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v0.10.1
No code changes: the library is byte-identical in behaviour to 0.10.0. This
release exists so that the project's governance, security and assurance
documentation is published alongside the crate rather than only in the
repository, and so that there is a release carrying signatures.
Added
-
SECURITY.md— how to report a vulnerability (privately, through GitHub
private vulnerability reporting or by email), what response to expect, and
how reporters are credited. It also states scope: the realistic reports are a
panic reachable from untrusted input through an API not documented as
panicking, a mis-encoded or mis-decoded instruction, or an unbounded loop or
allocation driven by input. Explicitly out of scope:read_u8/read_u16/
read_u32panicking past the end of the image, which they are documented to
do —try_read_*returningOptionis the form for untrusted input. -
docs/ASSURANCE_CASE.md— the argument that the crate is adequately
secure for what it does, with the evidence for each claim and the limits of
the argument stated rather than left implied. The realistic harm here is not
a memory-safety exploit in aforbid(unsafe_code)crate with no dependencies
and no I/O; it is a wrong instruction written into firmware. -
GOVERNANCE.md,CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md,ROADMAP.md— who decides what,
what happens to the project if the maintainer becomes unavailable, the
Contributor Covenant, and where the project is going.GOVERNANCE.mdis
honest that this is a single-maintainer project rather than describing a
committee that does not exist. -
CONTRIBUTING.mdgained coding standards, a testing policy and a DCO
section. The standards were already enforced by CI; they were not written
down anywhere a contributor would find them. The testing policy states
red-before-green as a requirement and says why a test that cannot fail is
worse than no test — both failure modes happened in this project and are in
the 0.10.0 entry below. -
Signed releases. Every release now carries a SLSA build-provenance
attestation and a keyless cosign signature over the exact.cratepublished
to crates.io, attached as release assets and verified inside the workflow
that produces them. crates.io holds the bytes but publishes no signature over
them; consumers of this crate write its output into firmware, so "are these
the bytes the maintainer built?" is a question with a device on the end of
it. Verify withgh attestation verify thumb-asm-0.10.1.crate --repo MattJackson/thumb-asm, orcosign verify-blob --bundleagainst the bundle
asset. -
A
yankdispatch input on the release workflow. Trusted Publishing mints
a token scoped to publishing, and crates.io refuses it for a yank, so that
path takes a separately scoped token and says so rather than failing with an
authentication error that looks like a misconfiguration.
Fixed
CODE_OF_CONDUCT.mdis declared CC BY 4.0, not MIT. It is the
Contributor Covenant reproduced verbatim — someone else's text, under its own
licence. Labelling it MIT with this project's copyright would have been the
same mistakeLICENSES/LicenseRef-Arm-Documentation.txtexists to avoid for
the Arm manuals.