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v2.3.0 — PQSecureStream, PQSecureChannel and PQSecureSocket: post-quantum protected messaging
Added
Three layers of protected messaging, each built on the one before.
PQSecureStream: protected messages over any byte stream. It works
over a file, a socket, a pipe or a message queue, and runs in browsers.- One direction of messages as numbered AEAD records (AES-256-GCM or
ChaCha20-Poly1305). Messages keep their boundaries and are sent as soon
as they are added. - Within a stream, tampered, retyped, replayed, reordered and dropped
records fail to decrypt. An authenticated End record reveals
truncation, and data after it is rejected. A one-way stream replayed
whole still decrypts; applications that care add message ids. - The last record number is kept for End, so a writer at the record
limit can still close cleanly. A message that would not fit is refused
before any of it is written. - Frames (64 KiB) and messages (
maxMessageLength) are bounded before
buffering, and reading stays linear however finely the input is
split. An optionalreceiveTimeoutdrops a stalled writer. encryptTo/decryptFromkey a stream to a recipient's ML-KEM or
X-Wing key, with no round trip (files, store-and-forward).
encryptWithKey/decryptWithKeykey it from a shared key, with a
per-stream salt so the key can be reused.PQSecureStreamWriter.closereports an output that fails to close (a
write error), so an incomplete file never looks complete. Repeated and
concurrent calls share the first call's result.addStreamaborts the
writer if its source fails.- Headers and handshake messages over the 64 KiB frame limit (an
overlong protocol name or client id) are refused when written, not
discovered by the reader.
- One direction of messages as numbered AEAD records (AES-256-GCM or
PQSecureChannel: an authenticated two-way channel over any byte
stream. Each direction is aPQSecureStream(channel.output/
channel.input).- The server signs a fresh X-Wing key, generated for each connection,
with its ML-DSA (or SLH-DSA) identity key, which the client has
pinned. A man-in-the-middle cannot substitute its own key, and
recorded traffic stays secret if the identity key later leaks (forward
secrecy). - Optional client authentication: the server sets a signed flag, and
the client proves its own key inside an encrypted record, so passive
observers do not see which key connected. TheclientIdlabel itself
is sent in the clear. AClientAuthorizercallback decides whether
that key may connect. - The session keys are bound to the application
protocol, both ids and
the hello transcript, and confirmed by Finished records. The ephemeral
key is destroyed after the handshake. - The handshake has a timeout. A handshake given up on (timed out or
failed) stops at its next step, so a slow authorizer cannot sign or
key a channel nobody holds. closeis a half-close;abortdrops the connection at once. On a
transport where closing the sink ends both directions (a WebSocket),
read to the end before closing.- A failed read stops the channel's sending side too, since they share
the transport.
- The server signs a fresh X-Wing key, generated for each connection,
PQSecureSocket/PQSecureServer(post_quantum_crypto_io):
PQSecureChannelover TCP.-
The server delivers established channels on
channelsand reports
refused handshakes toonHandshakeError. -
Connection limits:
- A client must send each handshake message within
stepTimeout
(10 s), before or after its ClientHello, or it is dropped. maxIdleConnectionscaps connections still waiting for their
ClientHello.maxPendingHandshakescaps handshakes past it, where signing starts;
one more ClientHello is refused as busy. A slot is held until the
handshake's work really stops, including a slowauthorizeClient.
Idle or stalled sockets therefore cannot crowd out real clients for
long, and a flood cannot make the server sign without limit. - A client must send each handshake message within
-
Neither a throwing
onHandshakeErrorcallback nor an accept error
(such as running out of file descriptors) crashes the server.
close()completes even if nobody listens tochannels.
-
PQSecureStreamException(stream and channel failures) and its
subclassPQSecureChannelException(handshake failures).
These are package-specific protocols, not TLS.
Documentation
- New examples:
example/secure_stream.dart(an append-style encrypted
file, truncation detection, a live pipe with a shared key) and
example/secure_socket.dart(an echo server with client
authentication). - README: a "Secure streams and channels" section.
