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v1.4.3 (security)

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@Mosaad-M Mosaad-M released this 03 Oct 23:14
· 43 commits to master since this release
cddce28

Security fix (critical): certificate path validation now enforces CA constraints.

Earlier versions only checked that each certificate's signature verified under the next certificate's key. They never checked that the issuer was a CA, so the holder of any publicly trusted certificate could impersonate any host. All users should upgrade.

What changed:

  • Issuer checks: issuers must be CAs (basicConstraints cA, keyCertSign) within their pathLenConstraint, and issuer and subject names must chain.
  • Leaf checks: the leaf must allow serverAuth / digitalSignature when those extensions are present.
  • Critical extensions: unsupported critical extensions are rejected, including nameConstraints, which is not enforced.
  • Anchor first: the path is anchored before any signature by an untrusted key is checked, and signatures are verified top-down. Certificates above the trust anchor are ignored, so expired cross-signs no longer break valid chains.
  • Validity times are parsed strictly and fail closed. The old parser could read out of bounds.

Verification: 20 new path-validation tests, each checked against OpenSSL. A live sweep validated 20 real sites, and badssl.com's broken endpoints were rejected.