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Research Non Custodial Pool
Status: experimental Pool Protocol v7. It reduces delegated block authority, but does not yet provide a complete trustless shared-pool system.
Hyphen separates two powers that conventional pools often combine:
shared reward variance reduction
AND
miner-held final block authorization
The pool can account for shares, operate VarDiff, relay templates, and provide PPLNS/PPS/FPPS calculations. It cannot produce a consensus-valid block for a miner unless that miner authorizes the exact solved header and reward keys.
This document calls the node-to-pool Template Provider protocol TP v5 and the pool-to-miner protobuf protocol Pool v7. Legacy Stratum V1 is a local share-only adapter; it cannot carry the frozen block authorization and is forbidden on mainnet mode.
- The node validates consensus and supplies a chain-bound base template.
- The pool authenticates miners, maintains share difficulty, relays work, and records settlement events.
- The miner owns an Ed25519 protocol identity and a separate
hy1...payout address. It validates each job before spending work. - The chain accepts only blocks with a valid miner block authorization.
Pool and miner identity keys are raw 32-byte protocol secrets. They are not wallet seeds and do not replace wallet backup.
- TP v5 binds signed requests and templates to network magic, consensus parameters hash, and genesis hash.
- Pool v7 login sends the miner identity, payout view/spend public keys, thread count, and the same chain identity.
- The pool personalizes the header with the miner public key and advertises
exact reward keys, transaction blobs, transaction root, difficulty, epoch
seed, chain length (
pouw_chain_length) and the parent work commitment the miner must chain its witness list into. - The miner recomputes the transaction root and rejects chain, header,
difficulty, depth, miner-key, or reward-key mismatches. A shared mode may
redirect coinbase to the pool wallet only when the miner explicitly starts
with
--allow-shared-reward-recipient. - The miner searches its nonce residue class. Ordinary shares are the same
header-bound claim judged against the share difficulty; they carry no
reusable block authorization. A full-block solution carries
BlockAuthorizationsigned by the miner over the full solved header, chain identity, and reward keys. - The pool recomputes PoW and verifies miner authorization before relaying a full block to the node.
- Every accepted share result has a pool-signed envelope and a hash-chain receipt committing to pool identity, miner identity, sequence, previous receipt, exact submission hash, and exact result hash. The miner recomputes the receipt and keeps a bounded queue of unanswered submissions.
| Property | Current enforcement |
|---|---|
| Share identity binding | Signed envelopes and per-session sender checks |
| Replay resistance | Signed envelope nonce/freshness checks and a 4,096-entry submission-nonce window |
| Miner-specific work | Header commits the miner public key |
| Template integrity after receipt | Miner recomputes the transaction root and validates all advertised metadata |
| Reward redirection resistance | Miner checks payout keys; consensus authorization commits exact reward keys |
| Pool cannot finish a block alone | Consensus requires the miner's authorization over the solved header |
| Share omission/substitution detection | Miner-verified, sequence-linked share receipts |
| Publicly inspectable local accounting | Wallet-scoped HTTP summaries and persisted settlement history |
| Ledger crash recovery | Atomic next-file replacement plus last committed backup recovery |
These properties mean a pool cannot take an already authorized solution and change its transactions, reward address, chain, or miner identity. They do not mean the pool has no remaining control.
| Attack | Status | Remaining work |
|---|---|---|
| Share stealing | Mitigated for identity substitution and payload replay | Test hostile proxies, reconnect races, and same-identity key compromise |
| Template hijacking | Post-delivery mutation is detected | Pool currently chooses the transaction list it sends; miner-originated job declaration is not exposed through Pool v6 |
| Pool censorship / MEV | Not solved | Add miner-selected transaction sets or direct miner-to-TP job declaration with bounded validation and fallback nodes |
| Block withholding by miner | Not solved | Economic detection/penalties require a formal model and cannot prove a private solution existed |
| Block withholding by pool | Not solved | Miner needs a safe direct submission path or encrypted/adaptor relay design after finding a block |
| Clandestine pools | Not solved | Non-transferability against deliberate off-protocol work sale needs a separate cryptographic construction and impossibility analysis |
| Payout griefing | Receipts expose accepted-share omission or mutation | Shared balances still depend on the operator to create on-chain payouts |
| Ledger forgery | Local snapshot recovery and miner receipts improve auditability | Publish append-only checkpoints, inclusion proofs, independent mirrors, and reconciliation tooling |
| Pool hopping | PPLNS uses a work-weighted trailing window | Strategy simulation and parameter calibration are still required; PROP/PPS economics remain operator-dependent |
The present shared modes (prop, pps, pplns, pps+, fpps) produce
internal pending_payout_atomic entries. No automatic transaction builder,
broadcaster, confirmation tracker, reserve proof, or solvency guarantee exists.