Tests
secure_stream_test.dartcovers:- recipient (ML-KEM-768, X-Wing) and shared-key streams;
- wrong key, protocol or key mode;
- a modified header or record, reordering, truncation, data after the
end; - AEAD policy, the size limit, the receive timeout, cancel, abort, a
failing output, concurrent close, a source error inaddStreamand
live pipes.
secure_channel_test.dartruns the channel through an in-memory wire
that acts as a man-in-the-middle:- handshake: unpinned identity, wrong server id, a substituted ephemeral
key, modified hello / signature / key exchange / flags, version, AEAD
and protocol mismatches, malformed and trailing data, an oversized
hello, a client stalling after its hello, timeout; - client authentication: authorized, unauthorized, a throwing or async
authorizer, a missing identity, stripped flags, a dropped ClientAuth,
and a handshake abandoned on timeout that writes nothing more; - records: tampered, retyped, replayed, reordered, dropped and reflected
records, truncation, mid-frame EOF, oversized and empty frames,
half-close, abort, and a failed read stopping the sender.
- handshake: unpinned identity, wrong server id, a substituted ephemeral
secure_socket_test.dartcovers:- TCP echo with several clients, client authorization, an unpinned
server and server close; - idle sockets that do not block handshakes, the busy refusal,
maxIdleConnections,stepTimeout, a throwingonHandshakeError,
andclose()with no listener or a paused one; - a
PQSecureStreamfile round trip and truncation.
- TCP echo with several clients, client authorization, an unpinned
test/browserruns a stream and a channel under dart2js and dart2wasm.
v2.2.1 — lossless UTF-8 maps, raw/signed-object separation, private key staging
Security
-
A leading U+FEFF no longer collapses map entries. Dart's
utf8.decodedrops a leading byte-order mark (EF BB BF), so the
canonical-map keysaandU+FEFF aboth decoded toa. The second
entry silently overrode the first:- in an authenticated context,
{..., 'tenant': 'A', 'U+FEFF tenant': 'B'}
parsed astenant: Band passedrequiredContext: {'tenant': 'B'}; - signed metadata was affected the same way;
- two manifest paths could read as the same path.
Canonical maps, manifest paths and key metadata now decode losslessly
(utf8String, the inverse ofutf8Bytes), in linear time however many
BOMs a value holds. - in an authenticated context,
-
Raw signatures and signed objects are separated. A detached
signature or manifest is a signature over
post_quantum_crypto/v1/<kind>\0 || bodyunder the caller's FIPS
context. A raw signature over a message with that prefix was therefore
also a valid signed object. A service that raw-signed messages chosen by
others with its release key could be made to sign content it never saw.- Raw
signnow throwsInvalidInputExceptionfor such messages. - Raw
verifynow returnsfalsefor them, so a published signed object
no longer verifies as a raw signature. - SECURITY.md notes that the guard does not cover the same key raw-signing
in other implementations.
- Raw
-
FileKeyStoragestages key files privately. Before, a new temporary
key file existed with the umask's permissions (typically 0644) until it
was restricted. Another local user who opened it in that window kept read
access to the key bytes written afterwards.- Key files are now written in an owner-only staging directory,
.pending(chmod 700, its mode checked on every write), and renamed
into place. - The permissions of the storage directory itself are left as the caller
set them. chmodis given absolute paths, so a relative directory starting with
-is not read as an option.
- Key files are now written in an owner-only staging directory,
Fixed
- Private-key copies are wiped:
KeyStorerevocation, rotation and restore destroy the private keys
they load, including on a restore that fails partway;- key generation wipes its seed;
- raw private-key imports wipe their temporary copy of the caller's bytes;
- signing wipes its hedging randomness.
- The
KeyStore's own operations no longer pay the SLH-DSA key check (1–2 s
per "s" key) for keys they only carry over. This covers revocation,
rotation, backup and restore, andchangeKeyPassworddoes the same. A key
is still checked when it is loaded for use withget. verifySlhDsaKey: falseis also honoured for an SLH-DSA key record in
seed form.importSigningPrivateKeyExpandeddocuments the SLH-DSA check and its
cost.- Raw and signed-object signing share one implementation.
Tests
-
Regression tests for each fix (
test/unit/review_regressions_test.dart):- U+FEFF-prefixed context keys, signed metadata, manifest paths and key
labels, and a 64 KiB value made only of BOMs; - raw signing and verification of signed-object domains, and near misses
that still sign; - wiping of key-generation seeds and signing randomness, through a spying
random source; - key-store revoke, rotate and restore leaving usable keys, and a backup
with a bad record restoring nothing; - the opt-out for seed-form SLH-DSA records;
FileKeyStoragestaging, checked on POSIX and run on Linux, macOS and
Windows.
Seven of them fail without the fixes.
