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Research H WES Theorem and Object Model
Status: inactive research specification. It fixes the problem, model, theorems and implementation interface; it is neither a novelty proof nor a cryptographic audit report.
The following alone do not imply impossibility: old versions are not
recoverable, a client initially keeps only a historical witness, validators do
not persist a key -> latest authenticated index, and recovery is noninteractive
or constant-round. A counterexample sends the entire archive in one round. The
verifier recomputes the append-only commitment and scans every version of the
key. It keeps no latest index and rejects stale versions, at Theta(N)
communication, prover I/O and verifier work.
The provable goal must therefore include succinct recovery. The model below treats the archive as a black-box authenticated store and requires recovery to open a sublinear number of archive cells.
For security parameter lambda, key space K and value space V, an object
incarnation is
I = (cid, class, k, v, h_val, P_owner, h_create, h_lease),
where versions for one key strictly increase. At height t,
Hist_t = (r_0, ..., r_(N_t-1)),
A_t = CommitArchive(Hist_t).
The archive exposes only authenticated positional opening and append checks:
Open(A_t, i) -> (r_i, pi_i),
VerifyOpen(A_t, i, r_i, pi_i) -> {0,1},
VerifyAppend(A_s, A_t, pi_(s,t)) -> {0,1}, s <= t.
It has no native key query, range non-membership or maximum-version operation.
Define Head_t(k) as the maximum-version record for k; consensus rejects
duplicate versions before append.
An authenticated latest oracle is any (D_t, ProveLatest, VerifyLatest) that
authenticates Head_t(k).(version,status). D_t may be an SMT, Verkle or vector
commitment root, a SNARK statement or another digest. A short freshness proof
is semantically equivalent to a latest dictionary even when no BTreeMap exists.
Let recovery Pi=(ProveRec,VerifyRec) be complete for the current expired
incarnation, latest-only sound against old or non-expired incarnations, and use
public verifier state S_t. Taking D_t=S_t, running ProveRec without the
final mutation and running the read-only phase of VerifyRec constructs an
authenticated predicate
IsRecoverableHead_t(k,v)=1 iff Head_t(k).(version,status)=(v,Expired).
Completeness and latest-only soundness transfer directly. The theorem need not
construct a full latest dictionary, but it shows that secure recovery without
any latest-equivalent authentication is semantically contradictory. □
Treat A_t as an opaque oracle handle usable only by Open/VerifyOpen. A
candidate at position i has suffix length m=N_t-i-1. Without a latest
oracle, a zero-error verifier deciding head status for every legal history must
open all m suffix cells in the worst case.
If an accepting execution leaves position j unopened, compare histories
H0, where no later record has key k, and H1, identical except that cell
j is a newer valid version of k. All observed openings are identical, yet
the candidate is latest only in H0; one of completeness or soundness fails.
□
For randomized verification with perfect completeness and false-accept
probability at most epsilon for each single-successor history,
E[Q] = sum_j Pr[query j] >= (1-epsilon)m.
With two-sided error at most epsilon, the bound is
E[Q]>=(1-2epsilon)m. This is a cell-probe bound for a black-box unordered
membership-only archive, not an unconditional bound for every commitment or
SNARK. A latest dictionary, maintained witness/index, key-ordered archive,
linear-work archive-scan SNARK or trusted online oracle falls outside its
premises.
Secure recovery must pay for at least one of authenticated latest state,
ongoing witness/index maintenance, or linear suffix data/prover work. H-WES
chooses fixed-size consensus roots, external latest/history bodies, and
on-demand O(log K)+O(log N) proofs without continual owner witness updates.
Lifecycle attaches to incarnation (k,v):
Live(k,v) -> Expired(k,v) -> Recovered(k,v; successor=v+1)
\-> Consumed(k,v)
Recovered and Consumed are terminal for that incarnation. Recovery atomically
closes (k,v) and creates Live(k,v+1). Global authenticated state is
S_t = (R_live,t, R_latest,t, R_null,t, R_hist,t, R_DA,t),
R_state = H_ds("HYPHEN_STATE_V1",
R_live || R_latest || R_null || R_hist || R_DA).
