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v1.18.0
A security and correctness release over 1.17.0, from the findings the reviews of 1.17.0 left open and from reviews of
this release's own changes. A controller with no API token now refuses a write that a web page sends from another
origin, and no longer answers a DNS-rebound page through a wildcard in CONTROLLER_ALLOWED_HOSTS; behind a
root_path, a file under /artifacts keeps its sandbox. In the fast profile a click on a pay, delete, post or
account button the controller can read asks for approval whatever the model labelled it; a typed text is previewed
only where a read of its field has found it not secret; more log lines quote and cut the text a web page or a mesh
peer sends; and a session closed while it is being created keeps no tunnel. On Linux with Landlock, provider CLIs now
start under a sandbox that closes the controller's data directory to them, outside their own home. Cron webhook keys
are stored hashed, share links can be revoked, and an approval records the operator who decided it where a named
credential proved them.
Read the upgrade notes first, since several change what a running deployment does; among them: a tokenless controller
refuses cross-origin writes and does not start with a wildcard in CONTROLLER_ALLOWED_HOSTS; what a CLI reads or
writes under /data moves into CLI_HOME (or CLI_SANDBOX_ENABLED=false keeps 1.17.0's behaviour); MCP 2025-03-26
is no longer negotiated; the first start hashes the cron webhook keys, schedules run in CRON_TIMEZONE (UTC by
default), and a job whose owner's named credential is gone is refused; decided approvals are pruned 30 days after
their decision from the first start (APPROVAL_RETENTION_DAYS=0 keeps them); the new .tool-call-digest.key in
APPROVAL_ROOT needs a backup; a resumed agent run gets the full max_steps of the run it resumes; and a stop waits
at most 5 seconds for the requests in flight, so a uvicorn started your own way needs --timeout-graceful-shutdown 5
too.
The controller image changes; the client, LangChain and MCP bridge packages now carry the MIT license text in their
wheels and sdists and otherwise change only in version, and the MCP bridge package requires this client; the
browser-node image changes only in version. Advisories: GHSA-7wq9-v3c2-7x2c, GHSA-h2q4-pwpr-qp4j, GHSA-hvjj-c398-6g72,
GHSA-jv4w-prgx-557p, GHSA-5p5g-q85f-m693, GHSA-5wf5-v2cm-mr2j and GHSA-vq4x-w2m7-hj4f, fixed in this release, and
GHSA-786v-hrgx-6wcx, fixed in 1.8.0 and published with them.
Upgrade notes
- MCP protocol
2025-03-26is no longer negotiated. A client that initializes with it is offered2025-11-25, as
any other version the controller does not speak is, and one that cannot follow disconnects itself. A session that
negotiated2025-03-26before the upgrade, restored from the session store, goes on at that version as it did,
with or without theMCP-Protocol-Versionheader, until it initializes again: a stdio bridge that outlives the
upgrade sends that header on every POST and re-initializes only on a404. It then replays its client's own
initializeand keeps the answer, so a2025-03-26client behind it goes on at2025-11-25without being told;
the controller answers a session the same at either version. On a session at any other version a2025-03-26
header is refused with400and-32602. - An MCP
initializewhoseclientInfoorcapabilitiesobject is past a bound is refused. Each may be nested
at most 32 levels and take at most 64 KiB as JSON (a value that is no object is kept as{}, as before); one past
either answers JSON-RPC error-32602and makes no session.
