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MyOwnPKI v0.1.0

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@github-actions github-actions released this 22 Oct 06:59
· 592 commits to main since this release

The first release: MyOwnPKI replaces the pki.sh Bash suite in the browser (phase 1 of
docs/PLAN.md). Start with docs/OPERATIONS.md.

Added

  • CA engine: root and intermediate CAs (online, or an offline root with the signing bundle for
    OpenSSL), CA renewal with a new key, retirement and revocation; leaf certificates from a CSR or
    with a server-generated key; built-in presets (server, client, server-client, S/MIME, code
    signing, timestamping, OCSP, custom) ported from pki.sh; name constraints, CA limits and the
    policy checks of PLAN §6 – extensions always come from the preset, never from the CSR.
  • Revocation and CRLs: revocation with RFC 5280 reasons (keyCompromise blocks the key for later
    requests), CRLs signed at once and renewed in the background, the offline root's CRL uploaded;
    CRLs and CA certificates on the public listener, including the URLs of imported pki.sh CAs.
  • Key protection: every CA and certificate key encrypted (AES-256-GCM under a root key wrapped
    with an Argon2id key from the unseal passphrase, plus a recovery key); the server starts sealed;
    seal and unseal audited; myownpki passphrase change and passphrase reset (with the recovery
    key).
  • Audit log: hash-chained instance and tenant logs with signed checkpoints;
    myownpki audit verify and the audit pages.
  • Sign-in: password (Argon2id, common-password check) plus TOTP and recovery codes, passkeys as
    second factor when auth.passkey_origin is set (through the API only, see below), step-up for dangerous actions, lockout and
    throttling, roles per tenant (viewer, operator, admin) and instance admins; API tokens.
  • REST API /api/v1 (OpenAPI 3.1 in api/openapi.yaml, 58 operations, RFC 9457 problems).
  • Web UI: dashboard, certificates (issue wizard, detail, revoke, renew, download, export as
    PKCS#12 or PEM with "delete the key afterwards"), CAs including the offline signing flow, presets,
    users and roles, tenant settings, audit log, legacy import, own account; light and dark theme;
    no inline styles or scripts (strict CSP).
  • Legacy import of a pki.sh directory (myownpki import legacy, or an archive upload in the
    UI): serial numbers, revocations (time and reason) and CRL numbers stay identical; dry run first.
  • Backup and restore: myownpki backup while the server runs, backup verify, restore with
    hash, integrity, audit-chain and name-index checks.
  • Operations: myownpki init (interactive, --stdin for automation, --demo),
    myownpki healthcheck, config check, db status / db migrate, user unlock / reset-2fa;
    a self-signed bootstrap certificate for the admin listener with its fingerprint in the log.
  • Release: archives for linux/amd64, linux/arm64, darwin/arm64, windows/amd64 and
    freebsd/amd64 (pure Go, reproducible), SPDX SBOMs, a checksum file signed keyless with cosign,
    and the container image ghcr.io/der-felix/myownpki (distroless, non-root, signed);
    deploy/docker-compose.yml for a single server.

Security

  • Built with Go 1.27.3 (fixes GO-2026-6809 / CVE-2026-111943: crypto/x509 now refuses known
    compromised intermediate certificates when verifying a chain).

Known limitations

  • No ACME server yet (v0.2), no agent and no monitoring yet (v0.3) – see the release plan in
    docs/PLAN.md §10.1.
  • Passkeys work only through the REST API in v0.1 – registering one, and using it to sign in
    or to confirm an action (/api/v1/auth/webauthn/*, /api/v1/users/me/webauthn). The web UI
    has no passkey button yet: it needs a small browser script that is not approved yet (ADR-04).
    The UI lists a user's passkeys and removes them; sign-in in the browser uses the authenticator
    app (TOTP).
  • One tenant (default); the tenant UI comes later.