaque;
      VirtQueue *vq = container_of(n, VirtQueue, host_notifier);
      bool progress;

      if (!vq->vring.desc || virtio_queue_empty(vq)) {
          return false;
      }

      progress = virtio_queue_notify_aio_vq(vq);

namely the call to virtio_queue_empty(). In this case, since no new
requests have actually been issued, shadow_avail_idx == last_avail_idx,
so we actually try to access the vring via vring_avail_idx() to get
the latest non-shadowed idx:

  int virtio_queue_empty(VirtQueue *vq)
  {
      bool empty;
      ...

      if (vq->shadow_avail_idx != vq->last_avail_idx) {
          return 0;
      }

      rcu_read_lock();
      empty = vring_avail_idx(vq) == vq->last_avail_idx;
      rcu_read_unlock();
      return empty;

but since the IOMMU region has been disabled we get a bogus value (0
usually), which causes virtio_queue_empty() to falsely report that
there are entries to be processed, which causes errors such as:

  "virtio: zero sized buffers are not allowed"

or

  "virtio-blk missing headers"

and puts the device in an error state.

This patch works around the issue by introducing virtio_set_disabled(),
which sets a 'disabled' flag to bypass checks like virtio_queue_empty()
when bus-mastering is disabled. Since we'd check this flag at all the
same sites as vdev->broken, we replace those checks with an inline
function which checks for either vdev->broken or vdev->disabled.

The 'disabled' flag is only migrated when set, which should be fairly
rare, but to maintain migration compatibility we disable it's use for
older machine types. Users requiring the use of the flag in conjunction
with older machine types can set it explicitly as a virtio-device
option.

NOTES:

 - This leaves some other oddities in play, like the fact that
   DRIVER_OK also gets unset in response to bus-mastering being
   disabled, but not restored (however the device seems to continue
   working)
 - Similarly, we disable the host notifier via
   virtio_bus_stop_ioeventfd(), which seems to move the handling out
   of virtio-blk dataplane and back into the main IO thread, and it
   ends up staying there till a reset (but otherwise continues working
   normally)

Cc: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>,
Cc: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@ozlabs.ru>
Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Message-Id: <20191120005003.27035-1-mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
arichardson pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 29, 2020
This avoid a memory leak when qom-set is called to set throttle_group
limits, here is an easy way to reproduce:

1. run qemu-iotests as follow and check the result with asan:
       ./check -qcow2 184

Following is the asan output backtrack:
Direct leak of 912 byte(s) in 3 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0xffff8d7ab3c3 in __interceptor_calloc   (/lib64/libasan.so.4+0xd33c3)
    #1 0xffff8d4c31cb in g_malloc0   (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x571cb)
    #2 0x190c857 in qobject_input_start_struct  /mnt/sdc/qemu-master/qemu-4.2.0-rc0/qapi/qobject-input-visitor.c:295
    #3 0x19070df in visit_start_struct   /mnt/sdc/qemu-master/qemu-4.2.0-rc0/qapi/qapi-visit-core.c:49
    #4 0x1948b87 in visit_type_ThrottleLimits   qapi/qapi-visit-block-core.c:3759
    #5 0x17e4aa3 in throttle_group_set_limits   /mnt/sdc/qemu-master/qemu-4.2.0-rc0/block/throttle-groups.c:900
    #6 0x1650eff in object_property_set     /mnt/sdc/qemu-master/qemu-4.2.0-rc0/qom/object.c:1272
    #7 0x1658517 in object_property_set_qobject   /mnt/sdc/qemu-master/qemu-4.2.0-rc0/qom/qom-qobject.c:26
    #8 0x15880bb in qmp_qom_set  /mnt/sdc/qemu-master/qemu-4.2.0-rc0/qom/qom-qmp-cmds.c:74
    #9 0x157e3e3 in qmp_marshal_qom_set  qapi/qapi-commands-qom.c:154

Reported-by: Euler Robot <euler.robot@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: PanNengyuan <pannengyuan@huawei.com>
Message-id: 1574835614-42028-1-git-send-email-pannengyuan@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
arichardson pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 29, 2020
start vm with libvirt, when GuestOS running, enter poweroff command using
the xhci keyboard, then ASAN shows memory leak stack:

Direct leak of 80 byte(s) in 5 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0xfffd1e6431cb in __interceptor_malloc (/lib64/libasan.so.4+0xd31cb)
    #1 0xfffd1e107163 in g_malloc (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x57163)
    #2 0xaaad39051367 in qemu_sglist_init /qemu/dma-helpers.c:43
    #3 0xaaad3947c407 in pci_dma_sglist_init /qemu/include/hw/pci/pci.h:842
    #4 0xaaad3947c407 in xhci_xfer_create_sgl /qemu/hw/usb/hcd-xhci.c:1446
    #5 0xaaad3947c407 in xhci_setup_packet /qemu/hw/usb/hcd-xhci.c:1618
    #6 0xaaad3948625f in xhci_submit /qemu/hw/usb/hcd-xhci.c:1827
    #7 0xaaad3948625f in xhci_fire_transfer /qemu/hw/usb/hcd-xhci.c:1839
    #8 0xaaad3948625f in xhci_kick_epctx /qemu/hw/usb/hcd-xhci.c:1991
    #9 0xaaad3948f537 in xhci_doorbell_write /qemu/hw/usb/hcd-xhci.c:3158
    #10 0xaaad38bcbfc7 in memory_region_write_accessor /qemu/memory.c:483
    #11 0xaaad38bc654f in access_with_adjusted_size /qemu/memory.c:544
    #12 0xaaad38bd1877 in memory_region_dispatch_write /qemu/memory.c:1482
    #13 0xaaad38b1c77f in flatview_write_continue /qemu/exec.c:3167
    #14 0xaaad38b1ca83 in flatview_write /qemu/exec.c:3207
    #15 0xaaad38b268db in address_space_write /qemu/exec.c:3297
    #16 0xaaad38bf909b in kvm_cpu_exec /qemu/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c:2383
    #17 0xaaad38bb063f in qemu_kvm_cpu_thread_fn /qemu/cpus.c:1246
    #18 0xaaad39821c93 in qemu_thread_start /qemu/util/qemu-thread-posix.c:519
    #19 0xfffd1c8378bb  (/lib64/libpthread.so.0+0x78bb)
    #20 0xfffd1c77616b  (/lib64/libc.so.6+0xd616b)

Reported-by: Euler Robot <euler.robot@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Chen Qun <kuhn.chenqun@huawei.com>
Message-id: 20200110105855.81144-1-kuhn.chenqun@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
arichardson pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 29, 2020
One multifd channel will shutdown all the other multifd's IOChannel when it
fails to receive an IOChannel. In this senario, if some multifds had not
received its IOChannel yet, it would try to shutdown its IOChannel which could
cause nullptr access at qio_channel_shutdown.

Here is the coredump stack:
    #0  object_get_class (obj=obj@entry=0x0) at qom/object.c:908
    #1  0x00005563fdbb8f4a in qio_channel_shutdown (ioc=0x0, how=QIO_CHANNEL_SHUTDOWN_BOTH, errp=0x0) at io/channel.c:355
    #2  0x00005563fd7b4c5f in multifd_recv_terminate_threads (err=<optimized out>) at migration/ram.c:1280
    #3  0x00005563fd7bc019 in multifd_recv_new_channel (ioc=ioc@entry=0x556400255610, errp=errp@entry=0x7ffec07dce00) at migration/ram.c:1478
    #4  0x00005563fda82177 in migration_ioc_process_incoming (ioc=ioc@entry=0x556400255610, errp=errp@entry=0x7ffec07dce30) at migration/migration.c:605
    #5  0x00005563fda8567d in migration_channel_process_incoming (ioc=0x556400255610) at migration/channel.c:44
    #6  0x00005563fda83ee0 in socket_accept_incoming_migration (listener=0x5563fff6b920, cioc=0x556400255610, opaque=<optimized out>) at migration/socket.c:166
    #7  0x00005563fdbc25cd in qio_net_listener_channel_func (ioc=<optimized out>, condition=<optimized out>, opaque=<optimized out>) at io/net-listener.c:54
    #8  0x00007f895b6fe9a9 in g_main_context_dispatch () from /usr/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0
    #9  0x00005563fdc18136 in glib_pollfds_poll () at util/main-loop.c:218
    #10 0x00005563fdc181b5 in os_host_main_loop_wait (timeout=1000000000) at util/main-loop.c:241
    #11 0x00005563fdc183a2 in main_loop_wait (nonblocking=nonblocking@entry=0) at util/main-loop.c:517
    #12 0x00005563fd8edb37 in main_loop () at vl.c:1791
    #13 0x00005563fd74fd45 in main (argc=<optimized out>, argv=<optimized out>, envp=<optimized out>) at vl.c:4473

To fix it up, let's check p->c before calling qio_channel_shutdown.

Signed-off-by: Jiahui Cen <cenjiahui@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Ying Fang <fangying1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
arichardson pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 29, 2020
…threads

One multifd will lock all the other multifds' IOChannel mutex to inform them
to quit by setting p->quit or shutting down p->c. In this senario, if some
multifds had already been terminated and multifd_load_cleanup/multifd_save_cleanup
had destroyed their mutex, it could cause destroyed mutex access when trying
lock their mutex.

Here is the coredump stack:
    #0  0x00007f81a2794437 in raise () from /usr/lib64/libc.so.6
    #1  0x00007f81a2795b28 in abort () from /usr/lib64/libc.so.6
    #2  0x00007f81a278d1b6 in __assert_fail_base () from /usr/lib64/libc.so.6
    #3  0x00007f81a278d262 in __assert_fail () from /usr/lib64/libc.so.6
    #4  0x000055eb1bfadbd3 in qemu_mutex_lock_impl (mutex=0x55eb1e2d1988, file=<optimized out>, line=<optimized out>) at util/qemu-thread-posix.c:64
    #5  0x000055eb1bb4564a in multifd_send_terminate_threads (err=<optimized out>) at migration/ram.c:1015
    #6  0x000055eb1bb4bb7f in multifd_send_thread (opaque=0x55eb1e2d19f8) at migration/ram.c:1171
    #7  0x000055eb1bfad628 in qemu_thread_start (args=0x55eb1e170450) at util/qemu-thread-posix.c:502
    #8  0x00007f81a2b36df5 in start_thread () from /usr/lib64/libpthread.so.0
    #9  0x00007f81a286048d in clone () from /usr/lib64/libc.so.6

To fix it up, let's destroy the mutex after all the other multifd threads had
been terminated.

Signed-off-by: Jiahui Cen <cenjiahui@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Ying Fang <fangying1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
arichardson pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 29, 2020
All paths that lead to bdrv_backup_top_drop(), except for the call
from backup_clean(), imply that the BDS AioContext has already been
acquired, so doing it there too can potentially lead to QEMU hanging
on AIO_WAIT_WHILE().

An easy way to trigger this situation is by issuing a two actions
transaction, with a proper and a bogus blockdev-backup, so the second
one will trigger a rollback. This will trigger a hang with an stack
trace like this one:

 #0  0x00007fb680c75016 in __GI_ppoll (fds=0x55e74580f7c0, nfds=1, timeout=<optimized out>,
     timeout@entry=0x0, sigmask=sigmask@entry=0x0) at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/ppoll.c:39
 #1  0x000055e743386e09 in ppoll (__ss=0x0, __timeout=0x0, __nfds=<optimized out>, __fds=<optimized out>)
     at /usr/include/bits/poll2.h:77
 #2  0x000055e743386e09 in qemu_poll_ns
     (fds=<optimized out>, nfds=<optimized out>, timeout=<optimized out>) at util/qemu-timer.c:336
 #3  0x000055e743388dc4 in aio_poll (ctx=0x55e7458925d0, blocking=blocking@entry=true)
     at util/aio-posix.c:669
 #4  0x000055e743305dea in bdrv_flush (bs=bs@entry=0x55e74593c0d0) at block/io.c:2878
 #5  0x000055e7432be58e in bdrv_close (bs=0x55e74593c0d0) at block.c:4017
 #6  0x000055e7432be58e in bdrv_delete (bs=<optimized out>) at block.c:4262
 #7  0x000055e7432be58e in bdrv_unref (bs=bs@entry=0x55e74593c0d0) at block.c:5644
 #8  0x000055e743316b9b in bdrv_backup_top_drop (bs=bs@entry=0x55e74593c0d0) at block/backup-top.c:273
 #9  0x000055e74331461f in backup_job_create
     (job_id=0x0, bs=bs@entry=0x55e7458d5820, target=target@entry=0x55e74589f640, speed=0, sync_mode=MIRROR_SYNC_MODE_FULL, sync_bitmap=sync_bitmap@entry=0x0, bitmap_mode=BITMAP_SYNC_MODE_ON_SUCCESS, compress=false, filter_node_name=0x0, on_source_error=BLOCKDEV_ON_ERROR_REPORT, on_target_error=BLOCKDEV_ON_ERROR_REPORT, creation_flags=0, cb=0x0, opaque=0x0, txn=0x0, errp=0x7ffddfd1efb0) at block/backup.c:478
 #10 0x000055e74315bc52 in do_backup_common
     (backup=backup@entry=0x55e746c066d0, bs=bs@entry=0x55e7458d5820, target_bs=target_bs@entry=0x55e74589f640, aio_context=aio_context@entry=0x55e7458a91e0, txn=txn@entry=0x0, errp=errp@entry=0x7ffddfd1efb0)
     at blockdev.c:3580
 #11 0x000055e74315c37c in do_blockdev_backup
     (backup=backup@entry=0x55e746c066d0, txn=0x0, errp=errp@entry=0x7ffddfd1efb0)
     at /usr/src/debug/qemu-kvm-4.2.0-2.module+el8.2.0+5135+ed3b2489.x86_64/./qapi/qapi-types-block-core.h:1492
 #12 0x000055e74315c449 in blockdev_backup_prepare (common=0x55e746a8de90, errp=0x7ffddfd1f018)
     at blockdev.c:1885
 #13 0x000055e743160152 in qmp_transaction
     (dev_list=<optimized out>, has_props=<optimized out>, props=0x55e7467fe2c0, errp=errp@entry=0x7ffddfd1f088) at blockdev.c:2340
 #14 0x000055e743287ff5 in qmp_marshal_transaction
     (args=<optimized out>, ret=<optimized out>, errp=0x7ffddfd1f0f8)
     at qapi/qapi-commands-transaction.c:44
 #15 0x000055e74333de6c in do_qmp_dispatch
     (errp=0x7ffddfd1f0f0, allow_oob=<optimized out>, request=<optimized out>, cmds=0x55e743c28d60 <qmp_commands>) at qapi/qmp-dispatch.c:132
 #16 0x000055e74333de6c in qmp_dispatch
     (cmds=0x55e743c28d60 <qmp_commands>, request=<optimized out>, allow_oob=<optimized out>)
     at qapi/qmp-dispatch.c:175
 #17 0x000055e74325c061 in monitor_qmp_dispatch (mon=0x55e745908030, req=<optimized out>)
     at monitor/qmp.c:145
 #18 0x000055e74325c6fa in monitor_qmp_bh_dispatcher (data=<optimized out>) at monitor/qmp.c:234
 #19 0x000055e743385866 in aio_bh_call (bh=0x55e745807ae0) at util/async.c:117
 #20 0x000055e743385866 in aio_bh_poll (ctx=ctx@entry=0x55e7458067a0) at util/async.c:117
 #21 0x000055e743388c54 in aio_dispatch (ctx=0x55e7458067a0) at util/aio-posix.c:459
 #22 0x000055e743385742 in aio_ctx_dispatch
     (source=<optimized out>, callback=<optimized out>, user_data=<optimized out>) at util/async.c:260
 #23 0x00007fb68543e67d in g_main_dispatch (context=0x55e745893a40) at gmain.c:3176
 #24 0x00007fb68543e67d in g_main_context_dispatch (context=context@entry=0x55e745893a40) at gmain.c:3829
 #25 0x000055e743387d08 in glib_pollfds_poll () at util/main-loop.c:219
 #26 0x000055e743387d08 in os_host_main_loop_wait (timeout=<optimized out>) at util/main-loop.c:242
 #27 0x000055e743387d08 in main_loop_wait (nonblocking=<optimized out>) at util/main-loop.c:518
 #28 0x000055e74316a3c1 in main_loop () at vl.c:1828
 #29 0x000055e743016a72 in main (argc=<optimized out>, argv=<optimized out>, envp=<optimized out>)
     at vl.c:4504

Fix this by not acquiring the AioContext there, and ensuring all paths
leading to it have it already acquired (backup_clean()).

RHBZ: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1782111
Signed-off-by: Sergio Lopez <slp@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
arichardson pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 29, 2020
Dirty map addition and removal functions are not acquiring to BDS
AioContext, while they may call to code that expects it to be
acquired.

This may trigger a crash with a stack trace like this one:

 #0  0x00007f0ef146370f in __GI_raise (sig=sig@entry=6)
     at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/raise.c:50
 #1  0x00007f0ef144db25 in __GI_abort () at abort.c:79
 #2  0x0000565022294dce in error_exit
     (err=<optimized out>, msg=msg@entry=0x56502243a730 <__func__.16350> "qemu_mutex_unlock_impl") at util/qemu-thread-posix.c:36
 #3  0x00005650222950ba in qemu_mutex_unlock_impl
     (mutex=mutex@entry=0x5650244b0240, file=file@entry=0x565022439adf "util/async.c", line=line@entry=526) at util/qemu-thread-posix.c:108
 #4  0x0000565022290029 in aio_context_release
     (ctx=ctx@entry=0x5650244b01e0) at util/async.c:526
 #5  0x000056502221cd08 in bdrv_can_store_new_dirty_bitmap
     (bs=bs@entry=0x5650244dc820, name=name@entry=0x56502481d360 "bitmap1", granularity=granularity@entry=65536, errp=errp@entry=0x7fff22831718)
     at block/dirty-bitmap.c:542
 #6  0x000056502206ae53 in qmp_block_dirty_bitmap_add
     (errp=0x7fff22831718, disabled=false, has_disabled=<optimized out>, persistent=<optimized out>, has_persistent=true, granularity=65536, has_granularity=<optimized out>, name=0x56502481d360 "bitmap1", node=<optimized out>) at blockdev.c:2894
 #7  0x000056502206ae53 in qmp_block_dirty_bitmap_add
     (node=<optimized out>, name=0x56502481d360 "bitmap1", has_granularity=<optimized out>, granularity=<optimized out>, has_persistent=true, persistent=<optimized out>, has_disabled=false, disabled=false, errp=0x7fff22831718) at blockdev.c:2856
 #8  0x00005650221847a3 in qmp_marshal_block_dirty_bitmap_add
     (args=<optimized out>, ret=<optimized out>, errp=0x7fff22831798)
     at qapi/qapi-commands-block-core.c:651
 #9  0x0000565022247e6c in do_qmp_dispatch
     (errp=0x7fff22831790, allow_oob=<optimized out>, request=<optimized out>, cmds=0x565022b32d60 <qmp_commands>) at qapi/qmp-dispatch.c:132
 #10 0x0000565022247e6c in qmp_dispatch
     (cmds=0x565022b32d60 <qmp_commands>, request=<optimized out>, allow_oob=<optimized out>) at qapi/qmp-dispatch.c:175
 #11 0x0000565022166061 in monitor_qmp_dispatch
     (mon=0x56502450faa0, req=<optimized out>) at monitor/qmp.c:145
 #12 0x00005650221666fa in monitor_qmp_bh_dispatcher
     (data=<optimized out>) at monitor/qmp.c:234
 #13 0x000056502228f866 in aio_bh_call (bh=0x56502440eae0)
     at util/async.c:117
 #14 0x000056502228f866 in aio_bh_poll (ctx=ctx@entry=0x56502440d7a0)
     at util/async.c:117
 #15 0x0000565022292c54 in aio_dispatch (ctx=0x56502440d7a0)
     at util/aio-posix.c:459
 #16 0x000056502228f742 in aio_ctx_dispatch
     (source=<optimized out>, callback=<optimized out>, user_data=<optimized out>) at util/async.c:260
 #17 0x00007f0ef5ce667d in g_main_dispatch (context=0x56502449aa40)
     at gmain.c:3176
 #18 0x00007f0ef5ce667d in g_main_context_dispatch
     (context=context@entry=0x56502449aa40) at gmain.c:3829
 #19 0x0000565022291d08 in glib_pollfds_poll () at util/main-loop.c:219
 #20 0x0000565022291d08 in os_host_main_loop_wait
     (timeout=<optimized out>) at util/main-loop.c:242
 #21 0x0000565022291d08 in main_loop_wait (nonblocking=<optimized out>)
     at util/main-loop.c:518
 #22 0x00005650220743c1 in main_loop () at vl.c:1828
 #23 0x0000565021f20a72 in main
     (argc=<optimized out>, argv=<optimized out>, envp=<optimized out>)
     at vl.c:4504

Fix this by acquiring the AioContext at qmp_block_dirty_bitmap_add()
and qmp_block_dirty_bitmap_add().

