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MyOwnPKI v0.3.1
Guided agent installation and packages, independent Windows trust confirmation, configurable
step-up and protected-action continuation, and safe predecessor handling for UI, REST, ACME and
agent deployments.
Added
- Independent root trust verification: the public trust page, authenticated CA details and guided
agent installation show authoritative SHA-256 and display-only SHA-1 for Windows certificate dialog
comparison. Root CA details expose an exact 64-hex SHA-256 automation value; pending CAs show no
empty fingerprints. Windows helpers no longer embed an expected hash: they compute both values and
import only after a matching independent-ExpectedSha256or explicit interactive SHA-256
confirmation. Strict argument validation, changed/mismatched certificate refusal, quiet-mode fail
closed behavior and elevated-child reauthorization prevent accidental or self-confirmed imports. - Guided Linux agent setup and packages: GoReleaser nFPM builds
.deband.rpmfor Linux
amd64/arm64 with anoreplaceconffile, example systemd files and no maintainer scripts or
autostart. The sharedmyownpki-agent setupverifies the independent root SHA-256, securely reads
optional join-token files, writes configuration/units atomically, preserves custom configuration,
polls pending enrollments and enables or restarts only enrolled agents. Tarballs and packages use
the same implementation.install-agent.shis now a deprecated verified-download forwarding
wrapper with default version 0.3.1. - Verified agent distribution and guided installation:
install.shstages the exact release's
.deb,.rpmand tarballs for both Linux architectures after checking every artifact against
checksums.txt, and restores the previous complete distribution when a server update rolls back.
Docker contains the same immutable files under/opt/myownpki/agent-dist;agent.package_dir
selects the host/container directory. The agent listener allows anonymousGET/HEADonly for
the manifest-listed artifacts and checksums, with exact-name, size, method, traversal and symlink
protections; RPC authentication is unchanged. Agents → Install agent requires admin and fresh
step-up and generates the full verified download/install/setup flow from independent UI root and
package hashes. Its optional exact-host token is one-use, expires after 15 minutes, appears only
in the one-time response and is consumed through a 0600 file, never argv, URLs or logs. Agent
reports additively carry the installed format (pki.db migration 0015 and protobuf field 5), and
strict SemVer update hints cover only older agents, including correct prerelease ordering and no
suggested downgrade. - Configurable predecessor handling on renewal: choose immediate, delayed (1–30 days) or no
revocation, always with reasonsuperseded. Tenant defaults are independent for agent deployments
and other certificates, with agent-wide, per-deployment and one-operation overrides. Current
migration defaults are owner-confirmed (agent: immediately after confirmed deployment; other
certificates: after seven days), recorded indocs/PHASE3.md§8.4.
Non-agent ACME renewals require the same account and exact normalized name set, with an optional
admin-audited per-account override in UI and REST; shared accounts should use one per host or
never. Agent actions
start only at an accepted deployed report with exact proof: a served TLS fingerprint always wins,
with the leaf fingerprint read back after the atomic write as the check-less fallback. A written
fingerprint never replaces a missing TLS proof and legacy agents without either field cause no action. Exact
account/order/name mapping and a real serial transition are required; failed, rolled-back,
currently serving, foreign-account and ambiguous certificates are protected. Delayed agent plans
start at server-recorded deployment time and repeated reports never duplicate or move plans. - Planned revocations: certificate lists/details and agent deployments show
Revocation planned,
the certificate filter and dashboard cover plans due within seven days, and authorized users can
plan, cancel or revoke now with step-up and audit. The scheduler executes due plans idempotently,
including restart/unseal catch-up; CRL publication follows the committed transaction through the
existing CRL jobs. Additive system.db migration 0013 and pki.db migration 0014 create no revocations
or schedules on upgrade with unchanged serials. REST adds renewal policy fields, plan/cancel
endpoints, planned timestamps and agent/deployment policy endpoints; legacyrevoke_previous
remains supported. - Web action continuation after step-up: protected forms show a safe action summary and run once
after the second factor, without asking for their inputs again. In-memory pending actions use
256-bit IDs in POST fields only, are bound to the session, user and credentials epoch, expire after
five minutes independently of the configured proof lifetime, and are consumed atomically before
the existing authorized handler. Replay, concurrent clicks, restart and business failure cannot
repeat the action; downloads, one-time secrets and multipart legacy imports keep their response
behavior. A new confirmation replaces the session's previous one, global entry/archive budgets
reject unbounded growth, and every store operation reclaims expired state. REST step-up responses
and the OpenAPI contract are unchanged. - Tenant-configurable step-up lifetime: tenant admins can choose 5, 10, 15, 30 or 60 minutes
(default 5) in Tenant settings or through the additivestep_up_minutesREST field. Changes
are audited and apply only to new TOTP, recovery-code and passkey proofs; each session snapshots
the lifetime, so existing proofs are unchanged. system.db migration 0012 adds the setting and
per-session snapshots, with five minutes retained for existing sessions.