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v1.1.0 (2026-09-26)
The optional global IP gate
Added
Optional global IP gate (GuardFairing::with_ip_gate over the new engine IpGateConfig): whitelist, blacklist, and exempt_ips lists parsed once at startup (invalid entry is a config error, fail closed), evaluated in on_request before the metadata scan on the request's client IP - a blacklisted client IP, or one a non-empty whitelist matches neither directly nor through exempt_ips, is refused with 403 Forbidden, including the unrouted-path 404 rewrite so probe traffic never reveals route inventory. exempt_ips is the skip-list for known-friendly automation: it sets the same skip state a whitelist match sets but never adds a deny path and never opens the whitelist gate; the blacklist and detection still apply to exempt IPs. Requests without a client IP (Rocket's local test client) are not attributed and still screened by detection
Changed
guard-core-engine dependency pinned to the published 4.1.0 release (path dep kept for local builds and CI against a sibling guard-core-rs checkout), carrying the stateful sliding-window rate limiter and dynamic IP ban engine, the tower stage with a reusable decide(), and the new detection stages (request size/content, user-agent, headers/auth, cloud provider blocking, geo blocking)
The request body is no longer scanned as one lossy blob: it is routed by content type through the engine's body-value extraction (guard-core 4.0.4 parity, upstream commit 5f399234), and every extracted value is scanned through the normal detect path with its reference context - urlencoded field values under request_body:form_field, multipart part entries (label scan, filename="..." entry with RFC 2231 handling, raw part headers, payload) under request_body:multipart_field, embedded JSON leaves under the :embedded_json suffix, JSON mongo operator keys ($where, $ne, ...) as direct nosql hits, and the whole-body blob only as the fallback for plain or unparseable bodies
Binary-dense multipart file-part payloads are reduced to printable runs of at least detection_binary_min_run_length (default 16) before pattern scanning, so compressed upload bytes stop producing attack-shaped matches while text embedded in uploads still scans in full; text uploads, text parts without a filename, and whole-body fallback scans keep their full scan
403/413/500 short-circuit responses now carry the bare message (Suspicious activity detected, Payload too large, Security check failed) as text/plain; charset=utf-8, matching the Python family's block-response convention, instead of the JSON {"detail":"..."} shape