What MCP defines for the two takes a few levels and well under a kilobyte, so a client is refused only for
something large of its own that it sends there (an icon as a data URI, for one). A session that an older version
stored past a bound is dropped at this version's start, which then writes the file of sessions once without it:
its client is answered404on its next request, as after an eviction, and theinitializeit then sends is
refused as above until it sends less. That write leaves out each record the start passed over as malformed too. resources/subscribeofbrowser://audit/eventsnow answers-32602. No event ever notified that resource, so
a subscription to it heard nothing. Poll it withresources/read. A subscription an older version recorded stays
silent, as it always was, andresources/unsubscribestill removes it.- A failed
resources/readnow answers-32603, and a page's DOM is capped. A read that failed for any reason
but an unknown resource or session (a timeout, a closed page, a policy refusal, a screenshot file that has gone, a
result that cannot be encoded) answered-32002"Resource not found", and abrowser://sessionsor
browser://audit/eventsread whose listing raised was an unhandled500(one whose listing could not be
encoded answered-32002). A client that took-32002to mean a resource is gone now
gets-32603for those, and should retry or report them.browser://<id>/domnow returns at most 1,000,000
characters, the mostmax_charsaccepts; a longer page ends in an HTML comment that says so and names
browser.get_html, which pages through the rest. - A session's second
GET /mcpends its first. A client that keeps two event streams open for one MCP session now
loses the older one when it opens the newer, and a stream also ends when its session is deleted or evicted. Open one
stream per session, reconnect only when it has ended, and after reconnecting read again what you watch:
notifications are not replayed. DELETE /mcpwith a wrongMCP-Protocol-Versionno longer deletes the session. 1.17.0 ignored the header on
DELETE. A version other than the session's now answers400and the session stays:-32602where the
controller does not speak it,-32600where it does. The session's own version deletes it,2025-03-26too for
a session restored at it. Send the session's version onDELETE, or no header, as the stdio bridge does.- On a confidential session,
browser.set_cookiesandbrowser.set_local_storagenow follow an action's rules, and
a required hosted Witness must answer. Both areaccount_change, so a session withprotection_mode=confidential
refuses them for an anonymous operator, on a shared takeover surface and in a shared browser process, as it refuses
a high-risk action: the call answers with the reason and nothing is changed.browser.set_viewportis a plain
write, which those rules do not refuse. All three are refused when the session requires a hosted Witness
(WITNESS_REMOTE_REQUIRED_FOR_CONFIDENTIAL) and it is not configured or does not answer. Send an operator id
(X-Operator-Id), run such sessions with an isolated takeover surface and browser, and keep the hosted Witness
reachable. browser.set_viewportnow waits for the session, and can be refused. At 1.17.0 it ran at once, on any page,
whatever else held the session. It now waits up to 10 seconds for a session another call holds and then answers
The session is busy with another call. Try again., is refused while the session's page is oneALLOWED_HOSTS
refuses, and answersThe page moved while it was readwhen the page moved during the call, the viewport already
changed. A client that sets the viewport while a long action or an agent step holds the session now gets an error
it never got: set the viewport before the action starts, or try again when it has ended.- A governed tool now refuses a
workflow_profileother thanfastorgoverned. Any other value (a typo, the
wrong case, a non-string) used to read asfast, so withoutFORCE_GOVERNED_APPROVALSthe call ran without the
approval it asked for (browser.eval_jswas governed whatever it said, andharness.start_convergenceon a live
session was refused). It now answers an error that names the two values, and nothing runs, with
FORCE_GOVERNED_APPROVALSon too, where such a call used to ask for an approval: send one of them, or leave the
argument out (nullcounts as left out).browser.queue_agent_runandbrowser.queue_agent_steprefuse such a
value too: neither is governed, but agovernedcall queues its run or step governed, and a mistyped one left it
at its request's ownworkflow_profile(fastby default). Any other tool that is not governed does not check
the value, as before. - A garbled reply from
browser.find_by_vision's model is now a tool error, where most read asfound: false.
That is a reply that is not a JSON object, one with nofoundor afoundthat is neither true nor false, or a
found: truereply whose point is not usable (see Changed). At 1.17.0 a reply that was no JSON, or whosefound
was missing or false, read asfound: false; one that was JSON but no object, or afound: truereply with a
nullx, answeredTool execution failed; and one whosefoundwas truthy ("true",1) and whosexand
ypassedint()("640", a point outside the screenshot or below zero) was answered as found, with the point.
A client that tookfound: falseto cover those must handle the error, by retrying the call or finding the
element another way. A reply offound: falsestays a normal answer: its coordinates are no longer read (a
nullor no number there failed at 1.17.0), and itsconfidenceis now always 0.0, where the reply's own was
passed through. - A
browser.find_elementspattern that ran can now be refused. Withregex=true, a pattern whose group repeats
without bound and holds an unbounded repeat of its own or overlapping alternatives, at any depth ((a+)+$,
(a|aa)+,((a|aa))+), fails validation with a message naming the group and why, where it used to reach the
page (an alternative that is itself a group is compared as written:(a|(a))+passes). Everyday patterns of that
shape, with a separator between the two repeats, are refused too (\d+(\.\d+)*,\w+(\s+\w+)*). Those were never
slow, and an upper bound on the group's repeat, or on each repeat inside it, gets them past the check
(\d+(\.\d{1,50})*, with{1,50}in place of+); or passregex=falseto match the text literally. A bound does
not make a slow pattern fast: the check does not count a repeat with an upper bound, so(a{1,50})+$passes it and
can hang a page as(a+)+$did. - A controller with no token now refuses a write from another web origin. On a tokenless loopback controller
(API_ALLOW_TOKENLESS_LOOPBACK=true), a POST, PUT, PATCH or DELETE that a browser marksSec-Fetch-Site: cross-siteorsame-site, or whoseOriginnames another host or port than itsHost(Origin: nulland one
that cannot be parsed included), answers403, and so does aGET /auth-profiles/{name}/exportmarked that way,
since an export writes an archive. A page on another origin, or on another port of the same host, that writes to
such a controller must be served from the controller's own origin instead. A token does not help a page: nothing
checks one on such a controller, and a page on another origin cannot send one to a controller that has a token
either, since no route answers a CORS preflight. A browser extension, or a non-browser client that names an
origin, needs the controller to have a token, and sends it. A loopback reverse proxy in front of
such a controller must pass the browser'sHostthrough with its port, or the controller needs a token: one that
rewritesHost, or listens on a port other than the scheme's default and forwards the name without it, leaves
the browser'sOriginnaming another host or port, and every write from the dashboard it serves is refused,
where 1.17.0 served them. In nginx that isproxy_set_header Host $http_host;($hostdrops the port).