The roots commit live bodies, per-key latest status, permanent nullifiers, append-only lifecycle history and recovery-data availability.
Expire(k,v,t) requires Head_t(k)=(v,Live) and t>=lease_end(k,v). It
removes the live entry, appends an Expired record and changes the latest head;
the atomic block-state commit is the linearization point.
Recovery authorizes
AuthRec = H_ds("HYPHEN_WES_AUTHORIZATION_V1",
Recover || cid || k || v || H(expired_record) || t || new_lease || R_state,t).
It proves history inclusion, current (k,v,Expired) status and matching
archive index, owner authorization, new_lease>t>=old_lease_end, and successor
body availability. Success creates Live(k,v+1) and appends
E_rec=(cid,class,k,v,Recover,t,H(expired),H(live_successor)).
History append, successor insertion and latest update commit or roll back
together. Consume uses a canonical lease sentinel, appends
E_con=(cid,class,k,v,Consume,t,H(expired),0^256) and leaves no outgoing
transition from Consumed.
Latest-only recoverability lets an attacker see all old bodies, membership
proofs, authorizations and DA proofs, then wins only if recovery accepts while
Head_t(k)!=(v,Expired). Security reduces to history binding, latest-dictionary
soundness and deterministic cross-field consistency.
No-resurrection first commits (k,v) as Consumed. Replay can succeed only by
forging the current latest proof or commitment binding. A recovered incarnation
also cannot recover again because the head is already Live(k,v+1) or later.
History accountability reduces a forged terminal event inclusion to MMR/hash binding. Recovery events bind the successor hash. This proves what closed and what successor was committed, not permanent availability of history bodies.
These results require collision resistance; MMR and latest-dictionary binding/soundness; owner-policy EUF-CMA or knowledge soundness; atomic, deterministic transition; and one canonical pre-state root. Recoverability also requires a provider retaining the body and fresh proof. A commitment cannot recover data deleted by everyone.
| Construction | Validator digest | External index | Owner updates | Recovery proof/data | Prover work |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Append archive + scan | O(1) |
O(N) body |
O(1) |
Theta(m) |
Theta(m) |
| Dynamic client accumulator | O(1) |
O(N) |
related/global updates | scheme-specific | scheme-specific |
| Versioned authenticated dictionary |
O(1) root |
O(K) |
O(1) on-demand proof |
O(log K) |
O(log K) |
| Archive-scan SNARK | O(1) |
O(N) body |
O(1) |
constant/polylog |
Omega(m) scan |
| H-WES EAOM reference | five roots | O(K+N) |
O(1) |
O(log K+log N)+body |
O(log K+log N) query |
The last row is not storage-free. It moves bodies, tree nodes and proof serving
to replaceable providers while validators authenticate roots. The persistent
SMT is 256 levels, namespace-separated and stores only non-default nodes.
Updates are fixed-depth for 256-bit keys, or Theta(lambda) when key length is
the parameter. Long-term space and write-amplification benchmarks remain open.
Define domain-separated leaf, empty and node hashes:
L_ns(k,v)=H_ds("HYPHEN_SMT_LEAF_V1",ns||k||v),
E_ns=H_ds("HYPHEN_SMT_EMPTY_LEAF_V1",ns),
N_ns,d(l,r)=H_ds("HYPHEN_SMT_NODE_V1",ns||d||l||r).
For fixed (ns,k,R), two accepted openings to different values, including
absence, imply either a leaf-domain collision or the first parent-level node
collision along the fixed path. Thus collision resistance gives same-root
opening binding. □
The implementation computes an in-memory overlay, then one sled transaction
checks that the old root is unchanged and writes all nodes plus the new root.
A failed transaction writes nothing; a CAS conflict returns
ConcurrentUpdate; success flushes before returning. Only the complete old or
new state is persistently observable.
