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v1.4.3 (security)
Security fix (critical): certificate path validation now enforces CA constraints.
Earlier versions only checked that each certificate's signature verified under the next certificate's key. They never checked that the issuer was a CA, so the holder of any publicly trusted certificate could impersonate any host. All users should upgrade.
What changed:
- Issuer checks: issuers must be CAs (basicConstraints
cA,keyCertSign) within theirpathLenConstraint, and issuer and subject names must chain. - Leaf checks: the leaf must allow
serverAuth/digitalSignaturewhen those extensions are present. - Critical extensions: unsupported critical extensions are rejected, including
nameConstraints, which is not enforced. - Anchor first: the path is anchored before any signature by an untrusted key is checked, and signatures are verified top-down. Certificates above the trust anchor are ignored, so expired cross-signs no longer break valid chains.
- Validity times are parsed strictly and fail closed. The old parser could read out of bounds.
Verification: 20 new path-validation tests, each checked against OpenSSL. A live sweep validated 20 real sites, and badssl.com's broken endpoints were rejected.