A request with neither header (curl, an SDK) is
served as before, and so is one whoseOriginmatches itsHostwithSec-Fetch-Sitesame-originornone.
/mesh/receiveis signed and not checked;/mcp(and/mcp/, which only redirects to it, behind aroot_pathas
well) keeps its own Origin check andMCP_ALLOWED_ORIGINS, so a browser MCP client on a listed origin goes on
working, while/mcp/tools/callis checked like any other write. A controller with a token is not affected. - Another operator's auth profile now answers as one that does not exist, everywhere it is read. A caller reading
a profile someone else owns gets what a missing profile gets, byte for byte:GET /auth-profiles/{name}and
GET /auth-profiles/{name}/exportanswer404, asPOST /sessionsdoes withauth_profileor a
storage_state_pathunderprofiles/, where each answered403, andbrowser.get_auth_profileand
browser.create_sessionanswer their not-found text, where they named the owner. A client that took403to mean
"it exists but is not yours" must treat404as either. A save over such a profile and an import that overwrites
one stay refused (403), and the refusal no longer names the owner. A cron job that names one is refused too:
POST /cronsanswers403, where it accepts a name not saved yet, andbrowser.create_cron_jobsays the
profile belongs to another operator. The reads hide whether a profile exists; these writes do not.
profile_dirandauth_state.pathare gone from the answers ofGET /auth-profiles/{name},
GET /auth-profiles,browser.get_auth_profileandbrowser.list_auth_profiles: useprofile_name.
GET /sessions/{id}/auth-statekeeps itspath. - The network log of a page
ALLOWED_HOSTSrefuses is now refused, as a raw CDP read of it is.
GET /sessions/{id}/network/requestsandGET /sessions/{id}/network-loganswer403with the same fixed text as
the raw CDP route,browser.get_network_logis a refusal, andbrowser://<id>/networkanswers-32603. The page
is checked before the read and again after it, so one that moves onto a refused host meanwhile is refused too, and
so is a session whose active page has closed, as any page read is. A session whose open page is allowed gets its
log as before, and one whose page is refused gets it again once the page is navigated to an allowed URL.
Both routes now wait up to 10 seconds for a session another call holds and then answer409(The session is busy with another call. Try again.): at 1.17.0GET /sessions/{id}/network/requestsanswered at once, whatever
held the session, andGET /sessions/{id}/network-logwaited without limit. A client that polls either one while
an action or an agent step runs must take409to mean "try again".GET /sessions/{id}/network/requestsalso
answers404for a session that has gone, as for one with no inspector, where it read the log of a session
being closed. - Refused takeover-link calls write fewer
takeover_link_refusedevents. One source writes one for its first
refusal in a minute, and the rest of that minute's are only counted until an event reports them in its
details.count: the refusals it reports beside its own. An alert that counts these events must add that field:
events and counts add up to the refusals, or to more where a shutdown cut a write short (what that event reports
can be reported twice), or to fewer where more than 1,024 sources are held: the oldest is forgotten, with what it
had only counted. How many events a minute sees is not fixed: a read with the right
token writes what is held and the minute goes on, so refusals between such reads write an event after each. An
event that reports others can come late (with the source's next call, at a maintenance sweep or at a clean
shutdown: see Fixed), so an alert on a rate should readdetails.countwhen it arrives, and a controller that is
killed loses what it had only counted. - Cron webhook keys are now stored hashed, and
webhook_key_previewis gone. The first start after the upgrade
replaces every key in the cron store with its SHA-256 hash, so a client goes on using the key it holds; a key or a
hash it cannot read (a store edited by hand) is left as it is, with a WARNING, or a readable key beside such a hash
removed, and that job's webhook refuses every key until the key is rotated. A store that
cannot be re-saved keeps working and the failure is logged; going back to an earlier version leaves each job whose
key is stored hashed with no usable key. A 1.17.0 controller started over a 1.18.0 cron store hands out each
stored record whole, so its cron answers showwebhook_key_hash(a hash of the key, not the key) and, for a job
that was refused (below),refusal_audited. A backup or quarantined copy of the store from before the upgrade
still holds the keys, and so does a.crons.json.*.tmpfile beside the store, which a 1.17.0 save that was killed
part-way leaves there and nothing removes: delete any such file, and rotate the keys if a copy may have been read.
