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MyOwnPKI v0.1.0
The first release: MyOwnPKI replaces the pki.sh Bash suite in the browser (phase 1 of
docs/PLAN.md). Start with docs/OPERATIONS.md.
Added
- CA engine: root and intermediate CAs (online, or an offline root with the signing bundle for
OpenSSL), CA renewal with a new key, retirement and revocation; leaf certificates from a CSR or
with a server-generated key; built-in presets (server, client, server-client, S/MIME, code
signing, timestamping, OCSP, custom) ported frompki.sh; name constraints, CA limits and the
policy checks of PLAN §6 – extensions always come from the preset, never from the CSR. - Revocation and CRLs: revocation with RFC 5280 reasons (keyCompromise blocks the key for later
requests), CRLs signed at once and renewed in the background, the offline root's CRL uploaded;
CRLs and CA certificates on the public listener, including the URLs of importedpki.shCAs. - Key protection: every CA and certificate key encrypted (AES-256-GCM under a root key wrapped
with an Argon2id key from the unseal passphrase, plus a recovery key); the server starts sealed;
seal and unseal audited;myownpki passphrase changeandpassphrase reset(with the recovery
key). - Audit log: hash-chained instance and tenant logs with signed checkpoints;
myownpki audit verifyand the audit pages. - Sign-in: password (Argon2id, common-password check) plus TOTP and recovery codes, passkeys as
second factor whenauth.passkey_originis set (through the API only, see below), step-up for dangerous actions, lockout and
throttling, roles per tenant (viewer, operator, admin) and instance admins; API tokens. - REST API
/api/v1(OpenAPI 3.1 inapi/openapi.yaml, 58 operations, RFC 9457 problems). - Web UI: dashboard, certificates (issue wizard, detail, revoke, renew, download, export as
PKCS#12 or PEM with "delete the key afterwards"), CAs including the offline signing flow, presets,
users and roles, tenant settings, audit log, legacy import, own account; light and dark theme;
no inline styles or scripts (strict CSP). - Legacy import of a
pki.shdirectory (myownpki import legacy, or an archive upload in the
UI): serial numbers, revocations (time and reason) and CRL numbers stay identical; dry run first. - Backup and restore:
myownpki backupwhile the server runs,backup verify,restorewith
hash, integrity, audit-chain and name-index checks. - Operations:
myownpki init(interactive,--stdinfor automation,--demo),
myownpki healthcheck,config check,db status/db migrate,user unlock/reset-2fa;
a self-signed bootstrap certificate for the admin listener with its fingerprint in the log. - Release: archives for linux/amd64, linux/arm64, darwin/arm64, windows/amd64 and
freebsd/amd64 (pure Go, reproducible), SPDX SBOMs, a checksum file signed keyless with cosign,
and the container imageghcr.io/der-felix/myownpki(distroless, non-root, signed);
deploy/docker-compose.ymlfor a single server.
Security
- Built with Go 1.27.3 (fixes GO-2026-6809 / CVE-2026-111943:
crypto/x509now refuses known
compromised intermediate certificates when verifying a chain).
Known limitations
- No ACME server yet (v0.2), no agent and no monitoring yet (v0.3) – see the release plan in
docs/PLAN.md §10.1. - Passkeys work only through the REST API in v0.1 – registering one, and using it to sign in
or to confirm an action (/api/v1/auth/webauthn/*,/api/v1/users/me/webauthn). The web UI
has no passkey button yet: it needs a small browser script that is not approved yet (ADR-04).
The UI lists a user's passkeys and removes them; sign-in in the browser uses the authenticator
app (TOTP). - One tenant (
default); the tenant UI comes later.