RHBZ: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1782175
Signed-off-by: Sergio Lopez <slp@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
arichardson pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 29, 2020
external_snapshot_abort() calls to bdrv_set_backing_hd(), which
returns state->old_bs to the main AioContext, as it's intended to be
used then the BDS is going to be released. As that's not the case when
aborting an external snapshot, return it to the AioContext it was
before the call.

This issue can be triggered by issuing a transaction with two actions,
a proper blockdev-snapshot-sync and a bogus one, so the second will
trigger a transaction abort. This results in a crash with an stack
trace like this one:

 #0  0x00007fa1048b28df in __GI_raise (sig=sig@entry=6) at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/raise.c:50
 #1  0x00007fa10489ccf5 in __GI_abort () at abort.c:79
 #2  0x00007fa10489cbc9 in __assert_fail_base
     (fmt=0x7fa104a03300 "%s%s%s:%u: %s%sAssertion `%s' failed.\n%n", assertion=0x5572240b44d8 "bdrv_get_aio_context(old_bs) == bdrv_get_aio_context(new_bs)", file=0x557224014d30 "block.c", line=2240, function=<optimized out>) at assert.c:92
 #3  0x00007fa1048aae96 in __GI___assert_fail
     (assertion=assertion@entry=0x5572240b44d8 "bdrv_get_aio_context(old_bs) == bdrv_get_aio_context(new_bs)", file=file@entry=0x557224014d30 "block.c", line=line@entry=2240, function=function@entry=0x5572240b5d60 <__PRETTY_FUNCTION__.31620> "bdrv_replace_child_noperm") at assert.c:101
 #4  0x0000557223e631f8 in bdrv_replace_child_noperm (child=0x557225b9c980, new_bs=new_bs@entry=0x557225c42e40) at block.c:2240
 #5  0x0000557223e68be7 in bdrv_replace_node (from=0x557226951a60, to=0x557225c42e40, errp=0x5572247d6138 <error_abort>) at block.c:4196
 #6  0x0000557223d069c4 in external_snapshot_abort (common=0x557225d7e170) at blockdev.c:1731
 #7  0x0000557223d069c4 in external_snapshot_abort (common=0x557225d7e170) at blockdev.c:1717
 #8  0x0000557223d09013 in qmp_transaction (dev_list=<optimized out>, has_props=<optimized out>, props=0x557225cc7d70, errp=errp@entry=0x7ffe704c0c98) at blockdev.c:2360
 #9  0x0000557223e32085 in qmp_marshal_transaction (args=<optimized out>, ret=<optimized out>, errp=0x7ffe704c0d08) at qapi/qapi-commands-transaction.c:44
 #10 0x0000557223ee798c in do_qmp_dispatch (errp=0x7ffe704c0d00, allow_oob=<optimized out>, request=<optimized out>, cmds=0x5572247d3cc0 <qmp_commands>) at qapi/qmp-dispatch.c:132
 #11 0x0000557223ee798c in qmp_dispatch (cmds=0x5572247d3cc0 <qmp_commands>, request=<optimized out>, allow_oob=<optimized out>) at qapi/qmp-dispatch.c:175
 #12 0x0000557223e06141 in monitor_qmp_dispatch (mon=0x557225c69ff0, req=<optimized out>) at monitor/qmp.c:120
 #13 0x0000557223e0678a in monitor_qmp_bh_dispatcher (data=<optimized out>) at monitor/qmp.c:209
 #14 0x0000557223f2f366 in aio_bh_call (bh=0x557225b9dc60) at util/async.c:117
 #15 0x0000557223f2f366 in aio_bh_poll (ctx=ctx@entry=0x557225b9c840) at util/async.c:117
 #16 0x0000557223f32754 in aio_dispatch (ctx=0x557225b9c840) at util/aio-posix.c:459
 #17 0x0000557223f2f242 in aio_ctx_dispatch (source=<optimized out>, callback=<optimized out>, user_data=<optimized out>) at util/async.c:260
 #18 0x00007fa10913467d in g_main_dispatch (context=0x557225c28e80) at gmain.c:3176
 #19 0x00007fa10913467d in g_main_context_dispatch (context=context@entry=0x557225c28e80) at gmain.c:3829
 #20 0x0000557223f31808 in glib_pollfds_poll () at util/main-loop.c:219
 #21 0x0000557223f31808 in os_host_main_loop_wait (timeout=<optimized out>) at util/main-loop.c:242
 #22 0x0000557223f31808 in main_loop_wait (nonblocking=<optimized out>) at util/main-loop.c:518
 #23 0x0000557223d13201 in main_loop () at vl.c:1828
 #24 0x0000557223bbfb82 in main (argc=<optimized out>, argv=<optimized out>, envp=<optimized out>) at vl.c:4504

RHBZ: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1779036
Signed-off-by: Sergio Lopez <slp@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
arichardson pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 2, 2020
If the multifd_send_threads is not created when migration is failed,
multifd_save_cleanup would be called twice. In this senario, the
multifd_send_state is accessed after it has been released, the result
is that the source VM is crashing down.

Here is the coredump stack:
    Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
    0x00005629333a78ef in multifd_send_terminate_threads (err=err@entry=0x0) at migration/ram.c:1012
    1012            MultiFDSendParams *p = &multifd_send_state->params[i];
    #0  0x00005629333a78ef in multifd_send_terminate_threads (err=err@entry=0x0) at migration/ram.c:1012
    #1  0x00005629333ab8a9 in multifd_save_cleanup () at migration/ram.c:1028
    #2  0x00005629333abaea in multifd_new_send_channel_async (task=0x562935450e70, opaque=<optimized out>) at migration/ram.c:1202
    #3  0x000056293373a562 in qio_task_complete (task=task@entry=0x562935450e70) at io/task.c:196
    #4  0x000056293373a6e0 in qio_task_thread_result (opaque=0x562935450e70) at io/task.c:111
    #5  0x00007f475d4d75a7 in g_idle_dispatch () from /usr/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0
    #6  0x00007f475d4da9a9 in g_main_context_dispatch () from /usr/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0
    #7  0x0000562933785b33 in glib_pollfds_poll () at util/main-loop.c:219
    #8  os_host_main_loop_wait (timeout=<optimized out>) at util/main-loop.c:242
    #9  main_loop_wait (nonblocking=nonblocking@entry=0) at util/main-loop.c:518
    #10 0x00005629334c5acf in main_loop () at vl.c:1810
    #11 0x000056293334d7bb in main (argc=<optimized out>, argv=<optimized out>, envp=<optimized out>) at vl.c:4471

If the multifd_send_threads is not created when migration is failed.
In this senario, we don't call multifd_save_cleanup in multifd_new_send_channel_async.

Signed-off-by: Zhimin Feng <fengzhimin1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
arichardson pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 11, 2020
It's not a big deal, but 'check qtest-ppc/ppc64' runs fail if sanitizers is enabled.
The memory leak stack is as follow:

Direct leak of 128 byte(s) in 4 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x7f11756f5970 in __interceptor_calloc (/lib64/libasan.so.5+0xef970)
    #1 0x7f1174f2549d in g_malloc0 (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x5249d)
    #2 0x556af05aa7da in mm_fw_cfg_init /mnt/sdb/qemu/tests/libqos/fw_cfg.c:119
    #3 0x556af059f4f5 in read_boot_order_pmac /mnt/sdb/qemu/tests/boot-order-test.c:137
    #4 0x556af059efe2 in test_a_boot_order /mnt/sdb/qemu/tests/boot-order-test.c:47
    #5 0x556af059f2c0 in test_boot_orders /mnt/sdb/qemu/tests/boot-order-test.c:59
    #6 0x556af059f52d in test_pmac_oldworld_boot_order /mnt/sdb/qemu/tests/boot-order-test.c:152
    #7 0x7f1174f46cb9  (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x73cb9)
    #8 0x7f1174f46b73  (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x73b73)
    #9 0x7f1174f46b73  (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x73b73)
    #10 0x7f1174f46f71 in g_test_run_suite (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x73f71)
    #11 0x7f1174f46f94 in g_test_run (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x73f94)

Reported-by: Euler Robot <euler.robot@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Pan Nengyuan <pannengyuan@huawei.com>
Message-Id: <20200203025935.36228-1-pannengyuan@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
arichardson pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 11, 2020
When remove dup_fd in monitor_fdset_dup_fd_find_remove function,
we need to free mon_fdset_fd_dup. ASAN shows memory leak stack:

Direct leak of 96 byte(s) in 3 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0xfffd37b033b3 in __interceptor_calloc (/lib64/libasan.so.4+0xd33b3)
    #1 0xfffd375c71cb in g_malloc0 (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x571cb)
    #2 0xaaae25bf1c17 in monitor_fdset_dup_fd_add /qemu/monitor/misc.c:1724
    #3 0xaaae265cfd8f in qemu_open /qemu/util/osdep.c:315
    #4 0xaaae264e2b2b in qmp_chardev_open_file_source /qemu/chardev/char-fd.c:122
    #5 0xaaae264e47cf in qmp_chardev_open_file /qemu/chardev/char-file.c:81
    #6 0xaaae264e118b in qemu_char_open /qemu/chardev/char.c:237
    #7 0xaaae264e118b in qemu_chardev_new /qemu/chardev/char.c:964
    #8 0xaaae264e1543 in qemu_chr_new_from_opts /qemu/chardev/char.c:680
    #9 0xaaae25e12e0f in chardev_init_func /qemu/vl.c:2083
    #10 0xaaae26603823 in qemu_opts_foreach /qemu/util/qemu-option.c:1170
    #11 0xaaae258c9787 in main /qemu/vl.c:4089
    #12 0xfffd35b80b9f in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x20b9f)
    #13 0xaaae258d7b63  (/qemu/build/aarch64-softmmu/qemu-system-aarch64+0x8b7b63)

Reported-by: Euler Robot <euler.robot@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Chen Qun <kuhn.chenqun@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200115072016.167252-1-kuhn.chenqun@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
arichardson pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 11, 2020
If we call the qmp 'query-block' while qemu is working on
'block-commit', it will cause memleaks, the memory leak stack is as
follow:

Indirect leak of 12360 byte(s) in 3 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x7f80f0b6d970 in __interceptor_calloc (/lib64/libasan.so.5+0xef970)
    #1 0x7f80ee86049d in g_malloc0 (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x5249d)
    #2 0x55ea95b5bb67 in qdict_new /mnt/sdb/qemu-4.2.0-rc0/qobject/qdict.c:29
    #3 0x55ea956cd043 in bdrv_refresh_filename /mnt/sdb/qemu-4.2.0-rc0/block.c:6427
    #4 0x55ea956cc950 in bdrv_refresh_filename /mnt/sdb/qemu-4.2.0-rc0/block.c:6399
    #5 0x55ea956cc950 in bdrv_refresh_filename /mnt/sdb/qemu-4.2.0-rc0/block.c:6399
    #6 0x55ea956cc950 in bdrv_refresh_filename /mnt/sdb/qemu-4.2.0-rc0/block.c:6399
    #7 0x55ea958818ea in bdrv_block_device_info /mnt/sdb/qemu-4.2.0-rc0/block/qapi.c:56
    #8 0x55ea958879de in bdrv_query_info /mnt/sdb/qemu-4.2.0-rc0/block/qapi.c:392
    #9 0x55ea9588b58f in qmp_query_block /mnt/sdb/qemu-4.2.0-rc0/block/qapi.c:578
    #10 0x55ea95567392 in qmp_marshal_query_block qapi/qapi-commands-block-core.c:95

Indirect leak of 4120 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x7f80f0b6d970 in __interceptor_calloc (/lib64/libasan.so.5+0xef970)
    #1 0x7f80ee86049d in g_malloc0 (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x5249d)
    #2 0x55ea95b5bb67 in qdict_new /mnt/sdb/qemu-4.2.0-rc0/qobject/qdict.c:29
    #3 0x55ea956cd043 in bdrv_refresh_filename /mnt/sdb/qemu-4.2.0-rc0/block.c:6427
    #4 0x55ea956cc950 in bdrv_refresh_filename /mnt/sdb/qemu-4.2.0-rc0/block.c:6399
    #5 0x55ea956cc950 in bdrv_refresh_filename /mnt/sdb/qemu-4.2.0-rc0/block.c:6399
    #6 0x55ea9569f301 in bdrv_backing_attach /mnt/sdb/qemu-4.2.0-rc0/block.c:1064
    #7 0x55ea956a99dd in bdrv_replace_child_noperm /mnt/sdb/qemu-4.2.0-rc0/block.c:2283
    #8 0x55ea956b9b53 in bdrv_replace_node /mnt/sdb/qemu-4.2.0-rc0/block.c:4196
    #9 0x55ea956b9e49 in bdrv_append /mnt/sdb/qemu-4.2.0-rc0/block.c:4236
    #10 0x55ea958c3472 in commit_start /mnt/sdb/qemu-4.2.0-rc0/block/commit.c:306
    #11 0x55ea94b68ab0 in qmp_block_commit /mnt/sdb/qemu-4.2.0-rc0/blockdev.c:3459
    #12 0x55ea9556a7a7 in qmp_marshal_block_commit qapi/qapi-commands-block-core.c:407

Fixes: bb808d5
Reported-by: Euler Robot <euler.robot@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Pan Nengyuan <pannengyuan@huawei.com>
Message-id: 20200116085600.24056-1-pannengyuan@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
trasz pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 28, 2020
Coverity reports:

  *** CID 1419387:  Memory - illegal accesses  (OVERRUN)
  /hw/hppa/dino.c: 267 in dino_chip_read_with_attrs()
  261             val = s->ilr & s->imr & s->icr;
  262             break;
  263         case DINO_TOC_ADDR:
  264             val = s->toc_addr;
  265             break;
  266         case DINO_GMASK ... DINO_TLTIM:
  >>>     CID 1419387:  Memory - illegal accesses  (OVERRUN)
  >>>     Overrunning array "s->reg800" of 12 4-byte elements at element index 12 (byte offset 48) using index "(addr - 2048UL) / 4UL" (which evaluates to 12).
  267             val = s->reg800[(addr - DINO_GMASK) / 4];
  268             if (addr == DINO_PAMR) {
  269                 val &= ~0x01;  /* LSB is hardwired to 0 */
  270             }
  271             if (addr == DINO_MLTIM) {
  272                 val &= ~0x07;  /* 3 LSB are hardwired to 0 */

  *** CID 1419393:  Memory - corruptions  (OVERRUN)
  /hw/hppa/dino.c: 363 in dino_chip_write_with_attrs()
  357             /* These registers are read-only.  */
  358             break;
  359
  360         case DINO_GMASK ... DINO_TLTIM:
  361             i = (addr - DINO_GMASK) / 4;
  362             val &= reg800_keep_bits[i];
  >>>     CID 1419393:  Memory - corruptions  (OVERRUN)
  >>>     Overrunning array "s->reg800" of 12 4-byte elements at element index 12 (byte offset 48) using index "i" (which evaluates to 12).
  363             s->reg800[i] = val;
  364             break;
  365
  366         default:
  367             /* Controlled by dino_chip_mem_valid above.  */
  368             g_assert_not_reached();

  *** CID 1419394:  Memory - illegal accesses  (OVERRUN)
  /hw/hppa/dino.c: 362 in dino_chip_write_with_attrs()
  356         case DINO_IRR1:
  357             /* These registers are read-only.  */
  358             break;
  359
  360         case DINO_GMASK ... DINO_TLTIM:
  361             i = (addr - DINO_GMASK) / 4;
  >>>     CID 1419394:  Memory - illegal accesses  (OVERRUN)
  >>>     Overrunning array "reg800_keep_bits" of 12 4-byte elements at element index 12 (byte offset 48) using index "i" (which evaluates to 12).
  362             val &= reg800_keep_bits[i];
  363             s->reg800[i] = val;
  364             break;
  365
  366         default:
  367             /* Controlled by dino_chip_mem_valid above.  */

Indeed the array should contain 13 entries, the undocumented
register 0x82c is missing. Fix by increasing the array size
and adding the missing register.