GET /crons,GET /crons/{id},POST /crons,browser.list_cron_jobsandbrowser.create_cron_jobanswered the
key's first 8 characters inwebhook_key_preview: they now answer
webhook_key_id, a short id derived from the hash that tells keys apart and is no part of the key. A lost key
cannot be read from the store any more:POST /crons/{id}/webhook-key/rotateorbrowser.rotate_cron_webhook_key
makes a new one and answers it once, ending the old one, andDELETE /crons/{id}/webhook-keyor
browser.revoke_cron_webhook_keyremoves it (a stored key it cannot read stays, and the answer is
revoked: false). - Cron schedules now run in
CRON_TIMEZONE,UTCby default, not in the controller process's zone. 1.17.0 gave
the scheduler no zone, so it used the one its own process saw. In the shipped image that is UTC whatever the
Docker host's clock says (neither the image nor the compose files setTZor mount/etc/localtime), so a
Docker deployment that added neither keeps its hours: leaveCRON_TIMEZONEunset there, since setting it to the
host's zone would move jobs that never moved. A controller run straight on a host that is not on UTC, or in a
container given a zone of its own (TZ), fires its jobs at a different hour after upgrading: a0 9 * * *job
meant nine in that zone and now means nine UTC. To keep the old hours there, setCRON_TIMEZONEto that zone's
name (America/Chicago,Europe/Berlin). A name the zone database does not know stops the controller at startup. POST /crons/{id}/triggerno longer answers404for an unknown job. A caller without the key could tell
which job ids exist. An unknown id, a job with no key and a wrong key now answer the same403(Not permitted),
and so does a job whose stored key cannot be read (a store edited by hand): treat403as covering all of them. A
job that is disabled still answers409once the key is proved. So does a
run the controller refuses to start with the key proved where 1.17.0 answered403(an auth state too old or not
encrypted, astart_urlthatALLOWED_HOSTSrefuses or whose load the pre-request gate stops),404(a stored
job with nogoal) or400(a stored job the run's request model refuses). Astart_urlthat does not load
answered400and now answers503: send that trigger again. The route's403now means the key and nothing
else, and its400the request itself: its body, or a job id in the path that is blank or longer than 50
characters (see Fixed).- A cron job whose owner has no named credential any more is refused, and so is a job a named operator queued.
A job fires as the token-verified operator who created it, and went on doing so after their token was removed. Each
fire now checksAPI_BEARER_TOKENSas it is then, where a token listed twice proves only the first operator
listed with it. An owner no credential names is refused: the answer is
{"triggered": false, "job_id": "<id>", "reason": "owner_credential_removed"},last_statusreads
refused: owner credential removed, no session is opened, and acron_job_refusedaudit event is written when
the job becomes refused, as the operatorsystemfor a scheduled fire and as its caller for a trigger; later
fires of a job still refused write no event and are logged at debug. The job's entry in the cron store records
that the event is written, so a restart writes no second one. An event the audit store could not take is written
at the job's next refused fire, and so is one whose writing the cron store could not record, which the audit log
then holds twice. A fire the credential allows ends the refusal, and the next refusal writes its own event. Where
the cron store could not record that end, the record of the run that fire queued ends it; so does a run that a
1.17.0 controller queued over the same store, which keeps the record's mark without knowing it. Where neither the
end nor a run was recorded, the next refusal may write no event: this version logs an error when that can be so,
and 1.17.0 logs nothing. A job a named operator queued fails when a worker takes it, with an error that says so,
if that credential has gone meanwhile. Moving to the sharedAPI_BEARER_TOKENor to no token counts: every job a
named operator created is then refused. Give the owner a named credential again, or delete the job and create it
again under a credential that stays. Deleting it needs the owner's credential as well, as listing it does: give
the credential back for the delete, or stop the controller and remove the job's entry from the cron store
(CRON_STORE_PATH,/data/crons/crons.jsonby default). A job created on the shared token or with no token is
unowned and runs as before, as does a job queued by an operator named only by a header. - A resumed agent run now gets the
max_stepsof the run it resumes, where it got what was left of them.