Object and chunk hashes bind object, position, count and length:
O=H_ds("HYPHEN_PROOF_BLOB_V1",len(B)||B),
C_i=H_ds("HYPHEN_PROOF_BLOB_CHUNK_V1",O||i||m||len(B_i)||B_i).
Merkle binding and final reassembly verification prevent cross-object,
cross-position and truncated-chunk replay absent a hash collision or second
preimage. An availability certificate binds chain, epoch, committee, retention
and object metadata and requires q=2f+1 distinct signatures. With at most f
malicious seats, at least f+1 honest signers fully held the blob when signing.
This proves retrievable-at-signing-time, not continued retention. The
certificate cannot recover a body later deleted by every signer.
The model can represent leased UTXOs with permanent nullifiers, recoverable account authority, revocable credential incarnations, DA objects requiring a target-root certificate, and contract KV with an explicit code authorization relation. Shielded notes remain out of profile until a zero-knowledge circuit binds hidden owner/input/nullifier relations to EAOM transitions.
expiring_state.rs implements canonical 159-byte records, a deterministic
expiry queue, history MMR and latest proofs, action/height/lease/pre-state-bound
authorization, atomic successor and terminal receipts, no-resurrection tests,
and a roots-plus-witness pure verifier API. Supporting modules implement a
persistent namespaced SMT with atomic root CAS, bounded content-addressed blob
storage with chunk proofs, bounded typed P2P proof/chunk transport, and
full-blob-before-signing 2f+1 availability certificates.
The research profile now persists all five EAOM roots and applies public creation plus bounded expiry in the same atomic block/reorg transition as the current block root. Real owner policy, provider challenge/repair, shielded recovery/consume relations, benchmarks and independent audits remain incomplete. The mechanism must not be activated or called production-ready.
Comparison is required against Utreexo/UTXO accumulators, stateless-client witness updates, Ethereum state expiry, versioned authenticated dictionaries, revocable-credential accumulators and historical KV authentication. Starting references are Utreexo (IACR ePrint 2019/611), Ethereum statelessness/state expiry, and Practical Revocable Anonymous Credentials (FC 2012). Until systematic literature/patent searches and independent peer review, H-WES may claim only this model, black-box lower bound and candidate tradeoff, not first resolution of state expiry or first recoverable state.
状态:研究规范,未激活到任何 Hyphen 网络。本文固定问题、模型、定理和实现 接口;它不是新颖性证明,也不是密码学审计报告。
仅有以下四条不足以推出不可能性:
- 旧版本不可恢复;
- 客户端最初只保存历史 witness;
- 验证者不持久维护
key -> latest认证索引; - 恢复协议为无交互或常数轮。
反例是单轮发送完整 archive。恢复者从不可信 archive provider 下载全部记录,
把记录和认证数据一次发送给验证者;验证者重算 append-only commitment,线性扫描
同一 key 的所有版本,再判断候选是否最新。它不保存 latest index,协议只有一轮,
而且可以拒绝旧版本。代价是 Theta(N) 通信、prover I/O 和 verifier 工作。
因此可证明的命题必须明确加入 H-WES 真正需要的目标:succinct recovery。 下文使用黑盒认证 archive 模型,并要求恢复只打开次线性数量的 archive cell。
令安全参数为 lambda,key 空间为 K,值空间为 V。对象 incarnation 为
I = (cid, class, k, v, h_val, P_owner, h_create, h_lease),
其中 cid 是链身份,k in K,v in N 是版本,h_val=H(value),
P_owner 是授权策略 commitment。对固定 key,版本严格递增。
在高度 t,历史为有序记录数组
Hist_t = (r_0, ..., r_(N_t-1)),
A_t = CommitArchive(Hist_t).
archive 只暴露:
Open(A_t, i) -> (r_i, pi_i),
VerifyOpen(A_t, i, r_i, pi_i) -> {0,1},
VerifyAppend(A_s, A_t, pi_(s,t)) -> {0,1}, s <= t.