CID 1419387 can be verified with:

  $ echo x 0xfff80830 | hppa-softmmu/qemu-system-hppa -S -monitor stdio -display none
  QEMU 4.2.50 monitor - type 'help' for more information
  (qemu) x 0xfff80830
  qemu/hw/hppa/dino.c:267:15: runtime error: index 12 out of bounds for type 'uint32_t [12]'
  SUMMARY: UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer: undefined-behavior /home/phil/source/qemu/hw/hppa/dino.c:267:15 in
  00000000fff80830: 0x00000000

and CID 1419393/1419394 with:

  $ echo writeb 0xfff80830 0x69 \
    | hppa-softmmu/qemu-system-hppa -S -accel qtest -qtest stdio -display none
  [I 1581634452.654113] OPENED
  [R +4.105415] writeb 0xfff80830 0x69
  qemu/hw/hppa/dino.c:362:16: runtime error: index 12 out of bounds for type 'const uint32_t [12]'
  SUMMARY: UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer: undefined-behavior qemu/hw/hppa/dino.c:362:16 in
  =================================================================
  ==29607==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: global-buffer-overflow on address 0x5577dae32f30 at pc 0x5577d93f2463 bp 0x7ffd97ea11b0 sp 0x7ffd97ea11a8
  READ of size 4 at 0x5577dae32f30 thread T0
      #0 0x5577d93f2462 in dino_chip_write_with_attrs qemu/hw/hppa/dino.c:362:16
      #1 0x5577d9025664 in memory_region_write_with_attrs_accessor qemu/memory.c:503:12
      #2 0x5577d9024920 in access_with_adjusted_size qemu/memory.c:539:18
      #3 0x5577d9023608 in memory_region_dispatch_write qemu/memory.c:1482:13
      #4 0x5577d8e3177a in flatview_write_continue qemu/exec.c:3166:23
      #5 0x5577d8e20357 in flatview_write qemu/exec.c:3206:14
      #6 0x5577d8e1fef4 in address_space_write qemu/exec.c:3296:18
      #7 0x5577d8e20693 in address_space_rw qemu/exec.c:3306:16
      #8 0x5577d9011595 in qtest_process_command qemu/qtest.c:432:13
      #9 0x5577d900d19f in qtest_process_inbuf qemu/qtest.c:705:9
      #10 0x5577d900ca22 in qtest_read qemu/qtest.c:717:5
      #11 0x5577da8c4254 in qemu_chr_be_write_impl qemu/chardev/char.c:183:9
      #12 0x5577da8c430c in qemu_chr_be_write qemu/chardev/char.c:195:9
      #13 0x5577da8cf587 in fd_chr_read qemu/chardev/char-fd.c:68:9
      #14 0x5577da9836cd in qio_channel_fd_source_dispatch qemu/io/channel-watch.c:84:12
      #15 0x7faf44509ecc in g_main_context_dispatch (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x4fecc)
      #16 0x5577dab75f96 in glib_pollfds_poll qemu/util/main-loop.c:219:9
      #17 0x5577dab74797 in os_host_main_loop_wait qemu/util/main-loop.c:242:5
      #18 0x5577dab7435a in main_loop_wait qemu/util/main-loop.c:518:11
      #19 0x5577d9514eb3 in main_loop qemu/vl.c:1682:9
      #20 0x5577d950699d in main qemu/vl.c:4450:5
      #21 0x7faf41a87f42 in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x23f42)
      #22 0x5577d8cd4d4d in _start (qemu/build/sanitizer/hppa-softmmu/qemu-system-hppa+0x1256d4d)

  0x5577dae32f30 is located 0 bytes to the right of global variable 'reg800_keep_bits' defined in 'qemu/hw/hppa/dino.c:87:23' (0x5577dae32f00) of size 48
  SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: global-buffer-overflow qemu/hw/hppa/dino.c:362:16 in dino_chip_write_with_attrs
  Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
    0x0aaf7b5be590: 00 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 02 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9
    0x0aaf7b5be5a0: 07 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 07 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9
    0x0aaf7b5be5b0: 07 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    0x0aaf7b5be5c0: 00 00 00 02 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    0x0aaf7b5be5d0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 03 f9 f9 f9 f9
  =>0x0aaf7b5be5e0: 00 00 00 00 00 00[f9]f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 00
    0x0aaf7b5be5f0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    0x0aaf7b5be600: 00 00 01 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 00 07 f9 f9 f9
    0x0aaf7b5be610: f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    0x0aaf7b5be620: 00 00 00 05 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 00 07 f9 f9 f9
    0x0aaf7b5be630: f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 07 f9 f9 f9
  Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
    Addressable:           00
    Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
    Heap left redzone:       fa
    Freed heap region:       fd
    Stack left redzone:      f1
    Stack mid redzone:       f2
    Stack right redzone:     f3
    Stack after return:      f5
    Stack use after scope:   f8
    Global redzone:          f9
    Global init order:       f6
    Poisoned by user:        f7
    Container overflow:      fc
    Array cookie:            ac
    Intra object redzone:    bb
    ASan internal:           fe
    Left alloca redzone:     ca
    Right alloca redzone:    cb
    Shadow gap:              cc
  ==29607==ABORTING

Fixes: Covertiy CID 1419387 / 1419393 / 1419394 (commit 1809259)
Acked-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org>
Message-Id: <20200218063355.18577-3-f4bug@amsat.org>
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
trasz pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 28, 2020
'fdt' forgot to clean both e500 and pnv when we call 'system_reset' on ppc,
this patch fix it. The leak stacks are as follow:

Direct leak of 4194304 byte(s) in 4 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x7fafe37dd970 in __interceptor_calloc (/lib64/libasan.so.5+0xef970)
    #1 0x7fafe2e3149d in g_malloc0 (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x5249d)
    #2 0x561876f7f80d in create_device_tree /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu/device_tree.c:40
    #3 0x561876b7ac29 in ppce500_load_device_tree /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu/hw/ppc/e500.c:364
    #4 0x561876b7f437 in ppce500_reset_device_tree /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu/hw/ppc/e500.c:617
    #5 0x56187718b1ae in qemu_devices_reset /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu/hw/core/reset.c:69
    #6 0x561876f6938d in qemu_system_reset /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu/vl.c:1412
    #7 0x561876f6a25b in main_loop_should_exit /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu/vl.c:1645
    #8 0x561876f6a398 in main_loop /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu/vl.c:1679
    #9 0x561876f7da8e in main /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu/vl.c:4438
    #10 0x7fafde16b812 in __libc_start_main ../csu/libc-start.c:308
    #11 0x5618765c055d in _start (/mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu/build/ppc64-softmmu/qemu-system-ppc64+0x2b1555d)

Direct leak of 1048576 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x7fc0a6f1b970 in __interceptor_calloc (/lib64/libasan.so.5+0xef970)
    #1 0x7fc0a656f49d in g_malloc0 (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x5249d)
    #2 0x55eb05acd2ca in pnv_dt_create /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu/hw/ppc/pnv.c:507
    #3 0x55eb05ace5bf in pnv_reset /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu/hw/ppc/pnv.c:578
    #4 0x55eb05f2f395 in qemu_system_reset /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu/vl.c:1410
    #5 0x55eb05f43850 in main /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu/vl.c:4403
    #6 0x7fc0a18a9812 in __libc_start_main ../csu/libc-start.c:308
    #7 0x55eb0558655d in _start (/mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu/build/ppc64-softmmu/qemu-system-ppc64+0x2b1555d)

Reported-by: Euler Robot <euler.robot@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Pan Nengyuan <pannengyuan@huawei.com>
Message-Id: <20200214033206.4395-1-pannengyuan@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
arichardson pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 29, 2020
Similar to other virtio device(https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/11399237/), virtio queues forgot to delete in unrealize, and aslo error path in realize, this patch fix these memleaks, the leak stack is as follow:
Direct leak of 57344 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x7f15784fb970 in __interceptor_calloc (/lib64/libasan.so.5+0xef970)
    #1 0x7f157790849d in g_malloc0 (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x5249d)
    #2 0x55587a1bf859 in virtio_add_queue /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu_test/qemu/hw/virtio/virtio.c:2333
    #3 0x55587a2071d5 in vuf_device_realize /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu_test/qemu/hw/virtio/vhost-user-fs.c:212
    #4 0x55587a1ae360 in virtio_device_realize /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu_test/qemu/hw/virtio/virtio.c:3531
    #5 0x55587a63fb7b in device_set_realized /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu_test/qemu/hw/core/qdev.c:891
    #6 0x55587acf03f5 in property_set_bool /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu_test/qemu/qom/object.c:2238
    #7 0x55587acfce0d in object_property_set_qobject /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu_test/qemu/qom/qom-qobject.c:26
    #8 0x55587acf5c8c in object_property_set_bool /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu_test/qemu/qom/object.c:1390
    #9 0x55587a8e22a2 in pci_qdev_realize /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu_test/qemu/hw/pci/pci.c:2095
    #10 0x55587a63fb7b in device_set_realized /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu_test/qemu/hw/core/qdev.c:891
    #11 0x55587acf03f5 in property_set_bool /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu_test/qemu/qom/object.c:2238
    #12 0x55587acfce0d in object_property_set_qobject /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu_test/qemu/qom/qom-qobject.c:26
    #13 0x55587acf5c8c in object_property_set_bool /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu_test/qemu/qom/object.c:1390
    #14 0x55587a496d65 in qdev_device_add /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu_test/qemu/qdev-monitor.c:679

Reported-by: Euler Robot <euler.robot@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Pan Nengyuan <pannengyuan@huawei.com>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200225075554.10835-2-pannengyuan@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
arichardson pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 29, 2020
Similar to other virtio-deivces, ctrl_vq forgot to delete in virtio_crypto_device_unrealize, this patch fix it.
This device has aleardy maintained vq pointers. Thus, we use the new virtio_delete_queue function directly to do the cleanup.

The leak stack:
Direct leak of 10752 byte(s) in 3 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x7f4c024b1970 in __interceptor_calloc (/lib64/libasan.so.5+0xef970)
    #1 0x7f4c018be49d in g_malloc0 (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x5249d)
    #2 0x55a2f8017279 in virtio_add_queue /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu_test/qemu/hw/virtio/virtio.c:2333
    #3 0x55a2f8057035 in virtio_crypto_device_realize /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu_test/qemu/hw/virtio/virtio-crypto.c:814
    #4 0x55a2f8005d80 in virtio_device_realize /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu_test/qemu/hw/virtio/virtio.c:3531
    #5 0x55a2f8497d1b in device_set_realized /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu_test/qemu/hw/core/qdev.c:891
    #6 0x55a2f8b48595 in property_set_bool /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu_test/qemu/qom/object.c:2238
    #7 0x55a2f8b54fad in object_property_set_qobject /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu_test/qemu/qom/qom-qobject.c:26
    #8 0x55a2f8b4de2c in object_property_set_bool /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu_test/qemu/qom/object.c:1390
    #9 0x55a2f80609c9 in virtio_crypto_pci_realize /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu_test/qemu/hw/virtio/virtio-crypto-pci.c:58

Reported-by: Euler Robot <euler.robot@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Pan Nengyuan <pannengyuan@huawei.com>
Cc: "Gonglei (Arei)" <arei.gonglei@huawei.com>
Message-Id: <20200225075554.10835-5-pannengyuan@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
arichardson pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 29, 2020
virtio queues forgot to delete in unrealize, and aslo error path in
realize, this patch fix these memleaks, the leak stack is as follow:

Direct leak of 114688 byte(s) in 16 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x7f24024fdbf0 in calloc (/lib64/libasan.so.3+0xcabf0)
    #1 0x7f2401642015 in g_malloc0 (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x50015)
    #2 0x55ad175a6447 in virtio_add_queue /mnt/sdb/qemu/hw/virtio/virtio.c:2327
    #3 0x55ad17570cf9 in vhost_user_blk_device_realize /mnt/sdb/qemu/hw/block/vhost-user-blk.c:419
    #4 0x55ad175a3707 in virtio_device_realize /mnt/sdb/qemu/hw/virtio/virtio.c:3509
    #5 0x55ad176ad0d1 in device_set_realized /mnt/sdb/qemu/hw/core/qdev.c:876
    #6 0x55ad1781ff9d in property_set_bool /mnt/sdb/qemu/qom/object.c:2080
    #7 0x55ad178245ae in object_property_set_qobject /mnt/sdb/qemu/qom/qom-qobject.c:26
    #8 0x55ad17821eb4 in object_property_set_bool /mnt/sdb/qemu/qom/object.c:1338
    #9 0x55ad177aeed7 in virtio_pci_realize /mnt/sdb/qemu/hw/virtio/virtio-pci.c:1801

Reported-by: Euler Robot <euler.robot@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Pan Nengyuan <pannengyuan@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200224041336.30790-2-pannengyuan@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
arichardson pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 29, 2020
In currently implementation there will be a memory leak when
nbd_client_connect() returns error status. Here is an easy way to
reproduce:

1. run qemu-iotests as follow and check the result with asan:
    ./check -raw 143

Following is the asan output backtrack:
Direct leak of 40 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x7f629688a560 in calloc (/usr/lib64/libasan.so.3+0xc7560)
    #1 0x7f6295e7e015 in g_malloc0  (/usr/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x50015)
    #2 0x56281dab4642 in qobject_input_start_struct  /mnt/sdb/qemu-4.2.0-rc0/qapi/qobject-input-visitor.c:295
    #3 0x56281dab1a04 in visit_start_struct  /mnt/sdb/qemu-4.2.0-rc0/qapi/qapi-visit-core.c:49
    #4 0x56281dad1827 in visit_type_SocketAddress  qapi/qapi-visit-sockets.c:386
    #5 0x56281da8062f in nbd_config   /mnt/sdb/qemu-4.2.0-rc0/block/nbd.c:1716
    #6 0x56281da8062f in nbd_process_options /mnt/sdb/qemu-4.2.0-rc0/block/nbd.c:1829
    #7 0x56281da8062f in nbd_open /mnt/sdb/qemu-4.2.0-rc0/block/nbd.c:1873

Direct leak of 15 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x7f629688a3a0 in malloc (/usr/lib64/libasan.so.3+0xc73a0)
    #1 0x7f6295e7dfbd in g_malloc (/usr/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x4ffbd)
    #2 0x7f6295e96ace in g_strdup (/usr/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x68ace)
    #3 0x56281da804ac in nbd_process_options /mnt/sdb/qemu-4.2.0-rc0/block/nbd.c:1834
    #4 0x56281da804ac in nbd_open /mnt/sdb/qemu-4.2.0-rc0/block/nbd.c:1873

Indirect leak of 24 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x7f629688a3a0 in malloc (/usr/lib64/libasan.so.3+0xc73a0)
    #1 0x7f6295e7dfbd in g_malloc (/usr/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x4ffbd)
    #2 0x7f6295e96ace in g_strdup (/usr/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x68ace)
    #3 0x56281dab41a3 in qobject_input_type_str_keyval /mnt/sdb/qemu-4.2.0-rc0/qapi/qobject-input-visitor.c:536
    #4 0x56281dab2ee9 in visit_type_str /mnt/sdb/qemu-4.2.0-rc0/qapi/qapi-visit-core.c:297
    #5 0x56281dad0fa1 in visit_type_UnixSocketAddress_members qapi/qapi-visit-sockets.c:141
    #6 0x56281dad17b6 in visit_type_SocketAddress_members qapi/qapi-visit-sockets.c:366
    #7 0x56281dad186a in visit_type_SocketAddress qapi/qapi-visit-sockets.c:393
    #8 0x56281da8062f in nbd_config /mnt/sdb/qemu-4.2.0-rc0/block/nbd.c:1716
    #9 0x56281da8062f in nbd_process_options /mnt/sdb/qemu-4.2.0-rc0/block/nbd.c:1829
    #10 0x56281da8062f in nbd_open /mnt/sdb/qemu-4.2.0-rc0/block/nbd.c:1873

Fixes: 8f071c9
Reported-by: Euler Robot <euler.robot@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Pan Nengyuan <pannengyuan@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Vladimir Sementsov-Ogievskiy <vsementsov@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: qemu-stable <qemu-stable@nongnu.org>
Cc: Vladimir Sementsov-Ogievskiy <vsementsov@virtuozzo.com>
Message-Id: <1575517528-44312-3-git-send-email-pannengyuan@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
arichardson pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 29, 2020
The virtqueue code sets up MemoryRegionCaches to access the virtqueue
guest RAM data structures.  The code currently assumes that
VRingMemoryRegionCaches is initialized before device emulation code
accesses the virtqueue.  An assertion will fail in
vring_get_region_caches() when this is not true.  Device fuzzing found a
case where this assumption is false (see below).

Virtqueue guest RAM addresses can also be changed from a vCPU thread
while an IOThread is accessing the virtqueue.  This breaks the same
assumption but this time the caches could become invalid partway through
the virtqueue code.  The code fetches the caches RCU pointer multiple
times so we will need to validate the pointer every time it is fetched.

Add checks each time we call vring_get_region_caches() and treat invalid
caches as a nop: memory stores are ignored and memory reads return 0.

The fuzz test failure is as follows:

  $ qemu -M pc -device virtio-blk-pci,id=drv0,drive=drive0,addr=4.0 \
         -drive if=none,id=drive0,file=null-co://,format=raw,auto-read-only=off \
         -drive if=none,id=drive1,file=null-co://,file.read-zeroes=on,format=raw \
         -display none \
         -qtest stdio
  endianness
  outl 0xcf8 0x80002020
  outl 0xcfc 0xe0000000
  outl 0xcf8 0x80002004
  outw 0xcfc 0x7
  write 0xe0000000 0x24 0x00ffffffabffffffabffffffabffffffabffffffabffffffabffffffabffffffabffffffabffffffabffffffabffffffabffffffabffffffab5cffffffabffffffabffffffabffffffabffffffabffffffabffffffabffffffabffffffabffffffabffffffabffffffabffffffabffffffabffffffab0000000001
  inb 0x4
  writew 0xe000001c 0x1
  write 0xe0000014 0x1 0x0d

The following error message is produced:

  qemu-system-x86_64: /home/stefanha/qemu/hw/virtio/virtio.c:286: vring_get_region_caches: Assertion `caches != NULL' failed.

The backtrace looks like this:

  #0  0x00007ffff5520625 in raise () at /lib64/libc.so.6
  #1  0x00007ffff55098d9 in abort () at /lib64/libc.so.6
  #2  0x00007ffff55097a9 in _nl_load_domain.cold () at /lib64/libc.so.6
  #3  0x00007ffff5518a66 in annobin_assert.c_end () at /lib64/libc.so.6
  #4  0x00005555559073da in vring_get_region_caches (vq=<optimized out>) at qemu/hw/virtio/virtio.c:286
  #5  vring_get_region_caches (vq=<optimized out>) at qemu/hw/virtio/virtio.c:283
  #6  0x000055555590818d in vring_used_flags_set_bit (mask=1, vq=0x5555575ceea0) at qemu/hw/virtio/virtio.c:398
  #7  virtio_queue_split_set_notification (enable=0, vq=0x5555575ceea0) at qemu/hw/virtio/virtio.c:398
  #8  virtio_queue_set_notification (vq=vq@entry=0x5555575ceea0, enable=enable@entry=0) at qemu/hw/virtio/virtio.c:451
  #9  0x0000555555908512 in virtio_queue_set_notification (vq=vq@entry=0x5555575ceea0, enable=enable@entry=0) at qemu/hw/virtio/virtio.c:444
  #10 0x00005555558c697a in virtio_blk_handle_vq (s=0x5555575c57e0, vq=0x5555575ceea0) at qemu/hw/block/virtio-blk.c:775
  #11 0x0000555555907836 in virtio_queue_notify_aio_vq (vq=0x5555575ceea0) at qemu/hw/virtio/virtio.c:2244
  #12 0x0000555555cb5dd7 in aio_dispatch_handlers (ctx=ctx@entry=0x55555671a420) at util/aio-posix.c:429
  #13 0x0000555555cb67a8 in aio_dispatch (ctx=0x55555671a420) at util/aio-posix.c:460
  #14 0x0000555555cb307e in aio_ctx_dispatch (source=<optimized out>, callback=<optimized out>, user_data=<optimized out>) at util/async.c:260
  #15 0x00007ffff7bbc510 in g_main_context_dispatch () at /lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0
  #16 0x0000555555cb5848 in glib_pollfds_poll () at util/main-loop.c:219
  #17 os_host_main_loop_wait (timeout=<optimized out>) at util/main-loop.c:242
  #18 main_loop_wait (nonblocking=<optimized out>) at util/main-loop.c:518
  #19 0x00005555559b20c9 in main_loop () at vl.c:1683
  #20 0x0000555555838115 in main (argc=<optimized out>, argv=<optimized out>, envp=<optimized out>) at vl.c:4441

Reported-by: Alexander Bulekov <alxndr@bu.edu>
Cc: Michael Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200207104619.164892-1-stefanha@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
trasz pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 3, 2020
Coverity reports:

  *** CID 1419387:  Memory - illegal accesses  (OVERRUN)
  /hw/hppa/dino.c: 267 in dino_chip_read_with_attrs()
  261             val = s->ilr & s->imr & s->icr;
  262             break;
  263         case DINO_TOC_ADDR:
  264             val = s->toc_addr;
  265             break;
  266         case DINO_GMASK ... DINO_TLTIM:
  >>>     CID 1419387:  Memory - illegal accesses  (OVERRUN)
  >>>     Overrunning array "s->reg800" of 12 4-byte elements at element index 12 (byte offset 48) using index "(addr - 2048UL) / 4UL" (which evaluates to 12).
  267             val = s->reg800[(addr - DINO_GMASK) / 4];
  268             if (addr == DINO_PAMR) {
  269                 val &= ~0x01;  /* LSB is hardwired to 0 */
  270             }
  271             if (addr == DINO_MLTIM) {
  272                 val &= ~0x07;  /* 3 LSB are hardwired to 0 */

  *** CID 1419393:  Memory - corruptions  (OVERRUN)
  /hw/hppa/dino.c: 363 in dino_chip_write_with_attrs()
  357             /* These registers are read-only.  */
  358             break;
  359
  360         case DINO_GMASK ... DINO_TLTIM:
  361             i = (addr - DINO_GMASK) / 4;
  362             val &= reg800_keep_bits[i];
  >>>     CID 1419393:  Memory - corruptions  (OVERRUN)
  >>>     Overrunning array "s->reg800" of 12 4-byte elements at element index 12 (byte offset 48) using index "i" (which evaluates to 12).
  363             s->reg800[i] = val;
  364             break;
  365
  366         default:
  367             /* Controlled by dino_chip_mem_valid above.  */
  368             g_assert_not_reached();

  *** CID 1419394:  Memory - illegal accesses  (OVERRUN)
  /hw/hppa/dino.c: 362 in dino_chip_write_with_attrs()
  356         case DINO_IRR1:
  357             /* These registers are read-only.  */
  358             break;
  359
  360         case DINO_GMASK ... DINO_TLTIM:
  361             i = (addr - DINO_GMASK) / 4;
  >>>     CID 1419394:  Memory - illegal accesses  (OVERRUN)
  >>>     Overrunning array "reg800_keep_bits" of 12 4-byte elements at element index 12 (byte offset 48) using index "i" (which evaluates to 12).
  362             val &= reg800_keep_bits[i];
  363             s->reg800[i] = val;
  364             break;
  365
  366         default:
  367             /* Controlled by dino_chip_mem_valid above.  */

Indeed the array should contain 13 entries, the undocumented
register 0x82c is missing. Fix by increasing the array size
and adding the missing register.