POST /agent/jobs/{id}/resumeandbrowser.resume_agent_jobwith nomax_stepsqueued a run of the steps the
first had not used, and of one step when it had used them all. They now queue a run of that run's whole
max_steps, so a resumed run can take more steps than were left: passmax_stepsto set the number. A resumed run
also no longer presents theapproval_idits first run was queued with, so a step of it that needs an approval asks
for a new one. After a downgrade to 1.17.0, every run job this version left queued fails when it runs, and no run
job it wrote can be resumed (400): its stored request holdsresume_checkpoints(null for a new run), which
1.17.0 refuses as a field it does not know. - Decided approvals are now deleted 30 days after their decision, and this deletes history. The first start after
the upgrade, and each maintenance sweep after it, delete fromAPPROVAL_ROOTandSTATE_DB_PATHthe approvals
decided, approved or rejected, more thanAPPROVAL_RETENTION_DAYS(default30) ago, with a tool call's stored
arguments. The days count from the decision, for an approval that has run since too, and the decided ones the
Changed entry lists are kept. A pending approval is never deleted, whatever its age, so the stores still grow with
approvals nobody decides.GET /approvalsstops listing the deleted ones, and their ids answer as ids that do not
exist. The audit log's own events about them stay, withinAUDIT_MAX_EVENTS. To keep every record, set
APPROVAL_RETENTION_DAYS=0before upgrading, or copyAPPROVAL_ROOTand the database first. A negative value
stops the controller at startup. - A fast-profile click on a pay, delete, post or account button now asks for approval, whatever its label. A
click labelledread,writeorupload(an unlabelled click iswrite) on a button whose label starts with
a phrase such asPay,Buy,Place order,Delete,Remove,SendorChange passwordnow answers
approval_requiredof that kind, as the same click labelled honestly did. So does atypeaimed at such a
button, and a click that names a container when the press lands on such a button inside it. An agent loop that
ran such clicks unattended in the fast profile now stops there until an operator approves (or the agent itself,
underAUTONOMOUS_APPROVALS). A form submit with no such label still runs unattended (one labelledreadis
recorded aswrite, but not where only the press found it), and so doSend code,Remove filter,
Purchase historyand the other harmless continuations (Send linkby itself asks: it is also the button of a
share dialog; so doesSend code to all users, since aftertoa label may go on only with words for where a
sign-in code goes or what it is for, an address, a masked number, a count of seconds (30s) or another of
Send's tail words:Send code to me againruns). A menu's command (role=menuitem) is read as a button is, and a
link inside a button or a menu item as that item. A click or a type, so labelled, by selector on a wrapper with no
box of its own (display: contents) answerstarget_has_no_box, and byelement_ida click answers
element_not_visibleonceACTION_TIMEOUT_MShas passed and a typefocus_lost, with nothing pressed: name an
element inside it. The direct routes (POST /sessions/{id}/actions/clickand/actions/type) carry no label and
are not read. The whole table, how a label is read, and what the read does not catch, are in
docs/production-hardening.md. - Approvals for tool calls are now matched under a key file,
.tool-call-digest.keyinAPPROVAL_ROOT: back it up
with the records. The first start after the upgrade writes the key there (also whenSTATE_DB_PATHholds the
records) and rewrites each stored tool call's stand-in, arequest_human_takeoveraction whoseaction.textreads
<tool> sha256:<digest>, so that it reads<tool> hmac-sha256:<key id>:<digest>, in both stores; no other
approval's text changes, and one it cannot write is logged and taken at the next start. Pending and approved
approvals go on covering the same call, and a client that reads the tool's name out ofaction.texthas the new
form to parse. Back up and restoreAPPROVAL_ROOTwhole, the dot file included. Restored without the key file, or
with another one, pending and approved approvals for tool calls are refused with a message that says so and the
agent asks again; each start logs how many there are, and rejecting them ends that warning. An operator's earlier
rejection of a tool call then no longer stops an agent's own approval of the same call under
AUTONOMOUS_APPROVALS, and each start logs how many such rejections are stored, in a warning of its own: reject
the call again when it is asked for, turnAUTONOMOUS_APPROVALSoff, or restore the key file. The retention
deletes such a rejection once it is older thanAPPROVAL_RETENTION_DAYS, which ends that warning (with0it
stays, and so does the warning); a key file restored after that does not bring the rejection back. A start that can
neither read a key from the file nor write one logs a warning and keys with a key of its own, so the approvals for
tool calls asked for in that process do not outlive it. Its retention deletes no such rejection, in controller
scope or in an open session: it cannot tell the file's key from one that is gone, and the next start that reads