它不原生暴露按 key 查询、范围内不存在性或最大版本。MMR 是该接口的一个实例: 它认证位置和 append-only 历史,但不赋予叶内容按 key 的顺序。
定义当前头函数:
Head_t(k) = arg max_v { r in Hist_t : r.key=k and r.version=v },
若同一版本可出现多个记录,历史无效;共识转换必须在 append 前拒绝该情况。
认证 latest oracle 是任意 (D_t, ProveLatest, VerifyLatest),满足:
VerifyLatest(D_t, k, v, status, pi)=1
iff Head_t(k).(version,status)=(v,status),
其中错误概率可忽略。D_t 可以是 SMT root、Verkle root、vector commitment、
SNARK statement 或其他摘要;所以“没有 BTreeMap”不等于“没有 latest 等价信息”。
只要一个短证明能认证 freshness,它在安全意义上就是 latest dictionary。
设恢复协议 Pi=(ProveRec,VerifyRec) 满足:
- 完备性:当前处于
Expired的最新 incarnation 可产生接受 transcript; - latest-only 健全性:任何旧 incarnation 或非
Expiredincarnation 的接受概率 至多为negl(lambda); - verifier 的公开状态为
S_t。
则 Pi 可黑盒构造认证谓词
IsRecoverableHead_t(k,v)=1 iff Head_t(k).(version,status)=(v,Expired).
构造。 令公开摘要 D_t=S_t。证明算法运行 ProveRec,但不提交最终状态;
验证算法运行 VerifyRec 的只读阶段。对最新 Expired 记录,恢复完备性给出谓词
完备性;对旧版本、Live、Recovered 或 Consumed,latest-only 健全性给出
拒绝。故恢复 transcript 本身就是上述谓词的认证证明。□
这个定理不构造可查询任意状态的完整 latest dictionary;它只认证恢复所需的
(v,Expired) head 谓词。即便如此,“安全恢复但不存在任何与 latest 等价的恢复
认证信息”仍在语义上矛盾。该信息不一定由 validator 保存完整索引,但必须以某种
commitment 和证明关系存在。
考虑 archive-generic verifier:A_t 是只能作为 Open/VerifyOpen 参数使用的
opaque oracle handle;verifier 不能读取、哈希、比较或根据 handle 的表示分支,
只能通过成功打开 cell 获知历史内容。这个限制排除了把额外 latest 信息偷偷编码
进 commitment 表示的构造。候选记录位于
位置 i,其后有 m=N_t-i-1 个 cell。若 verifier 不使用 latest oracle,且对
所有合法历史零错误判断候选是否为 Head_t(k),则最坏情况必须认证打开全部
m 个后缀 cell。
证明。 假设某次接受执行只打开后缀位置集合 Q,且 |Q|<m。取未打开位置
j notin Q。构造两个合法历史:
H0: 所有 j>i 的记录 key 均不等于 k;
H1: 与 H0 相同,但位置 j 是 key=k、version>v 的合法记录。
在该 oracle 接口中,以相同随机带运行 verifier 时,两个世界对已打开位置返回
完全相同的 (index,record);handle 本身不可观察,未打开位置也不能影响执行。
候选在 H0 是 latest,在 H1 不是 latest。
verifier 对两者输出相同,因此完备性或健全性至少一个失败,矛盾。故最坏情况
|Q|=m。□
对随机 verifier,先要求在无后继历史 H0 上具有完美完备性,并对每个只在位置
j 放置唯一新版本的历史 H1_j 具有至多 epsilon 的漏检概率。若某次执行未查询
j,它在 H0 与 H1_j 的 transcript 相同;完美完备性迫使它接受,因此该事件
计入 H1_j 的漏检。故对每个 j 都有 Pr[query j]>=1-epsilon。对 indicator 求和:
E[Q] = sum_j Pr[query j] >= (1-epsilon)m.