CID 1419387 can be verified with:

  $ echo x 0xfff80830 | hppa-softmmu/qemu-system-hppa -S -monitor stdio -display none
  QEMU 4.2.50 monitor - type 'help' for more information
  (qemu) x 0xfff80830
  qemu/hw/hppa/dino.c:267:15: runtime error: index 12 out of bounds for type 'uint32_t [12]'
  SUMMARY: UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer: undefined-behavior /home/phil/source/qemu/hw/hppa/dino.c:267:15 in
  00000000fff80830: 0x00000000

and CID 1419393/1419394 with:

  $ echo writeb 0xfff80830 0x69 \
    | hppa-softmmu/qemu-system-hppa -S -accel qtest -qtest stdio -display none
  [I 1581634452.654113] OPENED
  [R +4.105415] writeb 0xfff80830 0x69
  qemu/hw/hppa/dino.c:362:16: runtime error: index 12 out of bounds for type 'const uint32_t [12]'
  SUMMARY: UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer: undefined-behavior qemu/hw/hppa/dino.c:362:16 in
  =================================================================
  ==29607==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: global-buffer-overflow on address 0x5577dae32f30 at pc 0x5577d93f2463 bp 0x7ffd97ea11b0 sp 0x7ffd97ea11a8
  READ of size 4 at 0x5577dae32f30 thread T0
      #0 0x5577d93f2462 in dino_chip_write_with_attrs qemu/hw/hppa/dino.c:362:16
      #1 0x5577d9025664 in memory_region_write_with_attrs_accessor qemu/memory.c:503:12
      #2 0x5577d9024920 in access_with_adjusted_size qemu/memory.c:539:18
      #3 0x5577d9023608 in memory_region_dispatch_write qemu/memory.c:1482:13
      #4 0x5577d8e3177a in flatview_write_continue qemu/exec.c:3166:23
      #5 0x5577d8e20357 in flatview_write qemu/exec.c:3206:14
      #6 0x5577d8e1fef4 in address_space_write qemu/exec.c:3296:18
      #7 0x5577d8e20693 in address_space_rw qemu/exec.c:3306:16
      #8 0x5577d9011595 in qtest_process_command qemu/qtest.c:432:13
      #9 0x5577d900d19f in qtest_process_inbuf qemu/qtest.c:705:9
      #10 0x5577d900ca22 in qtest_read qemu/qtest.c:717:5
      #11 0x5577da8c4254 in qemu_chr_be_write_impl qemu/chardev/char.c:183:9
      #12 0x5577da8c430c in qemu_chr_be_write qemu/chardev/char.c:195:9
      #13 0x5577da8cf587 in fd_chr_read qemu/chardev/char-fd.c:68:9
      #14 0x5577da9836cd in qio_channel_fd_source_dispatch qemu/io/channel-watch.c:84:12
      #15 0x7faf44509ecc in g_main_context_dispatch (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x4fecc)
      #16 0x5577dab75f96 in glib_pollfds_poll qemu/util/main-loop.c:219:9
      #17 0x5577dab74797 in os_host_main_loop_wait qemu/util/main-loop.c:242:5
      #18 0x5577dab7435a in main_loop_wait qemu/util/main-loop.c:518:11
      #19 0x5577d9514eb3 in main_loop qemu/vl.c:1682:9
      #20 0x5577d950699d in main qemu/vl.c:4450:5
      #21 0x7faf41a87f42 in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x23f42)
      #22 0x5577d8cd4d4d in _start (qemu/build/sanitizer/hppa-softmmu/qemu-system-hppa+0x1256d4d)

  0x5577dae32f30 is located 0 bytes to the right of global variable 'reg800_keep_bits' defined in 'qemu/hw/hppa/dino.c:87:23' (0x5577dae32f00) of size 48
  SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: global-buffer-overflow qemu/hw/hppa/dino.c:362:16 in dino_chip_write_with_attrs
  Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
    0x0aaf7b5be590: 00 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 02 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9
    0x0aaf7b5be5a0: 07 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 07 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9
    0x0aaf7b5be5b0: 07 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    0x0aaf7b5be5c0: 00 00 00 02 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    0x0aaf7b5be5d0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 03 f9 f9 f9 f9
  =>0x0aaf7b5be5e0: 00 00 00 00 00 00[f9]f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 00
    0x0aaf7b5be5f0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    0x0aaf7b5be600: 00 00 01 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 00 07 f9 f9 f9
    0x0aaf7b5be610: f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    0x0aaf7b5be620: 00 00 00 05 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 00 07 f9 f9 f9
    0x0aaf7b5be630: f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 07 f9 f9 f9
  Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
    Addressable:           00
    Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
    Heap left redzone:       fa
    Freed heap region:       fd
    Stack left redzone:      f1
    Stack mid redzone:       f2
    Stack right redzone:     f3
    Stack after return:      f5
    Stack use after scope:   f8
    Global redzone:          f9
    Global init order:       f6
    Poisoned by user:        f7
    Container overflow:      fc
    Array cookie:            ac
    Intra object redzone:    bb
    ASan internal:           fe
    Left alloca redzone:     ca
    Right alloca redzone:    cb
    Shadow gap:              cc
  ==29607==ABORTING

Fixes: Covertiy CID 1419387 / 1419393 / 1419394 (commit 1809259)
Acked-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org>
Message-Id: <20200218063355.18577-3-f4bug@amsat.org>
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
trasz pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 3, 2020
'fdt' forgot to clean both e500 and pnv when we call 'system_reset' on ppc,
this patch fix it. The leak stacks are as follow:

Direct leak of 4194304 byte(s) in 4 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x7fafe37dd970 in __interceptor_calloc (/lib64/libasan.so.5+0xef970)
    #1 0x7fafe2e3149d in g_malloc0 (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x5249d)
    #2 0x561876f7f80d in create_device_tree /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu/device_tree.c:40
    #3 0x561876b7ac29 in ppce500_load_device_tree /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu/hw/ppc/e500.c:364
    #4 0x561876b7f437 in ppce500_reset_device_tree /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu/hw/ppc/e500.c:617
    #5 0x56187718b1ae in qemu_devices_reset /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu/hw/core/reset.c:69
    #6 0x561876f6938d in qemu_system_reset /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu/vl.c:1412
    #7 0x561876f6a25b in main_loop_should_exit /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu/vl.c:1645
    #8 0x561876f6a398 in main_loop /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu/vl.c:1679
    #9 0x561876f7da8e in main /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu/vl.c:4438
    #10 0x7fafde16b812 in __libc_start_main ../csu/libc-start.c:308
    #11 0x5618765c055d in _start (/mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu/build/ppc64-softmmu/qemu-system-ppc64+0x2b1555d)

Direct leak of 1048576 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x7fc0a6f1b970 in __interceptor_calloc (/lib64/libasan.so.5+0xef970)
    #1 0x7fc0a656f49d in g_malloc0 (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x5249d)
    #2 0x55eb05acd2ca in pnv_dt_create /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu/hw/ppc/pnv.c:507
    #3 0x55eb05ace5bf in pnv_reset /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu/hw/ppc/pnv.c:578
    #4 0x55eb05f2f395 in qemu_system_reset /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu/vl.c:1410
    #5 0x55eb05f43850 in main /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu/vl.c:4403
    #6 0x7fc0a18a9812 in __libc_start_main ../csu/libc-start.c:308
    #7 0x55eb0558655d in _start (/mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu/build/ppc64-softmmu/qemu-system-ppc64+0x2b1555d)

Reported-by: Euler Robot <euler.robot@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Pan Nengyuan <pannengyuan@huawei.com>
Message-Id: <20200214033206.4395-1-pannengyuan@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
arichardson pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 23, 2020
'list' forgot to free at the end of dump_vmstate_json_to_file(), although it's called only once, but seems like a clean code.

Fix the leak as follow:
Direct leak of 16 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x7fb946abd768 in __interceptor_malloc (/lib64/libasan.so.5+0xef768)
    #1 0x7fb945eca445 in g_malloc (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x52445)
    #2 0x7fb945ee2066 in g_slice_alloc (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x6a066)
    #3 0x7fb945ee3139 in g_slist_prepend (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x6b139)
    #4 0x5585db591581 in object_class_get_list_tramp /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu/qom/object.c:1084
    #5 0x5585db590f66 in object_class_foreach_tramp /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu/qom/object.c:1028
    #6 0x7fb945eb35f7 in g_hash_table_foreach (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x3b5f7)
    #7 0x5585db59110c in object_class_foreach /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu/qom/object.c:1038
    #8 0x5585db5916b6 in object_class_get_list /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu/qom/object.c:1092
    #9 0x5585db335ca0 in dump_vmstate_json_to_file /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu/migration/savevm.c:638
    #10 0x5585daa5bcbf in main /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu/vl.c:4420
    #11 0x7fb941204812 in __libc_start_main ../csu/libc-start.c:308
    #12 0x5585da29420d in _start (/mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu/build/x86_64-softmmu/qemu-system-x86_64+0x27f020d)

Indirect leak of 7472 byte(s) in 467 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x7fb946abd768 in __interceptor_malloc (/lib64/libasan.so.5+0xef768)
    #1 0x7fb945eca445 in g_malloc (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x52445)
    #2 0x7fb945ee2066 in g_slice_alloc (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x6a066)
    #3 0x7fb945ee3139 in g_slist_prepend (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x6b139)
    #4 0x5585db591581 in object_class_get_list_tramp /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu/qom/object.c:1084
    #5 0x5585db590f66 in object_class_foreach_tramp /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu/qom/object.c:1028
    #6 0x7fb945eb35f7 in g_hash_table_foreach (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x3b5f7)
    #7 0x5585db59110c in object_class_foreach /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu/qom/object.c:1038
    #8 0x5585db5916b6 in object_class_get_list /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu/qom/object.c:1092
    #9 0x5585db335ca0 in dump_vmstate_json_to_file /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu/migration/savevm.c:638
    #10 0x5585daa5bcbf in main /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu/vl.c:4420
    #11 0x7fb941204812 in __libc_start_main ../csu/libc-start.c:308
    #12 0x5585da29420d in _start (/mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu/build/x86_64-softmmu/qemu-system-x86_64+0x27f020d)

Reported-by: Euler Robot <euler.robot@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Pan Nengyuan <pannengyuan@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
arichardson pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 23, 2020
'crypto_opts' forgot to free in qcow2_close(), this patch fix the bellow leak stack:

Direct leak of 24 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x7f0edd81f970 in __interceptor_calloc (/lib64/libasan.so.5+0xef970)
    #1 0x7f0edc6d149d in g_malloc0 (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x5249d)
    #2 0x55d7eaede63d in qobject_input_start_struct /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu_test/qemu/qapi/qobject-input-visitor.c:295
    #3 0x55d7eaed78b8 in visit_start_struct /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu_test/qemu/qapi/qapi-visit-core.c:49
    #4 0x55d7eaf5140b in visit_type_QCryptoBlockOpenOptions qapi/qapi-visit-crypto.c:290
    #5 0x55d7eae43af3 in block_crypto_open_opts_init /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu_test/qemu/block/crypto.c:163
    #6 0x55d7eacd2924 in qcow2_update_options_prepare /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu_test/qemu/block/qcow2.c:1148
    #7 0x55d7eacd33f7 in qcow2_update_options /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu_test/qemu/block/qcow2.c:1232
    #8 0x55d7eacd9680 in qcow2_do_open /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu_test/qemu/block/qcow2.c:1512
    #9 0x55d7eacdc55e in qcow2_open_entry /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu_test/qemu/block/qcow2.c:1792
    #10 0x55d7eacdc8fe in qcow2_open /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu_test/qemu/block/qcow2.c:1819
    #11 0x55d7eac3742d in bdrv_open_driver /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu_test/qemu/block.c:1317
    #12 0x55d7eac3e990 in bdrv_open_common /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu_test/qemu/block.c:1575
    #13 0x55d7eac4442c in bdrv_open_inherit /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu_test/qemu/block.c:3126
    #14 0x55d7eac45c3f in bdrv_open /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu_test/qemu/block.c:3219
    #15 0x55d7ead8e8a4 in blk_new_open /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu_test/qemu/block/block-backend.c:397
    #16 0x55d7eacde74c in qcow2_co_create /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu_test/qemu/block/qcow2.c:3534
    #17 0x55d7eacdfa6d in qcow2_co_create_opts /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu_test/qemu/block/qcow2.c:3668
    #18 0x55d7eac1c678 in bdrv_create_co_entry /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu_test/qemu/block.c:485
    #19 0x55d7eb0024d2 in coroutine_trampoline /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu_test/qemu/util/coroutine-ucontext.c:115

Reported-by: Euler Robot <euler.robot@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Pan Nengyuan <pannengyuan@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200227012950.12256-2-pannengyuan@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
arichardson pushed a commit to arichardson/qemu that referenced this pull request Apr 15, 2020
There is a use-after-free possible: bdrv_unref_child() leaves
bs->backing freed but not NULL. bdrv_attach_child may produce nested
polling loop due to drain, than access of freed pointer is possible.

I've produced the following crash on 30 iotest with modified code. It
does not reproduce on master, but still seems possible:

    #0  __strcmp_avx2 () at /lib64/libc.so.6
    CTSRD-CHERI#1  bdrv_backing_overridden (bs=0x55c9d3cc2060) at block.c:6350
    CTSRD-CHERI#2  bdrv_refresh_filename (bs=0x55c9d3cc2060) at block.c:6404
    CTSRD-CHERI#3  bdrv_backing_attach (c=0x55c9d48e5520) at block.c:1063
    CTSRD-CHERI#4  bdrv_replace_child_noperm
        (child=child@entry=0x55c9d48e5520,
        new_bs=new_bs@entry=0x55c9d3cc2060) at block.c:2290
    CTSRD-CHERI#5  bdrv_replace_child
        (child=child@entry=0x55c9d48e5520,
        new_bs=new_bs@entry=0x55c9d3cc2060) at block.c:2320
    CTSRD-CHERI#6  bdrv_root_attach_child
        (child_bs=child_bs@entry=0x55c9d3cc2060,
        child_name=child_name@entry=0x55c9d241d478 "backing",
        child_role=child_role@entry=0x55c9d26ecee0 <child_backing>,
        ctx=<optimized out>, perm=<optimized out>, shared_perm=21,
        opaque=0x55c9d3c5a3d0, errp=0x7ffd117108e0) at block.c:2424
    CTSRD-CHERI#7  bdrv_attach_child
        (parent_bs=parent_bs@entry=0x55c9d3c5a3d0,
        child_bs=child_bs@entry=0x55c9d3cc2060,
        child_name=child_name@entry=0x55c9d241d478 "backing",
        child_role=child_role@entry=0x55c9d26ecee0 <child_backing>,
        errp=errp@entry=0x7ffd117108e0) at block.c:5876
    CTSRD-CHERI#8  in bdrv_set_backing_hd
        (bs=bs@entry=0x55c9d3c5a3d0,
        backing_hd=backing_hd@entry=0x55c9d3cc2060,
        errp=errp@entry=0x7ffd117108e0)
        at block.c:2576
    CTSRD-CHERI#9  stream_prepare (job=0x55c9d49d84a0) at block/stream.c:150
    CTSRD-CHERI#10 job_prepare (job=0x55c9d49d84a0) at job.c:761
    CTSRD-CHERI#11 job_txn_apply (txn=<optimized out>, fn=<optimized out>) at
        job.c:145
    CTSRD-CHERI#12 job_do_finalize (job=0x55c9d49d84a0) at job.c:778
    CTSRD-CHERI#13 job_completed_txn_success (job=0x55c9d49d84a0) at job.c:832
    CTSRD-CHERI#14 job_completed (job=0x55c9d49d84a0) at job.c:845
    CTSRD-CHERI#15 job_completed (job=0x55c9d49d84a0) at job.c:836
    CTSRD-CHERI#16 job_exit (opaque=0x55c9d49d84a0) at job.c:864
    CTSRD-CHERI#17 aio_bh_call (bh=0x55c9d471a160) at util/async.c:117
    CTSRD-CHERI#18 aio_bh_poll (ctx=ctx@entry=0x55c9d3c46720) at util/async.c:117
    CTSRD-CHERI#19 aio_poll (ctx=ctx@entry=0x55c9d3c46720,
        blocking=blocking@entry=true)
        at util/aio-posix.c:728
    CTSRD-CHERI#20 bdrv_parent_drained_begin_single (poll=true, c=0x55c9d3d558f0)
        at block/io.c:121
    CTSRD-CHERI#21 bdrv_parent_drained_begin_single (c=c@entry=0x55c9d3d558f0,
        poll=poll@entry=true)
        at block/io.c:114
    CTSRD-CHERI#22 bdrv_replace_child_noperm
        (child=child@entry=0x55c9d3d558f0,
        new_bs=new_bs@entry=0x55c9d3d27300) at block.c:2258
    CTSRD-CHERI#23 bdrv_replace_child
        (child=child@entry=0x55c9d3d558f0,
        new_bs=new_bs@entry=0x55c9d3d27300) at block.c:2320
    CTSRD-CHERI#24 bdrv_root_attach_child
        (child_bs=child_bs@entry=0x55c9d3d27300,
        child_name=child_name@entry=0x55c9d241d478 "backing",
        child_role=child_role@entry=0x55c9d26ecee0 <child_backing>,
        ctx=<optimized out>, perm=<optimized out>, shared_perm=21,
        opaque=0x55c9d3cc2060, errp=0x7ffd11710c60) at block.c:2424
    CTSRD-CHERI#25 bdrv_attach_child
        (parent_bs=parent_bs@entry=0x55c9d3cc2060,
        child_bs=child_bs@entry=0x55c9d3d27300,
        child_name=child_name@entry=0x55c9d241d478 "backing",
        child_role=child_role@entry=0x55c9d26ecee0 <child_backing>,
        errp=errp@entry=0x7ffd11710c60) at block.c:5876
    CTSRD-CHERI#26 bdrv_set_backing_hd
        (bs=bs@entry=0x55c9d3cc2060,
        backing_hd=backing_hd@entry=0x55c9d3d27300,
        errp=errp@entry=0x7ffd11710c60)
        at block.c:2576
    CTSRD-CHERI#27 stream_prepare (job=0x55c9d495ead0) at block/stream.c:150
    ...