Those entries MUST NOT be represented as wallet funds or completed payments.
A future protocol revision should be evaluated before implementation and should include:
- Miner-declared transaction sets with deterministic size/fee policy and TP validation, without allowing unbounded parsing or memory use.
- Direct full-block fallback submission that does not expose a transferable solution before miner authorization is fixed.
- Periodic Merkle commitments to accepted share receipts and settlement events, with miner inclusion proofs and independent archival mirrors.
- A specified payout transaction state machine: constructed, signed, broadcast, confirmed, reorged, retried, and reconciled.
- Simulation and fault injection for withholding, delayed replies, reordered receipts, disk corruption, pool hopping, and adversarial VarDiff changes.
Activation requires a standalone specification, test vectors, a reference verifier, cryptographic review, and evidence that each claimed property follows from the protocol rather than from operator policy.
The miner-bound authorization plus auditable share-receipt chain is project-specific work, not proof of academic novelty or patent freedom. A novelty claim requires a documented prior-art search and independent review against at least decentralized pool protocols, job-declaration protocols, blind/adaptor signatures, non-outsourceable puzzles, and payment-channel or commitment-ledger systems. Standard cryptographic primitives should remain in reviewed libraries; reimplementing them merely to look different would reduce security.
状态:实验性 Pool Protocol v7。它减少了委托的区块权限,但尚未提供完整的无信任共享矿池系统。
Hyphen 将传统矿池经常合并的两种权力分开:
共享奖励方差降低
以及
矿工持有最终区块授权
矿池可以统计 share、运行 VarDiff、转发 template 并提供 PPLNS/PPS/FPPS 计算。除非矿工授权精确的已求解区块头和奖励密钥,否则矿池不能为该矿工生成共识有效区块。
本文把 node-to-pool Template Provider 协议称为 TP v5,把 pool-to-miner protobuf 协议称为 Pool v7。旧 Stratum V1 只是本地 share adapter,无法携带冻结区块授权,在 mainnet 模式下禁用。旧的 --standalone 内置伪链同样 fail-closed 禁用;生产入口必须连接真实主链 Template Provider。
- 节点验证共识并提供绑定链的基础 template。
- 矿池认证矿工、维护 share 难度、转发工作并记录结算事件。
- 矿工拥有 Ed25519 协议身份和独立的
hy1...收款地址,并在消耗工作量前验证每个 job。 - 链只接受带有有效矿工区块授权的区块。
矿池和矿工身份密钥是原始 32 字节协议 secret,不是钱包种子,也不能替代钱包备份。
- TP v4 把签名请求和 template 绑定到 network magic、共识参数哈希和创世哈希。
- Pool v6 登录发送矿工身份、收款 view/spend 公钥、线程数和相同链身份。
- 矿池以矿工公钥个性化区块头,并公布精确奖励密钥、交易 blob、交易根、难度、epoch seed、链长(