- U+FEFF-prefixed context keys, signed metadata, manifest paths and key
Documentation
test/README.mddescribes each test directory, the tags and the NIST
ACVP vectors: which files, parameter sets and subsets, and what each test
checks.
v2.2.0 — SLH-DSA private-key check on import, package-sourced SLH-DSA key generation
Fixed
- SLH-DSA private keys are checked on import.
PK.rootis recomputed
fromSK.seedandPK.seed(FIPS 205 Algorithm 18) and must match.
Before, a corrupted or inconsistent key (PKCS#8, raw bytes, key record)
imported silently and then produced only signatures that fail
verification. This closes the last limitation on private-key import
listed in SECURITY.md.- Cost: one key generation per import and per key-store load. That is
milliseconds for the "f" parameter sets and 1–2 s for the "s" sets. - Loading a key record can skip it:
decodeKey,
decodeSigningPrivateKey,importPrivateKeyWithPasswordand
KeyStore.gettakeverifySlhDsaKey(defaulttrue). PKCS#8 and raw
imports are always checked.
- Cost: one key generation per import and per key-store load. That is
- SLH-DSA key generation uses the package's random source. It used
pqcrypto's ownRandom.secure(), so a random source configured on the
engine was ignored for it. All randomness now comes from the package.
This closes the SLH-DSA key-generation limitation in SECURITY.md.
Changed
- pqcrypto: ^0.4.4, which exports FIPS 205 Algorithm 18
(SlhDsa.generateKeyPairSeeded,
turkananation/pqcrypto#69). SignaturePrimitive(custom backends):generate()becomesgenerate(Uint8List randomness), with the new
keyGenerationRandomnessLength. For SLH-DSA the randomness is
SK.seed || SK.prf || PK.seed.- New
publicKeyFromSecretKey(secretKey), which checks an SLH-DSA
secret key and returns its public key. The SLH-DSA check now runs in
the backend, not in a separate file importing pqcrypto.
- Loading a key record compares the stored public key once, not twice.
Tests
- NIST ACVP SLH-DSA keyGen vectors (SHAKE parameter sets): the official
secret keys pass the check and yield the official public keys without
being given them, and key generation from the official seeds reproduces
the official key pair. - Mutation tests for SLH-DSA (128f/192f/256f):
SK.seed,PK.seedandPK.rootchanges are rejected, via raw and
PKCS#8 import;SK.prf, which FIPS 205 leaves unconstrained, is accepted and still
signs;- with
verifySlhDsaKey: falsea corrupted key record loads (and its
signatures fail), while the stored public key is still compared.
- SLH-DSA-SHAKE-128s: a
PK.rootchange is rejected (taggedslow). - SLH-DSA key generation is deterministic under a deterministic random
source.
v2.1.1 — README up to date with 2.1.0
Documentation
README brought up to date with 2.1.0:
- Key import validation: expanded keys are checked for consistency, and an
expanded-only ML-DSA key imports on its own. - Supported platforms: macOS and Windows run the platform-sensitive tests in
CI, Linux runs the full suite. - Architecture: the ML-DSA key check uses pqcrypto's SHAKE128 directly.
- The third-party test vectors are in the repository, not in the package.
No code changes.
v2.1.0 — Wycheproof and RFC 9881/9935 conformance, stricter expanded-key import, faster CI
Fixed
Found by the new standards-conformance vectors (below):
- ML-DSA expanded private keys with s1 or s2 out of range were accepted
and used to sign (Wycheproof). They are now rejected. - ML-DSA expanded private keys whose
t0does not match s1 and s2 were
accepted, even with the matching public key (RFC 9881 C.4, example 3).
The import now recomputest = A·s1 + s2(FIPS 204) and rejects them. - ML-KEM expanded private keys with a mutated secret vector but a valid
H(ek)were accepted and then silently failed every decapsulation
(RFC 9935 C.4.1, example 2). The import now runs a pairwise-consistency
test.
Changed
- An expanded-only ML-DSA private key (PKCS#8, RFC 9881
expandedKey)
now imports on its own: its public key is recomputed instead of being
required alongside.importSigningPrivateKeyExpanded'spublicKeyis
now optional; when given, it must match the recomputed one. - The new key checks evaluate every coefficient before deciding (timing does
not depend on where a key fails) and wipe every buffer derived from the
secret key, including a rejected key's copy. They cost about one signing
operation per import (ML-DSA-87: ~6 ms on the VM).