Signed-off-by: Vladimir Sementsov-Ogievskiy <vsementsov@virtuozzo.com>
Message-Id: <20200316060631.30052-2-vsementsov@virtuozzo.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: John Snow <jsnow@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
arichardson pushed a commit to arichardson/qemu that referenced this pull request Apr 15, 2020
We neglect to free port->bh on the error paths.  Fix that.
Reproducer:
    {'execute': 'device_add', 'arguments': {'id': 'virtio_serial_pci0', 'driver': 'virtio-serial-pci', 'bus': 'pci.0', 'addr': '0x5'}, 'id': 'yVkZcGgV'}
    {'execute': 'device_add', 'arguments': {'id': 'port1', 'driver': 'virtserialport', 'name': 'port1', 'chardev': 'channel1', 'bus': 'virtio_serial_pci0.0', 'nr': 1}, 'id': '3dXdUgJA'}
    {'execute': 'device_add', 'arguments': {'id': 'port2', 'driver': 'virtserialport', 'name': 'port2', 'chardev': 'channel2', 'bus': 'virtio_serial_pci0.0', 'nr': 1}, 'id': 'qLzcCkob'}
    {'execute': 'device_add', 'arguments': {'id': 'port2', 'driver': 'virtserialport', 'name': 'port2', 'chardev': 'channel2', 'bus': 'virtio_serial_pci0.0', 'nr': 2}, 'id': 'qLzcCkob'}

The leak stack:
Direct leak of 40 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x7f04a8008ae8 in __interceptor_malloc (/lib64/libasan.so.5+0xefae8)
    CTSRD-CHERI#1 0x7f04a73cf1d5 in g_malloc (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x531d5)
    CTSRD-CHERI#2 0x56273eaee484 in aio_bh_new /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/util/async.c:125
    CTSRD-CHERI#3 0x56273eafe9a8 in qemu_bh_new /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/util/main-loop.c:532
    CTSRD-CHERI#4 0x56273d52e62e in virtser_port_device_realize /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/hw/char/virtio-serial-bus.c:946
    CTSRD-CHERI#5 0x56273dcc5040 in device_set_realized /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/hw/core/qdev.c:891
    CTSRD-CHERI#6 0x56273e5ebbce in property_set_bool /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/qom/object.c:2238
    CTSRD-CHERI#7 0x56273e5e5a9c in object_property_set /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/qom/object.c:1324
    CTSRD-CHERI#8 0x56273e5ef5f8 in object_property_set_qobject /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/qom/qom-qobject.c:26
    CTSRD-CHERI#9 0x56273e5e5e6a in object_property_set_bool /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/qom/object.c:1390
    CTSRD-CHERI#10 0x56273daa40de in qdev_device_add /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/qdev-monitor.c:680
    CTSRD-CHERI#11 0x56273daa53e9 in qmp_device_add /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/qdev-monitor.c:805

Fixes: 199646d
Reported-by: Euler Robot <euler.robot@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Pan Nengyuan <pannengyuan@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Amit Shah <amit@kernel.org>
Message-Id: <20200309021738.30072-1-pannengyuan@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Laurent Vivier <lvivier@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
arichardson pushed a commit to arichardson/qemu that referenced this pull request Apr 15, 2020
The tulip networking card emulation has an OOB issue in
'tulip_copy_tx_buffers' when the guest provide malformed descriptor.
This test will trigger a ASAN heap overflow crash. To trigger this
issue we can construct the data as following:

1. construct a 'tulip_descriptor'. Its control is set to
'0x7ff | 0x7ff << 11', this will make the 'tulip_copy_tx_buffers's
'len1' and 'len2' to 0x7ff(2047). So 'len1+len2' will overflow
'TULIPState's 'tx_frame' field. This descriptor's 'buf_addr1' and
'buf_addr2' should set to a guest address.

2. write this descriptor to tulip device's CSR4 register. This will
set the 'TULIPState's 'current_tx_desc' field.

3. write 'CSR6_ST' to tulip device's CSR6 register. This will trigger
'tulip_xmit_list_update' and finally calls 'tulip_copy_tx_buffers'.

Following shows the backtrack of crash:

==31781==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x628000007cd0 at pc 0x7fe03c5a077a bp 0x7fff05b46770 sp 0x7fff05b45f18
WRITE of size 2047 at 0x628000007cd0 thread T0
    #0 0x7fe03c5a0779  (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.4+0x79779)
    CTSRD-CHERI#1 0x5575fb6daa6a in flatview_read_continue /home/test/qemu/exec.c:3194
    CTSRD-CHERI#2 0x5575fb6daccb in flatview_read /home/test/qemu/exec.c:3227
    CTSRD-CHERI#3 0x5575fb6dae66 in address_space_read_full /home/test/qemu/exec.c:3240
    CTSRD-CHERI#4 0x5575fb6db0cb in address_space_rw /home/test/qemu/exec.c:3268
    CTSRD-CHERI#5 0x5575fbdfd460 in dma_memory_rw_relaxed /home/test/qemu/include/sysemu/dma.h:87
    CTSRD-CHERI#6 0x5575fbdfd4b5 in dma_memory_rw /home/test/qemu/include/sysemu/dma.h:110
    CTSRD-CHERI#7 0x5575fbdfd866 in pci_dma_rw /home/test/qemu/include/hw/pci/pci.h:787
    CTSRD-CHERI#8 0x5575fbdfd8a3 in pci_dma_read /home/test/qemu/include/hw/pci/pci.h:794
    CTSRD-CHERI#9 0x5575fbe02761 in tulip_copy_tx_buffers hw/net/tulip.c:585
    CTSRD-CHERI#10 0x5575fbe0366b in tulip_xmit_list_update hw/net/tulip.c:678
    CTSRD-CHERI#11 0x5575fbe04073 in tulip_write hw/net/tulip.c:783

Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liq3ea@163.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
arichardson pushed a commit to arichardson/qemu that referenced this pull request Apr 15, 2020
Direct leak of 4120 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x7fa114931887 in __interceptor_calloc (/lib64/libasan.so.6+0xb0887)
    CTSRD-CHERI#1 0x7fa1144ad8f0 in g_malloc0 (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x588f0)
    CTSRD-CHERI#2 0x561e3c9c8897 in qmp_object_add /home/elmarco/src/qemu/qom/qom-qmp-cmds.c:291
    CTSRD-CHERI#3 0x561e3cf48736 in qmp_dispatch /home/elmarco/src/qemu/qapi/qmp-dispatch.c:155
    CTSRD-CHERI#4 0x561e3c8efb36 in monitor_qmp_dispatch /home/elmarco/src/qemu/monitor/qmp.c:145
    CTSRD-CHERI#5 0x561e3c8f09ed in monitor_qmp_bh_dispatcher /home/elmarco/src/qemu/monitor/qmp.c:234
    CTSRD-CHERI#6 0x561e3d08c993 in aio_bh_call /home/elmarco/src/qemu/util/async.c:136
    CTSRD-CHERI#7 0x561e3d08d0a5 in aio_bh_poll /home/elmarco/src/qemu/util/async.c:164
    CTSRD-CHERI#8 0x561e3d0a535a in aio_dispatch /home/elmarco/src/qemu/util/aio-posix.c:380
    CTSRD-CHERI#9 0x561e3d08e3ca in aio_ctx_dispatch /home/elmarco/src/qemu/util/async.c:298
    CTSRD-CHERI#10 0x7fa1144a776e in g_main_context_dispatch (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x5276e)

Signed-off-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200325184723.2029630-3-marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
arichardson pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 3, 2020
There is an overflow, the source 'datain.data[2]' is 100 bytes,
 but the 'ss' is 252 bytes.This may cause a security issue because
 we can access a lot of unrelated memory data.

The len for sbp copy data should take the minimum of mx_sb_len and
 sb_len_wr, not the maximum.

If we use iscsi device for VM backend storage, ASAN show stack:

READ of size 252 at 0xfffd149dcfc4 thread T0
    #0 0xaaad433d0d34 in __asan_memcpy (aarch64-softmmu/qemu-system-aarch64+0x2cb0d34)
    #1 0xaaad45f9d6d0 in iscsi_aio_ioctl_cb /qemu/block/iscsi.c:996:9
    #2 0xfffd1af0e2dc  (/usr/lib64/iscsi/libiscsi.so.8+0xe2dc)
    #3 0xfffd1af0d174  (/usr/lib64/iscsi/libiscsi.so.8+0xd174)
    #4 0xfffd1af19fac  (/usr/lib64/iscsi/libiscsi.so.8+0x19fac)
    #5 0xaaad45f9acc8 in iscsi_process_read /qemu/block/iscsi.c:403:5
    #6 0xaaad4623733c in aio_dispatch_handler /qemu/util/aio-posix.c:467:9
    #7 0xaaad4622f350 in aio_dispatch_handlers /qemu/util/aio-posix.c:510:20
    #8 0xaaad4622f350 in aio_dispatch /qemu/util/aio-posix.c:520
    #9 0xaaad46215944 in aio_ctx_dispatch /qemu/util/async.c:298:5
    #10 0xfffd1bed12f4 in g_main_context_dispatch (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x512f4)
    #11 0xaaad46227de0 in glib_pollfds_poll /qemu/util/main-loop.c:219:9
    #12 0xaaad46227de0 in os_host_main_loop_wait /qemu/util/main-loop.c:242
    #13 0xaaad46227de0 in main_loop_wait /qemu/util/main-loop.c:518
    #14 0xaaad43d9d60c in qemu_main_loop /qemu/softmmu/vl.c:1662:9
    #15 0xaaad4607a5b0 in main /qemu/softmmu/main.c:49:5
    #16 0xfffd1a460b9c in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x20b9c)
    #17 0xaaad43320740 in _start (aarch64-softmmu/qemu-system-aarch64+0x2c00740)

0xfffd149dcfc4 is located 0 bytes to the right of 100-byte region [0xfffd149dcf60,0xfffd149dcfc4)
allocated by thread T0 here:
    #0 0xaaad433d1e70 in __interceptor_malloc (aarch64-softmmu/qemu-system-aarch64+0x2cb1e70)
    #1 0xfffd1af0e254  (/usr/lib64/iscsi/libiscsi.so.8+0xe254)
    #2 0xfffd1af0d174  (/usr/lib64/iscsi/libiscsi.so.8+0xd174)
    #3 0xfffd1af19fac  (/usr/lib64/iscsi/libiscsi.so.8+0x19fac)
    #4 0xaaad45f9acc8 in iscsi_process_read /qemu/block/iscsi.c:403:5
    #5 0xaaad4623733c in aio_dispatch_handler /qemu/util/aio-posix.c:467:9
    #6 0xaaad4622f350 in aio_dispatch_handlers /qemu/util/aio-posix.c:510:20
    #7 0xaaad4622f350 in aio_dispatch /qemu/util/aio-posix.c:520
    #8 0xaaad46215944 in aio_ctx_dispatch /qemu/util/async.c:298:5
    #9 0xfffd1bed12f4 in g_main_context_dispatch (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x512f4)
    #10 0xaaad46227de0 in glib_pollfds_poll /qemu/util/main-loop.c:219:9
    #11 0xaaad46227de0 in os_host_main_loop_wait /qemu/util/main-loop.c:242
    #12 0xaaad46227de0 in main_loop_wait /qemu/util/main-loop.c:518
    #13 0xaaad43d9d60c in qemu_main_loop /qemu/softmmu/vl.c:1662:9
    #14 0xaaad4607a5b0 in main /qemu/softmmu/main.c:49:5
    #15 0xfffd1a460b9c in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x20b9c)
    #16 0xaaad43320740 in _start (aarch64-softmmu/qemu-system-aarch64+0x2c00740)

Reported-by: Euler Robot <euler.robot@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Chen Qun <kuhn.chenqun@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Message-id: 20200418062602.10776-1-kuhn.chenqun@huawei.com
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
arichardson pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 3, 2020
when s->inflight is freed, vhost_dev_free_inflight may try to access
s->inflight->addr, it will retrigger the following issue.

==7309==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address 0x604001020d18 at pc 0x555555ce948a bp 0x7fffffffb170 sp 0x7fffffffb160
READ of size 8 at 0x604001020d18 thread T0
    #0 0x555555ce9489 in vhost_dev_free_inflight /root/smartx/qemu-el7/qemu-test/hw/virtio/vhost.c:1473
    #1 0x555555cd86eb in virtio_reset /root/smartx/qemu-el7/qemu-test/hw/virtio/virtio.c:1214
    #2 0x5555560d3eff in virtio_pci_reset hw/virtio/virtio-pci.c:1859
    #3 0x555555f2ac53 in device_set_realized hw/core/qdev.c:893
    #4 0x5555561d572c in property_set_bool qom/object.c:1925
    #5 0x5555561de8de in object_property_set_qobject qom/qom-qobject.c:27
    #6 0x5555561d99f4 in object_property_set_bool qom/object.c:1188
    #7 0x555555e50ae7 in qdev_device_add /root/smartx/qemu-el7/qemu-test/qdev-monitor.c:626
    #8 0x555555e51213 in qmp_device_add /root/smartx/qemu-el7/qemu-test/qdev-monitor.c:806
    #9 0x555555e8ff40 in hmp_device_add /root/smartx/qemu-el7/qemu-test/hmp.c:1951
    #10 0x555555be889a in handle_hmp_command /root/smartx/qemu-el7/qemu-test/monitor.c:3404
    #11 0x555555beac8b in monitor_command_cb /root/smartx/qemu-el7/qemu-test/monitor.c:4296
    #12 0x555556433eb7 in readline_handle_byte util/readline.c:393
    #13 0x555555be89ec in monitor_read /root/smartx/qemu-el7/qemu-test/monitor.c:4279
    #14 0x5555563285cc in tcp_chr_read chardev/char-socket.c:470
    #15 0x7ffff670b968 in g_main_context_dispatch (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x4a968)
    #16 0x55555640727c in glib_pollfds_poll util/main-loop.c:215
    #17 0x55555640727c in os_host_main_loop_wait util/main-loop.c:238
    #18 0x55555640727c in main_loop_wait util/main-loop.c:497
    #19 0x555555b2d0bf in main_loop /root/smartx/qemu-el7/qemu-test/vl.c:2013
    #20 0x555555b2d0bf in main /root/smartx/qemu-el7/qemu-test/vl.c:4776
    #21 0x7fffdd2eb444 in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x22444)
    #22 0x555555b3767a  (/root/smartx/qemu-el7/qemu-test/x86_64-softmmu/qemu-system-x86_64+0x5e367a)

0x604001020d18 is located 8 bytes inside of 40-byte region [0x604001020d10,0x604001020d38)
freed by thread T0 here:
    #0 0x7ffff6f00508 in __interceptor_free (/lib64/libasan.so.4+0xde508)
    #1 0x7ffff671107d in g_free (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x5007d)

previously allocated by thread T0 here:
    #0 0x7ffff6f00a88 in __interceptor_calloc (/lib64/libasan.so.4+0xdea88)
    #1 0x7ffff6710fc5 in g_malloc0 (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x4ffc5)

SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free /root/smartx/qemu-el7/qemu-test/hw/virtio/vhost.c:1473 in vhost_dev_free_inflight
Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
  0x0c08801fc150: fa fa 00 00 00 00 04 fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fa
  0x0c08801fc160: fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fd fa fa 00 00 00 00 04 fa
  0x0c08801fc170: fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 01 fa fa 00 00 00 00 04 fa
  0x0c08801fc180: fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 01 fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 01
  0x0c08801fc190: fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 04 fa
=>0x0c08801fc1a0: fa fa fd[fd]fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fa
  0x0c08801fc1b0: fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fa
  0x0c08801fc1c0: fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fd
  0x0c08801fc1d0: fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 01 fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fa
  0x0c08801fc1e0: fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fd
  0x0c08801fc1f0: fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 01 fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fa
Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
  Addressable:           00
  Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
  Heap left redzone:       fa
  Freed heap region:       fd
  Stack left redzone:      f1
  Stack mid redzone:       f2
  Stack right redzone:     f3
  Stack after return:      f5
  Stack use after scope:   f8
  Global redzone:          f9
  Global init order:       f6
  Poisoned by user:        f7
  Container overflow:      fc
  Array cookie:            ac
  Intra object redzone:    bb
  ASan internal:           fe
  Left alloca redzone:     ca
  Right alloca redzone:    cb
==7309==ABORTING

Signed-off-by: Li Feng <fengli@smartx.com>
Message-Id: <20200417101707.14467-1-fengli@smartx.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Raphael Norwitz <raphael.norwitz@nutanix.com>
arichardson pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 3, 2020
…gration

'rdma->host' is malloced in qemu_rdma_data_init, but forgot to free on the error
path in rdma_start_incoming_migration(), this patch fix that.

The leak stack:
Direct leak of 2 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x7fb7add18ae8 in __interceptor_malloc (/lib64/libasan.so.5+0xefae8)
    #1 0x7fb7ad0df1d5 in g_malloc (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x531d5)
    #2 0x7fb7ad0f8b32 in g_strdup (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x6cb32)
    #3 0x55a0464a0f6f in qemu_rdma_data_init /mnt/sdb/qemu/migration/rdma.c:2647
    #4 0x55a0464b0e76 in rdma_start_incoming_migration /mnt/sdb/qemu/migration/rdma.c:4020
    #5 0x55a0463f898a in qemu_start_incoming_migration /mnt/sdb/qemu/migration/migration.c:365
    #6 0x55a0458c75d3 in qemu_init /mnt/sdb/qemu/softmmu/vl.c:4438
    #7 0x55a046a3d811 in main /mnt/sdb/qemu/softmmu/main.c:48
    #8 0x7fb7a8417872 in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x23872)
    #9 0x55a04536b26d in _start (/mnt/sdb/qemu/build/x86_64-softmmu/qemu-system-x86_64+0x286926d)

Reported-by: Euler Robot <euler.robot@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Pan Nengyuan <pannengyuan@huawei.com>
Message-Id: <20200420102727.17339-1-pannengyuan@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
arichardson pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 3, 2020
When error happen in multifd_new_send_channel_async, 'sioc' will not be used
to create the multifd_send_thread. Let's free it to avoid a memleak. And also
do error_free after migrate_set_error() to avoid another leak in the same place.

The leak stack:
Direct leak of 2880 byte(s) in 8 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x7f20b5118ae8 in __interceptor_malloc (/lib64/libasan.so.5+0xefae8)
    #1 0x7f20b44df1d5 in g_malloc (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x531d5)
    #2 0x564133bce18b in object_new_with_type /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/qom/object.c:683
    #3 0x564133eea950 in qio_channel_socket_new /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/io/channel-socket.c:56
    #4 0x5641339cfe4f in socket_send_channel_create /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/migration/socket.c:37
    #5 0x564133a10328 in multifd_save_setup /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/migration/multifd.c:772
    #6 0x5641339cebed in migrate_fd_connect /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/migration/migration.c:3530
    #7 0x5641339d15e4 in migration_channel_connect /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/migration/channel.c:92
    #8 0x5641339cf5b7 in socket_outgoing_migration /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/migration/socket.c:108

Direct leak of 384 byte(s) in 8 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x7f20b5118cf0 in calloc (/lib64/libasan.so.5+0xefcf0)
    #1 0x7f20b44df22d in g_malloc0 (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x5322d)
    #2 0x56413406fc17 in error_setv /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/util/error.c:61
    #3 0x564134070464 in error_setg_errno_internal /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/util/error.c:109
    #4 0x5641340851be in inet_connect_addr /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/util/qemu-sockets.c:379
    #5 0x5641340851be in inet_connect_saddr /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/util/qemu-sockets.c:458
    #6 0x5641340870ab in socket_connect /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/util/qemu-sockets.c:1105
    #7 0x564133eeaabf in qio_channel_socket_connect_sync /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/io/channel-socket.c:145
    #8 0x564133eeabf5 in qio_channel_socket_connect_worker /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/io/channel-socket.c:168

Indirect leak of 360 byte(s) in 8 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x7f20b5118ae8 in __interceptor_malloc (/lib64/libasan.so.5+0xefae8)
    #1 0x7f20af901817 in __GI___vasprintf_chk (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x10d817)
    #2 0x7f20b451fa6c in g_vasprintf (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x93a6c)
    #3 0x7f20b44f8cd0 in g_strdup_vprintf (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x6ccd0)
    #4 0x7f20b44f8d8c in g_strdup_printf (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x6cd8c)
    #5 0x56413406fc86 in error_setv /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/util/error.c:65
    #6 0x564134070464 in error_setg_errno_internal /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/util/error.c:109
    #7 0x5641340851be in inet_connect_addr /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/util/qemu-sockets.c:379
    #8 0x5641340851be in inet_connect_saddr /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/util/qemu-sockets.c:458
    #9 0x5641340870ab in socket_connect /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/util/qemu-sockets.c:1105
    #10 0x564133eeaabf in qio_channel_socket_connect_sync /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/io/channel-socket.c:145
    #11 0x564133eeabf5 in qio_channel_socket_connect_worker /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/io/channel-socket.c:168

Reported-by: Euler Robot <euler.robot@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Pan Nengyuan <pannengyuan@huawei.com>
Message-Id: <20200506095416.26099-2-pannengyuan@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
arichardson pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 3, 2020
…leaks

When error happen in multifd_send_thread, it use error_copy to set migrate error in
multifd_send_terminate_threads(). We should call error_free after it.

