Sandboxed URL creation to prevent SSRF attacks #12
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Micro-Learning Topic: Server-side request forgery (Detected by phrase)Matched on "Server-Side Request Forgery"Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerabilities are caused when an attacker can supply or modify a URL that reads or sends data to the server. The attacker can create a malicious request with a manipulated URL, when this request reaches the server, the server-side code executes the exploit URL causing the attacker to be able to read data from services that shouldn't be exposed. Try a challenge in Secure Code Warrior |
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Server-Side Request Forgery
DescriptionServer-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) attacks are a type of security vulnerability wherein a malicious actor can manipulate a parameter on the web application to create or control requests from a vulnerable server. These attacks are often used by attackers to target internal systems that are inaccessible from the external network due to the use of a firewall. The most common case is a server application that, to implement a feature, performs HTTPS requests to a third-party server. This request may be needed to: consume an Internet API, download a package or retrieve user information via a social account (e.g., Facebook, Gravatar). An attacker might abuse the feature to perform requests to another third party or profit from the server's privileges regarding the original third-party system (e.g., to exfiltrate data). In essence, SSRF attacks exploit one of the foundations of robust security, trust, by exploiting existing trust relationships to escalate attacks from applications against other back-end systems or even the server itself. Read moreImpactA successful SSRF attack can enable a malicious attacker to escalate and laterally move their way behind the firewall in the back-end web server without restriction, leading to the potential full compromise of confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the application. The fallout from attacks that have successfully executed SSRF as part of their toolkit will be as extreme as the amount of data at risk. In the case of the infamous 2019 Capital One hack, the numbers speak for themselves: the compromised data included names, addresses, phone numbers, self-reported income, credit scores, and payment histories, among other personal information belonging to approximately 100 million customers in the United States (that is roughly 1/3 of the population) and 6 million customers in Canada. As with so many issues in security, human error undoubtedly played a part in the above example, as the genesis of the breach entry was a misconfigured firewall. ScenariosUsually, client web requests are performed through language functions that support defined classes of protocols, such as HTTP, and make their use very simple for the developer. According to the way the vulnerable request is implemented on the server side, the attacker might be able to reach another website. An attacker can even change the protocol and, for example, use the SSRF attacks remain quite powerful due to firewalls and network security; an attacker able to forge an arbitrary request through the server will benefit from the server's physical/logical position and the active firewall rules. A network resource that is invisible and forbidden to the attacker might be available when the request is executed from the server. A common example is a management server hidden to the outside world but allowed from the server, as it might manage its updates or monitor its usage. Lastly, attackers can monitor the average elapsed time for SSRF directed to open TCP ports and compare it to requests directed to closed or filtered TCP ports. By submitting a fairly small amount of requests, an attacker can map the network and discover open and closed ports that could be the target of further attacks. PreventionIf a list of permitted URLs is known, developers should implement a hostname or IP address allow list for the application. The URLs should never be validated against a deny list; this approach is prone to get easily circumvented using a number of well-known techniques. Developers should disable unused URL schemas if HTTP and HTTPS are the only active protocols the application utilizes to make requests. To reduce the risk of an attacker taking advantage of response data leakage, the developer must ensure that, when sending a request to another server, the raw response is never returned as-is to the client application. When SSRF happens, the main defense-in-depth approach is to lower the trust in the server. This can usually be implemented through firewall rules at the inbound end (e.g., the other server receiving the request), but it's much harder to implement firewall rules at the outbound end due to the nature of TCP. TestingVerify that the application protects against SSRF attacks by validating or sanitizing untrusted data or HTTP file metadata, such as filenames and URL input fields, and that it uses allow lists for protocols, domains, paths, and ports.
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Potential issues, bugs, and flaws that can introduce unwanted behavior.
Code suggestions and improvements for better exception handling, logic, standardization, and consistency.
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PR Details of @pixeebot[bot] in java-design-patterns :
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| * THE SOFTWARE. | ||
| */ | ||
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| import io.github.pixee.security.HostValidator; | ||
| import io.github.pixee.security.Urls; | ||
| import java.net.*; | ||
| import java.io.*; | ||
| import java.nio.channels.*; |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
The imports for HostValidator and Urls from io.github.pixee.security are included, but there is no indication that these classes are being used in the code. This could lead to confusion and maintainability issues.
