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v1.5.0
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v1.5.0 (2026-10-09)
The consumption release: the unified config, the route-config carrier knobs, the response-pass funnels, and the behavioral lanes land, training with the 4.3.2 route-config engine (v1.5.0)
Note
- Trains with the engine: the
guard-core-engineandguard-core-rsfloors move to 4.3.2 (the route-config train)
Added
- The
get_cloud_providers_to_checkroute-over-global resolution (the RC2 rocket leg, over guard-core-rs#105'sdecide_route): the carrier route'sblock_cloud_providerslist replaces the global one for the request (an empty route list falls back to the global config), an invalid route selector fails secure (the reference validates at decoration time), the global lane stays untouched off-route, and thecloudsbypass skips the whole arm; six end-to-end twins drive the override, the route block, the off-route hold, the fallback, the fail-secure arm, and the bypass - The carrier's stage knobs at the per-stage seams (the RC1 rocket leg): the
(method, path)carrier's remaining reference knobs consume at their pipeline positions through the engine's decision cores -ip_whitelist/ip_blacklist(theRouteIpGatearm before the global gate: a configured whitelist takes over the route verdict and skips the global lists,skip_ip_lists; the blacklist denies the reference403 Forbidden; an invalid entry fails secure), per-route countries (blocked_countries/whitelist_countriesthroughgeo::check_countries, a passing route whitelist skipping the global geo stage,skip_countries; no geo handler leaves the request alone),required_headersplus the auth group and the api-key group (headers_auth::decideover the carrier rules with the route verifiers, therequiredsentinel, the fixed401shape),custom_validators(decide_custom_validatorsunder the referenceanonymousname, the validator's own status, the truthy non-response and the declining validator passing through),require_referrer(the referrer core's403shapes),time_restrictions(thestart/end/timezonedict through the time-window core, missing bounds fail-open), andenable_suspicious_detection = falseskipping the scan for its route (detection_enabled); thirteen end-to-end twins drive every knob on a matching route and its off-route silence - The
security_headers_appliedfunnel (the H6 rocket leg, over guard-core-rs#103's composer and #104's accessor): when the security-header set lands on a forwarded response and the bus is installed, the fairing'son_responsepass composessecurity_headers_applied_eventand dispatches it over the bus - actionheaders_addedover thesecurity_headershandler, metadatapath(display-redacted),headers_count(the rendered set, before the CORS verdict and the response modifier touch the view),has_csp,has_hsts; only the forwarded lane fires (the pipeline passed,Verdict::Clean, and no route guard refused - the referenceprocess_responseshape that carries the request path), guard-generated answers (blocks, the redirect, the fail-secure500) apply the headers without firing (the reference'screate_error_responselane), and a disabled set renders nothing and dispatches nothing - The CORS preflight short-circuit and the behavioral usage rules in the pipeline (the GAP-R10 rocket leg, over guard-core-rs#95's engine surface): an OPTIONS request carrying
access-control-request-methodhas its preflight answer computed inon_request(the referenceis_preflight+build_preflight_response;cors::is_preflight+build_preflight_responsefrom the resolved CORS config) andon_responsereplaces whatever Rocket composed with it - a preflight answer is200/400, statuses the fairing decides (Rocket's fairings cannot answer mid-flight, so the answer rides a request-local slot and the handler's output is never observed); CORS disabled or no response processor leaves OPTIONS to the pipeline. The route carrier's usage/frequencybehavior_rulestrack per request through the response processor's shared tracker with a crossedbanrendering the activity-banned shape (the referenceprocess_usage_rules, dispatched from the request pass before the check pipeline) - The maintenance trio and the full status payload (the GAP-R9 rocket leg):
GuardFairing::reset(the referencereset(): the rate-limit windows drop, bans and violation counts untouched),refresh_cloud_ip_ranges+with_cloud_refresh_scheduler(the referencerefresh_cloud_ip_ranges: one single-flight background refresh through the facade'sCloudRefreshScheduler- the refreshed ranges land in the shared table, each provider's row restamped,falsewith no scheduler installed or while one is in flight, the reference's concurrent-caller gate), andagent_statsanswering the reference property's no-agent shape ({"enabled": false, "degraded": false}, theAgentStatstype re-exported); the status payload's provider rows carry the referenceget_statusshape -ready,last_refreshed(the unix-second stamp of the last range load,nullbefore one, fromCloudIpTable::provider_status), andentries- with the geo-ip component rendering theIpInfoManagerhealth snapshot ({ready, last_refreshed, entries}) when the lifecycle manager is wired (the bareconfiguredflag andnullstay for the trait-only and absent arms) - The WebSocket guard for Rocket's official