Similarly, fix another two places in multifd_recv_thread/multifd_save_cleanup.

The leak stack:
Direct leak of 48 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x7f781af07cf0 in calloc (/lib64/libasan.so.5+0xefcf0)
    #1 0x7f781a2ce22d in g_malloc0 (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x5322d)
    #2 0x55ee1d075c17 in error_setv /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/util/error.c:61
    #3 0x55ee1d076464 in error_setg_errno_internal /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/util/error.c:109
    #4 0x55ee1cef066e in qio_channel_socket_writev /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/io/channel-socket.c:569
    #5 0x55ee1cee806b in qio_channel_writev /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/io/channel.c:207
    #6 0x55ee1cee806b in qio_channel_writev_all /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/io/channel.c:171
    #7 0x55ee1cee8248 in qio_channel_write_all /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/io/channel.c:257
    #8 0x55ee1ca12c9a in multifd_send_thread /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/migration/multifd.c:657
    #9 0x55ee1d0607fc in qemu_thread_start /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/util/qemu-thread-posix.c:519
    #10 0x7f78159ae2dd in start_thread (/lib64/libpthread.so.0+0x82dd)
    #11 0x7f78156df4b2 in __GI___clone (/lib64/libc.so.6+0xfc4b2)

Indirect leak of 52 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x7f781af07f28 in __interceptor_realloc (/lib64/libasan.so.5+0xeff28)
    #1 0x7f78156f07d9 in __GI___vasprintf_chk (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x10d7d9)
    #2 0x7f781a30ea6c in g_vasprintf (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x93a6c)
    #3 0x7f781a2e7cd0 in g_strdup_vprintf (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x6ccd0)
    #4 0x7f781a2e7d8c in g_strdup_printf (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x6cd8c)
    #5 0x55ee1d075c86 in error_setv /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/util/error.c:65
    #6 0x55ee1d076464 in error_setg_errno_internal /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/util/error.c:109
    #7 0x55ee1cef066e in qio_channel_socket_writev /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/io/channel-socket.c:569
    #8 0x55ee1cee806b in qio_channel_writev /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/io/channel.c:207
    #9 0x55ee1cee806b in qio_channel_writev_all /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/io/channel.c:171
    #10 0x55ee1cee8248 in qio_channel_write_all /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/io/channel.c:257
    #11 0x55ee1ca12c9a in multifd_send_thread /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/migration/multifd.c:657
    #12 0x55ee1d0607fc in qemu_thread_start /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/util/qemu-thread-posix.c:519
    #13 0x7f78159ae2dd in start_thread (/lib64/libpthread.so.0+0x82dd)
    #14 0x7f78156df4b2 in __GI___clone (/lib64/libc.so.6+0xfc4b2)

Reported-by: Euler Robot <euler.robot@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Pan Nengyuan <pannengyuan@huawei.com>
Message-Id: <20200506095416.26099-3-pannengyuan@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
arichardson pushed a commit to arichardson/qemu that referenced this pull request Jul 2, 2020
When we hotplug vcpus, cpu_update_state is added to vm_change_state_head
in kvm_arch_init_vcpu(). But it forgot to delete in kvm_arch_destroy_vcpu() after
unplug. Then it will cause a use-after-free access. This patch delete it in
kvm_arch_destroy_vcpu() to fix that.

Reproducer:
    virsh setvcpus vm1 4 --live
    virsh setvcpus vm1 2 --live
    virsh suspend vm1
    virsh resume vm1

The UAF stack:
==qemu-system-x86_64==28233==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address 0x62e00002e798 at pc 0x5573c6917d9e bp 0x7fff07139e50 sp 0x7fff07139e40
WRITE of size 1 at 0x62e00002e798 thread T0
    #0 0x5573c6917d9d in cpu_update_state /mnt/sdb/qemu/target/i386/kvm.c:742
    CTSRD-CHERI#1 0x5573c699121a in vm_state_notify /mnt/sdb/qemu/vl.c:1290
    CTSRD-CHERI#2 0x5573c636287e in vm_prepare_start /mnt/sdb/qemu/cpus.c:2144
    CTSRD-CHERI#3 0x5573c6362927 in vm_start /mnt/sdb/qemu/cpus.c:2150
    CTSRD-CHERI#4 0x5573c71e8304 in qmp_cont /mnt/sdb/qemu/monitor/qmp-cmds.c:173
    CTSRD-CHERI#5 0x5573c727cb1e in qmp_marshal_cont qapi/qapi-commands-misc.c:835
    CTSRD-CHERI#6 0x5573c7694c7a in do_qmp_dispatch /mnt/sdb/qemu/qapi/qmp-dispatch.c:132
    CTSRD-CHERI#7 0x5573c7694c7a in qmp_dispatch /mnt/sdb/qemu/qapi/qmp-dispatch.c:175
    CTSRD-CHERI#8 0x5573c71d9110 in monitor_qmp_dispatch /mnt/sdb/qemu/monitor/qmp.c:145
    CTSRD-CHERI#9 0x5573c71dad4f in monitor_qmp_bh_dispatcher /mnt/sdb/qemu/monitor/qmp.c:234

Reported-by: Euler Robot <euler.robot@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Pan Nengyuan <pannengyuan@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200513132630.13412-1-pannengyuan@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Igor Mammedov <imammedo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
arichardson pushed a commit to arichardson/qemu that referenced this pull request Jul 2, 2020
Trying libFuzzer on the vmport device, we get:

  AddressSanitizer:DEADLYSIGNAL
  =================================================================
  ==29476==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x000000008840 (pc 0x56448bec4d79 bp 0x7ffeec9741b0 sp 0x7ffeec9740e0 T0)
  ==29476==The signal is caused by a READ memory access.
    #0 0x56448bec4d78 in vmport_ioport_read (qemu-fuzz-i386+0x1260d78)
    CTSRD-CHERI#1 0x56448bb5f175 in memory_region_read_accessor (qemu-fuzz-i386+0xefb175)
    CTSRD-CHERI#2 0x56448bb30c13 in access_with_adjusted_size (qemu-fuzz-i386+0xeccc13)
    CTSRD-CHERI#3 0x56448bb2ea27 in memory_region_dispatch_read1 (qemu-fuzz-i386+0xecaa27)
    CTSRD-CHERI#4 0x56448bb2e443 in memory_region_dispatch_read (qemu-fuzz-i386+0xeca443)
    CTSRD-CHERI#5 0x56448b961ab1 in flatview_read_continue (qemu-fuzz-i386+0xcfdab1)
    CTSRD-CHERI#6 0x56448b96336d in flatview_read (qemu-fuzz-i386+0xcff36d)
    CTSRD-CHERI#7 0x56448b962ec4 in address_space_read_full (qemu-fuzz-i386+0xcfeec4)

This is easily reproducible using:

  $ echo inb 0x5658 | qemu-system-i386 -M isapc,accel=qtest -qtest stdio
  [I 1589796572.009763] OPENED
  [R +0.008069] inb 0x5658
  Segmentation fault (core dumped)

  $ coredumpctl gdb -q
  Program terminated with signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
  #0  0x00005605b54d0f21 in vmport_ioport_read (opaque=0x5605b7531ce0, addr=0, size=4) at hw/i386/vmport.c:77
  77          eax = env->regs[R_EAX];
  (gdb) p cpu
  $1 = (X86CPU *) 0x0
  (gdb) bt
  #0  0x00005605b54d0f21 in vmport_ioport_read (opaque=0x5605b7531ce0, addr=0, size=4) at hw/i386/vmport.c:77
  CTSRD-CHERI#1  0x00005605b53db114 in memory_region_read_accessor (mr=0x5605b7531d80, addr=0, value=0x7ffc9d261a30, size=4, shift=0, mask=4294967295, attrs=...) at memory.c:434
  CTSRD-CHERI#2  0x00005605b53db5d4 in access_with_adjusted_size (addr=0, value=0x7ffc9d261a30, size=1, access_size_min=4, access_size_max=4, access_fn=
      0x5605b53db0d2 <memory_region_read_accessor>, mr=0x5605b7531d80, attrs=...) at memory.c:544
  CTSRD-CHERI#3  0x00005605b53de156 in memory_region_dispatch_read1 (mr=0x5605b7531d80, addr=0, pval=0x7ffc9d261a30, size=1, attrs=...) at memory.c:1396
  CTSRD-CHERI#4  0x00005605b53de228 in memory_region_dispatch_read (mr=0x5605b7531d80, addr=0, pval=0x7ffc9d261a30, op=MO_8, attrs=...) at memory.c:1424
  CTSRD-CHERI#5  0x00005605b537c80a in flatview_read_continue (fv=0x5605b7650290, addr=22104, attrs=..., ptr=0x7ffc9d261b4b, len=1, addr1=0, l=1, mr=0x5605b7531d80) at exec.c:3200
  CTSRD-CHERI#6  0x00005605b537c95d in flatview_read (fv=0x5605b7650290, addr=22104, attrs=..., buf=0x7ffc9d261b4b, len=1) at exec.c:3239
  CTSRD-CHERI#7  0x00005605b537c9e6 in address_space_read_full (as=0x5605b5f74ac0 <address_space_io>, addr=22104, attrs=..., buf=0x7ffc9d261b4b, len=1) at exec.c:3252
  CTSRD-CHERI#8  0x00005605b53d5a5d in address_space_read (len=1, buf=0x7ffc9d261b4b, attrs=..., addr=22104, as=0x5605b5f74ac0 <address_space_io>) at include/exec/memory.h:2401
  CTSRD-CHERI#9  0x00005605b53d5a5d in cpu_inb (addr=22104) at ioport.c:88

X86CPU is NULL because QTest accelerator does not use CPU.
Fix by returning default values when QTest accelerator is used.

Reported-by: Clang AddressSanitizer
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
arichardson pushed a commit to arichardson/qemu that referenced this pull request Jul 2, 2020
On restart, we were scheduling a BH to process queued requests, which
would run before starting up the data plane, leading to those requests
being assigned and started on coroutines on the main context.

This could cause requests to be wrongly processed in parallel from
different threads (the main thread and the iothread managing the data
plane), potentially leading to multiple issues.

For example, stopping and resuming a VM multiple times while the guest
is generating I/O on a virtio_blk device can trigger a crash with a
stack tracing looking like this one:

<------>
 Thread 2 (Thread 0x7ff736765700 (LWP 1062503)):
 #0  0x00005567a13b99d6 in iov_memset
     (iov=0x6563617073206f4e, iov_cnt=1717922848, offset=516096, fillc=0, bytes=7018105756081554803)
     at util/iov.c:69
 CTSRD-CHERI#1  0x00005567a13bab73 in qemu_iovec_memset
     (qiov=0x7ff73ec99748, offset=516096, fillc=0, bytes=7018105756081554803) at util/iov.c:530
 CTSRD-CHERI#2  0x00005567a12f411c in qemu_laio_process_completion (laiocb=0x7ff6512ee6c0) at block/linux-aio.c:86
 CTSRD-CHERI#3  0x00005567a12f42ff in qemu_laio_process_completions (s=0x7ff7182e8420) at block/linux-aio.c:217
 CTSRD-CHERI#4  0x00005567a12f480d in ioq_submit (s=0x7ff7182e8420) at block/linux-aio.c:323
 CTSRD-CHERI#5  0x00005567a12f43d9 in qemu_laio_process_completions_and_submit (s=0x7ff7182e8420)
     at block/linux-aio.c:236
 CTSRD-CHERI#6  0x00005567a12f44c2 in qemu_laio_poll_cb (opaque=0x7ff7182e8430) at block/linux-aio.c:267
 CTSRD-CHERI#7  0x00005567a13aed83 in run_poll_handlers_once (ctx=0x5567a2b58c70, timeout=0x7ff7367645f8)
     at util/aio-posix.c:520
 CTSRD-CHERI#8  0x00005567a13aee9f in run_poll_handlers (ctx=0x5567a2b58c70, max_ns=16000, timeout=0x7ff7367645f8)
     at util/aio-posix.c:562
 CTSRD-CHERI#9  0x00005567a13aefde in try_poll_mode (ctx=0x5567a2b58c70, timeout=0x7ff7367645f8)
     at util/aio-posix.c:597
 CTSRD-CHERI#10 0x00005567a13af115 in aio_poll (ctx=0x5567a2b58c70, blocking=true) at util/aio-posix.c:639
 CTSRD-CHERI#11 0x00005567a109acca in iothread_run (opaque=0x5567a2b29760) at iothread.c:75
 CTSRD-CHERI#12 0x00005567a13b2790 in qemu_thread_start (args=0x5567a2b694c0) at util/qemu-thread-posix.c:519
 CTSRD-CHERI#13 0x00007ff73eedf2de in start_thread () at /lib64/libpthread.so.0
 CTSRD-CHERI#14 0x00007ff73ec10e83 in clone () at /lib64/libc.so.6

 Thread 1 (Thread 0x7ff743986f00 (LWP 1062500)):
 #0  0x00005567a13b99d6 in iov_memset
     (iov=0x6563617073206f4e, iov_cnt=1717922848, offset=516096, fillc=0, bytes=7018105756081554803)
     at util/iov.c:69
 CTSRD-CHERI#1  0x00005567a13bab73 in qemu_iovec_memset
     (qiov=0x7ff73ec99748, offset=516096, fillc=0, bytes=7018105756081554803) at util/iov.c:530
 CTSRD-CHERI#2  0x00005567a12f411c in qemu_laio_process_completion (laiocb=0x7ff6512ee6c0) at block/linux-aio.c:86
 CTSRD-CHERI#3  0x00005567a12f42ff in qemu_laio_process_completions (s=0x7ff7182e8420) at block/linux-aio.c:217
 CTSRD-CHERI#4  0x00005567a12f480d in ioq_submit (s=0x7ff7182e8420) at block/linux-aio.c:323
 CTSRD-CHERI#5  0x00005567a12f4a2f in laio_do_submit (fd=19, laiocb=0x7ff5f4ff9ae0, offset=472363008, type=2)
     at block/linux-aio.c:375
 CTSRD-CHERI#6  0x00005567a12f4af2 in laio_co_submit
     (bs=0x5567a2b8c460, s=0x7ff7182e8420, fd=19, offset=472363008, qiov=0x7ff5f4ff9ca0, type=2)
     at block/linux-aio.c:394
 CTSRD-CHERI#7  0x00005567a12f1803 in raw_co_prw
     (bs=0x5567a2b8c460, offset=472363008, bytes=20480, qiov=0x7ff5f4ff9ca0, type=2)
     at block/file-posix.c:1892
 CTSRD-CHERI#8  0x00005567a12f1941 in raw_co_pwritev
     (bs=0x5567a2b8c460, offset=472363008, bytes=20480, qiov=0x7ff5f4ff9ca0, flags=0)
     at block/file-posix.c:1925
 CTSRD-CHERI#9  0x00005567a12fe3e1 in bdrv_driver_pwritev
     (bs=0x5567a2b8c460, offset=472363008, bytes=20480, qiov=0x7ff5f4ff9ca0, qiov_offset=0, flags=0)
     at block/io.c:1183
 CTSRD-CHERI#10 0x00005567a1300340 in bdrv_aligned_pwritev
     (child=0x5567a2b5b070, req=0x7ff5f4ff9db0, offset=472363008, bytes=20480, align=512, qiov=0x7ff72c0425b8, qiov_offset=0, flags=0) at block/io.c:1980
 CTSRD-CHERI#11 0x00005567a1300b29 in bdrv_co_pwritev_part
     (child=0x5567a2b5b070, offset=472363008, bytes=20480, qiov=0x7ff72c0425b8, qiov_offset=0, flags=0)
     at block/io.c:2137
 CTSRD-CHERI#12 0x00005567a12baba1 in qcow2_co_pwritev_task
     (bs=0x5567a2b92740, file_cluster_offset=472317952, offset=487305216, bytes=20480, qiov=0x7ff72c0425b8, qiov_offset=0, l2meta=0x0) at block/qcow2.c:2444
 CTSRD-CHERI#13 0x00005567a12bacdb in qcow2_co_pwritev_task_entry (task=0x5567a2b48540) at block/qcow2.c:2475
 CTSRD-CHERI#14 0x00005567a13167d8 in aio_task_co (opaque=0x5567a2b48540) at block/aio_task.c:45
 CTSRD-CHERI#15 0x00005567a13cf00c in coroutine_trampoline (i0=738245600, i1=32759) at util/coroutine-ucontext.c:115
 CTSRD-CHERI#16 0x00007ff73eb622e0 in __start_context () at /lib64/libc.so.6
 CTSRD-CHERI#17 0x00007ff6626f1350 in  ()
 CTSRD-CHERI#18 0x0000000000000000 in  ()
<------>

This is also known to cause crashes with this message (assertion
failed):

 aio_co_schedule: Co-routine was already scheduled in 'aio_co_schedule'

RHBZ: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1812765
Signed-off-by: Sergio Lopez <slp@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200603093240.40489-3-slp@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
arichardson pushed a commit to arichardson/qemu that referenced this pull request Jul 2, 2020
The sender of packet will be checked in the qemu_net_queue_purge() but
we use NetClientState not its peer when trying to purge the incoming
queue in qemu_flush_or_purge_packets(). This will trigger the assert
in virtio_net_reset since we can't pass the sender check:

hw/net/virtio-net.c:533: void virtio_net_reset(VirtIODevice *): Assertion
`!virtio_net_get_subqueue(nc)->async_tx.elem' failed.
CTSRD-CHERI#9 0x55a33fa31b78 in virtio_net_reset hw/net/virtio-net.c:533:13
CTSRD-CHERI#10 0x55a33fc88412 in virtio_reset hw/virtio/virtio.c:1919:9
CTSRD-CHERI#11 0x55a341d82764 in virtio_bus_reset hw/virtio/virtio-bus.c:95:9
CTSRD-CHERI#12 0x55a341dba2de in virtio_pci_reset hw/virtio/virtio-pci.c:1824:5
CTSRD-CHERI#13 0x55a341db3e02 in virtio_pci_common_write hw/virtio/virtio-pci.c:1252:13
CTSRD-CHERI#14 0x55a33f62117b in memory_region_write_accessor memory.c:496:5
CTSRD-CHERI#15 0x55a33f6205e4 in access_with_adjusted_size memory.c:557:18
CTSRD-CHERI#16 0x55a33f61e177 in memory_region_dispatch_write memory.c:1488:16

Reproducer:
https://www.mail-archive.com/qemu-devel@nongnu.org/msg701914.html

Fix by using the peer.