Tests
- Wycheproof ML-KEM (key generation, encapsulation with unreduced and
overflowing keys, decapsulation incl. CCTV strcmp, expanded keys) and
ML-DSA (deterministic and randomized signing, invalid keys, verification
of malformed signatures) for every parameter set. - RFC 9881 and RFC 9935 Appendix C: every example key in the seed,
expanded and both forms is imported and re-exported byte for byte, and
every inconsistent key is rejected. tool/fetch_vectors.dartfetches and trims the new sources;
test/vectors/PROVENANCE.mdrecords them. Third-party vectors are no
longer included in the published package (159 KB instead of 3 MB).
CI
- Faster CI through parallel jobs:
- The VM suite runs in four coverage shards of similar length (the
vectorstag and the rest, each split in two); Codecov waits for all
uploads. The
fewslowtests run in their own job without coverage instrumentation,
which slowed them several times over. - Lint and package checks are separate jobs, and the examples run
concurrently. - The macOS/Windows jobs run only the tests tagged
platform(file
system, permissions, processes, isolates); everything else is pure Dart
computation and already runs on Linux and in browsers. - A newer push to a PR cancels the running check.
- The VM suite runs in four coverage shards of similar length (the
v2.0.1 — pub.dev description, early metadata checks, robust key-store backup
Fixed
- Key labels and revocation reasons are checked where they are
introduced. Before, a label over 4096 UTF-8 bytes (or with an unpaired
surrogate) was only rejected when the key was saved. Now key generation,
import,withMetadataandKeyMetadata.copyWithreject it. The new
KeyMetadata.checkLimitsdoes the same check on demand. Behavior
change: a key with such a label can no longer be created even if it is
never saved. KeyStore.backupno longer fails on a misplaced key file. Each
storage entry is decoded on its own and its key is backed up under its
real id, so a key file moved or copied over another key's name is still
backed up (once) and restored under the right name. An entry that holds
no valid key fails the backup as before, unless the new optional
onSkippedcallback is given, in which case it is left out and reported
there. A wrong store password always fails the backup. Decrypted private
keys are destroyed once encoded.- pub.dev: shorter pubspec
description(163 characters). pub.dev
requires 60–180 and scored the package 0/10 for "Provide a valid
pubspec.yaml".
v2.0.0 — key-committing wire format 2
Breaking
- Wire format 2. Every object now carries format version 2, and
objects written by 1.x (format 1) are rejected with
UnsupportedFormatException; there is no migration path. Keys can still
be moved over as SPKI/PKCS#8 or raw seeds, and key identifiers are
unchanged. - Key-committing encryption. Envelopes, streams and password objects
derive their payload key together with a stored 32-byte commitment,
checked before the AEAD opens. A malicious sender can no longer make one
multi-recipient envelope or stream decrypt to different plaintexts for
different recipients ("invisible salamanders"), and a password object
opens under at most one password (no partitioning oracles). See
doc/FORMAT_V2.md. - Streams no longer carry the 32-byte salt field.
- Strings with unpaired UTF-16 surrogates are rejected everywhere,
passwords and hybrid transcript identities included.
Added
EncryptedEnvelope.formatVersionandStreamHeader.formatVersion.TrustStore.withClockandPostQuantumCryptoEngine.createTrustStore,
whoseevaluatejudges expiry by the engine's policy clock.- "Format evolution" rules in doc/FORMATS.md. Every parser checks the
format version in one place, so a future format version can keep reading
this one behindSecurityPolicy.acceptLegacyFormats.
Tests
- A real two-key AES-GCM collision ("invisible salamanders") built with
GHASH arithmetic, rejected by the commitment. - Format vectors are now
test/vectors/post_quantum_crypto_v2.json.
v1.0.1 — key metadata, UTF-8 and key store fixes, Codecov, new examples
Fixed
- Key metadata: a label or revocation reason over 4096 UTF-8 bytes is
now rejected when written (ResourceLimitExceededException). Before, it
was written but could not be read back, making the stored key
unrecoverable. - Key metadata: a date beyond
DateTime's range in a key record raises
MalformedDataExceptioninstead of a rawRangeError. - Strings with unpaired UTF-16 surrogates in fields that are decoded
back (authenticated contexts, signed metadata, key labels and revocation
reasons, manifest paths) are rejected withInvalidInputException.