the file matches again the rejections kept under it. Nor does such a start rewrite the stand-ins 1.17.0 stored,
nor does a decision, a claim or a give-back of one there: it logs how many it left, they match their calls there
as before (a stand-in keyed under the file's key, by a start that read it, matches only where that key is held),
and the next start that reads the file rewrites them with what was decided of them there (an
operator's rejection still stops the agent's own approval of the call, and an approval can still run until it
expires). A file that holds no key is left as it is, to be removed by hand. After a
downgrade to 1.17.0, an approval for a tool call that 1.18.0 stored or rewrote matches no call there (the call
answers that the approval does not match the requested action), and the agent asks again. Nor does an operator's
rejection of a tool call that 1.18.0 stored or rewrote stop an agent's own approval of that call there under
AUTONOMOUS_APPROVALSonce the call is asked for again on 1.17.0, with the key file kept or not: 1.17.0 compares
the stored text as it is (so a pending approval that 1.18.0 stored, approved by its id after the downgrade, is
still stopped by such a rejection). Reject the call again there, or leaveAUTONOMOUS_APPROVALSoff across the
downgrade. - The image now starts uvicorn with
--timeout-graceful-shutdown 5: start it your own way, and you must pass it
too. A stop waits at most 5 seconds for the requests in flight and then runs the controller's cleanup; without
the option, a stop with an event stream open (GET /mcp,GET /sessions/{id}/events) reaches the cleanup only
once each stream's client has gone, and never where the supervisor kills the process first (see Fixed). If your own
image, command or process manager startsuvicorn app.main:app, add the option, in
seconds and well under what your supervisor waits before it kills the process (compose waits 60). A call still
running 5 seconds after a stop is now cancelled, where it ran on until it ended or Docker killed the controller.
At such a stop uvicorn logsCancel N running task(s), timeout graceful shutdown exceededat ERROR: that line is
a normal stop (docs/deployment.md, "Stopping the controller"). - A REST route's
500 Internal erroris logged with no Python traceback under it. Its ERROR record carried the
error by its traceback (Traceback (most recent call last):and the frames as Python prints them), which an alert
or a log parser may look for. It now holds, in its message, the route's message,answered 500 forthe error's
class and text, the three outermost frames and the ten nearest the raise, a line each, with the count of those
between, the first three errors it was raised from or while handling, by class and text, with the count of the
rest, and of a group the first three errors it holds, the same way (see Security): match onanswered 500 for
instead. The record carries noexc_info, so a handler that reads the exception from it (an error tracker's
logging integration, a structured formatter) gets the message alone. So are, in the same form,
POST /mesh/receive's (mesh.receive failed: answered 500 for, where it wasmesh.receive error), the ERROR of
an agent job worker that crashed on a job (agent job worker ... crashed on), of an agent step that failed
(agent step failed for session) and of a background task that failed (background task ... failed). This
is the record of the500 Internal errora route answers where it catches the error (41 of the 54 routes under
/sessions, and every route of/agent/jobs,/approvalsand/audit/events): an error a route does not catch
(a cron route's, a proxy persona's read, and under/sessionsthose of the network requests and hooks, the CDP
element and raw command, the events, the replay, the export script, the trace, the takeover link and the share)
still reaches Starlette, which answers a plain-textInternal Server Error, and the server logs its traceback, as
before. The WARNING now written behind a409 ConflictofPOST /sessionsandPOST /sessions/{id}/fork
(answered 409 for), which 1.17.0 did not log, has that form with the three frames nearest the raise alone. - A controller with no token whose
CONTROLLER_ALLOWED_HOSTSholds a wildcard no longer starts. With
API_ALLOW_TOKENLESS_LOOPBACK=trueand no token, on a loopback controller not in production (the only one that
starts without a token), an entry*,*.example.comor any other wildcard stops startup with a message that
names it (see Security); a production or exposed controller without a token stops with the error that asks for
one, as it did. Set a token (API_BEARER_TOKEN, or removeAPI_ALLOW_TOKENLESS_LOOPBACK: the controller then
uses the token inAPI_TOKEN_FILE, and generates one there if the file holds none, and demands it, so every
client must then send it), or list the exact host names clients use, whose DNS you control. On any controller,
an entry in brackets round anything but an IPv6 address ([localhost],[127.0.0.1],[*]), an IPv6 address
in brackets with a port ([::1]:8000, which never matched a Host), an entry with a stray bracket (local]host)
or a bare*.is now refused too: the controller then serves nothing, and every request,/healthzincluded,
answers500with a log line that names the entry (started withuvicorn --lifespan on, it does not start).