Recommended Solution:
Remove the unused imports if they are not necessary. If they are intended for future use, consider adding a comment to clarify their purpose.
| } | ||
| }); | ||
| } | ||
| URL website = new URL(urlString); | ||
| URL website = Urls.create(urlString, Urls.HTTP_PROTOCOLS, HostValidator.DENY_COMMON_INFRASTRUCTURE_TARGETS); | ||
| ReadableByteChannel rbc; | ||
| rbc = Channels.newChannel(website.openStream()); | ||
| FileOutputStream fos = new FileOutputStream(destination); |
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The Authenticator class is set with a default username and password from environment variables, but the password is stored in a char[] and not cleared after use. This can lead to potential security issues as the password remains in memory.
Recommended Solution:
Clear the char[] containing the password after it is used to enhance security. This can be done by setting each element of the array to \0 after the PasswordAuthentication object is created.
| */ | ||
| package com.iluwatar.promise; | ||
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| import io.github.pixee.security.HostValidator; | ||
| import io.github.pixee.security.Urls; | ||
| import java.io.BufferedReader; | ||
| import java.io.File; | ||
| import java.io.FileReader; |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
The import statements for HostValidator and Urls from the io.github.pixee.security package are not used in the provided code fragment. Unused imports can lead to confusion and should be removed to improve code maintainability and readability.
| */ | ||
| public static String downloadFile(String urlString) throws IOException { | ||
| LOGGER.info("Downloading contents from url: {}", urlString); | ||
| var url = new URL(urlString); | ||
| var url = Urls.create(urlString, Urls.HTTP_PROTOCOLS, HostValidator.DENY_COMMON_INFRASTRUCTURE_TARGETS); | ||
| var file = File.createTempFile("promise_pattern", null); | ||
| try (var bufferedReader = new BufferedReader(new InputStreamReader(url.openStream())); | ||
| var writer = new FileWriter(file)) { |
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The downloadFile method does not handle potential exceptions that could be thrown by Urls.create. If Urls.create throws an exception, it will not be caught, and the method will fail without providing a meaningful error message. It is important to handle such exceptions to ensure the method can fail gracefully and provide useful feedback.
Recommended Solution:
Wrap the call to Urls.create in a try-catch block and handle the exception appropriately, possibly logging an error message and rethrowing a custom exception if necessary.
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Please double check the following review of the pull request:Issues counts
Changes in the diff
Identified Issues
Issue 1: Lack of unit tests for new URL creation logicExplanation: Code to address the issue: // Test for MavenWrapperDownloader.java
import io.github.pixee.security.HostValidator;
import io.github.pixee.security.Urls;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;
import java.net.URL;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.*;
class MavenWrapperDownloaderTest {
@Test
void testUrlCreation() throws Exception {
String urlString = "http://example.com";
URL url = Urls.create(urlString, Urls.HTTP_PROTOCOLS, HostValidator.DENY_COMMON_INFRASTRUCTURE_TARGETS);
assertNotNull(url);
assertEquals("http", url.getProtocol());
assertEquals("example.com", url.getHost());
}
}
// Test for Utility.java
import io.github.pixee.security.HostValidator;
import io.github.pixee.security.Urls;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;
import java.net.URL;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.*;
class UtilityTest {
@Test
void testDownloadFileUrlCreation() throws Exception {
String urlString = "http://example.com";
URL url = Urls.create(urlString, Urls.HTTP_PROTOCOLS, HostValidator.DENY_COMMON_INFRASTRUCTURE_TARGETS);
assertNotNull(url);
assertEquals("http", url.getProtocol());
assertEquals("example.com", url.getHost());
}
}Explanation of the fix: Issue 2: Missing comments explaining the purpose of
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Issues Summary1. Project not foundLogs Summary: Failed to execute goal org.sonarsource.scanner.maven:sonar-maven-plugin:3.9.1.2184:sonar (default-cli) on project java-design-patterns: Project not found. Please check the 'sonar.projectKey' and 'sonar.organization' properties, the 'SONAR_TOKEN' environment variable, or contact the project administrator to check the permissions of the user the token belongs toFailing Step: org.sonarsource.scanner.maven:sonar-maven-plugin:3.9.1.2184:sonar (default-cli) Related Source Files: java-design-patterns Related Failures: ℹ️ Help(You can turn this bot off by adding a comment/ai off, or force a refresh of this report with /ai ...)
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Description
The pull request includes the following changes:
HostValidatorandUrlsfrom theio.github.pixee.securitypackage inUtility.java.URLto useUrls.create(...)method with specific security parameters inUtility.java.<versions.java-security-toolkit>1.2.0</versions.java-security-toolkit>in the<properties>section ofpom.xml.<dependency>forjava-security-toolkitin the<dependencyManagement>and<dependencies>sections ofpom.xml.HostValidatorandUrlsinUtility.java.URLwithUrls.create(...)method with specific security parameters inUtility.java.These changes enhance security by integrating the use of a custom security toolkit for URL handling.