Before, they were silently encoded as U+FFFD, so two distinct context keys
could produce an envelope that no recipient could open, and decoding did
not reproduce the input. Passwords and hybrid transcript identities are
only hashed and keep the 1.0.0 encoding, so existing data stays readable. KeyStore.getchecks that the stored entry holds the requested key
(key id, and private vs public); a swapped or misplaced file raises
InvalidKeyExceptioninstead of returning a different key.FileKeyStorage.deletewaits for pending writes of the same key, so
a delete issued after a write is no longer undone by that write. An
invalid key name fails the returned Future instead of throwing
synchronously.- Stream decryption opens chunks one at a time as they are emitted, so
a large input event no longer holds all its plaintext at once, and
onProgressreports each chunk as it is emitted instead of a batch total
ahead of time.
Documentation
- SECURITY.md: multi-recipient envelopes and streams are not key-committing;
SLH-DSA private-key import takes the public key from the secret key. - README: file APIs and caller-supplied input streams let their own errors
through unchanged. TrustStore.evaluateanddecryptFiledocument their clock and file
permission behaviour.
Examples
- New
example/sharing_and_releases.dart(group sharing with
add/remove recipients, password-based encryption, streaming progress,
signed manifests and artifacts) andexample/key_management.dart
(metadata, rotation, revocation, policies, backup/restore, PEM). The
README lists every example, and CI runs them all.
CI and tests
- Coverage is uploaded to Codecov (
codecov/codecov-action@v7); README
shows the Codecov badge.actions/checkoutupgraded to v7. - New tests for DER/PKCS#8 of every signature algorithm, PKCS#8 v2
embedded public keys, stream decryption cancellation and deferred header
parsing, and the fixes above.
v1.0.0 — initial release
Initial release of post_quantum_crypto: high-level post-quantum cryptography (PQC) in pure Dart. It runs on the Dart VM, Flutter, dart2js and dart2wasm.
⚠️ No independent cryptographic review has been performed. Algorithms are checked against official test vectors and against OpenSSL, but the design has not been audited. Read doc/SECURITY.md before relying on it.
Highlights
- Envelope encryption:
- ML-KEM-512/768/1024 (FIPS 203) and X-Wing recipients.
- Each recipient's data key is wrapped with HPKE (RFC 9180, HKDF-SHA-384), and the payload is AES-256-GCM or ChaCha20-Poly1305.
- One or many recipients, authenticated context, and rewrapping under a fresh data key.
- Streaming and files:
- A STREAM construction that detects reordering, duplication, truncation and appended data.
- Bounded memory, with progress and cancellation.
decryptFilepublishes its output only after the whole file has verified.
- Signatures:
- ML-DSA-44/65/87 (FIPS 204) and SLH-DSA-SHAKE (FIPS 205), with context strings.
- Detached signatures, signed artifacts, signed manifests, and
TrustStore.
- Hybrid key establishment: X-Wing with transcript binding and downgrade rejection. It is unauthenticated; it is not TLS or an authenticated key exchange.
- Keys:
- Seed-form keys, fingerprints and lifecycle metadata.
- SPKI/PKCS#8, interoperable with OpenSSL 3.5+.
- Argon2id-protected exports.
KeyStorewith rotation, revocation and encrypted backup.
- Policy:
SecurityPolicycovers allowed and minimum algorithms, hybrid-only mode, resource limits, and key expiry, revocation and usage. - Swappable backend: pqcrypto, package:cryptography and PointyCastle each sit behind package-owned interfaces.
Entry points: PostQuantumCryptoEngine (configurable) and PostQuantumCrypto (static defaults). File helpers are in package:post_quantum_crypto/post_quantum_crypto_io.dart.
Verification
- Official vectors:
- NIST ACVP for ML-KEM, ML-DSA and SLH-DSA.
- The X-Wing and HPKE-PQ drafts.
- Wycheproof (AES-GCM, ChaCha20-Poly1305, HKDF, HMAC, X25519).
- RFC 9106 (Argon2id).
- OpenSSL interoperability: both directions for ML-KEM, ML-DSA and SLH-DSA.
- CI: Linux, macOS and Windows on the VM; Chrome with dart2js and dart2wasm, with byte-identical output across platforms; parser fuzzing.
- Published format vectors:
test/vectors/post_quantum_crypto_v1.json.
Limitations
- No constant-time or side-channel-resistance claims on any platform. Zeroization is best-effort.
- Flutter mobile is not CI-tested separately; it is the same pure-Dart code as the VM.
- SLH-DSA key generation uses pqcrypto's own
Random.secure(). - Argon2id is slow on web targets.
See CHANGELOG.md, doc/FORMATS.md and doc/BENCHMARKS.md.