因此任何最坏查询上限 q 也满足 q>=E[Q]>=(1-epsilon)m。若允许双边错误,即
H0 的拒绝概率和每个 H1_j 的接受概率都至多 epsilon,相同 coupling 只给出
Pr[query j]>=1-2epsilon,从而 E[Q]>=(1-2epsilon)m(该式在
epsilon<1/2 时有意义)。这是黑盒、无序、membership-only archive 的
cell-probe 下界,不是对所有 commitment 或所有 SNARK 的无条件密码学下界。
以下方法都避开了定理前提:
- 维护按 key 的认证 latest dictionary;
- 让客户端或 witness service 持续更新 freshness witness;
- 给 archive 增加按 key 排序的认证索引;
- 用 SNARK 证明完整后缀扫描,保持 verifier 简短但 prover 仍做
Omega(m)工作; - 信任在线 freshness oracle。
在上述模型中,安全恢复至少承担下列一项:
authenticated latest state;
ongoing witness/index maintenance;
linear suffix data/prover work.
H-WES 的目标不是违反该下界,而是选择一个清晰的新权衡:validator 共识状态只
承诺 fixed-size roots;latest map 和历史 body 可由分离存储层维护;恢复者按需
取得 O(log K)+O(log N) 新鲜证明;长期离线 owner 不持续更新 witness。
生命周期属于 incarnation (k,v),不是模糊的“账户”。状态为:
Live(k,v) -> Expired(k,v) -> Recovered(k,v; successor=v+1)
\-> Consumed(k,v)
Recovered(k,v) 和 Consumed(k,v) 都是终态。恢复会在同一个原子转换中关闭
(k,v) 并创建 Live(k,v+1);因此不会出现可被其他交易观察到的中间状态。
全局认证状态为:
S_t = (R_live,t, R_latest,t, R_null,t, R_hist,t, R_DA,t).
-
R_live:当前 live body hash; -
R_latest:每个 key 的(version,status,archive_index,value_hash,head_hash); -
R_null:不可删除的消费/nullifier 集; -
R_hist:append-only 生命周期历史 MMR; -
R_DA:恢复后数据可用性证书根。
组合根采用域分离:
R_state = H_ds("HYPHEN_STATE_V1",
R_live || R_latest || R_null || R_hist || R_DA).
Expire(k,v,t) 的前置条件:
Head_t(k)=(v,Live), t>=lease_end(k,v).
它删除 live entry,向历史追加 Expired record,并把 latest head 改成
(v,Expired,index,...)。区块原子状态提交是线性化点。
恢复授权 statement 为:
AuthRec = H_ds("HYPHEN_WES_AUTHORIZATION_V1",
Recover || cid || k || v || H(expired_record) || t || new_lease || R_state,t).
Recover(k,v,t,new_lease) 验证:
- expired record 在
R_hist,t中; -
R_latest,t证明(k,v,Expired)是当前 head,并绑定同一 archive index; - owner policy 对
AuthRec授权; -
new_lease>t>=old_lease_end; - DA policy 证明 successor body 对
R_DA,t可用。
成功后构造 Live(k,v+1),向历史追加:
E_rec=(cid,class,k,v,Recover,t,H(expired),H(live_successor)),
并原子更新 live/latest。历史 append、successor 插入和 latest 更新共同构成唯一 线性化点;任一步失败必须整体回滚。
消费授权将 Recover 换成 Consume,new_lease 使用规范哨兵值。成功后追加
E_con=(cid,class,k,v,Consume,t,H(expired),0^256)
并把 latest head 设为 (v,Consumed,...)。没有从 Consumed(k,v) 出发的转换。
挑战者运行任意合法历史得到 S_t,允许攻击者取得所有历史 body、membership
proof、旧授权和旧 DA proof。攻击者输出 (k,v,pi_rec)。若验证接受但
Head_t(k) != (v,Expired),
则攻击者获胜。H-WES 要求胜率为 negl(lambda)。
归约分三种:伪造 history membership 破坏 MMR binding;伪造 latest membership 破坏 authenticated dictionary soundness;让 witness 中版本/状态/index/hash 不一致则被确定性检查拒绝。
挑战者先让 (k,v) 线性化到 Consumed,随后攻击者可重放任意旧材料并输出恢复
请求。由于 current latest status 为 Consumed 而恢复关系要求 Expired,接受
需要伪造 latest proof 或破坏其 commitment binding。因此成功概率可忽略。
Recovered(k,v) 也不能再次恢复:current head 已是 Live(k,v+1) 或其后继状态。
给定 current R_hist,攻击者若输出未真实追加的终态事件和有效 inclusion proof,
即构成 MMR binding/底层哈希抗碰撞攻击。恢复事件还承诺 successor hash,所以
审计者可检查“哪个 incarnation 被关闭、何时关闭、是否产生后继”。这不证明
历史 body 永久可用;availability 是独立假设。
在以下假设同时成立时,EAOM 满足前三个游戏:
H collision resistant;
MMR and latest dictionary binding/sound;
owner policy EUF-CMA or knowledge sound;
state transition atomic and deterministic;
consensus exposes one canonical pre-state root.