Write a name without brackets, and an IPv6 address without a port. The compose files' default no longer lists
testserver: a client that sendsHost: testserverto a controller started by compose needs it in
CONTROLLER_ALLOWED_HOSTS. - An approval asked for a
typeshows its text only where its field read as plain. An approval now says how
the field of itstyperead when it was asked for, asfield_read:plain,secret, orunread(the read
did not answer within a second, what the type names has no field that takes text, or has a frame in it and no
field that reads as secret, the caller marked the textsensitive, or an earlier release stored the approval).
Unless it isplain,
GET /approvals,GET /approvals/{id}, the approval tools, a decision's and an execution's answer and the
approval_requirederror give itsaction.textas "text hidden: its field reads as secret" or "text hidden:
its field has not been read", as its webhook's and SSE event's summary do (see Security); a text the caller
markedsensitiveshows its stored digest there ([sensitive text] hmac-sha256:...), as before, and its summary
reads "text hidden at the agent's request (sensitive)". A pending approval
for atypethat 1.17.0 stored shows no text after the upgrade: decide it from the page, or ask for the same
action again, which reuses the approval and reads its field. A client that retries
the action from theactionan approval answers, not from its own, now sends that text, which the approval does
not match: retry with the action you asked with. Thetext_previewof a type whose text submits its form and
leaves the page as its Enter goes in (a search that ends in a newline) is now withheld, and that type's receipt is
restricted(a page whose script submits a moment after the Enter keeps the preview, as the field had focus); so
is that of any type whose field does not have focus once the text is in, or lost it on the way (a text whose
Enter moves on to the next field, a field that blurs itself on Enter, a component that hands focus to a field
in its own open shadow root and takes it back), and of one typed by a selector that names a frame. - A
typeby selector that clears its field can now end asfocus_lostduring the clear. It checks after
select-all and after Delete that focus is still in the element its selector named, as a type byelement_id
does, but for focus in a frame inside that element, which counts as in it by selector and not byelement_id
(such a type keeps no preview: see Fixed). A page that moves focus during the clear, or puts another node in the
field's place as it empties, now gets the retryablefocus_lostwith no text typed, where the text went into
whatever had focus; so does a type whose element is not found again, or does not answer, within a second. Where
the page replaced the field, a second type finds the new node.clear_first: falseskips the clear and its
checks. - Behind a path prefix,
REQUEST_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHSnames paths as the router matches them. Only a
controller served behind an ASGIroot_path(uvicorn --root-path /api,UVICORN_ROOT_PATH) is affected. The
list is now compared with the path that follows the prefix, as every other path rule is (see Security), so the
default list works there as it stands. A deployment that wrote its prefix into the list (for example
/api/healthz) loses that exemption: write each entry without the prefix (/healthz). Behind a prefix the
paths that answer without a token (/healthz,/readyz,/version,/dashboardand the rest of that list)
now do, as they do without one, where each answered401. - A failed agent step's
error_codeis now502or503where the provider failed, never the provider's own
status, and its error text is fixed. A step the provider failed carried the provider's HTTP status as its
error_code: it was also the
response status ofPOST /sessions/{id}/agent/step, and it is in the steps of a run and of a queued job's result.