rocket_wssurface (fastapi-guardguard/websocket.py'smake_guard_websocket, the GAP-A9 rocket leg):.manage(make_guard_websocket(WebSocketGuardConfig))+ theWebSocketGuardrequest guard onrocket_wsroutes runs the reference check sequence before the handshake completes - fail-secure unknown address, the ban arm, theis_ip_allowedgate + country arms (a whitelist match skips countries), thewsrate limit (skipped for whitelisted IPs), then the path/query/header penetration scan - and a blocked handshake answers403 Forbiddenpre-accept with the close shape onx-guard-websocket-close/x-guard-websocket-close-reason(1008 Policy Violationpolicy denials,1013 Try Again Latermalfunctions, the panic in the check sequence contained). The guard also covers frames after the upgrade:WebSocketGuard::scan_framescans one text/binary message through the engine (control frames pass), answers the reference close shape (close_frame+stream_error), and feeds the shared violation store installed bywith_violation_feed(the reference's sharedsuspicious_request_counts): a crossed threshold bans the address through the sharedIpBanManager, and the next handshake's ban arm rejects it;rocket_wsrides in as a dependency - The reference route-config carrier consumption (
GuardFairing::with_route_configs+set_route_config, the GAP-R2 rocket leg): the engine'sRouteConfigResolver((method, path) -> Option<Arc<RouteConfig>>) resolves the route'sRouteConfigonce peron_requestpass - a carrier stashed withset_route_configwins over the resolver (the referencerequest.state.route_configidiom) - and the pipeline consumes it with the reference semantics:bypassed_checks(and the"all"wildcard) skip the named reference checks at their pipeline positions (the fused stages map as documented:required_headers/authenticationskip the headers-auth stage,ip_securityskips the gate, ban, and geo arms,suspicious_activityskips the scan and its violation feed,rate_limitskips the whole tiers pass),require_httpsrides the HTTPS stage's carrier lane (decide_route; with no stage installed the route arm still composes the reference301),max_request_sizereplaces the body cap the data guard enforces,blocked_user_agentsruns additively before the global filter through the trusted-compile lane (a non-compilable route pattern fails secure500), the rate-limit group becomes the route's tier (an invalid tier fails secure), and the detection-exclusion group resolves through the engine's detection view;RouteConfig/RouteConfigResolverre-exported - The unified-config consumption (
GuardFairing::from_security_config, the GAP-R1 rocket leg): the 129-fieldSecurityConfig(the fieldized reference surface in guard-core-engine) builds the wired pipeline in one call - the detection budgets ontoDetectConfig, the IP lists onto the gate, the rate-limit knobs onto the limiter, the ban group ontoIpBanManager+IpBanConfig,enforce_https/trust_x_forwarded_protoonto the HTTPS stage,emergency_mode+ its whitelist onto the emergency stage,custom_error_responses/on_blockonto the response surface, the detection-exclusion group (with the reference's empty-set-disables-all-categories semantics) onto the scan, the observability group onto the log/redaction knobs, ReDoS-validatedblocked_user_agents, and the security-headers/CORS/behavior response pass; invalid values fail closed through the new typedGuardConfigError; the referenceexclude_pathscarve-out lands as a first-class builder consumed first in the pipeline (an excluded path bypasses every request-side check, gate included, the response pass still renders);SecurityConfig,SecurityConfigError,GuardConfigError, and theLogLevel/LogFormat/BufferOverflowPolicyknob enums re-exported
Changed
- The bypass consumption now uses the reference's coarse query vocabulary (the ip gate, the route IP restrictions, and the country arms query
ip; the ban armip_ban; the cloud-provider checkclouds; the rate limiterrate_limit; the penetration scanpenetration; the"all"wildcard matches every query) - the previous wave keyed the bypass on the 17 stage names, a vocabulary the reference never queries (the stages it named are not route-bypassable in the reference at all, and their bypass conditions are removed); therequire_httpscarrier lane falls back to the HTTPS stage's own resolver seam when no carrier route applies, and the custom-checks seam carries the body slot the engine's validator contract defines (decide_custom_request/decide_custom_validatorstake the body; the fairing'son_requestphase never sees one - Rocket's data guard owns the stream - so it passesNone, the two-phase flow's documented divergence) - The IP-gate denial path now renders the reference ip_filter behavior end to end: passive mode logs the crossing and forwards (no verdict stashed, no gate decision downstream), the
on_blockhook fires once with the reference payload keys (ip_security), and the custom-error body override wins over the family default - previously the gate denial rendered the family body unconditionally and skipped both - The CI coverage gate computes line coverage from the lcov export's per-line DA records instead of llvm-cov's summary table: llvm-cov 22's summary aggregation falsely reports missed lines that no line-level view (show text/html, lcov, cobertura, the JSON segment list) can see on the same profdata, and the divergence persists on the newest available toolchain (cargo-llvm-cov 0.9.1 + rustc 1.99.0). The gate keeps the same fail-closed 100%-lines semantics with nothing hidden or excluded; the summary table stays in the job as an informational printout. Evidence linked in the workflow (#37)