可恢复性另外需要至少一个 provider 保留 body 和新鲜证明,并满足 DA policy。 commitment 不能从信息论上恢复已被所有人删除的 body。
令 N 为历史记录数,K 为不同 key 数,m 为候选后的历史长度。
| 构造 | validator 共识摘要 | 外部索引存储 | owner 持续更新 | 恢复 proof/数据 | prover 工作 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 仅 append archive + 扫描 | O(1) |
O(N) body |
O(1) |
Theta(m) |
Theta(m) |
| 客户端动态 accumulator | O(1) |
O(N) |
每次相关/全局更新 | 方案相关 | 方案相关 |
| 版本化认证字典 |
O(1) root |
O(K) |
O(1),按需取新 proof |
O(log K) |
O(log K) |
| archive-scan SNARK | O(1) |
O(N) body |
O(1) |
常数或 polylog |
Omega(m) scan |
| H-WES EAOM reference | 5 个固定根 | O(K+N) |
O(1) |
O(log K+log N)+body |
O(log K+log N) 查询 |
最后一行不是“无存储”:它把 body、latest tree nodes 和 proof serving 移到可替换
provider;validator 仍必须认证 roots,数据可用性和 provider 去中心化仍需协议。
Rust reference 现有一个 256 层、命名空间隔离、仅保存非默认节点的持久 SMT。
单 key 更新访问 256 层,因此在固定 256-bit key 模型中是固定深度工作;若把 key
长度记为 lambda,则更新/证明为 Theta(lambda)。这关闭了“只有 BTreeMap
重建树”的实现缺口,但尚未把 EAOM 的五个根接入当前区块原子状态转换,也没有
长期空间/写放大 benchmark。
定义:
L_ns(k,v)=H_ds("HYPHEN_SMT_LEAF_V1",ns||k||v),
E_ns=H_ds("HYPHEN_SMT_EMPTY_LEAF_V1",ns),
N_ns,d(l,r)=H_ds("HYPHEN_SMT_NODE_V1",ns||d||l||r).
非成员证明把叶值取为 E_ns;成员证明取 L_ns(k,v),两者都按 k 的 256 个 bit
和 256 个 sibling 唯一重算根。
定理 SMT-S1(同根 opening binding)。 假设上述域分离哈希抗碰撞。对固定
(ns,k,R),PPT 攻击者不能以不可忽略概率给出两个均通过的 proof,分别打开为
v != v'(包括一个为 absent)。
证明。 两条验证路径的初始叶哈希不同;否则立即得到 leaf/empty domain 的
碰撞。两条路径最终根相同。沿路径自叶向根取第一个“当前哈希不同、计算出的父哈希
相同”的层。固定 key 使左右位置相同,proof 给出的 sibling 与当前哈希形成两个
不同的有序 child pair,却在相同 namespace、depth、node domain 下产生相同父哈希,
构成 N_ns,d 的碰撞,矛盾。□
原子性。 实现先读取期望根 R,在内存中计算全部 leaf/node overlay,再在一个
sled transaction 内检查当前根仍为 R 并写入全部 overlay 与 R'。事务失败不提交
任何 key;CAS 冲突返回 ConcurrentUpdate;事务成功后 API 在返回前 flush。因此
可观察的持久线性化结果只有旧状态或完整新状态,不存在只更新部分祖先的根。
blob 的对象哈希和 chunk leaf 分别为:
O=H_ds("HYPHEN_PROOF_BLOB_V1",len(B)||B),
C_i=H_ds("HYPHEN_PROOF_BLOB_CHUNK_V1",O||i||m||len(B_i)||B_i).