A401, a404or a429from the provider came back as that. A client that read it must now read502(the
provider refused, and a retry will not help) or503(a rate limit, a server error, a timeout, or a connection
that could not be made or broke while it was read or written: try again later), with the error
Provider request failed. Any other failure of a step now says onlyAgent step failed, where it named the
error's class and text, and itserror_codestays null, as before (/agent/stepanswers it502): a connection
the provider closed with no answer and a proxy's refusal are among these, unretried, as in 1.17.0. One step
error keeps its text: a page that could not be observed saysCould not observe the page:and the browser's
error, cut at 300 characters, in the step, the job's checkpoint and a failed job'serror. A job that failed with
an error nothing handled now recordsAgent job failed. The detail is in the controller log. POST /sessions/{id}/agent/stepand/agent/runanswer anapproval_idthat no record holds with404, before
any step. A step whose action needed no approval used to run with such an id. Send anapproval_idwith the step
it was asked for, and not one the approval retention may have removed (see Fixed).- In API mode, a Claude or Gemini provider reports its API model, whatever
CLAUDE_CLI_MODELor
GEMINI_CLI_MODELsays. WithCLAUDE_AUTH_MODEorGEMINI_AUTH_MODEatapi(the default) and a CLI model set,
GET /agent/providersandbrowser.list_providersgave the CLI model as the provider'smodel, and so did a step
that failed or waited for an approval, while the request itself went out withCLAUDE_MODELorGEMINI_MODEL, as
it always did. They now report the model the request uses. A client that read the CLI model there in API mode reads
the API model now; inclimode the CLI model is reported as before. Nothing about a request changes. (STORE-30) - The Skills Curator's default model is now the provider's model setting. With
CURATOR_ENABLED=trueand no
CURATOR_MODEL, the curator used its own fixed defaults (claude-opus-4-7,gpt-4o,gemini-1.5-pro), which no
longer matched the models the controller is set up for. It now usesCLAUDE_MODEL,OPENAI_MODELorGEMINI_MODEL
forCURATOR_PROVIDER, and the startup line names that model (model=). No code calls the curator's model, in
this release or in 1.17.0 (the post-session review is not wired to a transcript), so no call and no cost changes.
SetCURATOR_MODELto keep a specific model. (STORE-31) - On Linux, a provider CLI (
*_AUTH_MODE=cli) can no longer open the controller's data directory, except
CLI_HOME, whatCLI_SANDBOX_WRITABLEnames there and the screenshot of its call, and outside it writes only its
own directories. Where the kernel has Landlock (5.13 or later),codex,claudeandgemininow start under a
Landlock ruleset: under/dataeach can read and writeCLI_HOMEand whatCLI_SANDBOX_WRITABLEnames there and
read the screenshot its own call names, and opening, listing or running anything else there answersEACCES
(docs/deployment.md lists what is not refused: astat, a watch, a socket connection); outside/datait reads,
lists and runs what it did before, and writes only in its home, wherever that is, the temp directories,/devand
the directories the newCLI_SANDBOX_WRITABLEnames. Move whatever your CLI reads or writes
under/dataintoCLI_HOME: aCODEX_HOME,CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIRorGEMINI_CLI_HOMEset elsewhere under/data,
a CA bundle, the CLI's own binary. A CLI that keeps state outside its home (aCODEX_HOMEorCLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR
set to a directory elsewhere, which the adapters pass on; a directory a tool of yours writes) needs that directory
inCLI_SANDBOX_WRITABLE. With the sandbox on, Codex cannot run a command its model asks for, in any
CODEX_SANDBOX_MODE(measured with codex-cli 0.114.0): its own sandbox does not work beneath this one. The decision
the controller asks Codex for needs no command. Where any of this cannot be done, or a CLI fails under the ruleset,
CLI_SANDBOX_ENABLED=falsestarts provider CLIs without it, as 1.17.0 did, which also gives a CLI/dataagain. A
CLI cannot list/itself, on a Linux host run now runs withno_new_privs(the image already set it), and on a
kernel older than 5.19 cannot rename or link a file from one directory to another. On a kernel older than 6.2 it
can still empty any file the controller's user may write (Landlock refusestruncatefrom 6.2). Where the sandbox
is off or
cannot be used, or would leave something open (the list is the Security entry's), the controller logs a warning that
names the condition, once per process for each distinct line, and still runs the CLI: a host run that uses acli
provider and keeps its data outside/datagets that warning at its first CLI call, and so does one on macOS or
Windows. SetCLI_SANDBOX_REQUIRED=trueto have no CLI run there instead. See "The CLI sandbox" in
docs/deployment.md. (N1) API_ADMIN_OPERATORSis new, and once set it refuses the shared token on the admin surfaces. Nothing changes
until you set it. Set (API_ADMIN_OPERATORS=alice,ops), the maintenance sweep and its status,GET /readiness,
the/proxy-personasroutes,GET /mesh/peers, and thebrowser.readiness_checkand proxy persona tools answer
only an operator it lists, proven by a named credential ofAPI_BEARER_TOKENS. The sharedAPI_BEARER_TOKEN
proves no operator, whatever itsX-Operator-Idsays, so every caller on it is answered403there, or a tool
error over MCP: before you set it, move the scripts, dashboard tabs and MCP clients that use these surfaces to a
listed operator's named token. Ids are compared exactly, and an id no named credential proves admits nobody.
(AUTH-32)
Security, Fixed and Changed
This release also has 31 Security entries, 82 Fixed entries and 8 Changed entries, too many for a GitHub release page: read them in the 1.18.0 section of CHANGELOG.md.