pouw_chain_length)以及矿工必须把见证列表链入的父区块工作量承诺。 - 矿工重算交易根,并拒绝链、区块头、难度、深度、矿工密钥或奖励密钥不匹配。只有矿工明确以
--allow-shared-reward-recipient启动时,共享模式才可把 coinbase 重定向到矿池钱包。 - 矿工在自己的 nonce 余数类上搜索。普通 share 就是用相同区块头绑定的 claim 对照 share 难度判定,不携带可复用区块授权。完整区块解携带
BlockAuthorization,由矿工对完整已求解区块头、链身份和奖励密钥签名。 - 矿池重算 PoW 并验证矿工授权,然后才把完整区块转发给节点。
- 每个接受的 share 结果具有矿池签名 envelope 和 hash-chain receipt,承诺矿池身份、矿工身份、序号、前一 receipt、精确提交哈希和精确结果哈希。矿工重算 receipt,并保留有界的未回答提交队列。
| 性质 | 当前强制方式 |
|---|---|
| Share 身份绑定 | 签名 envelope 与逐 session sender 检查 |
| 重放抵抗 | 签名 envelope nonce/新鲜度检查及 4,096 项 submission nonce 窗口 |
| 矿工特定工作 | 区块头承诺矿工公钥 |
| 接收后的 template 完整性 | 矿工重算交易根并验证所有公布元数据 |
| 奖励重定向抵抗 | 矿工检查收款密钥;共识授权承诺精确奖励密钥 |
| 矿池不能独自完成区块 | 共识要求矿工对已求解区块头授权 |
| Share 遗漏/替换检测 | 矿工验证的序列链接 share receipt |
| 可公开检查的本地账目 | 按钱包划分的 HTTP summary 和持久化结算历史 |
| 账本崩溃恢复 | 原子 next-file 替换与最近已提交备份恢复 |
这些性质意味着矿池不能拿已授权解去更换交易、奖励地址、链或矿工身份,但并不意味着矿池不再有控制权。
| 攻击 | 状态 | 剩余工作 |
|---|---|---|
| Share stealing | 缓解身份替换和 payload 重放 | 测试恶意代理、重连竞态及同身份密钥泄露 |
| Template hijacking | 可检测交付后修改 | Pool v6 尚未暴露矿工发起的 job declaration,矿池仍选择发送的交易列表 |
| 矿池审查/MEV | 未解决 | 增加矿工选择交易集,或矿工直连 TP 的 job declaration,并提供有界验证和备用节点 |
| 矿工扣留区块 | 未解决 | 经济检测/惩罚需要正式模型,且不能证明私人解曾存在 |
| 矿池扣留区块 | 未解决 | 矿工找到区块后需要安全直提路径,或加密/adaptor relay 设计 |
| 隐蔽矿池 | 未解决 | 针对有意协议外出售工作、实现不可转移性,需要独立密码构造和不可能性分析 |
| 付款阻挠 | Receipt 暴露接受 share 的遗漏或修改 | 共享余额仍依赖运营者创建链上付款 |
| 账本伪造 | 本地快照恢复和矿工 receipt 改善可审计性 | 发布 append-only checkpoint、inclusion proof、独立 mirror 和对账工具 |
| Pool hopping | PPLNS 使用工作量加权尾窗口 | 仍需策略模拟和参数校准;PROP/PPS 经济性仍取决于运营者 |
当前共享模式(prop、pps、pplns、pps+、fpps)生成内部 pending_payout_atomic 项。自动交易构建器、广播器、确认跟踪器、储备证明和偿付保证均不存在。这些项不得被表示为钱包资金或已完成付款。
账本加载采用 fail-closed:主状态和备份同时无法规范解码时,进程必须停止,不能静默创建空账本。旧的非规范 map 存储若无法迁移,也不能通过清空状态继续运行。
未来的协议版本提案应先评估后实现,并包括:
- 矿工声明的交易集和有界 TP 验证。
- 不在固定矿工授权前暴露可转移解的完整区块直提 fallback。
- 接受 share receipt 与结算事件的周期 Merkle commitment、矿工 inclusion proof 和独立归档 mirror。
- 包含 constructed、signed、broadcast、confirmed、reorged、retried 和 reconciled 的付款交易状态机。
- 针对扣留、延迟回复、receipt 重排、磁盘损坏、pool hopping 和恶意 VarDiff 的模拟与故障注入。
激活需要独立规范、测试向量、参考 verifier、密码学审查,以及每项声明来自协议而非运营者政策的证据。
绑定矿工的授权与可审计 share-receipt 链是项目特定工作,不证明学术新颖性或专利自由。新颖性声明至少需要针对去中心矿池协议、job-declaration 协议、blind/adaptor 签名、non-outsourceable puzzle 和 payment-channel/commitment-ledger 系统开展有记录的现有技术检索和独立审查。标准密码原语应继续使用经过审查的库;仅为显得不同而重写会降低安全性。
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