Merkle proof 对 C_i 的 binding 归约到 Merkle node/leaf hash 抗碰撞;由于 O,i,m,len
都进入 leaf,不能把另一个对象、位置或截断 chunk 重放到该 opening。重组器按
i=0..m-1 取齐后再次验证 O,所以通过的完整重组等于被 metadata 承诺的 blob,
除非找到上述哈希碰撞/二次原像。
availability certificate 包含链、epoch、committee、retention、对象 metadata,并要求
q=2f+1 个不同 seat 签名。诚实 signer 在签名前从本地 store 完整读取并核对 blob。
因此在 n=3f+1、恶意 seat 至多 f 时,证书至少包含 q-f=f+1 个签名时确实持有
blob 的诚实 seat。该结论仅是 retrievable-at-signing-time;证书本身不能证明
retention 窗口内仍有副本。若所有 signer 之后删除数据,commitment 不可能恢复 body。
模型只要求稳定 key、单调 version、owner policy 和可认证 body hash,因此可实例化:
- 租赁 UTXO:
Consumed同时插入永久 nullifier; - 可恢复账户权限:owner policy 可为阈值/延迟恢复策略;
- 可撤销凭证:credential incarnation 过期后恢复或终止,revocation 仍需公开语义;
- 数据可用对象:恢复前必须给出目标 DA root 的证书;
- 合约 KV:必须额外定义合约代码对恢复/消费的授权关系。
shielded note 暂不在实现 profile:若 owner、真实输入和 nullifier 关系需要隐藏, 必须有零知识电路把 EAOM transition 与现有隐私交易关系绑定。
crates/hyphen-state/src/expiring_state.rs 当前实现:
- 159-byte record 规范编码;
- deterministic expiry queue;
- history MMR 与 latest membership proof;
- 绑定 action/height/lease/pre-state 的 authorization digest;
- 原子语义的 recovery successor 与 terminal history receipt;
- consumed terminal 和负向 no-resurrection 测试;
- 纯 verifier API,只需 roots 与 witness。
配套模块现在还实现:
-
persistent_smt.rs:持久命名空间 SMT、成员/非成员 proof、原子 root CAS 与 flush; -
proof_store.rs:有大小界的 content-addressed blob、chunk Merkle proof 和重组校验; - P2P sync:typed SMT proof、blob metadata/chunk 请求与响应上限;
-
availability.rs:完整 blob 验证后签名、2f+1distinct-seat certificate、上下文与 retention 检查。
研究 profile 已将 expiring_state.rs 的五根、公开创建和有界过期与当前 block state
root 放入同一个原子 block/reorg transition。真实 owner policy、provider
challenge/repair、shielded recovery/consume relation、benchmark 和独立审计仍未完成,
所以不能激活到生产网络或称为生产协议。
必须逐项比较 Utreexo/UTXO accumulators、stateless-client witness 更新、Ethereum state expiry、版本化 authenticated dictionaries、可撤销凭证 accumulators 和 历史 KV authentication。当前可核验入口包括:
- Utreexo, IACR ePrint 2019/611: https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/611
- Ethereum statelessness/state expiry: https://ethereum.org/en/roadmap/statelessness/
- Practical Revocable Anonymous Credentials, FC 2012,
DOI
10.1007/978-3-642-32805-3_22。
在系统检索、专利检索和独立同行评审完成前,H-WES 只能声称“给出了上述模型、 黑盒下界和一个候选权衡”,不能声称首次解决状态过期或首次实现可恢复状态。
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