Reported-by: "Alexander Bulekov" <alxndr@bu.edu>
Acked-by: Alexander Bulekov <alxndr@bu.edu>
Fixes: ca77d85 ("net: complete all queued packets on VM stop")
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
arichardson pushed a commit to arichardson/qemu that referenced this pull request Jul 2, 2020
libFuzzer found using 'qemu-system-i386 -M q35':

qemu: hardware error: e1000e: PSRCTL.BSIZE0 cannot be zero
CPU #0:
EAX=00000000 EBX=00000000 ECX=00000000 EDX=00000663
ESI=00000000 EDI=00000000 EBP=00000000 ESP=00000000
EIP=0000fff0 EFL=00000002 [-------] CPL=0 II=0 A20=1 SMM=0 HLT=0
ES =0000 00000000 0000ffff 00009300
CS =f000 ffff0000 0000ffff 00009b00
SS =0000 00000000 0000ffff 00009300
DS =0000 00000000 0000ffff 00009300
FS =0000 00000000 0000ffff 00009300
GS =0000 00000000 0000ffff 00009300
LDT=0000 00000000 0000ffff 00008200
TR =0000 00000000 0000ffff 00008b00
GDT=     00000000 0000ffff
IDT=     00000000 0000ffff
CR0=60000010 CR2=00000000 CR3=00000000 CR4=00000000
DR0=00000000 DR1=00000000 DR2=00000000 DR3=00000000
DR6=ffff0ff0 DR7=00000400
EFER=0000000000000000
FCW=037f FSW=0000 [ST=0] FTW=00 MXCSR=00001f80
FPR0=0000000000000000 0000 FPR1=0000000000000000 0000
FPR2=0000000000000000 0000 FPR3=0000000000000000 0000
FPR4=0000000000000000 0000 FPR5=0000000000000000 0000
FPR6=0000000000000000 0000 FPR7=0000000000000000 0000
XMM00=00000000000000000000000000000000 XMM01=00000000000000000000000000000000
XMM02=00000000000000000000000000000000 XMM03=00000000000000000000000000000000
XMM04=00000000000000000000000000000000 XMM05=00000000000000000000000000000000
XMM06=00000000000000000000000000000000 XMM07=00000000000000000000000000000000
==1988== ERROR: libFuzzer: deadly signal
    CTSRD-CHERI#6 0x7fae4d3ea894 in __GI_abort (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x22894)
    CTSRD-CHERI#7 0x563f4cc59a1d in hw_error (qemu-fuzz-i386+0xe8ca1d)
    CTSRD-CHERI#8 0x563f4d7c93f2 in e1000e_set_psrctl (qemu-fuzz-i386+0x19fc3f2)
    CTSRD-CHERI#9 0x563f4d7b798f in e1000e_core_write (qemu-fuzz-i386+0x19ea98f)
    CTSRD-CHERI#10 0x563f4d7afc46 in e1000e_mmio_write (qemu-fuzz-i386+0x19e2c46)
    CTSRD-CHERI#11 0x563f4cc9a0a7 in memory_region_write_accessor (qemu-fuzz-i386+0xecd0a7)
    CTSRD-CHERI#12 0x563f4cc99c13 in access_with_adjusted_size (qemu-fuzz-i386+0xeccc13)
    CTSRD-CHERI#13 0x563f4cc987b4 in memory_region_dispatch_write (qemu-fuzz-i386+0xecb7b4)

It simply sent the following 2 I/O command to the e1000e
PCI BAR CTSRD-CHERI#2 I/O region:

  writew 0x0100 0x0c00 # RCTL =   E1000_RCTL_DTYP_MASK
  writeb 0x2170 0x00   # PSRCTL = 0

2813 static void
2814 e1000e_set_psrctl(E1000ECore *core, int index, uint32_t val)
2815 {
2816     if (core->mac[RCTL] & E1000_RCTL_DTYP_MASK) {
2817
2818         if ((val & E1000_PSRCTL_BSIZE0_MASK) == 0) {
2819             hw_error("e1000e: PSRCTL.BSIZE0 cannot be zero");
2820         }

Instead of calling hw_error() which abort the process (it is
meant for CPU fatal error condition, not for device logging),
log the invalid request with qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR)
and return, ignoring the request.

Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
arichardson pushed a commit to arichardson/qemu that referenced this pull request Jul 2, 2020
Since commit d70c996, when enabling the PMU we get:

  $ qemu-system-aarch64 -cpu host,pmu=on -M virt,accel=kvm,gic-version=3
  Segmentation fault (core dumped)

  Thread 1 "qemu-system-aar" received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
  0x0000aaaaaae356d0 in kvm_ioctl (s=0x0, type=44547) at accel/kvm/kvm-all.c:2588
  2588        ret = ioctl(s->fd, type, arg);
  (gdb) bt
  #0  0x0000aaaaaae356d0 in kvm_ioctl (s=0x0, type=44547) at accel/kvm/kvm-all.c:2588
  CTSRD-CHERI#1  0x0000aaaaaae31568 in kvm_check_extension (s=0x0, extension=126) at accel/kvm/kvm-all.c:916
  CTSRD-CHERI#2  0x0000aaaaaafce254 in kvm_arm_pmu_supported (cpu=0xaaaaac214ab0) at target/arm/kvm.c:213
  CTSRD-CHERI#3  0x0000aaaaaafc0f94 in arm_set_pmu (obj=0xaaaaac214ab0, value=true, errp=0xffffffffe438) at target/arm/cpu.c:1111
  CTSRD-CHERI#4  0x0000aaaaab5533ac in property_set_bool (obj=0xaaaaac214ab0, v=0xaaaaac223a80, name=0xaaaaac11a970 "pmu", opaque=0xaaaaac222730, errp=0xffffffffe438) at qom/object.c:2170
  CTSRD-CHERI#5  0x0000aaaaab5512f0 in object_property_set (obj=0xaaaaac214ab0, v=0xaaaaac223a80, name=0xaaaaac11a970 "pmu", errp=0xffffffffe438) at qom/object.c:1328
  CTSRD-CHERI#6  0x0000aaaaab551e10 in object_property_parse (obj=0xaaaaac214ab0, string=0xaaaaac11b4c0 "on", name=0xaaaaac11a970 "pmu", errp=0xffffffffe438) at qom/object.c:1561
  CTSRD-CHERI#7  0x0000aaaaab54ee8c in object_apply_global_props (obj=0xaaaaac214ab0, props=0xaaaaac018e20, errp=0xaaaaabd6fd88 <error_fatal>) at qom/object.c:407
  CTSRD-CHERI#8  0x0000aaaaab1dd5a4 in qdev_prop_set_globals (dev=0xaaaaac214ab0) at hw/core/qdev-properties.c:1218
  CTSRD-CHERI#9  0x0000aaaaab1d9fac in device_post_init (obj=0xaaaaac214ab0) at hw/core/qdev.c:1050
  ...
  CTSRD-CHERI#15 0x0000aaaaab54f310 in object_initialize_with_type (obj=0xaaaaac214ab0, size=52208, type=0xaaaaabe237f0) at qom/object.c:512
  CTSRD-CHERI#16 0x0000aaaaab54fa24 in object_new_with_type (type=0xaaaaabe237f0) at qom/object.c:687
  CTSRD-CHERI#17 0x0000aaaaab54fa80 in object_new (typename=0xaaaaabe23970 "host-arm-cpu") at qom/object.c:702
  CTSRD-CHERI#18 0x0000aaaaaaf04a74 in machvirt_init (machine=0xaaaaac0a8550) at hw/arm/virt.c:1770
  CTSRD-CHERI#19 0x0000aaaaab1e8720 in machine_run_board_init (machine=0xaaaaac0a8550) at hw/core/machine.c:1138
  CTSRD-CHERI#20 0x0000aaaaaaf95394 in qemu_init (argc=5, argv=0xffffffffea58, envp=0xffffffffea88) at softmmu/vl.c:4348
  CTSRD-CHERI#21 0x0000aaaaaada3f74 in main (argc=<optimized out>, argv=<optimized out>, envp=<optimized out>) at softmmu/main.c:48

This is because in frame CTSRD-CHERI#2, cpu->kvm_state is still NULL
(the vCPU is not yet realized).

KVM has a hard requirement of all cores supporting the same
feature set. We only need to check if the accelerator supports
a feature, not each vCPU individually.

Fix by removing the 'CPUState *cpu' argument from the
kvm_arm_<FEATURE>_supported() functions.

Fixes: d70c996 ('Use CPUState::kvm_state in kvm_arm_pmu_supported')
Reported-by: Haibo Xu <haibo.xu@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Jones <drjones@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
arichardson pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 13, 2020
tries to fix a leak detected when building with --enable-sanitizers:
./i386-softmmu/qemu-system-i386
Upon exit:
==13576==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks

Direct leak of 1216 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x7f9d2ed5c628 in malloc (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.5)
    #1 0x7f9d2e963500 in g_malloc (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libglib-2.0.so.)
    #2 0x55fa646d25cc in object_new_with_type /tmp/qemu/qom/object.c:686
    #3 0x55fa63dbaa88 in qdev_new /tmp/qemu/hw/core/qdev.c:140
    #4 0x55fa638a533f in pc_pflash_create /tmp/qemu/hw/i386/pc_sysfw.c:88
    #5 0x55fa638a54c4 in pc_system_flash_create /tmp/qemu/hw/i386/pc_sysfw.c:106
    #6 0x55fa646caa1d in object_init_with_type /tmp/qemu/qom/object.c:369
    #7 0x55fa646d20b5 in object_initialize_with_type /tmp/qemu/qom/object.c:511
    #8 0x55fa646d2606 in object_new_with_type /tmp/qemu/qom/object.c:687
    #9 0x55fa639431e9 in qemu_init /tmp/qemu/softmmu/vl.c:3878
    #10 0x55fa6335c1b8 in main /tmp/qemu/softmmu/main.c:48
    #11 0x7f9d2cf06e0a in __libc_start_main ../csu/libc-start.c:308
    #12 0x55fa6335f8e9 in _start (/tmp/qemu/build/i386-softmmu/qemu-system-i386)

Signed-off-by: Alexander Bulekov <alxndr@bu.edu>
Message-Id: <20200701145231.19531-1-alxndr@bu.edu>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
arichardson pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 13, 2020
…tart

When the disconnect event is triggered in the connecting stage,
the tcp_chr_disconnect_locked may be called twice.

The first call:
    #0  qemu_chr_socket_restart_timer (chr=0x55555582ee90) at chardev/char-socket.c:120
    #1  0x000055555558e38c in tcp_chr_disconnect_locked (chr=<optimized out>) at chardev/char-socket.c:490
    #2  0x000055555558e3cd in tcp_chr_disconnect (chr=0x55555582ee90) at chardev/char-socket.c:497
    #3  0x000055555558ea32 in tcp_chr_new_client (chr=chr@entry=0x55555582ee90, sioc=sioc@entry=0x55555582f0b0) at chardev/char-socket.c:892
    #4  0x000055555558eeb8 in qemu_chr_socket_connected (task=0x55555582f300, opaque=<optimized out>) at chardev/char-socket.c:1090
    #5  0x0000555555574352 in qio_task_complete (task=task@entry=0x55555582f300) at io/task.c:196
    #6  0x00005555555745f4 in qio_task_thread_result (opaque=0x55555582f300) at io/task.c:111
    #7  qio_task_wait_thread (task=0x55555582f300) at io/task.c:190
    #8  0x000055555558f17e in tcp_chr_wait_connected (chr=0x55555582ee90, errp=0x555555802a08 <error_abort>) at chardev/char-socket.c:1013
    #9  0x0000555555567cbd in char_socket_client_reconnect_test (opaque=0x5555557fe020 <client8unix>) at tests/test-char.c:1152
The second call:
    #0  0x00007ffff5ac3277 in raise () from /lib64/libc.so.6
    #1  0x00007ffff5ac4968 in abort () from /lib64/libc.so.6
    #2  0x00007ffff5abc096 in __assert_fail_base () from /lib64/libc.so.6
    #3  0x00007ffff5abc142 in __assert_fail () from /lib64/libc.so.6
    #4  0x000055555558d10a in qemu_chr_socket_restart_timer (chr=0x55555582ee90) at chardev/char-socket.c:125
    #5  0x000055555558df0c in tcp_chr_disconnect_locked (chr=<optimized out>) at chardev/char-socket.c:490
    #6  0x000055555558df4d in tcp_chr_disconnect (chr=0x55555582ee90) at chardev/char-socket.c:497
    #7  0x000055555558e5b2 in tcp_chr_new_client (chr=chr@entry=0x55555582ee90, sioc=sioc@entry=0x55555582f0b0) at chardev/char-socket.c:892
    #8  0x000055555558e93a in tcp_chr_connect_client_sync (chr=chr@entry=0x55555582ee90, errp=errp@entry=0x7fffffffd178) at chardev/char-socket.c:944
    #9  0x000055555558ec78 in tcp_chr_wait_connected (chr=0x55555582ee90, errp=0x555555802a08 <error_abort>) at chardev/char-socket.c:1035
    #10 0x000055555556804b in char_socket_client_test (opaque=0x5555557fe020 <client8unix>) at tests/test-char.c:1023

Run test/test-char to reproduce this issue.

test-char: chardev/char-socket.c:125: qemu_chr_socket_restart_timer: Assertion `!s->reconnect_timer' failed.

Signed-off-by: Li Feng <fengli@smartx.com>
Acked-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200522025554.41063-1-fengli@smartx.com>
arichardson pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 13, 2020
"tmp.tls_hostname" and "tmp.tls_creds" allocated by migrate_params_test_apply()
is forgot to free at the end of qmp_migrate_set_parameters(). Fix that.

The leak stack:
Direct leak of 2 byte(s) in 2 object(s) allocated from:
   #0 0xffffb597c20b in __interceptor_malloc (/usr/lib64/libasan.so.4+0xd320b)
   #1 0xffffb52dcb1b in g_malloc (/usr/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x58b1b)
   #2 0xffffb52f8143 in g_strdup (/usr/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x74143)
   #3 0xaaaac52447fb in migrate_params_test_apply (/usr/src/debug/qemu-4.1.0/migration/migration.c:1377)
   #4 0xaaaac52fdca7 in qmp_migrate_set_parameters (/usr/src/debug/qemu-4.1.0/qapi/qapi-commands-migration.c:192)
   #5 0xaaaac551d543 in qmp_dispatch (/usr/src/debug/qemu-4.1.0/qapi/qmp-dispatch.c:165)
   #6 0xaaaac52a0a8f in qmp_dispatch (/usr/src/debug/qemu-4.1.0/monitor/qmp.c:125)
   #7 0xaaaac52a1c7f in monitor_qmp_dispatch (/usr/src/debug/qemu-4.1.0/monitor/qmp.c:214)
   #8 0xaaaac55cb0cf in aio_bh_call (/usr/src/debug/qemu-4.1.0/util/async.c:117)
   #9 0xaaaac55d4543 in aio_bh_poll (/usr/src/debug/qemu-4.1.0/util/aio-posix.c:459)
   #10 0xaaaac55cae0f in aio_dispatch (/usr/src/debug/qemu-4.1.0/util/async.c:268)
   #11 0xffffb52d6a7b in g_main_context_dispatch (/usr/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x52a7b)
   #12 0xaaaac55d1e3b(/usr/bin/qemu-kvm-4.1.0+0x1622e3b)
   #13 0xaaaac4e314bb(/usr/bin/qemu-kvm-4.1.0+0xe824bb)
   #14 0xaaaac47f45ef(/usr/bin/qemu-kvm-4.1.0+0x8455ef)
   #15 0xffffb4bfef3f in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib64/libc.so.6+0x23f3f)
   #16 0xaaaac47ffacb(/usr/bin/qemu-kvm-4.1.0+0x850acb)

Direct leak of 2 byte(s) in 2 object(s) allocated from:
   #0 0xffffb597c20b in __interceptor_malloc (/usr/lib64/libasan.so.4+0xd320b)
   #1 0xffffb52dcb1b in g_malloc (/usr/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x58b1b)
   #2 0xffffb52f8143 in g_strdup (/usr/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x74143)
   #3 0xaaaac5244893 in migrate_params_test_apply (/usr/src/debug/qemu-4.1.0/migration/migration.c:1382)
   #4 0xaaaac52fdca7 in qmp_migrate_set_parameters (/usr/src/debug/qemu-4.1.0/qapi/qapi-commands-migration.c:192)
   #5 0xaaaac551d543 in qmp_dispatch (/usr/src/debug/qemu-4.1.0/qapi/qmp-dispatch.c)
   #6 0xaaaac52a0a8f in qmp_dispatch (/usr/src/debug/qemu-4.1.0/monitor/qmp.c:125)
   #7 0xaaaac52a1c7f in monitor_qmp_dispatch (/usr/src/debug/qemu-4.1.0/monitor/qmp.c:214)
   #8 0xaaaac55cb0cf in aio_bh_call (/usr/src/debug/qemu-4.1.0/util/async.c:117)
   #9 0xaaaac55d4543 in aio_bh_poll (/usr/src/debug/qemu-4.1.0/util/aio-posix.c:459)
   #10 0xaaaac55cae0f in in aio_dispatch (/usr/src/debug/qemu-4.1.0/util/async.c:268)
   #11 0xffffb52d6a7b in g_main_context_dispatch (/usr/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x52a7b)
   #12 0xaaaac55d1e3b(/usr/bin/qemu-kvm-4.1.0+0x1622e3b)
   #13 0xaaaac4e314bb(/usr/bin/qemu-kvm-4.1.0+0xe824bb)
   #14 0xaaaac47f45ef (/usr/bin/qemu-kvm-4.1.0+0x8455ef)
   #15 0xffffb4bfef3f in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib64/libc.so.6+0x23f3f)
   #16 0xaaaac47ffacb(/usr/bin/qemu-kvm-4.1.0+0x850acb)

Signed-off-by: Chuan Zheng <zhengchuan@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: KeQian Zhu <zhukeqian1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: HaiLiang <zhang.zhanghailiang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
arichardson pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 13, 2020
bdrv_aio_cancel() calls aio_poll() on the AioContext for the given I/O
request until it has completed. ENOMEDIUM requests are special because
there is no BlockDriverState when the drive has no medium!

Define a .get_aio_context() function for BlkAioEmAIOCB requests so that
bdrv_aio_cancel() can find the AioContext where the completion BH is
pending. Without this function bdrv_aio_cancel() aborts on ENOMEDIUM
requests!

libFuzzer triggered the following assertion:

  cat << EOF | qemu-system-i386 -M pc-q35-5.0 \
    -nographic -monitor none -serial none \
    -qtest stdio -trace ide\*
  outl 0xcf8 0x8000fa24
  outl 0xcfc 0xe106c000
  outl 0xcf8 0x8000fa04
  outw 0xcfc 0x7
  outl 0xcf8 0x8000fb20
  write 0x0 0x3 0x2780e7
  write 0xe106c22c 0xd 0x1130c218021130c218021130c2
  write 0xe106c218 0x15 0x110010110010110010110010110010110010110010
  EOF
  ide_exec_cmd IDE exec cmd: bus 0x56170a77a2b8; state 0x56170a77a340; cmd 0xe7
  ide_reset IDEstate 0x56170a77a340
  Aborted (core dumped)

  (gdb) bt
  #1  0x00007ffff4f93895 in abort () at /lib64/libc.so.6
  #2  0x0000555555dc6c00 in bdrv_aio_cancel (acb=0x555556765550) at block/io.c:2745
  #3  0x0000555555dac202 in blk_aio_cancel (acb=0x555556765550) at block/block-backend.c:1546
  #4  0x0000555555b1bd74 in ide_reset (s=0x555557213340) at hw/ide/core.c:1318
  #5  0x0000555555b1e3a1 in ide_bus_reset (bus=0x5555572132b8) at hw/ide/core.c:2422
  #6  0x0000555555b2aa27 in ahci_reset_port (s=0x55555720eb50, port=2) at hw/ide/ahci.c:650
  #7  0x0000555555b29fd7 in ahci_port_write (s=0x55555720eb50, port=2, offset=44, val=16) at hw/ide/ahci.c:360
  #8  0x0000555555b2a564 in ahci_mem_write (opaque=0x55555720eb50, addr=556, val=16, size=1) at hw/ide/ahci.c:513
  #9  0x000055555598415b in memory_region_write_accessor (mr=0x55555720eb80, addr=556, value=0x7fffffffb838, size=1, shift=0, mask=255, attrs=...) at softmmu/memory.c:483

Looking at bdrv_aio_cancel:

2728 /* async I/Os */
2729
2730 void bdrv_aio_cancel(BlockAIOCB *acb)
2731 {
2732     qemu_aio_ref(acb);
2733     bdrv_aio_cancel_async(acb);
2734     while (acb->refcnt > 1) {
2735         if (acb->aiocb_info->get_aio_context) {
2736             aio_poll(acb->aiocb_info->get_aio_context(acb), true);
2737         } else if (acb->bs) {
2738             /* qemu_aio_ref and qemu_aio_unref are not thread-safe, so
2739              * assert that we're not using an I/O thread.  Thread-safe
2740              * code should use bdrv_aio_cancel_async exclusively.
2741              */
2742             assert(bdrv_get_aio_context(acb->bs) == qemu_get_aio_context());
2743             aio_poll(bdrv_get_aio_context(acb->bs), true);
2744         } else {
2745             abort();     <===============
2746         }
2747     }
2748     qemu_aio_unref(acb);
2749 }

Fixes: 02c50ef ("block: Add bdrv_aio_cancel_async")
Reported-by: Alexander Bulekov <alxndr@bu.edu>
Buglink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/qemu/+bug/1878255
Originally-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200720100141.129739-1-stefanha@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
arichardson pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 13, 2020
It should be safe to reenter qio_channel_yield() on io/channel read/write
path, so it's safe to reduce in_flight and allow attaching new aio
context. And no problem to allow drain itself: connection attempt is
not a guest request. Moreover, if remote server is down, we can hang
in negotiation, blocking drain section and provoking a dead lock.

How to reproduce the dead lock:

1. Create nbd-fault-injector.conf with the following contents:

[inject-error "mega1"]
event=data
io=readwrite
when=before

2. In one terminal run nbd-fault-injector in a loop, like this:

n=1; while true; do
    echo $n; ((n++));
    ./nbd-fault-injector.py 127.0.0.1:10000 nbd-fault-injector.conf;
done

3. In another terminal run qemu-io in a loop, like this:

n=1; while true; do
    echo $n; ((n++));
    ./qemu-io -c 'read 0 512' nbd://127.0.0.1:10000;
done

After some time, qemu-io will hang trying to drain, for example, like
this:

 #3 aio_poll (ctx=0x55f006bdd890, blocking=true) at
    util/aio-posix.c:600
 #4 bdrv_do_drained_begin (bs=0x55f006bea710, recursive=false,
    parent=0x0, ignore_bds_parents=false, poll=true) at block/io.c:427
 #5 bdrv_drained_begin (bs=0x55f006bea710) at block/io.c:433
 #6 blk_drain (blk=0x55f006befc80) at block/block-backend.c:1710
 #7 blk_unref (blk=0x55f006befc80) at block/block-backend.c:498
 #8 bdrv_open_inherit (filename=0x7fffba1563bc
    "nbd+tcp://127.0.0.1:10000", reference=0x0, options=0x55f006be86d0,
    flags=24578, parent=0x0, child_class=0x0, child_role=0,
    errp=0x7fffba154620) at block.c:3491
 #9 bdrv_open (filename=0x7fffba1563bc "nbd+tcp://127.0.0.1:10000",
    reference=0x0, options=0x0, flags=16386, errp=0x7fffba154620) at
    block.c:3513
 #10 blk_new_open (filename=0x7fffba1563bc "nbd+tcp://127.0.0.1:10000",
    reference=0x0, options=0x0, flags=16386, errp=0x7fffba154620) at
    block/block-backend.c:421

And connection_co stack like this:

 #0 qemu_coroutine_switch (from_=0x55f006bf2650, to_=0x7fe96e07d918,
    action=COROUTINE_YIELD) at util/coroutine-ucontext.c:302
 #1 qemu_coroutine_yield () at util/qemu-coroutine.c:193
 #2 qio_channel_yield (ioc=0x55f006bb3c20, condition=G_IO_IN) at
    io/channel.c:472
 #3 qio_channel_readv_all_eof (ioc=0x55f006bb3c20, iov=0x7fe96d729bf0,
    niov=1, errp=0x7fe96d729eb0) at io/channel.c:110
 #4 qio_channel_readv_all (ioc=0x55f006bb3c20, iov=0x7fe96d729bf0,
    niov=1, errp=0x7fe96d729eb0) at io/channel.c:143
 #5 qio_channel_read_all (ioc=0x55f006bb3c20, buf=0x7fe96d729d28
    "\300.\366\004\360U", buflen=8, errp=0x7fe96d729eb0) at
    io/channel.c:247
 #6 nbd_read (ioc=0x55f006bb3c20, buffer=0x7fe96d729d28, size=8,
    desc=0x55f004f69644 "initial magic", errp=0x7fe96d729eb0) at
    /work/src/qemu/master/include/block/nbd.h:365
 #7 nbd_read64 (ioc=0x55f006bb3c20, val=0x7fe96d729d28,
    desc=0x55f004f69644 "initial magic", errp=0x7fe96d729eb0) at
    /work/src/qemu/master/include/block/nbd.h:391
 #8 nbd_start_negotiate (aio_context=0x55f006bdd890,
    ioc=0x55f006bb3c20, tlscreds=0x0, hostname=0x0,
    outioc=0x55f006bf19f8, structured_reply=true,
    zeroes=0x7fe96d729dca, errp=0x7fe96d729eb0) at nbd/client.c:904
 #9 nbd_receive_negotiate (aio_context=0x55f006bdd890,
    ioc=0x55f006bb3c20, tlscreds=0x0, hostname=0x0,
    outioc=0x55f006bf19f8, info=0x55f006bf1a00, errp=0x7fe96d729eb0) at
    nbd/client.c:1032
 #10 nbd_client_connect (bs=0x55f006bea710, errp=0x7fe96d729eb0) at
    block/nbd.c:1460
 #11 nbd_reconnect_attempt (s=0x55f006bf19f0) at block/nbd.c:287
 #12 nbd_co_reconnect_loop (s=0x55f006bf19f0) at block/nbd.c:309
 #13 nbd_connection_entry (opaque=0x55f006bf19f0) at block/nbd.c:360
 #14 coroutine_trampoline (i0=113190480, i1=22000) at
    util/coroutine-ucontext.c:173

Note, that the hang may be
triggered by another bug, so the whole case is fixed only together with
commit "block/nbd: on shutdown terminate connection attempt".

Signed-off-by: Vladimir Sementsov-Ogievskiy <vsementsov@virtuozzo.com>
Message-Id: <20200727184751.15704-3-vsementsov@virtuozzo.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
arichardson pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 29, 2021
mon_get_cpu_env() is indirectly called monitor_parse_arguments() where
the current monitor isn't set yet. Instead of using monitor_cur_env(),
explicitly pass the Monitor pointer to the function.

Without this fix, an HMP command like "x $pc" crashes like this:

  #0  0x0000555555caa01f in mon_get_cpu_sync (mon=0x0, synchronize=true) at ../monitor/misc.c:270
  #1  0x0000555555caa141 in mon_get_cpu (mon=0x0) at ../monitor/misc.c:294
  #2  0x0000555555caa158 in mon_get_cpu_env () at ../monitor/misc.c:299
  #3  0x0000555555b19739 in monitor_get_pc (mon=0x555556ad2de0, md=0x5555565d2d40 <monitor_defs+1152>, val=0) at ../target/i386/monitor.c:607
  #4  0x0000555555cadbec in get_monitor_def (mon=0x555556ad2de0, pval=0x7fffffffc208, name=0x7fffffffc220 "pc") at ../monitor/misc.c:1681
  #5  0x000055555582ec4f in expr_unary (mon=0x555556ad2de0) at ../monitor/hmp.c:387
  #6  0x000055555582edbb in expr_prod (mon=0x555556ad2de0) at ../monitor/hmp.c:421
  #7  0x000055555582ee79 in expr_logic (mon=0x555556ad2de0) at ../monitor/hmp.c:455
  #8  0x000055555582eefe in expr_sum (mon=0x555556ad2de0) at ../monitor/hmp.c:484
  #9  0x000055555582efe8 in get_expr (mon=0x555556ad2de0, pval=0x7fffffffc418, pp=0x7fffffffc408) at ../monitor/hmp.c:511
  #10 0x000055555582fcd4 in monitor_parse_arguments (mon=0x555556ad2de0, endp=0x7fffffffc890, cmd=0x555556675b50 <hmp_cmds+7920>) at ../monitor/hmp.c:876
  #11 0x00005555558306a8 in handle_hmp_command (mon=0x555556ad2de0, cmdline=0x555556ada452 "$pc") at ../monitor/hmp.c:1087
  #12 0x000055555582df14 in monitor_command_cb (opaque=0x555556ad2de0, cmdline=0x555556ada450 "x $pc", readline_opaque=0x0) at ../monitor/hmp.c:47

After this fix, nothing is left in monitor_parse_arguments() that can
indirectly call monitor_cur(), so the fix is complete.

Fixes: ff04108
Reported-by: lichun <lichun@ruijie.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20201113114326.97663-4-kwolf@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
arichardson pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 29, 2021
In qobject_type(), NULL is returned when the 'QObject' returned from parse_value() is not of QString type,
and this 'QObject' memory will leaked.
So we need to first cache the 'QObject' returned from parse_value(), and finally
free 'QObject' memory at the end of the function.
Also, we add a testcast about invalid dict key.

The memleak stack is as follows:
Direct leak of 32 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0xfffe4b3c34fb in __interceptor_malloc (/lib64/libasan.so.4+0xd34fb)
    #1 0xfffe4ae48aa3 in g_malloc (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x58aa3)
    #2 0xaaab3557d9f7 in qnum_from_int qemu/qobject/qnum.c:25
    #3 0xaaab35584d23 in parse_literal qemu/qobject/json-parser.c:511
    #4 0xaaab35584d23 in parse_value qemu/qobject/json-parser.c:554
    #5 0xaaab35583d77 in parse_pair qemu/qobject/json-parser.c:270
    #6 0xaaab355845db in parse_object qemu/qobject/json-parser.c:327
    #7 0xaaab355845db in parse_value qemu/qobject/json-parser.c:546
    #8 0xaaab35585b1b in json_parser_parse qemu/qobject/json-parser.c:580
    #9 0xaaab35583703 in json_message_process_token qemu/qobject/json-streamer.c:92
    #10 0xaaab355ddccf in json_lexer_feed_char qemu/qobject/json-lexer.c:313
    #11 0xaaab355de0eb in json_lexer_feed qemu/qobject/json-lexer.c:350
    #12 0xaaab354aff67 in tcp_chr_read qemu/chardev/char-socket.c:525
    #13 0xfffe4ae429db in g_main_context_dispatch (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x529db)
    #14 0xfffe4ae42d8f  (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x52d8f)
    #15 0xfffe4ae430df in g_main_loop_run (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x530df)
    #16 0xaaab34d70bff in iothread_run qemu/iothread.c:82
    #17 0xaaab3559d71b in qemu_thread_start qemu/util/qemu-thread-posix.c:519

Fixes: 532fb53 ("qapi: Make more of qobject_to()")
Reported-by: Euler Robot <euler.robot@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Chen <alex.chen@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Chen Qun <kuhn.chenqun@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20201113145525.85151-1-alex.chen@huawei.com>
[Commit message tweaked]
arichardson pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 29, 2021
Properly free resp for get_watchdog_action() to avoid memory leak.
ASAN shows memory leak stack:

Indirect leak of 12360 byte(s) in 3 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x7f41ab6cbd4e in __interceptor_calloc (/lib64/libasan.so.5+0x112d4e)
    #1 0x7f41ab4eaa50 in g_malloc0 (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x55a50)
    #2 0x556487d5374b in qdict_new ../qobject/qdict.c:29
    #3 0x556487d65e1a in parse_object ../qobject/json-parser.c:318
    #4 0x556487d65cb6 in parse_pair ../qobject/json-parser.c:287
    #5 0x556487d65ebd in parse_object ../qobject/json-parser.c:343
    #6 0x556487d661d5 in json_parser_parse ../qobject/json-parser.c:580
    #7 0x556487d513df in json_message_process_token ../qobject/json-streamer.c:92
    #8 0x556487d63919 in json_lexer_feed_char ../qobject/json-lexer.c:313
    #9 0x556487d63d75 in json_lexer_feed ../qobject/json-lexer.c:350
    #10 0x556487d28b2a in qmp_fd_receive ../tests/qtest/libqtest.c:613
    #11 0x556487d2a16f in qtest_qmp_eventwait_ref ../tests/qtest/libqtest.c:827
    #12 0x556487d248e2 in get_watchdog_action ../tests/qtest/npcm7xx_watchdog_timer-test.c:94
    #13 0x556487d25765 in test_enabling_flags ../tests/qtest/npcm7xx_watchdog_timer-test.c:243

Reported-by: Euler Robot <euler.robot@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Chen Qun <kuhn.chenqun@huawei.com>
Message-Id: <20201118115646.2461726-3-kuhn.chenqun@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Havard Skinnemoen <hskinnemoen@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Hao Wu <wuhaotsh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
arichardson pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 29, 2021
When 'j = icu->nr_sense – 1', the 'j < icu->nr_sense' condition is true,
then 'j = icu->nr_sense', the'icu->init_sense[j]' has out-of-bounds access.

The asan showed stack:
ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x604000004d7d at pc 0x55852cd26a76 bp 0x7ffe39f26200 sp 0x7ffe39f261f0
READ of size 1 at 0x604000004d7d thread T0
    #0 0x55852cd26a75 in rxicu_realize ../hw/intc/rx_icu.c:311
    #1 0x55852cf075f7 in device_set_realized ../hw/core/qdev.c:886
    #2 0x55852cd4a32f in property_set_bool ../qom/object.c:2251
    #3 0x55852cd4f9bb in object_property_set ../qom/object.c:1398
    #4 0x55852cd54f3f in object_property_set_qobject ../qom/qom-qobject.c:28
    #5 0x55852cd4fc3f in object_property_set_bool ../qom/object.c:1465
    #6 0x55852cbf0b27 in register_icu ../hw/rx/rx62n.c:156
    #7 0x55852cbf12a6 in rx62n_realize ../hw/rx/rx62n.c:261
    #8 0x55852cf075f7 in device_set_realized ../hw/core/qdev.c:886
    #9 0x55852cd4a32f in property_set_bool ../qom/object.c:2251
    #10 0x55852cd4f9bb in object_property_set ../qom/object.c:1398
    #11 0x55852cd54f3f in object_property_set_qobject ../qom/qom-qobject.c:28
    #12 0x55852cd4fc3f in object_property_set_bool ../qom/object.c:1465
    #13 0x55852cbf1a85 in rx_gdbsim_init ../hw/rx/rx-gdbsim.c:109
    #14 0x55852cd22de0 in qemu_init ../softmmu/vl.c:4380
    #15 0x55852ca57088 in main ../softmmu/main.c:49
    #16 0x7feefafa5d42 in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x26d42)

Add the 'ice->src[i].sense' initialize to the default value, and then
process init_sense array to identify which irqs should be level-triggered.

Suggested-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Euler Robot <euler.robot@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Chen Qun <kuhn.chenqun@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Message-id: 20201111141733.2358800-1-kuhn.chenqun@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
arichardson pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 1, 2023
Incoming enabled bitmaps are busy, because we do
bdrv_dirty_bitmap_create_successor() for them. But disabled bitmaps
being migrated are not marked busy, and user can remove them during the
incoming migration. Then we may crash in cancel_incoming_locked() when
try to remove the bitmap that was already removed by user, like this:

 #0  qemu_mutex_lock_impl (mutex=0x5593d88c50d1, file=0x559680554b20
   "../block/dirty-bitmap.c", line=64) at ../util/qemu-thread-posix.c:77
 #1  bdrv_dirty_bitmaps_lock (bs=0x5593d88c0ee9)
   at ../block/dirty-bitmap.c:64
 #2  bdrv_release_dirty_bitmap (bitmap=0x5596810e9570)
   at ../block/dirty-bitmap.c:362
 #3  cancel_incoming_locked (s=0x559680be8208 <dbm_state+40>)
   at ../migration/block-dirty-bitmap.c:918
 #4  dirty_bitmap_load (f=0x559681d02b10, opaque=0x559680be81e0
   <dbm_state>, version_id=1) at ../migration/block-dirty-bitmap.c:1194
 #5  vmstate_load (f=0x559681d02b10, se=0x559680fb5810)
   at ../migration/savevm.c:908
 #6  qemu_loadvm_section_part_end (f=0x559681d02b10,
   mis=0x559680fb4a30) at ../migration/savevm.c:2473
 #7  qemu_loadvm_state_main (f=0x559681d02b10, mis=0x559680fb4a30)
   at ../migration/savevm.c:2626
 #8  postcopy_ram_listen_thread (opaque=0x0)
   at ../migration/savevm.c:1871
 #9  qemu_thread_start (args=0x5596817ccd10)
   at ../util/qemu-thread-posix.c:521
 #10 start_thread () at /lib64/libpthread.so.0
 #11 clone () at /lib64/libc.so.6

Note bs pointer taken from bitmap: it's definitely bad aligned. That's
because we are in use after free, bitmap is already freed.

So, let's make disabled bitmaps (being migrated) busy during incoming
migration.

Signed-off-by: Vladimir Sementsov-Ogievskiy <vsementsov@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210322094906.5079-2-vsementsov@virtuozzo.com>
arichardson pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 1, 2023
When building with --enable-sanitizers we get:

  Direct leak of 32 byte(s) in 2 object(s) allocated from:
      #0 0x5618479ec7cf in malloc (qemu-system-aarch64+0x233b7cf)
      #1 0x7f675745f958 in g_malloc (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x58958)
      #2 0x561847f02ca2 in usb_packet_init hw/usb/core.c:531:5
      #3 0x561848df4df4 in usb_ehci_init hw/usb/hcd-ehci.c:2575:5
      #4 0x561847c119ac in ehci_sysbus_init hw/usb/hcd-ehci-sysbus.c:73:5
      #5 0x56184a5bdab8 in object_init_with_type qom/object.c:375:9
      #6 0x56184a5bd955 in object_init_with_type qom/object.c:371:9
      #7 0x56184a5a2bda in object_initialize_with_type qom/object.c:517:5
      #8 0x56184a5a24d5 in object_initialize qom/object.c:536:5
      #9 0x56184a5a2f6c in object_initialize_child_with_propsv qom/object.c:566:5
      #10 0x56184a5a2e60 in object_initialize_child_with_props qom/object.c:549:10
      #11 0x56184a5a3a1e in object_initialize_child_internal qom/object.c:603:5
      #12 0x561849542d18 in npcm7xx_init hw/arm/npcm7xx.c:427:5

Similarly to commit d710e1e ("usb: ehci: fix memory leak in
ehci"), fix by calling usb_ehci_finalize() to free the USBPacket.

Fixes: 7341ea0
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210323183701.281152-1-f4bug@amsat.org>
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
arichardson pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 1, 2023
When building with --enable-sanitizers we get:

  Direct leak of 16 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
      #0 0x5618479ec7cf in malloc (qemu-system-aarch64+0x233b7cf)
      #1 0x7f675745f958 in g_malloc (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x58958)
      #2 0x561847c2dcc9 in xlnx_dp_init hw/display/xlnx_dp.c:1259:5
      #3 0x56184a5bdab8 in object_init_with_type qom/object.c:375:9
      #4 0x56184a5a2bda in object_initialize_with_type qom/object.c:517:5
      #5 0x56184a5a24d5 in object_initialize qom/object.c:536:5
      #6 0x56184a5a2f6c in object_initialize_child_with_propsv qom/object.c:566:5
      #7 0x56184a5a2e60 in object_initialize_child_with_props qom/object.c:549:10
      #8 0x56184a5a3a1e in object_initialize_child_internal qom/object.c:603:5
      #9 0x5618495aa431 in xlnx_zynqmp_init hw/arm/xlnx-zynqmp.c:273:5

The RX/TX FIFOs are created in xlnx_dp_init(), add xlnx_dp_finalize()
to destroy them.

Fixes: 58ac482 ("introduce xlnx-dp")
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org>
Reviewed-by: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@wdc.com>
Message-id: 20210323182958.277654-1-f4bug@amsat.org
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
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2 participants